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BIBLICAL COMMENTARY

ON THE

PROVERBS OF SOLOMON.

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ABBREVIATIONS.

[THE usual abbreviations of words and phrases are adopted throughout this work, and will readily be understood by the reader. The mark of abbreviation in Hebrew words is a stroke like an acute accent after a letter, as *e.g.* תְּר׳ for תְּרוּמוֹת, xxix. 4; and in Hebrew sentences, וגו׳ for וְגוֹמֵר *et complens* = etc., as *e.g.* at xxx. 4.]

THE BOOK OF PROVERBS.

FIRST COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS.—CHAP. X.-XXII. 16. (CONTINUED.)

CHAP. XVIII. 1. This series of proverbs now turns from the fool to the separatist:

The separatist seeketh after his own pleasure;
Against all that is beneficial he showeth his teeth.

The reflexive נִפְרָד has here the same meaning as the Rabbinical פָּרַשׁ מִן־הַצִּבּוּר, to separate oneself from the congregation, *Aboth* ii. 5; נִפְרָד denotes a man who separates himself, for he follows his own counsel, Arab. *mnfrd* (*mtfrrd*) *brâyh*, or *jhys almhhl* (*seorsum ab aliis secedens*). Instead of לְתַאֲוָה, Hitzig, after Jerome, adopts the emendation לְתוֹאֵנָה, "after an occasion" (a pretext), and by נפרד thinks of one pushed aside, who, thrown into opposition, seeks to avenge himself. But his translation of 1*b*, "against all that is fortunate he gnasheth his teeth," shows how much the proverb is opposed to this interpretation. נִפְרָד denotes one who willingly (Judg. iv. 11), and, indeed, obstinately withdraws himself. The construction of יְבַקֵּשׁ with לְ (also Job x. 6) is explained by this, that the poet, giving prominence to the object, would set it forward: a pleasure (תאוה, as Arab. *hawan*, unstable and causeless direction of the mind to something, pleasure, freak, caprice), and nothing else, he goes after who has separated himself (Fl.); the effort of the separatist goes out after a pleasure, *i.e.* the enjoyment and realization of such; instead of seeking to conform himself to the law and ordinance of the community, he seeks to carry out a separate view, and to accomplish some darling plan: *libidinem sectatur sui cerebri homo.* With this 1*b* accords.

תּוּשִׁיָּה (*vid.* at ii. 7) is concretely that which furthers and profits. Regarding הִתְגַּלַּע, *vid.* at xvii. 14. Thus putting his subjectivity in the room of the common weal, he shows his teeth, places himself in fanatical opposition against all that is useful and profitable in the principles and aims, the praxis of the community from which he separates himself. The figure is true to nature: the polemic of the schismatic and the sectary against the existing state of things, is for the most part measureless and hostile.

Ver. 2 The fool hath no delight in understanding;
But only that his heart may reveal itself therein.

The verb חָפֵץ forms the fut. יַחְפֹּץ as well as יַחְפֵּץ; first the latter from חָפַץ, with the primary meaning, to bow, to bend down; then both forms as intransitive, to bend oneself to something, to be inclined to something, Arab. *'tf.* (Fl.). תְּבוּנָה is here the intelligence which consists in the understanding of one's own deficiency, and of that which is necessary to meet it. The inclination of the fool goes not out after such intelligence, but (כִּי אִם־; according to Ben-Naphtali, כִּי־אִם) only that his heart, *i.e.* the understanding which he thinks that he already possesses, may reveal itself, show itself publicly. He thinks thereby to show himself in his true greatness, and to render a weighty service to the world. This loquacity of the fool, proceeding from self-satisfaction, without self-knowledge, has already, xii. 23, and often, been reprimanded.

The group beginning with ver. 3 terminates in two proverbs (vers. 6 and 7), related to the concluding verse of the foregoing:

Ver. 3 If a godless man cometh, then cometh also contempt;
And together with disgrace, shame.

J. D. Michaelis, and the most of modern critics, read רִשַּׁע; then, contempt etc., are to be thought of as the consequences that follow godlessness; for that קָלוֹן means (Hitzig) disgracefulness, *i.e.* disgraceful conduct, is destitute of proof; קלון always means disgrace as an experience. But not only does the Masoretic text punctuate רָשָׁע, but also all the old translators, the Greek, Aramaic, and Latin, have done so. And is it on this account, because a coming naturally seems to be spoken of a person? The "pride cometh, then cometh shame," xi. 2,

was in their recollection not less firmly, perhaps, than in ours. They read רָשָׁע, because בּוז does not fittingly designate the first of that which godlessness effects, but perhaps the first of that which proceeds from it. Therefore we adhere to the opinion, that the proverb names the fiends which appear in the company of the godless wherever he goes, viz. first בּוז, contempt (Ps. xxxi. 19), which places itself haughtily above all due subordination, and reverence, and forbearance; and then, with the disgrace [*turpitudo*], קלון, which attaches itself to those who meddle with him (Isa. xxii. 18), there is united the shame, הֶרְפָּה (Ps. xxxix. 9), which he has to suffer from him who has only always expected something better from him. Fleischer understands all the three words in the passive sense, and remarks, "עם־קלון חרפה, a more artificial expression for קלון וחרפה, in the Turkish quite common for the copula *wāw*, *e.g.* *ṣwylh ṭ̈râḳ*, earth and water, *'wrtylh âr*, the man and the woman." But then the expression would be tautological; we understand בּוז and חרפה of that which the godless does to others by his words, and קלון of that which he does to them by his conduct. By this interpretation, עם is more than the representative of the copula.

Ver. 4 Deep waters are the words from a man's mouth,
A bubbling brook, a fountain of wisdom.

Earlier, we added to *hominis* the supplement *sc. sapientis*, but then an unnecessary word would be used, and that which is necessary omitted. Rather it might be said that אִישׁ is meant in an ideal sense; but thus meant, אישׁ, like גֶּבֶר, denotes the valiant man, but not man as he ought to be, or the man of honour; and besides, a man may be a man of honour without there being said of him what this proverb expresses. Ewald comes nearer the case when he translates, "deep waters are the heart-words of many." Heart-words—what an unbiblical expression! The LXX., which translates λόγος ἐν καρδίᾳ, has not read דברי לב, but דבר בלב (as xx. 5, עֵצָה בְלֵב־). But that "of many" is certainly not a right translation, yet right in so far as אישׁ (as at xii. 14) is thought of as made prominent: the proverb expresses, in accordance with the form of narrative proverbs which present an example, what occurs in actual life, and is observed. Three different things are said of the words

from a man's mouth: they are deep waters, for their meaning does not lie on the surface, but can be perceived only by penetrating into the secret motives and aims of him who speaks; they are a bubbling brook, which freshly and powerfully gushes forth to him who feels this flow of words, for in this brook there never fails an always new gush of living water; it is a fountain or well of wisdom, from which wisdom flows forth, and whence wisdom is to be drawn. Hitzig supposes that the distich is antithetic; מַיִם עֲמֻקִּים, or rather מֵי מַעֲמַקִּים, "waters of the deep," are cistern waters; on the contrary, "a welling brook is a fountain of wisdom." But עָמֹק means deep, not deepened, and deep water is the contrast of shallow water; a cistern also may be deep (cf. xxii. 14), but deep water is such as is deep, whether it be in the ocean or in a ditch. 4*b* also does not suggest a cistern, for thereby it would be indicated that the description, דִּבְרֵי פִי־אִישׁ, is not here continued; the "fountain of wisdom" does not form a proper parallel or an antithesis to this subject, since this much rather would require the placing in contrast of deep and shallow, of exhausted (drained out) and perennial. And: the fountain is a brook, the well a stream—who would thus express himself! We have thus neither an antithetic nor a synonymous (LXX. after the phrase *ἀναπηδῶν*, Jerome, *Venet.*, Luth.), but an integral distich (*vid.* vol. i. p. 8) before us; and this leads us to consider what depths of thought, what riches of contents, what power of spiritual and moral advancement, may lie in the words of a man.

Ver. 5 To favour the person of the godless is not good,
And to oppress the righteous in judgment.

As ver. 4 has one subject, so ver. 5 has one predicate. The form is the same as xvii. 26. שְׂאֵת פָּנִי (cf. xxiv. 23), *προσωπολημψία*, *acceptio personæ*, is this, that one accepts the פָּנִי, *i.e.* the personal appearance of any one (*πρόσωπον λαμβάνει*), *i.e.* regards it as acceptable, respectable, agreeable, which is a thing in itself not wrong; but in a judge who ought to determine according to the facts of the case and the law, it becomes sinful partiality. הַטּוֹת, in a forensic sense, with the accus. of the person, may be regarded in a twofold way: either as a turning aside, מִדִּין, Isa. x. 2, from following and attaining unto the right, or as an oppressing, for the phrase הַטָּה מִשְׁפָּט [to pervert justice] (cf.

xvii. 23) is transferred to the person who experiences the oppression = perversion of the law; and this idea perhaps always underlies the expression, wherever, as *e.g.* Mal. iii. 5, no addition brings with it the other. Under xvii. 15 is a fuller explanation of לֹא־טוֹב.

Ver. 6 The lips of the fool engage in strife,
And his mouth calleth for stripes.

We may translate: the lips of the fool cause strife, for בּוֹא בְ, to come with anything, *e.g.* Ps. lxvi. 13, is equivalent to bring it (to bring forward), as also: they engage in strife; as one says בּוֹא בְּדָמִים: to be engaged in bloodshed, 1 Sam. xxv. 26. We prefer this *intrant* (*ingerunt se*), with Schultens and Fleischer. יָבֹאוּ for תָּבֹאנָה, a *synallage generis*, to which, by means of a "self-deception of the language" (Fl.), the apparent masculine ending of such duals may have contributed. The stripes which the fool calleth for (לְ קָרָא, like ii. 3) are such as he himself carries off, for it comes *a verbis ad verbera*. The LXX.: his bold mouth calleth for death (פִּיו הַהֹמֶה מָוֶת יִקְרָא); לִמְהֻלֹּמוֹת has, in codd. and old editions, the *Mem raphatum*, as also at xix. 29; the sing. is thus מַהֻלּוֹם, like מַנְעוּל to מַנְעֻלָיו, for the *Mem dagessatum* is to be expected in the inflected מַהֻלָּם, by the passing over of the *ō* into *ŭ*.

Ver. 7 The mouth of the fool is to him destruction,
And his lips are a snare to his soul.

As ver. 6 corresponds to xvii. 27 of the foregoing group, so this ver. 7 corresponds to xvii. 28. Regarding מְחִתָּה־לוֹ, *vid.* xiii. 3. Instead of פִּי כְסִיל, is to be written פִּי־כְסִיל, according to *Torath Emeth*, p. 40, Cod. 1294, and old editions.

A pair of proverbs regarding the flatterer and the slothful:

Ver. 8 The words of the flatterer are as dainty morsels,
And they glide down into the innermost parts.

An "analogy, with an epexegesis in the second member" (Fl.), which is repeated in xxvi. 22. Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, and others, are constrained to interpret וְהֵם as introducing a contrast, and in this sense they give to מִתְלַהֲמִים all kinds of unwarrantable meanings. Ewald translates: as burning (להם, cogn. להב), and offers next: as whispering (להם, cogn. רעם, נהם); Ch. B. Michaelis, Bertheau, and others: as sporting (להם, cogn. לחה); Hitzig: like soft airs (להם, cogn. Arab. *hillam*, *flaccus*,

laxus). All these interpretations are without support. The word לָהַם has none of all these significations; it means, as the Arab. *lahima* warrants, *deglutire*. But Böttcher's explanation also: "as swallowed down, because spoken with reserve," proceeds, like those others, from the supposed syntactically fine yet false supposition, that 8*b* is an antithetic "*dennoch*" [*tamen*]. In that case the poet would have written וְהֵם יֵרְדוּ (cf. והוא, as the beginning of a conditional clause, iii. 29, xxiii. 3). But והוא, והם, with the finite following, introduces neither here nor at Deut. xxxiii. 3, Judg. xx. 34, Ps. xcv. 10, cf. Gen. xliii. 23, a conditional clause. Thus 8*b* continues the clause 8*a* by one standing on the same line; and thus we do not need to invent a meaning for כמתלהמים, which forms a contrast to the penetrating into the innermost parts. The relation of the parts of the proverb is rightly given by Luther:

> The words of the slanderer are stripes,
> And they go through the heart of one.

He interprets להם as transposed from הלם (Rashi and others); but stripes cannot be called מהלמים—they are called, 6*b*, מהלמות. This interpretation of the word has always more support than that of Symmachus: ὡς ἀκέραιοι; Jerome: *quasi simplicia;* Aquila, xxvi. 22: γοητικοί; which last, as also that of Capellus, Clericus, and Schultens: *quasi numine quodam afflata*, seems to support itself on the Arab. *âhm* iv. *inspirare*. But in reality *âhm* does not mean *afflare;* it means *deglutire*, and nothing else. The Jewish lexicographers offer nothing worth considering; Kimchi's חלקים, according to which the *Venet.* translates μαλθακιζόμενοι, is fanciful; for the Talm. הַלָּם, striking = hitting, suitable, standing well, furnishes no transition to "smooth" and "soft." Immanuel compares *âhm* = בלע; and Schultens, who is followed by Gesenius and others, has already, with perfect correctness, explained: *tanquam quæ avidissime inglutiantur*. Thus also Fleischer: things which offer themselves to be eagerly gulped down, or which let themselves be thus swallowed. But in this way can one be truly just to the *Hithpa.?* The Arab. *âlthm* (stronger form, *âltkm*, according to which van Dyk translates *mthl ukam hlwt*, like sweet morsels) means to swallow into oneself, which is not here appro-

priate. The *Hithpa.* will thus have here a passive signification: things which are greedily swallowed. Regarding נִרְגָּן from רָגַן, *vid.* at xvi. 28. וְהֵם refers to the words of the flatterer, and is emphatic, equivalent to *æque illa, etiam illa*, or *illa ipsa*. יָרַד is here connected with the obj. accus. (cf. i. 12) instead of with אֶל, vii. 27. חַדְרֵי, *penetralia*, we had already at vii. 27; the root-word is (Arab.) *khdr*, to seclude, to conceal, different from *hdr*, *demittere*, and *hkhr* (cogn. חזר), to finish, *circumire*. בֶּטֶן is the inner part of the body with reference to the organs lying there, which mediate not only the life of the body, but also that of the mind,—in general, the internal part of the personality. The LXX. does not translate this proverb, but has in its stead xix. 15, in a different version, however, from that it gives there; the Syr. and the Targ. have thereby been drawn away from the Hebr. text.

Ver. 9 He also who showeth himself slothful in his business,
Is a brother to him who proceedeth to destroy.

The *Hithpa.* הִתְרַפָּה signifies here, as at xxiv. 10, to show oneself slack, lazy, negligent. מְלַאכָה is properly a commission for another, as a king has a messenger, ambassador, commissioner to execute it; here, any business, whether an undertaking in commission from another, or a matter one engages in for himself. He who shows himself slack therein, produces in his way, viz. by negligence, destruction, as truly as the בַּעַל מַשְׁחִית, who does it directly by his conduct. Thus one is named, who is called, or who has his own delight in it, to destroy or overthrow. Jerome, incorrectly limiting: *sua opera dissipantis.* Hitzig well compares Matt. xii. 30. In the variation, xxviii. 24*b*, the destroyer is called אִישׁ מַשְׁחִית, the connection of the words being adject.; on the contrary, the connection of בעל משחית is genit. (cf. xxii. 24, xxiii. 2, etc.), for משחית as frequently means that which destroys = destruction. Von Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2, 403) understands אישׁ מ' of the street robber, בעל מ' of the captain of robbers; but the designation for the latter must be שַׂר מ', though at 1 Kings xi. 24 he is called by the name שַׂר גְּדוּד. The form of the word in the proverb here is more original than at xxviii. 24. There חָבֵר [companion] is used, here אָח [brother], a general Semitic name of him who, or of that which, is in any way related to another, cf. Job xxx. 29. Fleischer com-

pares the Arab. proverb: *âlshbht âkht alkhṭyât*, scepticism is the sister of sin.

Two proverbs, of the fortress of faith, and of the fortress of presumption:

Ver. 10 A strong tower is the name of Jahve:
The righteous runneth into it, and is high.

The name of Jahve is the Revelation of God, and the God of Revelation Himself, the creative and historical Revelation, and who is always continually revealing Himself; His name is His nature representing itself, and therefore capable of being described and named, before all the *Tetragramm*, as the *Anagramm* of the overruling and inworking historical being of God, as the *Chiffre* of His free and all-powerful government in grace and truth, as the self-naming of God the Saviour. This name, which is afterwards interwoven in the name Jesus, is מְנַהֵל־עֹז (Ps. lxi. 4), a strong high tower bidding defiance to every hostile assault. Into this the righteous runneth, to hide himself behind its walls, and is thus lifted (*perf. consec.*) high above all danger (cf. יְשֻׂגָּב, xxix. 25). רוּץ אֶל means, Job xv. 26, to run against anything, רוּץ, *seq. acc.*, to invest, blockade anything, רוּץ בְּ, to hasten within; Hitzig's conjecture, יָרוּם [riseth up high], instead of יָרוּץ, is a freak. רוּץ בְּ is speedily בּוֹא בְּ, the idea the same as Ps. xxvii. 5, xxxi. 21.

Ver. 11 The possession of the righteous is his strong fort,
And is like a high wall in his imagination.

Line first = x. 15*a*. מַשְׂגִּית from שָׂגָה, Chald. סְגָא (whence after *Megilla* 14*a*, יְסִגָּה, she who looks), R. שׂךְ, cogn. זך, to pierce, to fix, means the image as a medal, and thus also intellectually: image (conception, and particularly the imagination) of the heart (Ps. lxxiii. 7), here the fancy, conceit; Fleischer compares (Arab.) *tsiwwr*, to imagine something to oneself, French *se figurer*. Translators from the LXX. to Luther incorrectly think on שׂכר (סכך), to entertain; only the *Venet.* is correct in the rendering: *ἐν φαντασίᾳ αὐτοῦ*; better than Kimchi, who, after Ezra viii. 12, thinks on the chamber where the riches delighted in are treasured, and where he fancies himself in the midst of his treasures as if surrounded by an inaccessible wall.

We place together vers. 12–19, in which the figure of a secure fortress returns:

Ver. 12. This proverb is connected with the preceding of the rich man who trusts in his mammon.

Before destruction the heart of man is haughty;
And humility goeth before honour.

Line first is a variation of xvi. 18*a*, and line second is similar to xv. 33*b*.

Ver. 13 If one giveth an answer before he heareth,
It is to him as folly and shame.

The *part.* stands here differently from what it does at xiii. 18, where it is subj., and at xvii. 14, where it is pred. of a simple sentence; it is also here, along with what appertains to it in accordance with the Semitic idiom, subj. to 13*b* (one who answers . . . is one to whom this . . .); but, in accordance with our idiom, it becomes a hypothetical antecedent (cf. vol. i. p. 282). For "to answer" one also uses הָשִׁיב without addition; but the original full expression is הָשִׁיב דָּבָר, *reddere verbum, referre dictum* (cf. עָנָה דָּבָר, Jer. xliv. 20, absol. in the cogn., xv. 28*a*); דבר one may not understand of the word to which, but of the word with which, the reply is made. הֵיא לוֹ comprehends the meaning: it avails to him (*ducitur ei*), as well as it reaches to him (*est ei*). In Agricola's *Fünfhundert Sprüchen* this proverb is given thus: *Wer antwortet ehe er höret, der zaiget an sein torhait vnd wirdt ze schanden* [he who answers before he hears shows his folly, and it is to him a shame]. But that would require the word to be יֵבוֹשׁ, *pudefiet;* (היא לו) כְּלִמָּה means that it becomes to him a ground of merited disgrace. "כְּלִמָּה, properly wounding, *i.e.* shame (like *atteinte à son honneur*), from כָּלַם (cogn. הָלַם), to strike, hit, wound" (Fl.). Sirach (xi. 8) warns against such rash talking, as well as against the rudeness of interrupting others.

Ver. 14 The spirit of a man beareth his sickness;
But a broken spirit, who can bear it?

The breath of the Creator imparting life to man is spoken of as *spiritus spirans*, רוּחַ (רוּחַ חַיִּים), and as *spiritus spiratus*, נֶפֶשׁ (נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה); the spirit (*animus*) is the primary, and the soul (*anima*) the secondary principle of life; the double gender of רוח is accounted for thus: when it is thought of as the primary, and thus in a certain degree (*vid. Psychol.* p. 103 ff.) the manly principle, it is mas. (Gen. vi. 3; Ps. li. 12, etc.). Here the

change of gender is in the highest degree characteristic, and אִישׁ also is intentionally used (cf. 1 Sam. xxvi. 15) instead of אָדָם, 16*a*: the courageous spirit of a man which sustains or endures (יְכַלְכֵּל, R. כל, *çomprehendere*, *prehendere*; Luther, "who knows how to contain himself in his sufferings;" cf. Ps. li. 12, "may the free Spirit hold me") the sickness [*Siechthum*] (we understand here "*siech*" in the old meaning = *sick*) with self-control, is *generis masculini*; while, on the contrary, the רוּחַ נְכֵאָה (as xv. 13, xvii. 22), brought down from its manliness and superiority to disheartened passivity, is *genere feminino* (cf. Ps. li. 12 with ver. 19). Fleischer compares the Arab. proverb, *thbât âlnfs bâlghdhâ thbât alrwh balghnâ*, the soul has firmness by nourishment, the spirit by music.[1] The question מִי יִשָּׂאֶנָּה is like Mark ix. 50: if the salt becomes tasteless, wherewith shall one season it? There is no seasoning for the spice that has become insipid. And for the spirit which is destined to bear the life and fortune of the person, if it is cast down by sufferings, there is no one to lift it up and sustain it. But is not God the Most High the lifter up and the bearer of the human spirit that has been crushed and broken? The answer is, that the manly spirit, 14*a*, is represented as strong in God; the discouraged, 14*b*, as not drawing from God the strength and support he ought to do. But passages such as Isa. lxvi. 2 do not bring it near that we think of the רוח נכאה as alienated from God. The spirit is נְשָׁמָה, the bearer of the personal and natural life with its functions, activities, and experiences. If the spirit is borne down to powerless and helpless passivity, then within the sphere of the human personality there is no other sustaining power that can supply its place.

Ver. 15 The heart of a man of understanding gaineth knowledge,
And the ear of the wise seeketh after knowledge.

נָבוֹן may be also interpreted as an adj., but we translate it here as at xiv. 33, because thus it corresponds with the parallelism; cf. לֵב צַדִּיק, xv. 28, and לֵב חָכָם, xvi. 23, where the adject. interpretation is excluded. The gaining of wisdom is, after xvii. 16,

[1] In the Arab. language, influenced by philosophy, روح, the *anima vitalis*, and نفس, the *anima rationalis*, are inverted; *vid.* Baudissin's *Translationis antiquæ Arab. libri Jobi quæ supersunt* (1870), p. 34.

referred to the heart: a heart vigorous in embracing and receiving it is above all necessary, and just such an one possesses the נבון, which knows how to value the worth and usefulness of such knowledge. The wise, who are already in possession of such knowledge, are yet at the same time constantly striving to increase this knowledge: their ear seeks knowledge, eagerly asking where it is to be found, and attentively listening when the opportunity is given of מָצָא, obtaining it.

Ver. 16 The gift of a man maketh room for him,
And bringeth him before the great.

That מַתָּן may signify intellectual endowments, Hitzig supposes, but without any proof for such an opinion. Intellectual ability as the means of advancement is otherwise designated, xxii. 29. But Hitzig is right in this, that one mistakes the meaning of the proverb if he interprets מתן in the sense of שֹׁחַד (*vid.* at xvii. 8): מתן is an indifferent idea, and the proverb means that a man makes free space, a free path for himself, by a gift, *i.e.* by this, that he shows himself to be agreeable, pleasing where it avails, not niggardly but liberal. As a proverb expresses it:

Mit dem Hut in der Hand
Kommt man durchs ganze Land

[with hat in hand one goes through the whole land], so it is said here that such liberality brings before the great, *i.e.* not: furnishes with introductions to them; but helps to a place of honour near the great, *i.e.* those in a lofty position (cf. לִפְנֵי, xxii. 29; עִם, Ps. cxiii. 8). It is an important part of practical wisdom, that by right liberality, *i.e.* by liberal giving where duty demands it, and prudence commends it, one does not lose but gains, does not descend but rises; it helps a man over the difficulties of limited, narrow circumstances, gains for him affection, and helps him up from step to step. The *ā* of מַתָּן is, in a singular way (cf. מַתָּנָה, מַתְּנַת), treated as unchangeable.

Ver. 17 He that is first in his controversy is right;
But there cometh another and searcheth him thoroughly—

an exhortation to be cautious in a lawsuit, and not to justify without more ado him who first brings forward his cause, and supports it by reasons, since, if the second party afterwards search into the reasons of the first, they show themselves un-

tenable. הָרִאשׁוֹן בְּרִיבוֹ are to be taken together; the words are equivalent to אֲשֶׁר יבא בריבו בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה : *qui prior cum causa sua venit*, i.e. *eam ad judicem defert* (Fl.). הראשון may, however, also of itself alone be *qui prior venit;* and בריבו will be taken with צדיק: *justus qui prior venit in causa sua* (*esse videtur*). The accentuation rightly leaves the relation undecided. Instead of יבא (יָבוֹא) the *Kerî* has וּבָא, as it elsewhere, at one time, changes the fut. into the perf. with ו (*e.g.* xx. 4, Jer. vi. 21); and, at another time, the perf. with ו into the fut. (*e.g.* Ps. x. 10, Isa. v. 29). But here, where the *perf. consec.* is not so admissible, as vi. 11, xx. 4, the fut. ought to remain unchanged. רֵעֵהוּ is the other part, synon. with בעל דין חברו, *Sanhedrin* 7*b*, where the אזהרה לבית־דין (admonition for the court of justice) is derived from Deut. i. 16, to hear the accused at the same time with the accuser, that nothing of the latter may be adopted beforehand. This proverb is just such an *audiatur et altera pars*. The *status controversiæ* is only brought fairly into the light by the hearing of the *altera pars:* then comes the other and examines him (the first) to the very bottom. חָקַר, elsewhere with the accus. of the thing, *e.g.* ריב, thoroughly to search into a strife, Job xxix. 16, is here, as at xxviii. 11, connected with the accus. of the person: to examine or lay bare any one thoroughly; here, so that the misrepresentations of the state of the matter might come out to view along with the reasons assigned by the accuser.

Ver. 18 The lot allayeth contentions,
And separateth between the mighty,

i.e. erects a partition wall between them—those contending (הַפְרִיד בֵּין, as at 2 Kings ii. 11, cf. Arab. *frḳ byn*); עֲצוּמִים are not opponents who maintain their cause with weighty arguments (עֲצֻמוֹת, Isa. xli. 21), *qui argumentis pollent* (*vid.* Rashi), for then must the truth appear in the *pro et contra;* but mighty opponents, who, if the lot did not afford a seasonable means of reconciliation, would make good their demands by blows and by the sword (Fl.). Here it is the lot which, as the judgment of God, brings about peace, instead of the *ultima ratio* of physical force. The proverb refers to the lot what the Epistle to the Hebrews, vi. 16, refers to the oath, *vid.* at xvi. 33. Regarding מְדָנִים and its altered forms, *vid.* vol. i. p. 145.

Ver. 19 A brother toward whom it has been acted perfidiously resists
more than a strong tower;
And contentions are like the bar of a palace.

Luther rightly regarded the word נוֹשָׁע, according to which the LXX., Vulg., and Syr. translated *frater qui adjuvatur a fratre*, as an incorrect reading; one would rather expect אח מושיע, "a brother who stands by," as Luther earlier translated; and besides, נושע does not properly mean *adjuvari*, but *salvari*. His translation—

Ein verletzt Bruder helt herter denn eine feste Stad,
Und Zanck helt herter, denn rigel am Palast

[a brother wounded resisteth more than a strong city, and strife resisteth more than bolts in the palace], is one of his most happy renderings. מִקְרִית־עֹז in itself only means *ὑπὲρ πόλιν ὀχυράν* (*Venet.*); the noun-adjective (cf. Isa. x. 10) to be supplied is to be understood to עז: עז הוא or קָשָׁה הוא (Kimchi). The *Niph.* נפשע occurs only here. If one reads נִפְשָׁע, then it means one who is treated falsely = נִפְשָׁע בו, like the frequently occurring קָמַי, my rising up ones = קָמִים עָלַי, those that rise up against me; but Çodd. (also Baer's *Cod. jaman.*) and old editions have נִפְשַׁע, which, as we have above translated, gives an impersonal attributive clause; the former: *frater perfidiose tractatus* (Fl.: *mala fide offensus*); the latter: *perfide actum est, scil.* בו *in eum* = *in quem perfide actum.* אח is, after xvii. 17, a friend in the highest sense of the word; פשע means to break off, to break free, with ב or עַל of him on whom the action terminates. That the פִּשְׁעַ is to be thought of as אח of the אח נפשע is obvious; the translation, "brothers who break with one another" (Gesen.), is incorrect: אח is not collective, and still less is נפשע a *reciprocum*. The relation of אח is the same as that of אַלּוּף, xvi. 28. The Targum (improving the Peshito) translates אָחָא דְמִתְעֵי מִן אֲחוֹי, which does not mean: a brother who renounces (Hitzig), but who is treated wickedly on the part of his brother. That is correct; on the contrary, Ewald's "a brother resists more than . . ." proceeds from a meaning of פשע which it has not; and Bertheau gives, with Schultens, an untenable[1] reflexive meaning to the

[1] Among the whole Heb. synon. for sinning, there exists no reflexive *Niph.*; and also the Arab. *fsḳ* has no ethical signification. נִסְבָּל only, in the sense of fool, is found.

Niph. (which as denom. might mean "covered with crime," *Venet.* πλημμελητείς), and, moreover, one that is too weak, for he translates, "a brother is more obstinate than . . ." Hitzig corrects אָחוֹ פֹּשֵׁעַ, to shut up sin = to hold it fettered; but that is not correct Heb. It ought to be עָצֹר, כָּבֹשׁ, or רָדוֹת. In 19*a* the force of the substantival clause lies in the מִן (more than, *i.e.* harder = more difficult to be gained), and in 19*b* in the בְּ; cf. Mic. vii. 4, where they are interchanged. The parallelism is synonymous: strifes and lawsuits between those who had been friends form as insurmountable a hindrance to their reconciliation, are as difficult to be raised, as the great bars at the gate of a castle (Fl.). The point of comparison is not only the weight of the cross-beam (from בְּרַח, crosswise, across, to go across the field), but also the shutting up of the access. Strife forms a partition wall between such as once stood near each other, and so much thicker the closer they once stood.

With ver. 19, the series of proverbs which began with that of the flatterer closes. The catchword אח, which occurred at its commencement, 9*b*, is repeated at its close, and serves also as a landmark of the group following 20-24. The proverb of the breach of friendship and of contentions is followed by one of the reaction of the use of the tongue on the man himself.

Ver. 20 Of the fruit which a man's mouth bringeth is his heart satisfied;
By the revenue of his lips is he filled.

He will taste in rich measure of the consequences not merely of the good (xii. 14, cf. xiii. 2), but of whatever he has spoken. This is an oxymoron like Matt. xv. 11, that not that which goeth into the mouth, but that which cometh out of it, defileth a man. As at John iv. 34 the conduct of a man, so here his words are called his βρῶμα. Not merely the conduct (i. 31, Isa. iii. 10), but also the words are fruit-bringing; and not only do others taste of the fruit of the words as of the actions of a man, whether they be good or bad, but above all he himself does so, both in this life and in that which is to come.

Ver. 21 Death and life are in the power of the tongue;
And whoever loveth it shall eat its fruit.

The hand, יָד, is so common a metaphor for power, that as here a hand is attributed to the tongue, so *e.g.* Isa. xlvii. 14 to the flame, and Ps. xlix. 16 to Hades. Death and life is the great alternative

which is placed, Deut. xxx. 15, before man. According as he uses his tongue, he falls under the power of death or attains to life. All interpreters attribute, 21*b*, וְאֹהֲבֶיהָ to the tongue: *qui eam* (*linguam*) *amant vescentur* (יֹאכַל, distrib. sing., as iii. 18, 35, etc.) *fructu ejus*. But "to love the tongue" is a strange and obscure expression. He loves the tongue, says Hitzig, who loves to babble. Euchel: he who guards it carefully, or: he who takes care of it, *i.e.* who applies himself to right discourse. Combining both, Zöckler: who uses it much, as *εὐλογῶν* or *κακολογῶν*. The LXX. translates, *οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες αὐτῆς*, *i.e.* אֹחֲזֶיהָ; but אחז means *prehendere* and *tenere*, not *cohibere*, and the tongue kept in restraint brings forth indeed no bad fruit, but it brings no fruit at all. Why thus? Does the suffix of ואהביה, perhaps like viii. 17, *Chethîb*, refer to wisdom, which, it is true, is not named, but which lies everywhere before the poet's mind? At xiv. 3 we ventured to make חכמה the subject of 3*b*. Then 21*b* would be as a miniature of viii. 17–21. Or is ואהביה a mutilation of וְאֹהֵב יְהוָה: and he who loves Jahve (Ps. xcvii. 10) enjoys its (the tongue's) fruit?

Ver. 22 Whoso hath found a wife hath found a good thing,
And hath obtained favour from Jahve.

As ואהביה, 21*b*, reminds us of viii. 17, so here not only 22*b*, but also 22*a* harmonizes with viii. 35 (cf. xii. 2). A wife is such as she ought to be, as ver. 14, איש, a man is such as he ought to be; the LXX., Syr., Targ., and Vulgate supply *bonam*, but "gnomic brevity and force disdains such enervating adjectives, and cautious limitations of 'the idea'" (Fl.). Besides, אשה טובה in old Hebr. would mean a well-favoured rather than a good-dispositioned wife, which later idea is otherwise expressed, xix. 14, xxxi. 10. The *Venet.* rightly has *γυναῖκα*, and Luther *ein Ehefraw*, for it is a married woman that is meant. The first מָצָא is *perf. hypotheticum*, Gesen. § 126, Anm. 1. On the other hand, Eccles. vii. 26, "I found, מוֹצֵא אֲנִי, more bitter than death the woman," etc.; wherefore, when in Palestine one married a wife, the question was wont to be asked: מצא או מוצא, has he married happily (after מצא of the book of Proverbs) or unhappily (after מוצא of Ecclesiastes) (*Jebamoth* 63*b*)?[1]

[1] Cf. Tendlau's *Sprichwörter u. Redensarten deutsch-jüdischer Vorzeit* (1860), p. 235.

The LXX. adds a distich to ver. 22, "He that putteth away a good wife putteth away happiness; and he that keepeth an adulteress, is foolish and ungodly." He who constructed this proverb [added by the LXX.] has been guided by מצא to מוֹצִיא (Ezra x. 3); elsewhere ἐκβάλλειν (γυναῖκα), Gal. iv. 30, Sir. xxviii. 15, is the translation of גָּרַשׁ. The Syr. has adopted the half of that distich, and Jerome the whole of it. On the other hand, vers. 23, 24, and xix. 1, 2, are wanting in the LXX. The translation which is found in some Codd. is that of Theodotion (*vid.* Lagarde).

Ver. 23 The poor uttereth suppliant entreaties;
And the rich answereth rudenesses.

The oriental proverbial poetry furnishes many parallels to this. It delights in the description of the contrast between a suppliant poor man and the proud and avaricious rich man; *vid. e.g.* Samachschari's *Goldene Halsbänder*, No. 58. תַּחֲנוּנִים, according to its meaning, refers to the *Hithpa.* הִתְחַנֵּן, *misericordiam alicujus pro se imploravit;* cf. the old vulgar "*barmen*," *i.e.* to seek to move others to *Erbarmen* [compassion] (רחמים). עַזּוֹת, *dura*, from עז (synon. קָשֶׁה), hard, fast, of bodies, and figuratively of an unbending, hard, haughty disposition, and thence of words of such a nature (Fl.). Both nouns are accus. of the object, as Job xl. 27, תחנונים with the parallel רַכּוֹת. The proverb expresses a fact of experience as a consolation to the poor to whom, if a rich man insults him, nothing unusual occurs, and as a warning to the rich that he may not permit himself to be divested of humanity by mammon. A hard wedge to a hard clod; but whoever, as the Scripture saith, grindeth the poor by hard stubborn-hearted conduct, and grindeth his bashful face (Isa. iii. 15), challenges unmerciful judgment against himself; for the merciful, only they shall obtain mercy, αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται (Matt. v. 7).

Ver. 24 A man of many friends cometh off a loser;
But there is a friend more faithful than a brother.

Jerome translates the commencing word by *vir*, but the Syr., Targ. by איש, which is adopted by Hitzig, Böttcher, and others. But will a German poet use in one line "*itzt*" [same as *jetzt* = now], and in the next "*jetzt*"? and could the Hebrew poet prefer to יֵשׁ its rarer, and here especially not altogether unam-

biguous form אִישׁ (cf. to the contrary, Eccles. vii. 15)? We write אִישׁ, because the Masora comprehends this passage, with 2 Sam. xiv. 19, Mic. vi. 10, as the ג׳ סבירין יֵשׁ, *i.e.* as the three, where one ought to expect יֵשׁ, and is thus exposed to the danger of falling into error in writing and reading; but erroneously אִישׁ is found in all these three places in the *Masora magna* of the Venetian Bible of 1526; elsewhere the Masora has the *defectiva scriptio* with like meaning only in those two other passages. While אִישׁ = יֵשׁ, or properly יֵשׁ, with equal possibility as אִישׁ,[1] and it makes no material difference in the meaning of 24*a* whether we explain: there are friends who serve to bring one to loss: or a man of many friends comes to loss,—the *inf.* with לְ is used in substantival clauses as the expression of the most manifold relations, Gesen. § 132, Anm. 1 (cf. at Hab. i. 17), here in both cases it denotes the end, as *e.g.* Ps. xcii. 8, to which it hastens with many friends, or with the man of many friends. It is true that אִישׁ (like בַּעַל) is almost always connected only with genitives of things; but as one says אישׁ אלהים: a man belongs to God, so may one also say אִישׁ רֵעִים: a man belongs to many friends; the common language of the people may thus have named a man, to whom, because he has no definite and decided character, the rule that one knows a man by his friends is not applicable, a so-called every-man's-friend, or all-the-world's-friend. Theodotion translates *ἀνὴρ ἑταιριῶν τοῦ ἑταιρεύσασθαι*; and thus also the Syr., Targ., and Jerome render (and among the moderns, Hitzig) הִתְרֹעֵעַ as reflexive in the sense of to cherish social intercourse; but this reflexive is הִתְרָעָה, xxii. 24. That הִתְרוֹעֵעַ is either *Hithpa.* of רוּעַ, to exult, Ps. lx. 10, lxv. 14, according to which the *Venet.* translates (contrary to Kimchi) *ὥστε ἀλαλάζειν*: such an one can exult, but which is not true, since, according to 24*b*, a true friend outweighs the many; or it is *Hithpa.* of רָעַע, to be wicked, sinful (Fl.: *sibi perniciem paraturus est*); or, which we prefer, warranted by Isa. xxiv. 19, of רָעַע, to become brittle (Böttcher and others)—which not only gives a good sense, but also a similar alliteration with רֵעִים, as iii. 29, xiii. 20. In contradistinction to רַע, which is a general,

[1] One sees from this interchange how softly the י was uttered; cf. Wellhausen's *Text der Bb. Samuel* (1871) (Preface). Kimchi remarks that we say אֶקְטֹל for אֶקְטֹל, because we would otherwise confound it with יִקְטֹל.

and, according to the usage of the language (*e.g.* 17*b*), a familiar idea, the true friend is called, in the antithetical parallel member, אֹהֵב (xxvii. 6); and after xvii. 17, דֹּבֵק מֵאָח, one who remains true in misfortune. To have such an one is better than to have many of the so-called friends; and, as appears from the contrast, to him who is so fortunate as to have one such friend, there comes a blessing and safety. Immanuel has given the right explanation: "A man who sets himself to gain many friends comes finally to be a loser (סוּפוֹ לְהִשָּׁבֵר), for he squanders his means, and is impoverished in favour of others." And Schultens: *At est amicus agglutinatus præ fratre. Rarum et carum esse genus insinuatur, ac proinde intimam illam amicitiam, quæ conglutinet compingatque corda, non per multos spargendam, sed circumspecte et ferme cum uno tantum ineundam.* Thus closes this group of proverbs with the praise of friendship deepened into spiritual brotherhood, as the preceding, ver. 19, with a warning against the destruction of such a relation by a breach of trust not to be made good again.

Chap. xix. The plur. רֵעִים, xviii. 24, is emphatic and equivalent to רֵעִים רַבִּים. The group 1–4 closes with a proverb which contains this catchword. The first proverb of the group comes by שְׂפָתָיו into contact with xviii. 20, the first proverb of the preceding group.

Ver. 1 Better a poor man walking in his innocence,
Than one with perverse lips, and so a fool.

The contrast, xxviii. 6, is much clearer. But to correct this proverb in conformity with that, as Hitzig does, is unwarrantable. The Syr., indeed, translates here as there; but the Chald. assimilates this translation to the Heb. text, which Theodotion, and after him the Syro-Hexapl., renders by *ὑπὲρ στρεβλόχειλον ἄφρονα.* But does 1*a* form a contrast to 1*b*? Fleischer remarks: "From the contrast it appears that he who is designated in 1*b* must be thought of as עָשִׁיר" [rich]; and Ewald, "Thus early the ideas of a rich man and of a fool, or a despiser of God, are connected together." Saadia understands כסיל [a fool], after Job xxxi. 24, of one who makes riches his בֶּסֶל [confidence]. Euchel accordingly translates: the false man, although he builds himself greatly up, viz. on his riches. But כסיל designates the intellectually slothful, in whom the flesh overweighs the mind.

And the representation of the rich, which, for 1*b* certainly arises out of 1*a*, does not amalgamate with נכסיל, but with עִקֵּשׁ שְׂפָתָיו. Arama is on the right track, for he translates: the rich who distorts his mouth (cf. vol. i. p. 143), for he gives to the poor suppliant a rude refusal. Better Zöckler: a proud man of perverse lips and haughty demeanour. If one with haughty, scornful lips is opposed to the poor, then it is manifestly one not poor who thinks to raise himself above the poor, and haughtily looks down on him. And if it is said that, in spite of this proud demeanour, he is a fool, then this presents the figure of one proud of his wealth, who, in spite of his emptiness and *nequitia*, imagines that he possesses a greatness of knowledge, culture, and worth corresponding to the greatness of his riches. How much better is a poor man than such an one who walketh (*vid.* on תֹּם, vol. i. p. 79) in his innocence and simplicity, with his pure mind wholly devoted to God and to that which is good!—his poverty keeps him in humility which is capable of no malicious conduct; and this pious blameless life is of more worth than the pride of wisdom of the distinguished fool. There is in contrast to עִקֵּשׁוּת a simplicity, ἁπλότης, of high moral worth; but, on the other side, there is also a simplicity which is worthless. This is the connecting thought which introduces the next verse.

Ver. 2 The not-knowing of the soul is also not good,
And he who hasteneth with the legs after it goeth astray.

Fleischer renders נֶפֶשׁ as the subj. and לא־טוֹב as neut. pred.: in and of itself sensual desire is not good, but yet more so if it is without foresight and reflection. With this explanation the words must be otherwise accentuated. Hitzig, in conformity with the accentuation, before us: if desire is without reflection, it is also without success. But where נפשׁ denotes desire or sensuality, it is always shown by the connection, as *e.g.* xxiii. 2; here דַּעַת, referring to the soul as knowing (cf. Ps. cxxxix. 14), excludes this meaning. But נפשׁ is certainly *gen. subjecti;* Luzzatto's "self-knowledge" is untenable, for this would require דעת נַפְשׁוֹ; Meîri rightly glosses דעת נפשׁ by עִנְיָן. After this Zöckler puts Hitzig's translation right in the following manner: where there is no consideration of the soul, there is no prosperity. But that also is incorrect, for it would require אֵין־טוֹב; לא־טוב is always pred., not a substantival clause.

Thus the proverb states that בלא־דעת נפש is not good, and that is equivalent to היות בלא־דעת נפש (for the subject to לא־טוב is frequently, as *e.g.* xvii. 26, xviii. 5, an infinitive); or also: בלא־דעת נפש is a virtual noun in the sense of the not-knowing of the soul; for to say לא־דעת was syntactically inadmissible, but the expression is בלא־דעת, not בלי דעת (בִּבְלִי), because this is used in the sense unintentionally or unexpectedly. The גַּם which begins the proverb is difficult. If we lay the principal accent in the translation given above on "not good," then the placing of גם first is a *hyperbaton* similar to that in xvii. 26, xx. 11; cf. אַף, xvii. 11; רק, xiii. 10, as if the words were: if the soul is without knowledge, then also (*eo ipso*) it is destitute of anything good. But if we lay the principal accent on the "also," then the meaning of the poet is, that ignorance of the soul is, like many other things, not good; or (which we prefer without on that account maintaining[1] the original connection of ver. 1 and ver. 2), that as on the one side the pride of wisdom, so on the other ignorance is not good. In this case גם belongs more to the subject than to the predicate, but in reality to the whole sentence at the beginning of which it stands. To hasten with the legs (אָץ, as xxviii. 20) means now in this connection to set the body in violent agitation, without direction and guidance proceeding from the knowledge possessed by the soul. He who thus hastens after it without being intellectually or morally clear as to the goal and the way, makes a false step, goes astray, fails (*vid.* viii. 36, where חֹטְאַי is the contrast to מֹצְאַי).

Ver. 3 The foolishness of a man overturneth his way,
And his heart is angry against Jahve.

Regarding סלף, *vid.* at xi. 3; also the Arab. signification "to go before" proceeds from the root conception *pervertere*, for first a letting precede, or preceding (*e.g.* of the paying before the delivery of that which is paid for: *salaf*, a pre-numbering, and then also: advanced money), consisting in the reversal of the

[1] The old interpreters and also the best Jewish interpreters mar the understanding and interpretation of the text, on the one side, by distinguishing between a nearest and a deeper meaning of Scripture (דרך נגלה and דרך נסתר); on the other by this, that they suppose an inward connection of all the proverbs, and expend useless ingenuity in searching after the connection. The former is the method especially adopted by Immanuel and Mefri, the latter has most of all been used by Arama.

natural order, is meant. The way is here the way of life, the walking: the folly of a man overturns, *i.e.* destroys, his life's-course; but although he is himself the fabricator of his own ruin, yet the ill-humour (עָוֶל, *æstuare*, *vid.* at Ps. xi. 6), of his heart turns itself against God, and he blames (LXX. essentially correct: *αἰτιᾶται*) God instead of himself, viz. his own madness, whereby he has turned the grace of God into lasciviousness, cast to the winds the instruction which lay in His providences, and frustrated the will of God desiring his good. A beautiful paraphrase of this parable is found at Sir. xv. 11–20; cf. Lam. iii. 39.

Ver. 4 Wealth bringeth many friends;
But the reduced—his friend separateth himself.

The very same contrast, though otherwise expressed, we had at xiv. 20. Regarding הוֹן, *vid.* vol. i. p. 63. דָּל is the tottering, or he who has fallen into a tottering condition, who has no resources, possesses no means. The accentuation gives *Mugrash* to the word (according to which the Targ. translates), for it is not the subject of יִפָּרֵד: the reduced is separated (pass. *Niph.*) by his misfortunes, or must separate himself (reflex. *Niph.*) from his friend (מֵרֵעֵהוּ, as Eccles. iv. 4, *præ socio suo*); but subject of the virtual pred. מֵרֵעֵהוּ יִפָּרֵד: the reduced—his friend (מרעהו, as ver. 7) separates himself, *i.e.* (according to the nature of the Semitic substantival clause) he is such (of such a fate) that his friend sets himself free, whereby מִמֶּנּוּ may be omitted as self-obvious; נִפְרָד means one who separates himself, xviii. 1. If we make דָּל the subject of the *separatur*, then the initiative of the separation from the friend is not expressed.

In vers. 5 and 9 we have the introductory proverb of two groups, the former of which, in its close as well as its beginning, cannot be mistaken.

Ver. 5 A lying witness remaineth not unpunished;
And he who breathes out lies escapeth not.

Regarding יָפִיחַ, *vid.* vol. i. p. 148: as here we read it of false witness at vi. 19, xiv. 5, 25. לֹא יִנָּקֶה occurs four times before, the last of which is at xvii. 5. The LXX. elsewhere translates יפיח כזבים by *ἐκκαίειν ψευδῆ*, to kindle lies; but here by *ὁ δὲ ἐγκαλῶν ἀδίκως*, and at ver. 9 by *ὃς δ' ἂν ἐκκαύσῃ κακίαν*, both

times changing only because ψευδής goes before, and instead of ψευδῆ, the choice of a different rendering commended itself.

Ver. 6 Many stroke the cheeks of the noble;
And the mass of friends belongeth to him who gives.

The phrase חַלּוֹת פְּנֵי כל signifies to stroke the face of any one, from the fundamental meaning of the verb חָלָה, to rub, to stroke, Arab. *khala*, with which the Heb., meaning to be sick, weak (*viribus attritum esse*), and the Arabic: to be sweet (properly *lævem et politum, glabrum esse*, or *palatum demulcere, leniter stringere*, contrast *asperum esse ad gustum*), are connected (Fl.). The object of such insinuating, humble suing for favour is the נָדִיב (from נָדַב, *instigare*), the noble, he who is easily incited to noble actions, particularly to noble-mindedness in bestowing gifts and in doing good, or who feels himself naturally impelled thereto, and spontaneously practises those things; cf. the Arab. *krym*, *nobilis* and *liberalis* (Fl.), and at Job xxi. 28; parall. אִישׁ מַתָּן, a man who gives willingly, as אִישׁ חֵמָה, xv. 18, one who is easily kindled into anger. Many (רַבִּים, as Job xi. 19) stroke the face of the liberal (Lat. *caput mulcent* or *demulcent*); and to him who gives willingly and richly belongs כָּל־הֵרֵעַ, the mass (the totality) of good friends, cf. xv. 17; there the art. of הֵרֵעַ, according to the manner of expression of the Arab. grammarians, stood for "the exhaustion of the characteristic properties of the genus": the friend who corresponds to the nature (the idea) of such an one; here it stands for "the comprehension of the individuals of the genus;" all that is only always friend. It lies near with Ewald and Hitzig to read וְכָלֵּה רֵעַ (and every one is friend . . .) (כלּה = כלּוֹ, as Jer. viii. 10, etc.); but why could not כָּל־הֵרֵעַ be used as well as כל־האדם, perhaps with the sarcastic appearance which the above translation seeks to express? The LXX. also had וכל הרע in view, which it incorrectly translates πᾶς δὲ ὁ κακός, whereby the Syr. and the Targ. are led into error; but מַתָּן is not one and the same with שׁוֹחַד, *vid.* xviii. 6. On the contrary, there certainly lies before us in ver. 7 a mutilated text. The tristich is, as we have shown, vol. i. p. 15, open to suspicion; and the violence which its interpretation needs in order to comprehend it, as a formal part of 7*ab*, places it beyond a doubt, and the LXX. confirms it that 7*c* is the remainder of a distich, the half of which is lost.

Ver. 7*ab*. We thus first confine our attention to these two lines,—

All the brethren of the poor hate him;
How much more do his friends withdraw themselves from him?

Regarding אַף כִּי, *quanto magis*, *vid.* at xi. 31, xv. 11, xvii. 7. In a similar connection xiv. 20 spake of hatred, *i.e.* the cooling of love, and the manifesting of this coldness. The brethren who thus show themselves here, unlike the friend who has become a brother, according to xvii. 17, are brothers-german, including kindred by blood relation. כָּל has *Mercha*, and is thus without the *Makkeph*, as at Ps. xxxv. 10 (*vid.* the Masora in Baer's *Liber Psalmorum*, 1861, p. 133). Kimchi (*Michlol* 205*a*), Norzi, and others think that *cāl* (with קמץ רחב) is to be read as at Isa. xl. 12, where וְכָל is a verb. But that is incorrect. The case is the same as with אֶת, iii. 12; Ps. xlvii. 5, lx. 2. As here *ĕ* with *Mercha* remains, so *ŏ* with *Mercha* in that twice occurring וְכֹל; that which is exceptional is this, that the accentuated כל is written thus twice, not as the usual כֹּל, but as כָּל with the *Makkeph*. The ground of the exception lies, as with other peculiarities, in the special character of metrical accentuation; the *Mercha* represents the place of the *Makkeph*, and ֒ thus remains in the unchanged force of a *Kametz-Chatuph*. The plur. רֵעָיו does not stamp מְרֵעֵהוּ as the defectively written plur.; the suffix *ēhu* is always sing., and the sing. is thus, like הֵרֵעַ, 6*b*, meant collectively, or better: generally (in the sense of kind), which is the linguistic usage of these two words, 1 Sam. xxx. 26; Job xlii. 10. But it is worthy of notice that the Masoretic form here is not מְרֵעֵהוּ, but מְרֵעֵהוּ, with *Sheva*. The Masora adds to it the remark לית, and accordingly the word is thus written with *Sheva* by Kimchi (*Michlol* 202*a* and *Lex.* under the word רעה), in Codd., and older editions. The *Venet.*, translating by *ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου αὐτοῦ*, has not noticed that. But how? Does the punctuation מְרֵעֵהוּ mean that the word is here to be derived from מֵרַע, *maleficus?* Thus understood, it does not harmonize with the line of thought. From this it is much more seen that the punctuation of the inflected מֵרֵעַ, *amicus*, fluctuates. This word מֵרַע is a formation so difficult of comprehension, that one might almost, with Olshausen, § 210; Böttcher, § 794; and Lagarde, regard the מ as the partitive מִן, like the French

des amis (cf. Eurip. *Med.* 560: *πένητα φεύγει πᾶς τις ἐκποδὼν φίλος*), or: something of friend, a piece of friend, while Ewald and others regard it as possible that מרע is abbreviated from מְרֻעָה. The punctuation, since it treats the *Tsere* in מרעהו, 4*b*[1] and elsewhere, as unchangeable, and here in מֵרֵעֵהוּ as changeable, affords proof that in it also the manner of the formation of the word was incomprehensible.

Ver. 7*c* Seeking after words which are vain.

If now this line belongs to this proverb, then מְרַדֵּף must be used of the poor, and לֹא־הֵמָּה, or לוֹ־הֵמָּה (*vid.* regarding the 15 *Kerîs*, לוֹ for לֹא, at Ps. c. 3), must be the attributively nearer designation of the אמרים. The meaning of the *Kerî* would be: he (the poor man) hunts after mere words, which—but no actions corresponding to them—are for a portion to him. This is doubtful, for the principal matter, that which is not a portion to him, remains unexpressed, and the לוֹ־הֵמָּה [to him they belong] affords only the service of guarding one against understanding by the אמרים the proper words of the poor. This service is not in the same way afforded by לֹא הֵמָּה [they are not]; but this expression characterizes the words as vain, so that it is to be interpreted according to such parallels as Hos. xii. 2: words which are not, *i.e.* which have nothing in reality corresponding to them, *verba nihili*, *i.e.* the empty assurances and promises of his brethren and friends (Fl.). The old translators all[2] read לֹא, and the Syr. and Targ. translate not badly: מִלּוֹי לָא שְׁרִיר; Symmachus, *ῥήσεσιν ἀνυπάρκτοις*. The expression is not to be rejected: לֹא הָיָה sometimes means to come to לֹא, *i.e.* to nothing, Job vi. 21, Ezek. xxi. 32, cf. Isa. xv. 6; and לֹא הוּא, he is not = has no reality, Jer. v. 12, אֲמָרִים לֹא־המה, may thus mean words which are nothing (vain). But how can it be said of the poor whom everything forsakes, that one dismisses him with words behind which there is nothing, and now also that he pursues such words? The former supposes always a sympathy, though it be a feigned one,

[1] In vol. i. p. 266, we have acknowledged מרעהו, from מרע, friend, only for xix. 7; but at xix. 4 we have also found *amicus ejus* more probable than *ab amico suo* (=מן רעהו).

[2] Lagarde erroneously calls Theodotion's *ῥήσεις οὐκ αὐτῷ* a translation of the *Kerî*; *οὐκ* is, however, לֹא, and instead of *αὐτῷ* the expression *αὐτῶν*, which is the translation of המה, is also found.

which is excluded by שְׂנֵאָהוּ [they hate him] and רָחֲקוּ [withdraw themselves]; and the latter, spoken of the poor, would be unnatural, for his purposed endeavour goes not out after empty talk, but after real assistance. So 7*c*: pursuing after words which (are) nothing, although in itself not falling under critical suspicion, yet only of necessity is connected with this proverb regarding the poor. The LXX., however, has not merely one, but even four lines, and thus two proverbs following 7*b*. The former of these distichs is: Ἔννοια ἀγαθὴ τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτὴν ἐγγιεῖ, ἀνὴρ δὲ φρόνιμος εὑρήσει αὐτήν; it is translated from the Hebr. (ἔννοια ἀγαθή, v. 2 = מְזִמּוֹת), but it has a meaning complete in itself, and thus has nothing to do with the fragment 7*c*. The second distich is: Ὁ πολλὰ κακοποιῶν τελεσιουργεῖ κακίαν, ὃς δὲ ἐρεθίζει λόγους οὐ σωθήσεται. This ὃς δὲ ἐρεθίζει λόγους is, without doubt, a translation of מרדף אמרים (7*c*); λόγους is probably a corruption of λόγοις (thus the Complut.), not, he who pursueth words, but he who incites by words, as Homer (*Il.* iv. 5 f.) uses the expression ἐρεθιζέμεν ἐπέεσσι. The concluding words, οὐ σωθήσεται, are a repetition of the Heb. לא ימלט (cf. LXX. xix. 5 with xxviii. 26), perhaps only a conjectural emendation of the unintelligible לא המה. Thus we have before us in that ὁ πολλὰ κακοποιῶν, κ.τ.λ., the line lost from the Heb. text; but it is difficult to restore it to the Heb. We have attempted it, vol. i. p. 15. Supposing that the LXX. had before them לא המה, then the proverb is—

> "He that hath many friends is rewarded with evil,
> Hunting after words which are nothing;"

i.e. since this his courting the friendship of as many as possible is a hunting after words which have nothing after them and come to nothing.

> Ver. 8 He that getteth understanding loveth his soul,
> And he that values reasonableness will acquire good;

or, more closely, since this would be the translation of יִמְצָא טוֹב, xvi. 20, xvii. 20: so it happens, or it comes to this, that he acquires good (= הָיָה לְמוֹצֵא); the *inf.* with ל is here, as at xviii. 24, the expression of a *fut. periphrasticum*, as in the Lat. *consecutumus est*. Regarding קֹנֵה־לֵב, *vid.* xv. 32, and שֹׁמֵר תְּבוּנָה, vol. i. p. 119. That the deportment of men is either care for

the soul, or the contrary of that, is a thought which runs through the Book of Proverbs.

The group of proverbs (vers. 9–16) now following begins and closes in the same way as the preceding.

Ver. 9 A lying witness doth not remain unpunished,
And one who breathes out lies perisheth,

or goeth to ruin, for אָבַד (R. בד, to divide, separate) signifies to lose oneself in the place of the separated, the dead (Arab. in the infinite). In ver. 5, instead of this *ἀπολεῖται* (LXX.), the negative *οὐ σωθήσεται* is used, or as the LXX. there more accurately renders it, *οὐ διαφεύξεται*.

Ver. 10 Luxury becometh not a fool;
How much less a servant to rule over princes.

Thus also with לֹא נָאוָה (3 *p. Pil. non decet*, cf. the adj. xxvi. 1) xvii. 7 begins: אַף כִּי rises here, as at ver. 7, *a minori ad majus*: how much more is it unbecoming = how much less is it seemly. The contrast in the last case is, however, more rugged, and the expression harsher. "A fool cannot bear luxury: he becomes by it yet more foolish; one who was previously a humble slave, but who has attained by good fortune a place of prominence and power, from being something good, becomes at once something bad: an insolent *sceleratus*" (Fl.). Agur, xxx. 22 f., describes such a *homo novus* as an unbearable calamity; and the author of the Book of Ecclesiastes, written in the time of the Persian domination, speaks, x. 7, of such. The LXX. translates, *καὶ ἐὰν οἰκέτης ἄρξηται μεθ' ὕβρεως δυναστεύειν*, rendering the phrase בְּשָׂרִים by *μεθ' ὕβρεως*, but all other translators had בְּשׂרִים before them.

Ver. 11 The discretion of a man maketh him long-suffering,
And it is a glory for him to be forbearing toward transgression.

The Syr., Targum, Aquila, and Theodotion translate הֵאֶרִיךְ אפּוֹ by *μακροθυμία*, and thus read הַאֲרִיךְ; but Rashi, Kimchi, and others remark that הֵאֶרִיךְ is here only another vocalization for הַאֲרִיךְ, which is impossible. The *Venet.* also translates: *Νοῦς ἀνθρώπου μηκυνεῖ τὸν θυμὸν ἑαυτοῦ*; the correct word would be *αὐτοῦ*: the discretion (*intellectus* or *intelligentia*; *vid.* regarding שֵׂכֶל, iii. 4) of a man extends his anger, *i.e.* brings it about that it continues long before it breaks out (*vid.* xiv. 29). One does not stumble at the perf. in view of ver. 7, xviii. 8, xvi. 26, and

the like; in the proverbial style the fut. or the particip. is more common. In the synonymous parallel member, תִּפְאַרְתּוֹ points to man as such: it is an honour to him to pass by a transgression (particularly that which affects himself), to let it go aside, *i.e.* to forbear revenge or punishment (cf. Arab. *tjâwz 'aly*); thus also the divine πάρεσις (Rom. iii. 25) is designated by Mic. vii. 18; and in Amos vii. 8, viii. 2, עָבֹר stands absol. for the divine remission or passing by, *i.e.* unavenging of sin.

Ver. 12 A murmuring as of a lion is the wrath of the king,
And as dew on plants is his favour.

Line 1 is a variation of xx. 2*a*; line 2*a* of xvi. 15*b*. זַעַף is not the being irritated against another, but generally ill-humour, fretfulness, bad humour; the murmuring or growling in which this state of mind expresses itself is compared to that of a lion which, growling, prepares and sets itself to fall upon its prey (*vid.* Isa. v. 29, cf. Amos iii. 4). Opposed to the זעף stands the beneficial effect of the רָצוֹן, *i.e.* of the pleasure, the delight, the satisfaction, the disposition which shows kindness (LXX. τὸ ἱλαρὸν αὐτοῦ). In the former case all are afraid; in the latter, everything lives, as when the refreshing dew falls upon the herbs of the field. The proverb presents a fact, but that the king may mirror himself in it.

Ver. 13 A foolish son is destruction for his father,
And a continual dropping are the contentions of a wife.

Regarding הַוּוֹת, *vid.* at xvii. 4, cf. x. 3. Line 2*a* is expanded, xxvii. 15, into a distich. The dropping is טֹרֵד, properly striking (cf. Arab. *tirad*, from *tarad* III., hostile assault) when it pours itself forth, stroke (drop) after stroke = constantly, or with unbroken continuity. Lightning-flashes are called (*Jer Berachoth*, p. 114, Shitomir's ed.) טורדין, *opp.* מפסיקין, when they do not follow in intervals, but constantly flash; and *b. Bechoroth* 44*a*; דומעות, weeping eyes, דולפות, dropping eyes, and טורדות, eyes always flowing, are distinguished. An old interpreter (*vid.* R. Ascher in *Pesachim* II. No. 21) explains דֶּלֶף טוֹרֵד by: "which drops, and drops, and always drops." An Arab proverb which I once heard from Wetzstein, says that there are three things which make our house intolerable: *âltakk* (= *âldhalf*), the trickling through of rain; *âlnakk*, the contention of the wife; and *âlbakk*, bugs.

Ver. 14 House and riches are a paternal inheritance,
But from Jahve cometh a prudent wife.

House and riches (*opulentia*), which in themselves do not make men happy, one may receive according to the law of inheritance; but a prudent wife is God's gracious gift, xviii. 22. There is not a more suitable word than מַשְׂכֶּלֶת (fem. of מַשְׂכִּיל) to characterize a wife as a divine gift, making her husband happy. שֵׂכֶל (הַשְׂכֵּל) is the property which says: "I am named modesty, which wears the crown of all virtues." [1]

Ver. 15 Slothfulness sinketh into deep sleep,
And an idle soul must hunger.

Regarding תַּרְדֵּמָה and its root-word רָדַם, *vid.* at x. 5. הִפִּיל, to befall, to make to get, is to be understood after Gen. iii. 21; the obj. על־האדם, viz. הֶעָצֵל, is naturally to be supplied. In 15*b* the fut. denotes that which will certainly happen, the inevitable. In both of its members the proverb is perfectly clear; Hitzig, however, corrects 15*a*, and brings out of it the meaning, "slothfulness gives tasteless herbs to eat." The LXX. has two translations of this proverb, here and at xviii. 8. That it should translate רמיה by *ἀνδρόγυνος* was necessary, as Lagarde remarks, for the exposition of the "works of a Hebrew Sotades." But the Hebrew literature never sunk to such works, wallowing in the mire of sensuality, and *ἀνδρόγυνος* is not at all thus enigmatical; the Greek word was also used of an effeminate man, a man devoid of manliness, a weakling, and was, as the LXX. shows, more current in the Alexandrine Greek than elsewhere.

Ver. 16 He that keepeth the commandment keepeth his soul;
He that taketh no heed to his ways dies.

As at vi. 23, cf. Eccles. viii. 5, מִצְוָה is here the commandment of God, and thus obligatory, which directs man in every case to do that which is right, and warns him against that which is wrong. And בּוֹזֵה דְרָכָיו (according to the Masora with *Tsere*, as in Codd. and old editions, not בּוֶזֶה) is the antithesis of נֹצֵר דַּרְכּוֹ, xvi. 17. To despise one's own way is equivalent to, to regard it as worth no consideration, as no question of conscience whether one should enter upon this way or that. Hitzig's

[1] The LXX. translates: *παρὰ δὲ κυρίου ἁρμόζεται γυνὴ ἀνδοί.* Here as often (*vid.* my *Jesurun*) the Arab. *usus loquendi* makes itself felt in the idiom of the LXX., for *shâkl* means *ἁρμόζειν*.

reading, בּוֹזֵר, "he that scattereth his ways," lets himself be drawn by the manifold objects of sensuality sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another, is supported by Jer. iii. 13, according to which it must be מְפַזֵּר; the conj. is not in the style of the Book of Proverbs, and besides is superfluous. The LXX., which is fond of a *quid pro quo*—it makes, 13*b*, a courtesan offering a sacrifice she had vowed of the wages of sin of the quarrelsome woman—has here, as the Heb. text: *ὁ καταφρονῶν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ὁδῶν ἀπολεῖται.* Thus after the *Kerî* יָמֵת, as also the Targ., Syro-Hexap., and Luther; on the contrary, the Syr., Jerome, the *Venet.* adopt the *Chethîb* יוּמַת: he will become dead, *i.e.* dies no natural death. The *Kerî* is more in the spirit and style of the Book of Proverbs (xv. 10, xxiii. 13, x. 21).

Vers. 17–21. These verses we take together. But we have no other reason for making a pause at ver. 21, than that ver. 22 is analogous to ver. 17, and thus presents itself to us as an initial verse.

Ver. 17 He lendeth to Jahve who is compassionate to the lowly,
And his bounty He requites to him.

As at xiv. 31, חוֹנֵן is *part. Kal.* The Masoretically exact form of the word is חֹנֵן (as וְאוֹזֵל, xx. 14) with *Mercha* on the first syllable, on which the tone is thrown back, and the העמדה on the second. The Roman legal phrase, *mutui datione contrahitur obligatio*, serves to explain the fundamental conception of לָוָה, *mutuo accipere*, and הִלְוָה, *mutuum dare* (*vid.* xxii. 7). The construction, Ex. xxii. 24, "to make any one bound as a debtor, *obligare*," lies at the foundation of the genitive connection מַלְוֵה ה' (not מלוה). With 17*b* cf. xii. 14, where the subject of יְשֻׁיב (*Kerî*) remains in the background. גְּמָלוֹ (not גמלו) is here his work done in the sense of good exhibited. "Love," Hedinger once said, "is an imperishable capital, which always bears interest." And the Archbishop Walther: *nam Deo dat qui dat inopibus, ipse Deus est in pauperibus.* Dr. Jonas, as Dächsel relates, once gave to a poor man, and said, "Who knows when God restores it!" There Luther interposed: "As if God had not long ago given it beforehand!" This answer of Luther meets the abuse of this beautiful proverb by the covetous.

Ver. 18. This proverb brings to view once more the pedagogic character of this Older Book of Proverbs:

Correct thy son, for yet there is hope;
But go not too far to kill him.

That כִּי is meant relatively, as at xi. 15, is seen from Job xi. 18, xiv. 7; Jer. xxxi. 16 f.; כִּי־יֵשׁ תִּקְוָה is the usual expression for *etenim spes est*. Though a son show obstinacy, and manifest a bad disposition, yet there is hope in the training of the youth of being able to break his self-will, and to wean him from his bad disposition; therefore his education should be carried forward with rigorous exactness, but in such a way that wisdom and love regulate the measure and limits of correction: *ad eum interficiendum animam ne tollas* (*animum ne inducas*). נַפְשֶׁךָ is not the subject, for in that case the word would have been תִּשָּׂאֶךָ (2 Kings xiv. 10). It is the object: To raise the soul to something is equivalent to, to direct his desire to it, to take delight in it. The teacher should not seek correction as the object, but only as the means; he who has a desire after it, to put the child to death in the case of his guilt, changes correction into revenge, permits himself to be driven by passion from the proper end of correction, and to be pushed beyond its limits. The LXX. translates freely εἰς δὲ ὕβριν, for ὕβρις is unrestrained abuse, מוסר אכזרי as Immanuel glosses. Besides, all the ancients and also the *Venet.* translate המיתו as the inf. of הָמִית. But Oetinger (for he translates: lift not thy soul to his cry, for which Euchel: let not his complaining move thy compassion) follows the derivation from הָמָה suggested by Kimchi, Meîri, and Immanuel, and preferred by Ralbag, so that הֲמִיתוֹ after the form בְּכִית is equivalent to הֲמָיָתוֹ. But leaving out of view that המה means *strepere*, not *lamentari*, and that נשׂא נפשׁו means attention, not desire, xxiii. 13 points out to us a better interpretation.

Ver. 19. Another proverb with נשׂא:

A man of excessive wrath must suffer punishment;
For if thou layest hold of it, hindering it, thou makest it only worse.

The LXX., Syr., and Targ. translate as if the words were גְּבַר חמה (as בְּעַל חמה, xxix. 22). Theodotion, the *Venet.*, and Luther render the *Kerî* גָּדֹל; Jerome's *impatiens* is colourless. The *Chethîb* גרל gives no appropriate meaning. The Arabic *jaril* means *lapidosus* (whence גּוֹרָל, cf. Aram. גַּלְגַּל = ψῆφος), and Schultens translates accordingly *aspere scruposus iracundiæ*, which is altogether after the manner of his own heavy style.

Ewald translates גָּרֶל as derived from the Arab *jazyl*, *largus*, *grandis*; but the possibility of the passing over of ר into ז, as maintained by Ewald and also by Hitzig, or the reverse, is physiologically undemonstrable, and is confirmed by no example worthy of mention. Rather it may be possible that the Heb. had an adj. גָּזֶל or גָּרֶל in the sense of stony, gravel-like, hard as gravel, but tow rather than gravel would be appropriate to חֵמָה. Hitzig corrects חמה גֹּמֵל, "who acts in anger;" but he says חמה שִׁלֵּם, to recompense anger, Isa. lix. 18; גמל חמה is without support. This correction, however, is incomparably more feasible than Böttcher's, "moderate inheritance bears expiation;" חֵמְאָה = חֵמָה must mean not only thick [curdled] milk, but also moderation, and Böttcher finds this "sound." From all these instances one sees that גרל is an error in transcription; the *Kerî* גְּדֹל־חֵמָה rightly improves it, a man is thus designated whose peculiarity it is to fall into a high degree of passionate anger (חֵמָה גְּדוֹלָה, Dan. xi. 44): such an one has to bear עֹנֶשׁ, a fine, *i.e.* to compensate, for he has to pay compensation or smart-money for the injury suffered, as *e.g.* he who in strife with another pushes against a woman with child, so that injury befalls her, Ex. xxi. 22. If we compare this passage with 2 Sam. xiv. 6, there appears for תַּצִּיל the meaning of taking away of the object (whether a person or a thing) against which the passionate hothead directs himself. Therewith the meaning of וְעוֹד תּוֹסֵף accords. The meaning is not that, הַצֵּל, once is not enough, but much rather must be repeated, and yet is without effect; but that one only increases and heightens the חמה thereby. It is in vain to seek to spare such a violent person the punishment into which he obstinately runs; much more advisable is it to let him rage till he ceases; violent opposition only makes the evil the greater. With כִּי אִם, "*denn wenn*" [for then], cf. ii. 3, "*ja wenn*" [yea if], and with וְעוֹד in the conclusion, Job xiv. 7 (a parallelism syntactically more appropriate than Ps. cxxxix. 18).

Ver. 20 Hearken to counsel, and receive instruction,
That thou mayest become wise afterwards.

The rule of morals, xii. 15*b*, receives here the paræ̈netic tone which is the keynote of the introduction i.–ix. Löwenstein translates: that thou mayest finally become wise. But בְּאַחֲרִיתֶךָ corresponds rather to our "*hinfort*" [*posthac*] than to "*end-*

lich" [finally]. He to whom the warning is directed must break with the self-willed, undisciplined רֵאשִׁית [beginning] of his life, and for the future (*τὸν ἐπίλοιπον ἐν σαρκὶ χρόνον*, 1 Pet. iv. 2) become wise. The relative contrast between the two periods of life is the same as at Job viii. 7.

Ver. 21 Many are the thoughts in a man's heart;
But Jahve's counsel, that stands.

In תָּקוּם lies, as at Isa. xl. 8, both: that the counsel of God (His plan of the world and of salvation) is accomplished and comes into actual fact, and that it continues. This counsel is the true reality elevated above the checkered manifoldness of human purposes, aims, and subjectivities, which penetrates and works itself out in history. The thoughts of a man thus gain unity, substance, endurance, only in so far as he subjects himself to this counsel, and makes his thoughts and actions conformable and subordinate to this counsel.

Ver. 22. The series makes a new departure with a proverb regarding the poor (cf. ver. 17):

A man's delight is his beneficence;
And better is a poor man than a liar.

The right interpretation will be that which presses upon תַּאֲוַת no strange meaning, and which places the two parts of the verse in an inner mutual relation ethically right. In any case it lies nearer to interpret תאוה, in relation to man, actively than passively: that which makes man worthy of desire (Rashi), adorns and distinguishes him (Kimchi, Aben-Ezra); or, that which is desired by man, is above all things sought for (Luzzatto); and, in like manner, the Heb. meaning for חַסְדּוֹ lies nearer than the Aram. (*vid.* xiv. 34): the pleasure of a man is his disgrace (Ralbag). Thus Bertheau's translation: the desire of a man is his *charitas*, must mean: that which brings to a man true joy is to act amiably. But is that, thus generally expressed, true? And if this were the thought, how much more correctly and distinctly would it be expressed by שִׂמְחָה לָאָדָם עֲשׂוֹת חֶסֶד (cf. xxi. 15)! Hitzig is rightly reminded by חסדו of the Pharisee who thanks God that he is not as other men; the word ought to have been חסד to remove every trace of self-satisfaction. Hitzig therefore proposes from the LXX. and the Vulgate the text-correction מִתְּבוּאַת, and translates, "from the revenue of a man is his kind

gift;" and Ewald, who is satisfied with חֶבְוֹאַת, "the gain of a man is his pious love." The latter is more judicious: חסד (love) distributed is in reality gain (according to ver. 17); but 22*b* corresponds rather with the former: "better is he who from want does not give חבואה, than he who could give and says he has nothing." But was there then need for that *καρπός* of the LXX.? If a poor man is better than a lord given to lying,—for אִישׁ with רָשׁ is a man of means and position,—*i.e.* a poor man who would give willingly, but has nothing, than that man who will not give, and therefore lies, saying that he has nothing; then 22*a* means that the will of a man (cf. תאוה, xi. 23) is his doing good (*vid.* regarding חֶסֶד, at iii. 3), *i.e.* is its soul and very essence. Euchel, who accordingly translates: the philanthropy of a man consists properly in his goodwill, rightly compares the Rabbinical proverb, אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט ובלבד שיהכוון, *i.e.* one may give more or less, it all depends on the intention, the disposition.

Ver. 23 The fear of Jahve tendeth to life;
Satisfied, one spendeth the night, not visited by evil.

The first line is a variation of xiv. 27*a*. How the fear of God thus reacheth to life, *i.e.* helps to a life that is enduring, free from care and happy, 23*b* says: the promises are fulfilled to the God-fearing, Deut. xi. 15 and Lev. xxvi. 6; he does not go hungry to bed, and needs fear no awakening in terror out of his soft slumber (iii. 24). With ו *explic.*, 23*a* is explained. לִין וְשָׂבֵעַ means to spend the night (the long night) hungry, as לִין עָרוּם, Job xxiv. 7, to pass the night in nakedness (cold). נִפְקָד, of visitation of punishment, we read also at Isa. xxix. 6, and instead of בְּרָע, as it might be according to this passage, we have here the accus. of the manner placing the meaning of the *Niph.* beyond a doubt (cf. xi. 15, רַע, in an evil manner). All is in harmony with the matter, and is good Heb.; on the contrary, Hitzig's ingenuity introduces, instead of וְשָׂבֵעַ, an unheard of word, וְשָׂרֵעַ, "and he stretches himself." One of the Greeks excellently translates: *καὶ ἐμπλησθεὶς αὐλισθήσεται ἄνευ ἐπισκοπῆς πονηρᾶς*. The LXX., which instead of רַע, *γνῶσις*, translates thus, דַּע, discredits itself. The Midrash—Lagarde says of its translation—varies in colour like an opal. In other

words, it handles the text like wax, and forms it according to its own taste, like the Midrash with its "read not so, but so."

Ver. 24 The slothful hath thrust his hand into the dish;
He bringeth it not again to his mouth.

This proverb is repeated in a different form, xxvi. 15. The figure appears, thus understood, an hyperbole, on which account the LXX. understand by צלחת the bosom or lap, *κόλπον*; Aquila and Symmachus understand by it the arm-pit, *μασχάλην* or *μάλην*; and the Jewish interpreters gloss it by חיק (Kimchi) or קרע החלוק, the slit (Ital. *fenditura*) of the shirt. But the domestic figure, 2 Kings xxi. 13, places before us a dish which, when it is empty, is wiped and turned upside down;[1] and that the slothful when he eats appears too slothful to bring his hand, *e.g.* with the rice or the piece of bread he has taken out of the dish, again to his mouth, is true to nature: we say of such a man that he almost sleeps when he eats. The fut. after the perf. here denotes that which is not done after the former thing, *i.e.* that which is scarcely and only with difficulty done; גַּם . . . לֹא may have the meaning of "yet not," as at Ps. cxxix. 2; but the sense of "not once" = *ne . . . quidem*, lies here nearer Deut. xxiii. 3.

Ver. 25 The scorner thou smitest, and the simple is prudent;
And if one reprove the man of understanding, he gaineth knowledge

Hitzig translates in a way that is syntactically inexact: smite the scorner, so the simple becomes prudent; that would have required at least the word וְיַעְרִם: fut. and fut. connected by ו is one of many modes of expression for the simultaneous, discussed by me at Hab. iii. 10. The meaning of the proverb has a complete commentary at xxi. 11, where its two parts are otherwise expressed with perfect identity of thought. In regard to the לֵץ, with whom denunciation and threatening bear no fruit (xiii. 1, xv. 12), and perhaps even produce the contrary effect to that intended (ix. 7), there remains nothing

[1] While צַפַּחַת, *ṣaḥfat*, in the sense of dish, is etymologically clear, for צַלַּחַת, neither *ṣalaḥ* (to be good for), nor *ṣalakh* (to be deaf, mangy), offers an appropriate verbal meaning. The Arab. *zuluḥ* (large dishes) stands under *zalah* (to taste, of the tasting of food), but is scarcely a derivative from it. Only צלח, which in the meaning of good for, proceeding from the idea of penetrating through, has retained the root-meaning of cleft, furnishes for צַלַּחַת and צְלוֹחִית a root-word in some measure useful.

else than to vindicate the injured truths by means of the private justice of corporal punishment. Such words, if spoken to the right man, in the right spirit, at the right time, may affect him with wholesome terrors; but even though he is not made better thereby, yet the simple, who listens to the mockeries of such not without injury, will thereby become prudent (gain עָרְמָה = הָעָרִים, prudence, as at xv. 5), *i.e.* either arrive at the knowledge that the mockery of religion is wicked, or guard himself against incurring the same repressive measures. In 25*b* וְהוֹכִחַ is neither inf. (Umbreit), which after xxi. 11*b* must be וּבְהוֹכִחַ, nor impr. (Targ., Ewald), which according to rule is הוֹכַח, but the hypothetic perf. (Syr.) with the most general subject (Merc., Hitzig): if one impart instruction to the (dat. obj. as ix. 7, xv. 2) man of understanding (*vid.* xvi. 21), then he acquires knowledge, *i.e.* gains an insight into the nature and value of that which one wishes to bring him to the knowledge of (הָבִין דַּעַת, as xxix. 7; cf. viii. 5). That which the deterring lesson of exemplary punishment approximately effects with the wavering, is, in the case of the man of understanding, perfectly attained by an instructive word.

We have now reached the close of the third chief section of the older Book of Proverbs. All the three sections begin with בֵּן חָכָם, x. 1, xiii. 1, xv. 20. The Introduction, i.–ix., dedicates this collection of Solomonic proverbs to youth, and the three beginnings accordingly relate to the relative duties of a son to his father and mother. We are now no longer far from the end, for xxii. 17 resumes the tone of the Introduction. The third principal part would be disproportionately large if it extended from xv. 1 to xxii. 15. But there does not again occur a proverb beginning with the words "son of man." We can therefore scarcely go wrong if we take xix. 26 as the commencement of a fourth principal part. The Masora divides the whole *Mishle* into eight *sedarim*, which exhibit so little knowledge of the true division, that the *parashas* (sections) x. 1, xxii. 17 do not at all find their right place.[1] The MSS., how-

[1] The 915 verses of the *Mishle*, according to the Masora, fall into eight *sedarim*, beginning as follows: i. 1, v. 18, ix. 12, xiv. 4, xviii. 10, xxii. 22, xxv. 13, xxviii. 16.

ever, contain evidences that this Hagiograph was also anciently divided into *parashas*, which were designated partly by spaces between the lines (*sethumoth*) and partly by breaks in the lines (*phethucoth*). In Baer's *Cod. Jamanensis*,[1] after vi. 19, there is the letter פ written on the margin as the mark of such a break. With vi. 20 (*vid. l.c.*) there indeed commences a new part of the introductory Mashal discourses. But, besides, we only seldom meet with[2] coincidences with the division and grouping which have commended themselves to us. In the MS. of the *Græcus Venetus*, xix. 11, 16, and 19 have their initial letters coloured red; but why only these verses, is not manifest. A comparison of the series of proverbs distinguished by such initials with the *Cod. Jaman.* and Cod. II. of the Leipzig City Library, makes it more than probable that it gives a traditional division of the *Mishle*, which may perhaps yet be discovered by a comparison of MSS.[3] But this much is clear, that a historico-literary reconstruction of the *Mishle*, and of its several parts, can derive no help from this comparison.

With xix. 26 there thus begins the fourth principal part of the Solomonic collection of proverbs introduced by i.–ix.

> He that doeth violence to his father and chaseth his mother,
> Is a son that bringeth shame and disgrace.

The right name is given in the second line to him who acts as is described in the first. שֹׁדֵד means properly to barricade [*obstruere*], and then in general to do violence to, here: to ruin one both as to life and property. The part., which has the force of an attributive clause, is continued in the finite: *qui matrem fugat;* this is the rule of the Heb. style, which is not φιλομέτοχος, Gesen. § 134, Anm. 2. Regarding מֵבִישׁ, *vid.* at x. 5; regarding the placing together of הֵבִישׁ וְהֶחְפִּיר, *vid.* xiii. 5, where for הֵבִישׁ, to make shame, to be scandalous, the word הֵבְאִישׁ, which is radically different, meaning to bring into bad odour, is used. The putting to shame is in בּוֹשׁ (kindred with Arab.

[1] *Vid.* the *Prefatio* to the Masoretico-Critical Edition of Isaiah by Baer and myself; Leipzig, 1872.

[2] There are spaces within the lines after i. 7, 9, 33, ii. 22, iii. 18, 35, v. 17, 23, vi. 4, 11, 15, 19 (here a פ), 35, viii. 21, 31, 35, ix. 18, xvii. 25, xviii. 9, xxii. 19, 27, xxiii. 14, xxiv. 22, 33, xxvi. 21, xxviii. 10, 16, xxix. 17, 27, xxx. 6, 9, 14, 17, 20, 23, 28, 33, xxxi. 9.

[3] *Vid.* Gebhardt's *Prolegomena* to his new edition of the *Versio Veneta.*

bâth) thought of as *disturbatio* (cf. *σύγχυσις*) (cf. at Ps. vi. 11), in חָפַר (*khfr*) as *opertio* (cf. Cicero's *Cluent.* 20: *infamia et dedecore opertus*), not, as I formerly thought, with Fürst, as reddening, blushing (*vid.* Ps. xxxiv. 6). Putting to shame would in this connection be too weak a meaning for מַחְפִּיר. The pædagogic stamp which ver. 26 impresses on this fourth principal part is made yet further distinct in the verse that now follows.

Ver. 27 Cease, my son, to hear instruction,
To depart from the words of knowledge.

Oetinger correctly: cease from hearing instruction if thou wilt make no other use of it than to depart, etc., *i.e.* cease to learn wisdom and afterwards to misuse it. The proverb is, as Ewald says, as "bloody irony;" but it is a dissuasive from hypocrisy, a warning against the self-deception of which Jas. i. 22–24 speaks, against heightening one's own condemnation, which is the case of that servant who knows his lord's will and does it not, Luke xii. 47. חָדַל, in the meaning to leave off doing something further, is more frequently construed with ל *seq. infin.* than with מִן (cf. *e.g.* Gen. xi. 8 with 1 Kings xv. 21); but if we mean the omission of a thing which has not yet been begun, then the construction is with ל, Num. ix. 13. Instead of לִשְׁגּוֹת, there might have been also used מִלִּשְׁגּוֹת (omit rather . . . than . . .), and לְמַעַן שְׁגוֹת would be more distinct; but as the proverb is expressed, לשגות is not to be mistaken as the subord. infin. of purpose. The LXX., Syr., Targ., and Jerome do violence to the proverb. Luther, after the example of older interpreters: instruction, that which leads away from prudent learning; but *musar* always means either discipline weaning from evil, or education leading to good.

Ver. 28 A worthless witness scoffeth at right;
And the mouth of the godless swalloweth up mischief.

The Mosaic law does not know the oath of witnesses; but the adjuring of witnesses to speak the truth, Lev. iv. 1, places a false statement almost in the rank of perjury. The מִשְׁפָּט, which legally and morally binds witnesses, is just their duty to state the matter in accordance with truth, and without deceitful and malicious reservation; but a worthless witness (*vid.* regarding בְּלִיַּעַל, vi. 12) despiseth what is right (יָלִיץ with accus.-

obj. like xiv. 9), *i.e.* scornfully disregards this duty. Under 28*b* Hitzig remarks that בלע only in *Kal* means to devour, but in *Piel*, on the contrary, to absorb = annihilate; therefore he reads with the LXX. and Syr. דִּין [justice] instead of אָוֶן [mischief]: the mouth of the wicked murders that which is right, properly, swallows down his feeling of right. But בְּלַע interchanges with בָּלַע in the sense of swallowing only, without the connected idea of annihilation; cf. כְּבַלַּע for the continuance [duration] of a gulp = for a moment, Num. iv. 20 with Job vii. 29; and one can thus understand 28*b* without any alteration of the text after Job xv. 16; cf. xx. 12–15, as well as with the text altered after Isa. iii. 12; by no means so that one makes און the subject: mischief swallows up, *i.e.* destroys, the mouth of the wicked (Rashi); for when "mouth" and "to swallow" stand connected, the mouth is naturally that which swallows, not that which is swallowed (cf. Eccles. x. 12: the mouth of the fool swallows, *i.e.* destroys, him). Thus 28*b* means that wickedness, *i.e.* that which is morally perverse, is a delicious morsel for the mouth of the godless, which he eagerly devours; to practise evil is for him, as we say, "*ein wahrer Genuss*" [a true enjoyment].

Ver. 29 Judgments are prepared for scorners,
And stripes for the backs of fools.

שְׁפָטִים never means punishment which a court of justice inflicts, but is always used of the judgments of God, even although they are inflicted by human instrumentality (*vid.* 2 Chron. xxiv. 24); the singular, which nowhere occurs, is the segolate *n. act.* שֶׁפֶט = שְׁפוֹט, 2 Chron. xx. 9, plur. שְׁפוּטִים. Hitzig's remark: "the judgment may, after ver. 25, consist in stripes," is misleading; the stroke, הַכּוֹת, there is such as when, *e.g.*, a stroke on the ear is applied to one who despises that which is holy, which, under the circumstances, may be salutary; but it does not fall under the category of *shephuthim*, nor properly under that of מַהֲלֻמוֹת. The former are providential chastisements with which history itself, or God in history, visits the despiser of religion; the latter are strokes which are laid on the backs of fools by one who is instructing them, in order, if possible, to bring them to thought and understanding. נָכוֹן, here inflected as *Niph.*, is used, as Job xv. 23, as meaning to be placed in readiness, and thus to be surely imminent. Regarding *mahalŭmoth*, *vid.* at xviii. 6.

Chap. xx. 1. This proverb warns against the debauchery with which free-thinking is intimately associated.

Wine is a mocker, mead boisterous;
And no one who is overtaken thereby is wise.

The article stands with יַיִן. Ewald maintains that in x.–xxii. 6 the article occurs only here and at xxi. 31, and that it is here, as the LXX. shows, not original. Both statements are incorrect. The article is found, *e.g.*, at xix. 6, xviii. 18, 17, and here the personification of "wine" requires it; but that it is wanting to שׁכר shows how little poetry delights in it; it stands once for twice. The effects of wine and mead (שֵׁכָר from שָׁכַר, to stop, obstruct, become stupid) are attributed to these liquors themselves as their property. Wine is a mocker, because he who is intoxicated with it readily scoffs at that which is holy; mead is boisterous (cf. הוֹמִיָּה, vii. 11), because he who is inebriated in his dissolute madness breaks through the limits of morality and propriety. He is unwise who, through wine and the like, *i.e.* overpowered by it (cf. 2 Sam. xiii. 28), staggers, *i.e.* he gives himself up to wine to such a degree that he is no longer master of himself. At v. 19 we read, שָׁגָה בְּ, of the intoxication of love; here, as at Isa. xxviii. 7, of the intoxication of wine, *i.e.* of the passionate slavish desire of wine or for wine. The word "*Erpicht*" [*avidissimus*], *i.e.* being indissolubly bound to a thing, corresponds at least in some degree to the idea. Fleischer compares the French: *être fou de quelque chose*. Isa. xxviii. 7, however, shows that one has to think on actual staggering, being overtaken in wine.

Ver. 2 A roaring as of a lion is the terror of the king;
And he that provoketh him forfeiteth his life.

Line first is a variation of xix. 12. The terror which a king spreads around (מְלָךְ, *gen. subjecti.*, as, *e.g.*, at Job ix. 34 and generally) is like the growling of a lion which threatens danger. The thought here suggested is that it is dangerous to arouse a lion. Thus מִתְעַבְּרוֹ does not mean: he who is angry at him (*Venet.*: χολούμενος αὐτῷ), but he who provokes him (LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther). הִתְעַבֵּר signifies, as we saw at xiv. 16, to be in a state of excessive displeasure, extreme anger. Here the meaning must be: he who puts him into a state of anger (LXX., ὁ παροξύνων αὐτόν, in other versions with the

addition of καὶ ἐπιμιγνύμενος, who conducts himself familiarly towards him = מִתְעָרֵבוּ). But can *mitharvo* have this meaning? That the *Hithpa.* of transitive stems, *e.g.* הִתְחַנֵּן (1 Kings viii. 59) and הִשְׁתַּפֵּר (Mic. vi. 16), is construed with the accus. of that which any one performs for himself (cf. Ewald's *Gramm. Arab.* § 180), is not unusual; but can the *Hithpa.* of the intrans. עבר, which signifies to fall into a passion, "express with the accusative the passion of another excited thereby" (Ewald, § 282*a*)? There is no evidence for this; and Hitzig's conjecture, מְתַעְבְּרוֹ (*Tiphel* of the Targ. תְּעַבּוֹר = עֲבָרָה), is thus not without occasion. But one might suppose that הִתְעַבֵּר, as the reflexive of a *Piel* or *Hiphil* which meant to be put into a state of anger, may mean to draw forth the anger of any one, as in Arab., the VIIIth form (*Hithpa.*) of *ḥadr*, to be present, with the accus. as reflexive of the IVth form, may mean: *sibi aliquid præsens sistere.* Not so difficult is חָטָא with the accus. of that which is missing, *vid.* viii. 36 and Hab. ii. 10.

Ver. 3 It is an honour to a man to remain far from strife;
But every fool showeth his teeth.

Or better: whoever is a fool *quisquis amens*, for the emphasis does not lie on this, that every fool, *i.e.* every single one of this sort, contends to the uttermost; but that whoever is only always a fool finds pleasure in such strife. Regarding הִתְגַּלַּע, *vid.* xvii. 14, xviii. 1. On the contrary, it is an honour to a man to be peaceable, or, as it is here expressed, to remain far from strife. The phrase may be translated: to desist from strife; but in this case the word would be pointed שְׁבֹת, which Hitzig prefers; for שְׁבֹת from שָׁבַת means, 2 Sam. xxiii. 7, annihilation (the termination of existence); also Ex. xxi. 19, שִׁבְתּוֹ does not mean to be keeping holy day; but to be sitting, viz. at home, in a state of incapability for work. Rightly Fleischer: "יָשַׁב מִן, like Arab. *k'ad ṣan*, to remain sitting quiet, and thus to hold oneself removed from any kind of activity." He who is prudent, and cares for his honour, not only breaks off strife when it threatens to become passionate, but does not at all enter into it, keeps himself far removed from it.

Ver. 4 At the beginning of the harvest the sluggard plougheth not;
And so when he cometh to the reaping-time there is nothing.

Many translators (Symmachus, Jerome, Luther) and inter-

preters (*e.g.* Rashi, Zöckler) explain: *propter frigus*; but חֹרֶף is, according to its verbal import, not a synon. of קֹר and צִנָּה, but means gathering = the time of gathering (synon. אָסִיף), from חָרַף, *carpere*,[1] as harvest, the time of the *καρπίζειν*, the plucking off of the fruit; but the harvest is the beginning of the old Eastern agricultural year, for in Palestine and Syria the time of ploughing and sowing with the harvest or early rains (יוֹרֶה=מֹרֶה, Neh. vii. 24; Ezra ii. 18) followed the fruit harvest from October to December. The מִן is thus not that of cause but of time. Thus rendered, it may mean the beginning of an event and onwards (*e.g.* 1 Sam. xxx. 25), as well as its termination and onwards (Lev. xxvii. 17): here of the harvest and its ingathering and onwards. In 4*b*, the *Chethîb* and *Kerî* vary as at xviii. 17. The *fut.* יִשְׁאַל would denote what stands before the sluggard; the *perf.* וְשָׁאַל places him in the midst of this, and besides has this in its favour, that, interpreted as *perf. hypotheticum*, it makes the absence of an object to שׁאל more tenable. The *Chethîb*, וְשָׁאֵל, is not to be read after Ps. cix. 10: he will beg in harvest—*in vain* (Jerome, Luther), to which Hitzig well remarks: Why in vain? Amid the joy of harvest people dispense most liberally; and the right time for begging comes later. Hitzig conjecturally arrives at the translation:

> "A pannier the sluggard provideth not;
> Seeketh to borrow in harvest, and nothing cometh of it."

But leaving out of view the "pannier," the meaning "to obtain something as a loan," which שׁאל from the connection may bear, is here altogether imaginary. Let one imagine to himself an indolent owner of land, who does not trouble himself about the tilling and sowing of his fields at the right time and with diligence, but leaves this to his people, who do only as much as is commanded them: such an one asks, when now the harvest-time has come, about the ingathering; but he receives the answer, that the land has lain unploughed, because he had not commanded it to be ploughed. When he asks, there is nothing, he asks in vain (וְאֵין, as at xiv. 6, xiii. 4). Meîri rightly explains מֵחֹרֶף by מתחלת זמן החרישה, and 4*b* by: "so then, when he asks at harvest time, he will find nothing;" on the other

[1] *Vid.* Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 426.

hand, the LXX. and Aram. think on חרף, *carpere conviciis*, as also in Codd. here and there is found the meaningless מְחֹרָף.

Ver. 5 The purpose in the heart of a man is deep water;
But a man of understanding draweth it out.

"Still waters are deep." Like such deep waters (xviii. 4) is that which a man hath secretly (Isa. xxix. 15) planned in his heart. He keeps it secret, conceals it carefully, craftily misleads those who seek to draw it out; but the man of תְּבוּנָה, *i.e.* one who possesses the right criteria for distinguishing between good and bad, true and false, and at the same time has the capacity to look through men and things, draws out (the *Venet.* well, *ἀνέλξει*) the secret עֵצָה, for he penetrates to the bottom of the deep water. Such an one does not deceive himself with men, he knows how to estimate their conduct according to its last underlying motive and aim; and if the purpose is one that is pernicious to him, he meets it in the process of realization. What is here said is applicable not only to the subtle statesman and the general, but also to the pragmatical historian and the expositor, as, *e.g.*, of a poem such as the book of Job, the idea of which lies like a pearl at the bottom of deep water.

Ver. 6 Almost every one meeteth a man who is gracious to him;
But a man who standeth the test, who findeth such an one?

As צִיר אמונים, xiii. 17, signifies a messenger in whom there is confidence, and עֵד אמונים, xiv. 5, a witness who is altogether truthful, so אִישׁ אֲמוּנִים is a man who remains true to himself, and maintains fidelity toward others. Such an one it is not easy to find; but patrons who make promises and awaken expectations, finally to leave in the lurch him who depends on them—of such there are many. This contrast would proceed from 6*a* also, if we took יִקְרָא in the sense of to call, to call or cry out with ostentation: *multi homines sunt quorum suam quisque humanitatem proclamat* (Schelling, Fleischer, Ewald, Zöckler, and also, *e.g.*, Meîri). But אִישׁ חַסְדּוֹ is certainly to be interpreted after xi. 17, Isa. lvii. 1. Recognising this, Hitzig translates: many a man one names his dear friend; but in point of style this would be as unsuitable as possible. Must יִקְרָא then mean *vocat?* A more appropriate parallel word to מְצָא is קָרָה = קָרָא, according to which, with Oetinger, Heidenheim, Euchel, and Löwenstein, we explain: the greater part of

men meet one who shows himself to them (to this or that man) as אִישׁ חֶסֶד, a man well-affectioned and benevolent; but it is rare to find one who in his affection and its fruits proves himself to be true, and actually performs that which was hoped for from him. Luther translates, with the Syr. and Targ. after Jerome: *Viel Menschen werden From gerhümbt* [many men are reputed pious]; but if יִקָּרֵא were equivalent to יְקֻבָּא, then אִישׁ חֶסֶד ought to have been used instead of אִישׁ חסדו. The LXX. read רב אדם יקר איש חסד, man is something great, and a compassionate man is something precious; but it costs trouble to find out a true man. The fundamental thought remains almost the same in all these interpretations and readings: love is plentiful; fidelity, rare; therefore חסד, of the right kind, after the image of God, is joined to אמת.

Ver. 7 He who in his innocence walketh as one upright,
Blessed are his children after him!

We may not take the first line as a separate clause with צַדִּיק, as subject (Van Dyk, Elster) or predicate (Targ.); for, thus rendered, it does not appropriately fall in as parallel to the second line, because containing nothing of promise, and the second line would then strike in at least not so unconnectedly (cf. on the contrary, x. 9, xiv. 25). We have before us a substantival clause, of which the first line is the complex subject. But Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther erroneously: the just man walking in his innocence; this placing first of the adj. is in opposition to the Hebr. syntax. We must, if the whole is to be interpreted as nom., regard צדיק as permutative: one walking in his innocence, a righteous one. But, without doubt, *tsedek* is the accus. of the manner; in the manner of one righteous, or in apposition: as one righteous; cf. Job xxxi. 26 with Mic. ii. 7. Thus Hitzig rightly also refers to these two passages, and Ewald also refers to xxii. 11, xxiv. 15. To walk in his innocence as a righteous man, is equivalent to always to do that which is right, without laying claim to any distinction or making any boast on that account; for thereby one only follows the impulse and the direction of his heart, which shows itself and can show itself not otherwise than in unreserved devotion to God and to that which is good. The children after him are not the children after his death (Gen. xxiv. 67); but, according

to Deut. iv. 40, cf. Job xxi. 21, those who follow his example, and thus those who come after him; for already in the lifetime of such an one, the benediction begins to have its fulfilment in his children.

The following group begins with a royal proverb, which expresses what a king does with his eyes. Two proverbs, of the seeing eye and the necessary opening of the eyes, close it.

Ver. 8 A king sitting on the seat of justice,
Scattereth asunder all evil with his eyes.

Excellently the *Venet.* ἐπὶ θρόνου δίκης, for כִּסֵּא־דִין is the name of the seat of rectitude (the tribunal), as the "throne of grace," Heb. iv. 17, is the name of the *capporeth* as the seat of mercy; the seat of the judge is merely called כִּסֵּא; on the other hand, כִּסֵּא־דִין is the contrast of כִּסֵּא הַוּוֹת, Ps. xciv. 20: the seat from which the decision that is in conformity with what is right (cf., *e.g.*, Jer. v. 28) goes forth, and where it is sought. As little here as at ver. 26 is there need for a characterizing adj. to *melek;* but the LXX. hits the meaning for it, understands such to דִין: ὅταν βασιλεὺς δίκαιος καθίσῃ ἐπὶ θρόνου. By the "eyes" are we then to understand those of the mind: he sifts, *dignoscit*, with the eyes of the mind all that is evil, *i.e.* distinguishes it subjectively from that which is not evil? Thus Hitzig by a comparison of Ps. xi. 4, cxxxix. 3 (where Jerome has *eventilasti*, the Vulg. *investigasti*). Scarcely correctly, for it lies nearer to think on the eyes in the king's head (*vid.* xvi. 15); in that case: to winnow (to sift) means to separate the good and the bad, but first mediately: to exclude the bad; finally, ver. 26 leads to the conclusion that מְזָרֶה is to be understood, not of a subjective, but of an actual scattering, or separating, or driving away. Thus the penetrating, fear-inspiring eyes of the king are meant, as Immanuel explains: בראיית עיניו מבריחם מפניו ומפזר אותם בכל פיאה. But in this explanation the personal rendering of כָּל־רָע is incorrect; for *mezareh*, meant of the driving asunder of persons, requires as its object a plur. (cf. 26*a*). *Col-ra* is understood as neut. like v. 14. Before the look of a king to whom it belongs to execute righteousness and justice (Isa. xvi. 5), nothing evil stands; criminal acts and devices seen through, and so also judged by these eyes, are broken up and scattered to all the winds, along with the danger that thereby threatened

the community. It is the command: "put away the evil" (Deut. xiii. 6 [5]), which the king carries into effect by the powerful influence of his look. With *col-ra* there is connected the thought that in the presence of the heavenly King no one is wholly free from sin.

Ver. 9 Who can say I have made my heart clean,
I am pure from my sins?

It it the same thought that Solomon expresses in his prayer at the consecration of the temple, 1 Kings viii. 46: there is no man who sinneth not. To cleanse his heart (as Ps. lxxiii. 13), is equivalent to to empty it, by self-examination and earnest effort after holiness, of all impure motives and inclinations; *vid.* regarding זכה, to be piercing, shining brightly, cloudlessly pure, Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 424. The consequence of זְכוּת is, becoming pure; and the consequence of זְכוּת לֵב, *i.e.* of the purifying of the heart, the being pure from sinful conduct: I have become pure from my sins, *i.e.* from such as I might fall into by not resisting temptations; the suffix is not understood as actual, but as potential, like Ps. xviii. 24. No one can boast of this, for man's knowledge of himself and of his sins remains always limited (Jer. xvii. 9 f.; Ps. xix. 13); and sin is so deeply rooted in his nature (Job xiv. 4, xv. 14–16), that the remains of a sinful tendency always still conceal themselves in the folds of his heart, sinful thoughts still cross his soul, sinful inclinations still sometimes by their natural force overcome the moral resistance that opposes them, and stains of all kinds still defile even his best actions.

Ver. 10. This proverb passes sentence of condemnation against gross sins in action and life.

Diverse stones, diverse measures—
An abomination to Jahve are they both.

The stones are, as at xi. 1, xvi. 11, those used as weights. Stone and stone, ephah and ephah, means that they are of diverse kinds, one large and one small (the LXX., in which the sequence of the proverbs from ver. 10 is different, has *μέγα καὶ μικρόν*), so that one may be able deceitfully to substitute the one for the other. אֵיפָה (from אָפָה, to bake) may originally have been used to designate such a quantity of meal as supplied a family of moderate wants; it corresponds to the *bath* (Ezek.

xlv. 11) as a measure for fluids, and stands here synecdochically instead of all the measures, including, *e.g.*, the *cor*, of which the *ephah* was a tenth part, and the *seah*, which was a third part of it. 10*b* = xvii. 5, an echo of Lev. xix. 36; Deut. xxv. 13–16. Just and equal measure is the demand of a holy God; the contrary is to Him an abhorrence.

Ver. 11 Even a child maketh himself known by his conduct,
Whether his disposition be pure and whether it be right.

If מַעֲלָל may be here understood after the use of עוֹלֵל, to play, to pass the time with anything, then גַּם refers thereto: even by his play (Ewald). But granting that מְעוֹלֵל [children], synon. with נער, had occasioned the choice of the word מעלל (*vid.* Fleischer on Isa. iii. 4), yet this word never means anything else than work, an undertaking of something, and accomplishing it; wherefore Böttcher proposes מַעֲלוּלָיו, for מַעֲלוּל may have meant play, in contradistinction to מַעֲלָל. This is possible, but conjectural. Thus *gam* is not taken along with *b'amalalav*. That the child also makes himself known by his actions, is an awkward thought; for if in anything else, in these he must show what one has to expect from him. Thus *gam* is after the syntactical method spoken of at xvii. 26, xix. 2, to be referred to נער (also the child, even the child), although in this order it is referred to the whole clause. The verb נכר is, from its fundamental thought, to perceive, observe from an *ἐναντιόσημον*: to know, and to know as strange, to disown (*vid.* under Isa. iii. 9); the *Hithpa.* elsewhere signifies, like (Arab.) *tankkar*, to make oneself unknowable, but here to make oneself knowable; Symmachus, *ἐπιγνωρισθήσεται*, *Venet.* *γνωσθήσεται*. Or does the proverb mean: even the child dissembles in his actions (Oetinger)? Certainly not, for that would be a statement which, thus generally made, is not justified by experience. We must then interpret 11*b* as a direct question, though it has the form of an indirect one: he gives himself to be known, viz. whether his disposition be pure and right. That one may recognise his actions in the conduct of any one, is a platitude; also that one may recognise his conduct in these, is not much better. פֹּעַל is therefore referred by Hitzig to God as the Creator, and he interprets it in the sense of the Arab. *khulk*, being created = *natura*. We also in this way explain יְצָרָנוּ, Ps.

ciii. 14, as referable to God the יוֹצֵר; and that *poal* occurs, *e.g.* Isa. i. 31, not merely in the sense of action, but also in that of performance or structure, is favourable to this interpretation. But one would think that *poal*, if thus used in the sense of the nature of man, would have more frequently occurred. It everywhere else means action or work. And thus it is perhaps also here used to denote action, but regarded as habitual conduct, and according to the root-meaning, moral disposition. The N. T. word ἔργον approaches this idea in such passages as Gal. vi. 4. It is less probable that 11*b* is understood with reference to the future (Luther and others); for in that case one does not see why the poet did not make use of the more intelligible phrase אם זך וישר יהיה פעלו. It is like our (Germ.) proverb: *Was ein Haken werden will krümmt sich bald* [what means to become a hook bends itself early]; or: *Was ein Dörnchen werden will spitzt sich bei Zeiten*[1] [what means to become a thorn sharpens itself early], and to the Aram. בוצין מקטפיה ידיע בוצין = that which will become a gourd shows itself in the bud, *Berachoth* 48*a*.

Ver. 12 The hearing ear and the seeing eye—
Jahve hath created them both.

Löwenstein, like the LXX.: the ear hears and the eye sees—it is enough to refer to the contrary to ver. 10 and xvii. 15. In itself the proverb affirms a fact, and that is its *sensus simplex*; but besides, this fact may be seen from many points of view, and it has many consequences, none of which is to be rejected as contrary to the meaning: (1.) It lies nearest to draw the conclusion, *viâ eminentiæ*, which is drawn in Ps. xciv. 9. God is thus the All-hearing and the All-seeing, from which, on the one side, the consolation arises that everything that is seen stands under His protection and government, xv. 3; and on the other side, the warning, *Aboth* ii. 1: "Know what is above thee; a Seeing eye and a Hearing ear, and all thy conduct is marked in His book." (2.) With this also is connected the sense arising out of the combination in Ps. xl. 7: man ought then to use the ear and the eye in conformity with the design which they are intended to subserve, according to

[1] A similar comparison from *Bereschith Rabba, vid.* Duke's *Rabbin. Blumenlese*, p. 126.

the purpose of the Creator (Hitzig compares xvi. 4); it is not first applicable to man with reference to the natural, but to the moral life: he shall not make himself deaf and blind to that which it is his duty to hear and to see; but he ought also not to hear and to see with pleasure that from which he should turn away (Isa. xxxiii. 15),—in all his hearing and seeing he is responsible to the Creator of the ear and the eye. (3.) One may thus interpret "hearing" and "seeing" as commendable properties, as Fleischer suggests from comparison of xvi. 11: an ear that truly hears (the word of God and the lessons of Wisdom) and an eye that truly sees (the works of God) are a gift of the Creator, and are (Arab.) *lillhi*, are to be held as high and precious. Thus the proverb, like a polished gem, may be turned now in one direction and now in another; it is to be regarded as a many-sided fact.

Ver. 13 Love not sleep, lest thou become poor;
Open thine eyes, and have enough to eat.

What is comprehended in the first line here is presented in detail in vi. 9–11. The *fut. Niph.* of רוּשׁ, to become poor (cf. x. 4), is formed metaplastically from יִרַּשׁ, xxiii. 21, xxx. 9, as at 1 Sam. ii. 7; Hitzig compares (Arab.) *ryth*, which, however, means to loiter or delay, not to come back or down. The R. רש signifies either to be slack without support (cf. דַּל), or to desire (cf. אֶבְיוֹן, Arab. *fkyr*, properly *hiscens*, R. פק, as in פקח, to open widely, which here follows). Regarding the second imper. 13*b*, *vid.* iii. 4: it has the force of a consequence, *Las deine augen wacker sein, So wirstu brots gnug haben* (Luth.) [Let thine eyes be open, so shalt thou have bread enough]. With these two proverbs of the eyes, the group beginning with ver. 8 rounds itself off.

The following group has its natural limit at the new point of departure at ver. 20, and is internally connected in a diversity of ways.

Ver. 14 "Bad, bad!" saith the buyer;
And going his way, he boasteth then.

Luther otherwise:

"Bad, bad!" saith one if he hath it;
But when it is gone, then he boasteth of it.

This rendering has many supporters. Geier cites the words of the Latin poet:

"*Omne bonum præsens minus est, sperata videntur Magna.*"

Schultens quotes the proverbs τὸ παρὸν βαρύ and *Præsentia laudato*, for with Luther, he refers ואזל לו to the present possession (אזל, as 1 Sam. ix. 7 = (Arab.) *zâl*, to cease, to be lost), and translates: *at dilapsum sibi, tum demum pro splendido celebrat.* But by this the *Hithpa.* does not receive its full meaning; and to extract from הַקּוֹנֶה the idea to which ואזל לו refers, if not unnecessary, is certainly worthless. *Hakkoneh* may also certainly mean the possessor, but the possessor by acquisition (LXX. and the *Venet.* ὁ κτώμενος); for the most part it signifies the possessor by purchase, the buyer (Jerome, *emptor*), as correlate of מֹכֵר, Isa. xxiv. 2; Ezek. iv. 12. It is customary for the buyer to undervalue that which he seeks to purchase, so as to obtain it as cheaply as possible; afterwards he boasts that he has bought that which is good, and yet so cheap. That is an every-day experience; but the proverb indirectly warns against conventional lying, and shows that one should not be startled and deceived thereby. The subject to ואזל לו is thus the buyer; אזל with לו denotes, more definitely even than הלך לו, going from thence, *s'en aller*. Syntactically, the punctuation וְאָזַל לוֹ [and he takes himself off] (*perf. hypoth.*, Ewald, 357*a*) would have been near (Jerome: *et cum recesserit*); but yet it is not necessary, with Hitzig, thus to correct it. The poet means to say: making himself off, he then boasts. We cannot in German place the "*alsdann*" [then] as the אָז here, and as also, *e.g.* at 1 Sam. xx. 12; but Theodotion, in good Greek: καὶ πορευθεὶς τότε καυχήσεται. We may write וְאָזַל לוֹ with *Mercha* on the antepenult, on which the accent is thrown back, cf. חוֹנֵן, xix. 17, but not לוֹ; for the rule for *Dagesh* does not here, with the retrogression of the tone, come into application, as, *e.g.*, in אוֹכַל לַחְמִי, Ps. xli. 10. Singularly the Syr. and Targ. do not read רַע רַע, but רַע לְרַע, and couple ver. 15 with 14. In the LXX., vers. 14–19 are wanting.

Ver. 15 There is indeed gold, and many pearls;
But a precious treasure are lips full of knowledge.

In order to find a connection between this proverb and that which precedes, we need only be reminded of the parable of

the merchantman who sought goodly pearls, Matt. xiii. 45 f. The proverb rises to a climax: there is gold, and there are pearls in abundance, the one of which has always a higher value than the other; but intelligent lips are above all such jewels—they are a precious treasure, which gold and all pearls cannot equal. In a similar manner the N. T. places the one pearl above the many goodly pearls. So might דעת (*chokma*) be called the pearl above all pearls (iii. 15, viii. 11); but the lips as the organ of knowledge are fittingly compared with a precious vessel, a vessel of more precious substance than gold and pearls are.

Ver. 16 Take from him the garment, for he hath become surety for another;
And for strangers take him as a pledge.

The same proverb xxvii. 13, where קַח, with the usual aphæresis, here interchanges with it the fuller form לְקַח, which is also found at Ezek. xxxvii. 16. To this imperative חַבְלֵהוּ is parallel: take him as a pledge (Theodotion, Jerome, the *Venet.* and Luther); it is not a substantive: his pledge (Targ.), which would require the word חַבְלָתוֹ (חַבְלוֹ); nor is it to be read with the Syr. חַבָּלֵהוּ, one pledges him; but it is imperative, not however of the *Piel*, which would be חַבְּלֵהוּ, and would mean "destroy him;" but, as Aben Ezra rightly, the imperative of *Kal* of חָבַל, to take as a pledge, Ex. xxii. 25, for חַבְלֵהוּ without any example indeed except חַנֵּנִי, Ps. ix. 14; cf. lxxx. 16. The first line is clear: take his garment, for he has become good for another (cf. xi. 15), who has left him in the lurch, so that he must now become wise by experience. The second line also is intelligible if we read, according to the *Chethîb*, נָכְרִים (Jerome, the *Venet.*), not נָכְרִים, as Schultens incorrectly points it, and if we interpret this plur. like בנים, Gen. xxi. 7, with Hitzig following Luther, as plur. of the category: take him as a pledge, hold fast by his person, so as not to suffer injury from strange people for whom he has become surety. But the *Kerî* requires נָכְרִיָּה (according to which Theodotion and the Syr., and, more distinctly still than these, the Targ. translates), and thus, indeed, it stands written, xxvii. 13, without the *Kerî*, thus *Bathra* 173*b* reads and writes also here. Either נָכְרִיָּה is a strange woman, a prostitute, a *maitresse* for whom the unwise has made himself

surety, or it is neut. for *aliena res* (LXX. xxvii. 13, τὰ ἀλλότρια), a matter not properly belonging to this unwise person. We regard נכרים in this passage as original. בעד coincides with vi. 26: it does not mean *ἀντί*, but *ὑπέρ*; "for strange people" is here equivalent to for the sake of, on account of strange people (*χάριν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων*, as the *Venet.* translates it).

Ver. 17 Sweet to a man is the bread of deceit;
Yet at last his mouth is full of gravel.

"Bread of deceit" is not deceit itself, as that after which the desire of a man goes forth, and that for which he has a relish (thus, *e.g.*, Immanuel and Hitzig); but that which is not gained by labour, and is not merited. Possession (*vid.* iv. 17) or enjoyment (ix. 17) obtained by deceit is thus called, as לֶחֶם כְּזָבִים, xxiii. 3, denotes bread; but for him who has a relish for it, it is connected with deceit. Such bread of lies is sweet to a man, because it has come to him without effort, but in the end not only will he have nothing to eat, but his tongue, teeth, and mouth will be injured by small stones; *i.e.* in the end he will have nothing, and there will remain to him only evil (Fleischer). Or: it changes itself (Job xx. 14) at last into gravel, of which his mouth is filled full, as we might say, "it lies at last in his stomach like lead." חָצָץ is the Arab. *hatny*, gravel (Hitzig, *grien* = *gries*, coarse sand, grit), R. חצץ, *scindere*. Similarly in Arab. *hajar*, a stone, is used as the image of disappointed expectations, *e.g.* the adulterer finds a stone, *i.e.* experiences disappointment.

Ver. 18 Plans are established by counsel,
And with prudent government make war.

From the conception of a thought, practically influencing the formation of our own life and the life of the community, to its accomplishment there is always a long way which does not lead to the end unless one goes forward with counsel and strength combined, and considers all means and eventualities. The *Niph.* of כון means, in a passive sense: to be accomplished or realized (Ps. cxli. 2). The clause 18*a* is true for times of war as well as for times of peace; war is disastrous, unless it is directed with strategic skill (*vid.* regarding תַּחְבֻּלוֹת, i. 5). Grotius compares the proverb, *Γνῶμαι πλέον κρατοῦσιν ἢ σθένος χειρῶν*. In xxiv. 6, the necessity of counsel is also referred to the case of war. Ewald would read [the infin.] עֲשֹׂה, or

עָשׂה: with management it is that one carries on war. But why? Because to him the challenge to carry on war appears to be contrary to the spirit of proverbial poetry. But the author of the proverb does certainly mean: if thou hast to carry on war, carry it on with the skill of a general; and the imper. is protected by xxiv. 6 against that infin., which is, besides, stylistically incongruous.

Ver. 19 He that goeth out gossiping revealeth a secret;
And with the babbler have nothing to do.

Luther otherwise (like Hitzig)—

Be not complicated with him who revealeth a secret,
And with the slanderer, and with the false (better: loquacious) mouth,

so that ל and the warning apply to the threefold description, a rendering which Kimchi also, and Immanuel, and others at least suggest. But in connection with xi. 13, the first line has the force of a *judicium*, which includes the warning to entrust nothing to a babbler which ought to be kept silent. Write גּוֹלֶה סוֹד, as found in Codd. and old Edd., with *Munach* on the *penultima*, on which the tone is thrown back, and *Dagesh* to ם, after the rule of the דחיק (Gesen. § 20, 2*a*), altogether like קוֹנֵה לֵב, xv. 32. 19*b* the *Venet.* translates after the first meaning of the word by Kimchi, *τῷ ἀπαταιῶνι τοῖς χείλεσι*, to him who slanders and befools, for it thus improves Theodotion's *τῷ ἀπατῶντι τὰ χείλη αὐτοῦ*. But פֹּתֶה means, Job v. 2, —cf. Hos. vii. 11,—not him who befools another, but him who is befooled, is slandered, by another (Aben Ezra: שיפתוהו אחרים), with which שְׂפָתָיו here does not agree. But now he who is easily befooled is called פֹּתֶה, as being open to influence (susceptible), *patens*; and if this particip. is used, as here, transitively, and, on account of the object שפתיו standing near cannot possibly be equivalent to מְפַתֶּה, the usage of the language also just noticed is against it, then it means *patefaciens* or *dilatans* (cf. הַפְתָּה, Gen. ix. 27, Targ. אַפְתִּי = הַרְחִיב), and places itself as synon. to פֹּשֵׂק, xiii. 3; thus one is called who does not close his mouth, who cannot hold his mouth, who always idly babbles, and is therefore, because he can keep nothing to himself, a dangerous companion. The Complut. rightly translates: *μετὰ πλατύνοντος τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ μίχθητι χείλη*.

The following group begins, for once more the aim of this older Book of Proverbs becomes prominent, with an inculcation of the fourth[1] commandment.

Ver. 20 He that curseth his father and his mother,
His light is extinguished in midnight darkness.

The divine law, Ex. xxi. 17, Lev. xx. 9, condemns such an one to death. But the proverb does not mean this sentence against the criminal, which may only seldom be carried into execution, but the fearful end which, because of the righteousness of God ruling in history, terminates the life of such an unnatural son (xxx. 17). Of the godless, it has already been said that their light is extinguished, xiii. 9, there is suddenly an end to all that brightened, *i.e.* made happy and embellished their life; but he who acts wickedly (קֹלֵל, R. קל, *levem esse*, synon. הָקֵלָה, Deut. xxvii. 16), even to the cursing of his father and mother, will see himself surrounded by midnight darkness (Symmachus, σκοτομήνη, moonless night), not: he will see himself in the greatest need, forsaken by divine protection (Fleischer), for Jansen rightly: *Lux et lucerna in scripturis et vitæ claritatem et posteritatem et prosperitatem significat.* The apple of the eye, אִישׁוֹן, of darkness (*vid.* vii. 9), is that which forms the centre or centralization of darkness. The Syr. renders it correctly by *bobtho*, pupil [of the eye], but the Targ. retains the אֱשׁוֹן of the *Kerî*, and renders it in Aram. by אֶתּוֹן, which Rashi regards as an infin., Parchon as a particip. after the form עֶרוֹךְ; but it may be also an infin. substantive after the form עֶזּוֹז, and is certainly nothing else than the abbreviated and vocally obscured אִישׁוֹן. For the Talm. אָשַׁן, to be hard, furnishes no suitable idea; and the same holds true of אֲשׁוּנֵי, times, Lev. xv. 25 of the Jerusalem Targ.; while the same abbreviation and the same passing over of *o* into *u* represents this as the inflected אִישׁוֹן (= עֵת). There is also no evidence for a verb אָשַׁן, to be black, dark; the author of Aruch interprets אשונא, *Bereschith Rabba*, c. 33, with reference to the passage before us, of a dark bathing apartment, but only tentatively, and אישון is there quoted as the Targ. of צֵל, Gen. xix. 8, which the text lying before us does not ratify. *Ishon* means the little man (in the eye), and neither the blackness

[1] *i.e.* The *fifth* according to the arrangement of the Westminster Confession.]

(Buxtorf and others) nor the point of strength, the central point (Levy) of the eye.[1]

Ver. 21 An inheritance which in the beginning is obtained in haste,
Its end will not be blessed.

The partic. מְבֹהָל may, after Zech. xi. 8, cf. Syr. ܡܫܬܥܠ, *nauseans*, mean "detested," but that affords here no sense; rather it might be interpreted after the Arab. *bajila*, to be avaricious, "gotten by avarice, niggardliness," with which, however, neither נַחֲלָה, inheritance, nor, since avarice is a chronic disease, בְּרֵאשׁוֹנָה agrees. On the contrary, the *Kerî* מְבֹהֶלֶת [hastened] perfectly agrees, both linguistically (*vid.* xxviii. 22; cf. xiii. 11) and actually; for, as Hitzig remarks, the words following ver. 20 fully harmonize with the idea of an inheritance, into the possession of which one is put before it is rightly due to him; for a son such as that, the parents may live too long, and so he violently deprives them of the possession (cf. xix. 26); but on such a possession there rests no blessing. Since the *Piel* may mean to hasten, Esth. ii. 9, so מְבֹהָל may mean hastened = speedy, Esth. viii. 14, as well as made in haste. All the old interpreters adopt the *Kerî;* the Aram. render it well by מְסַרְהַבָּא, from מְסַרְהַב, overturned; and Luther, like Jerome, *hæreditas ad quam festinatur.*

Ver. 22 Say not: I will avenge the evil;
Hope in Jahve, so will He help thee.

Men ought always to act toward their neighbours according to the law of love, and not according to the *jus talionis*, xxiv. 29; they ought not only, by requiting good with evil (xvi. 13; Ps. vii. 5*a*, xxxv. 12), not to transgress this law of requital, but they ought to surpass it, by also recompensing not evil with evil (*vid.* regarding עֵקֶב, and synon. to xvii. 13); and that is what the proverb means, for 22*b* supposes injustice suffered, which might stir up a spirit of revenge. It does not, however, say that men ought to commit the taking of vengeance to God; but, in the sense of Rom. xii. 17–19, 1 Pet. iii. 9, that, renouncing all dependence on self, they ought to commit their deliverance out of the distress into which they have fallen, and their vindication, into the hands of God; for the promise is not that He will avenge them, but that

[1] *Vid.* Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 419.

He will help them. The jussive וישע (write וְיֹשַׁע, according to *Metheg-setzung*, § 42, with *Gaja* as העמדה, with the ע to secure distinct utterance to the final guttural) states as a consequence, like, *e.g.*, 2 Kings v. 10, what will then happen (Jerome, Luther, Hitzig) if one lets God rule (Gesen. § 128, 2*c*); equally possible, syntactically, is the rendering: that He may help thee (LXX., Ewald); but, regarded as a promise, the words are more in accordance with the spirit of the proverb, and they round it off more expressively.

Ver. 23 An abomination to Jahve are two kinds of weights;
And deceitful balances are not good.

A variant to ver. 10, xi. 1. The pred. לֹא־טוֹב (xvii. 26, xviii. 5, xix. 3) is conceived of as neut.; they are not good, much rather bad and pernicious, for the deceiver succeeds only in appearance; in reality he fails.

Ver. 24 The steps of a man depend on Jahve;
And a man—how can he understand his way?

Line first is from Ps. xxxvii. 23, but there, where the clause has the verbal predicate כּוֹנְנוּ, the meaning is that it is the gracious assistance of God, by virtue of which a man takes certain steps with his feet, while here we have before us a variation of the proverb "*der Mensch denkt, Gott lenkt*" [= man proposes, God disposes], xvi. 9, Jer. x. 23; for מִן, as at 2 Sam. iii. 37, Ps. cxviii. 23, denotes God in general as conditioning, as the ultimate cause. Man is indeed free to turn himself hither or thither, to decide on this course of conduct or on that, and is therefore responsible for it; but the relations co-operating in all his steps as the possible and defining conditions are God's contrivance and guidance, and the consequences which are connected with his steps and flow therefrom, lie beyond the power of man,—every one of his steps is a link of a chain, neither the beginning nor the end of which he can see; while, on the other hand, God's knowledge comprehends the beginning, middle, and end, and the wisdom of God ruling in the sphere of history, makes all human activity, the free action of man, subservient to his world-plan. The question, which has a negative answer, is applicable to man: what, *i.e.* how shall he understand his way? מה is like, *e.g.*, Ex. x. 26, Job ix. 2, xix. 28, accus., and fluctuates between the functions of a governed accusative: What

does he understand . . . (Job xi. 8) and an adv.: how, *i.e.* how so little, how even not, for it is the מה of the negative question which has become in (Arab.) *mâ* a word of negation. The way of a man is his life's-course. This he understands in the present life only relatively, the true unravelling of it remains for the future.

Ver. 25 It is a snare to a man to cry out hastily "holy;"
And first after vows to investigate.

Two other interpretations of the first line have been proposed. The snare of a man devours, *i.e.* destroys the holy; but then מוֹקֵשׁ אָדָם must be an expression of an action, instead of an expression of an endurance, which is impossible. The same is true against the explanation: the snare of a man devours, *i.e.* consumes, eats up the holy, which as such is withdrawn from common use. Jerome with his *devotare sanctos*, and Luther with his *das Heilige lestern* [to calumniate the holy], give to לוּעַ = בָּלַע a meaning which loses itself in the arbitrary. Accordingly, nothing is to be done with the meaning *καταπίεται* (Aquila, the *Venet.*). But יָלַע will be the abbreviated fut. of לוּעַ (from יְלוּעַ), or לָעַע (יְלַע), Job vi. 3 = (Arab.) *laghâ temere loqui (proloqui)*; and קֹדֶשׁ (after Hitzig: consecration, which is contrary to usage) is like *κορβᾶν*, Mark vii. 11, the exclamation to which one suddenly gives utterance, thereby meaning that this or that among his possessions henceforth no longer belongs to him, but is consecrated to God, and thus ought to be delivered up to the temple. Such a sudden vow and halting deference to the oath that has been uttered is a snare to a man, for he comes to know that he has injured himself by the alienation of his property, which he has vowed beyond that which was due from him, or that the fulfilling of his vow is connected with difficulties, and perhaps also to others, with regard to whom its disposal was not permitted to him, is of evil consequences, or it may be he is overcome by repentance and is constrained to break his oath. The LXX. hits the true meaning of the proverb with rare success: *Παγὶς ἀνδρὶ ταχύ τι τῶν ἰδίων ἁγιάσαι, μετὰ δὲ τὸ εὔξασθαι μετανοεῖν γίνεται.* נְדָרִים is plur. of the category (cf. 16*b* *Chethîb*), and בַּקֵּר, as 2 Kings xvi. 15, Arab. *bakr*, *examinare*, *inquirere*, means to subject to investigation, viz. whether he ought to observe, and might observe, a vow such as this, or whether he

might not and ought not rather to renounce it (Fleischer). Viewed syntactically, 25*a* is so difficult, that Bertheau, with Hitzig, punctuates יָלַע; but this substantive must be formed from a verb יָלַע (cf. Hab. iii. 13), and this would mean, after (Arab.) *wala'*, "to long eagerly for," which is not suitable here. The punctuation shows ילע as the 3d. fut. What interpreters here say of the doubled accent of the word arises from ignorance: the correct punctuation is יָלַּע, with *Gaja* to ע, to give the final guttural more force in utterance. The poet appears to place in the foreground: "a snare for a man," as a *rubrum;* and then continuing the description, he cries out suddenly "holy!" and after the vow, he proceeds to deliberate upon it. Fleischer rightly: *post vota inquisiturus est* (*in ea*) = יָהִיה לְבַקֵּר; *vid.* at Hab. i. 17, which passage Hitzig also compares as syntactically very closely related.

Ver. 26 A wise king winnoweth the godless,
And bringeth over them the wheel.

A variant to xx. 8, but here with the following out of the figure of the winnowing. For אוֹפָן with מְזָרֶה is, without doubt, the wheel of the threshing-cart, עֲגָלָה, Isa. xxviii. 27 f.; and thus with מִזְרֶה, the winnowing fork, מִזְרֶה is to be thought of; *vid.* a description of them along with that of the winnowing shovel, רַחַת, in Wetzstein's *Excursus* to Isa., p. 707 ff. We are not to think of the punishment of the wheel, which occurs only as a terrible custom of war (*e.g.* Amos i. 3). It is only meant that a wise king, by sharp and vigorous procedure, separates the godless, and immediately visits them with merited punishment, as he who works with the winnowing shovel gives the chaff to the wind. Most ancient interpreters think on אוֹפָן (from אָפַן, *vertere*) in its metaphorical meaning: τρόπος (thus also Löwenstein, he deals with them according to merit), or the wheel of fortune, with reference to the constellations; thus, misfortune (Immanuel, Meîri). Arama, Oetinger, and others are, however, on the right track.

With a proverb of a light that was extinguished, ver. 20 began the group; the proverb of God's light, which here follows, we take as the beginning of a new group.

Ver. 27 A candle of Jahve is the soul of man,
Searching through all the chambers of the heart.

If the O. T. language has a separate word to denote the self-conscious personal human spirit in contradistinction to the spirit of a beast, this word, according to the usage of the language, as Reuchlin, in an appendix to Aben Ezra, remarks, is נְשָׁמָה; it is so called as the principle of life breathed immediately by God into the body (*vid.* at Gen. ii. 7, vii. 22). Indeed, that which is here said of the human spirit would not be said of the spirit of a beast: it is "the mystery of self-consciousness which is here figuratively represented" (Elster). The proverb intentionally does not use the word נֶפֶשׁ, for this is not the power of self-consciousness in man, but the medium of bodily life; it is related secondarily to נשמה (רוח), while נשמת חיים (רוח) is used, נפשׁ חיים is an expression unheard of. Hitzig is in error when he understands by נשמה here the soul in contradistinction to the spirit, and in support of this appeals to an expression in the *Cosmography* of *Kazwîni:* "the soul (Arab. *âl-nefs*) is like the lamp which moves about in the chambers of the house;" here also *en-nefs* is the self-conscious spirit, for the Arab. and post-bibl. Heb. terminology influenced by philosophy reverses the biblical usage, and calls the rational soul נפשׁ, and, on the contrary, the animal soul נשמה, רוח (*Psychologie,* p. 154). חֹפֶשׂ is the particip. of חָפַשׂ, Zeph. i. 12, without distinguishing the *Kal* and *Piel.* Regarding חַדְרֵי־בָטֶן, LXX. *ταμιεῖα κοιλίας, vid.* at xviii. 8: בֶּטֶן denotes the inner part of the body (R. בט, to be deepened), and generally of the personality; cf. Arab. *bâtn âlrwh,* the interior of the spirit, and xxii. 18, according to which Fleischer explains: "A candle of Jahve, *i.e.* a means bestowed on man by God Himself to search out the secrets deeply hid in the spirit of another." But the candle which God has kindled in man has as the nearest sphere of illumination, which goes forth from it, the condition of the man himself—the spirit comprehends all that belongs to the nature of man in the unity of self-consciousness, but yet more: it makes it the object of reflection; it penetrates, searching it through, and seeks to take it up into its knowledge, and recognises the problem proposed to it, to rule it by its power. The proverb is thus to be ethically understood: the spirit is that which penetrates that which is within, even into its many secret corners and folds, with its self-testing and self-knowing light

—it is, after Matt. vi. 22, the inner light, the inner eye. Man becomes known to himself according to his moral as well as his natural condition in the light of the spirit; "for what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him?" says Paul, 1 Cor. ii. 11. With reference to this Solomonic proverb, the seven-branched candlestick is an ancient symbol of the soul, *e.g.* on the Jewish sepulchral monuments of the Roman *viâ Portuensis*. Our texts present the phrase נֵר יְהוָה; but the Talm. *Pesachim* 7*b*, 8*a*, the *Pesikta* in part 8, the Midrash *Othijoth de-Rabbi Akiba*, under the letter נ, Alphasi (ר"יף) in *Pesachim*, and others, read נֵר אֱלֹהִים; and after this phrase the Targum translates, while the Syr. and the other old versions render by the word "Lord" (*Venet.* ὀντωτής), and thus had יהוה before them.

Ver. 28 Love and truth guard the king;
And he supports his throne by love.

We have not in the German [nor in the Eng.] language a couple of words that completely cover חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת; when they are used of God, we translate them by grace and truth [*Gnade u. Wahrheit*], Ps. xl. 12 (יִצְּרוּנִי); when of men, by love and truth [*Liebe u. Treue*], xvi. 6; and when of the two-sided divine forces, by kindness and truth, iii. 3. Love and truth are the two good spirits that guard the king. If it is elsewhere said that the king's throne is supported "with judgment and with justice," Isa. ix. 6 [7]; here, on the other side, we see that the exercise of government must have love as its centre; he has not only to act on the line of right, שִׁוּרַת הַדִּין; but, as the later proverb says, in such a way, that within this circle his conduct is determined by the central motive of love. In this sense we give the king not only the title of *Grossmächtigster* [most high and mighty], but also that of "*Allergnädigster*" [most gracious], for the king can and ought to exercise grace before other men; the virtue of condescension establishes his throne more than the might of greatness.

Ver. 29 The ornament of young men is their strength;
And the honour of the old is grey hairs.

Youth has the name בָּחוּר (different from בָּחוּר, chosen), of the maturity (R. בחר, cogn. בכר, בגר, whence Mishn. בֹּגְרוּת, manhood, in contradistinction to נַעֲרוּת) into which he enters from

the bloom of boyhood; and the old man is called זָקֵן (Arab. *dhikn*, as Schultens says, *a mento pendulo*, from the hanging chin זָקָן, (Arab.) *dhakan*, chin, beard of the chin). To stand in the fulness of fresh unwasted strength is to youth, as such, an ornament (תִּפְאֶרֶת, cf. פְּאֵרוּר, blooming colour of the countenance); on the contrary, to the old man who has spent his strength in the duties of his office, or as it is said at xvi. 31, "in the way of righteousness," grey hairs (שֵׂיבָה, from שָׂב, Arab. *shâb*, *canescere*) give an honourable appearance (הָדָר, from הָדַר, *turgidum, amplum esse, vid.* at Isa. lxiii. 1).

Ver. 30 Cutting wounds cleanse away evil,
And reach the inner parts of the body.

The two words for wounds in line first stand in the *st. constr.*; חַבּוּרָה (from חָבַר, to be bound around with stripes, to be striped) is properly the streak, the stripe; but is here heightened by פֶּצַע (from פָּצַע, to cleave, split, tear open), beyond the idea of the stripe-wound: tearing open the flesh, cuts tearing into the flesh. The pred. is after the *Kerî* תַּמְרוּק; but this substantive, found in the Book of Esther, where it signifies the purification of the women for the harem (according to which, *e.g.*, Ahron B. Joseph explains כמו תמרוק לנשים שהוא יפה להם), is syntactically hard, and scarcely original. For if we explain with Kimchi: wounds of deep incision find their cleansing (cure) by evil, *i.e.* by means which bring suffering (according to which, probably the *Venet.* *μώλωπες τραύματος λάμψουσιν ἐν κακῷ*), then תמרוקן, with the pronoun pointing back, one would have expected. But the interpretation of בְּרַע, of severe means of cure, is constrained; that which lies nearest, however, is to understand רע of evil. But if, with this understanding of the word, we translate: *Vibices plagarum sunt lustratio quæ adhibetur malo* (Fleischer), one does not see why בְּרַע, and not rather gen. רַע, is used. But if we read after the *Chethîb* תַּמְרִיק, then all is syntactically correct; for (1.) that the word יְמָרִיקוּ, or תַּמְרֻקָּנָה, is not used, is in accordance with a well-known rule, Gesen. § 146, 3; and (2.) that הַמְרִיק is connected, not directly with an accus. obj., but with בְּ, has its analogy in בְּ הִתְעָה, Jer. xlii. 2, הִשְׁרִישׁ בְּ, Job xxxi. 12, and the like, and besides has its special ground in the metaphorical character of the cleansing. Thus, *e.g.*, one uses Syr. ܐܫܬܥܐ of external misleading; but with

ב of moral misleading (Ewald, § 217, 2); and Arab. اشاد of erecting a building; but with ב of the intellectual erection of a memorial (monument). It is the so-called *Bâ-âlmojâz; vid.* de Sacy's *Chrest. Arab.* i. 397. The verb מָרַק means in Talm. also, "to take away" (a metaph. of *abstergere;* cf. Arab. *marak*, to wipe off[1]); and that meaning is adopted, *Schabbath* 33*a*, for the interpretations of this proverb: stripes and wounds a preparedness for evil carries away, and sorrow in the innermost part of the body, which is explained by דרוקן (a disease appearing in diverse forms; cf. "*Drachenschuss*," as the name of an animal disease); but granting that the biblical מרק may bear this meaning, the ב remains unaccountable; for we say מרק עצמו לַעֲבֵרָה, for to prepare oneself for a transgression (sin of excess), and not בַּעֲבֵרָה. We have thus to abide by the primary meaning, and to compare the proverb, *Berachoth 5a:* "afflictive providences wash away all the transgressions of a man." But the proverb before us means, first at least, not the wounds which God inflicts, but those which human educational energy inflicts: deep-cutting wounds, *i.e.* stern discipline, leads to the rubbing off of evil, *i.e.* rubs it, washes it, cleanses it away. It may now be possible that in 30*b* the subject idea is permutatively continued: *et verbera penetralium corporis* (thus the *Venet.: πληγαὶ τῶν ταμιείων τοῦ γαστρός*), *i.e. quorum vis ad intimos corporis et animi recessus penetrat* (Fleischer). But that is encumbered, and חַדְרֵי־בָטֶן (cf. ver. 27, xviii. 8), as referring to the depths to which stern corporal discipline penetrates, has not its full force. וּמַכּוֹת is either a particip.: and that as touching (*ferientes*) the inner chambers of the body, or חדרי־בטן is with the ב, or immediately, the second object of תמריק to be supplied: and strokes (rub off, cleanse, make pure) the innermost part. Jerome and the Targ. also supply ב, but erroneously, as designating place: *in secretioribus ventris*, relatively better the LXX. and Syr.: *εἰς ταμεῖα κοιλίας*. Luther hits the sense at least, for he translates:

> One must restrain evil with severe punishment,
> And with hard strokes which one feels.

[1] *Vid.* Dozy's *Lettre à M. Fleischer* (1871), p. 198.

Chap. xxi. 1. The group, like the preceding one, now closes with a proverb of the king.

> A king's heart in Jahve's hand is like brooks of water;
> He turneth it whithersoever He will.

Brook and canal (the *Quinta*: *ὑδραγωγοί*) are both called פֶּלֶג, or פְּלַג Job xx. 17, Arab. *falaj* (from פָּלַג, to divide, according to which Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, *διαρέσεις*; *Venet.* *διανομαί*; Jerome, *divisiones*); *Jâkût* has the explanation of the word: "*falaj* is the name given to flowing water, particularly the brook from a spring, and every canal which is led from a spring out over flat ground." Such brooks of water are the heart of a king, *i.e.* it is compared to such, in Jahve's hand. The second line contains the point of comparison: He inclines it, gives to it the direction (הַטָּה, causat. of נָטָה, Num. xxi. 15) toward whatever He will (חֵפֶץ denotes willing, as a bending and inclining, viz. of the will; *vid.* at xviii. 2). Rightly Hitzig finds it not accidental that just the expression "brooks of water" is chosen as the figure for tractableness and subjection to government. In Isa. xxxii. 2, the princes of Judah are compared to "rivers of water in a dry place" with reference to the exhaustion of the land during the oppression of the Assyrian invasion; the proverb has specially in view evidences of kindness proceeding from the heart, as at xvi. 15 the favour of the king is compared to clouds of latter rain emptying themselves in beneficent showers, and at xix. 12 to the dew refreshing the plants. But the speciality of the comparison here is, that the heart of the king, however highly exalted above his subjects, and so removed from their knowledge he may be, has yet One above it by whom it is moved by hidden influences, *e.g.* the prayer of the oppressed; for man is indeed free, yet he acts under the influence of divinely-directed circumstances and divine operations; and though he reject the guidance of God, yet from his conduct nothing results which the Omniscient, who is surprised by nothing, does not make subservient to His will in the world-plan of redemption. Rightly the Midrash: God gives to the world good or bad kings, according as He seeks to bless it or to visit it with punishment; all decisions that go forth from the king's mouth come לכהחלה, *i.e.* in their

first commencement and their last reason they come from the Holy One.

The next group extends from ver. 2 to ver. 8, where it closes as it began.

Ver. 2 Every way of a man is right in his own eyes;
But a weigher of hearts is Jahve.

A proverb similar to xvi. 2 (where דַּרְכֵי for דַּרְכּוֹ, זַךְ for יָשָׁר, לִבּוֹת for רוּחוֹת). God is also, xvii. 3, called a trier, בֹּחֵן, of hearts, as He is here called a weigher, תֹּכֵן. The proverb indirectly admonishes us of the duty of constant self-examination, according to the objective norm of the revealed will of God, and warns us against the self-complacency of the fool, of whom xii. 15 says (as Trimberg in "*Renner*"): "all fools live in the pleasant feeling that their life is the best," and against the self-deception which walks in the way of death and dreams of walking in the way of life, xiv. 12 (xvi. 25).

Ver. 3 To practise justice and right
Hath with Jahve the pre-eminence above sacrifice.

We have already (vol. i. p. 42) shown how greatly this depreciation of the works of the ceremonial *cultus*, as compared with the duties of moral obedience, is in the spirit of the Chokma; cf. also at xv. 8. Prophecy also gives its testimony, *e.g.* Hos. vi. 7, according to which also here (cf. xx. 8*b* with Isa. ix. 8) the practising of צְדָקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט (sequence of words as at Gen. xviii. 19, Ps. xxxiii. 5, elsewhere צֶדֶק ומשפט, and yet more commonly משפט וצדקה) does not denote legal rigour, but the practising of the *justum et æquum*, or much rather the *æquum et bonum*, thus in its foundation conduct proceeding from the principle of love. The *inf.* עֲשׂה (like קָנֹה, xvi. 16) occurs three times (here and at Gen. l. 20; Ps. ci. 3); once עֲשׂו is written (Gen. xxxi. 18), as also in the *infin. absol.* the form עָשֹׂה and עָשׂוֹ interchange (*vid.* Norzi at Jer. xxii. 4); once עֲשֹׂהוּ for עֲשׂוֹתוֹ (Ex. xviii. 18) occurs in the *status conjunctus*.

Ver. 4 Loftiness of eyes and swelling of heart—
The husbandry of the godless is sin.

If נֵר, in the sense of light, gives a satisfactory meaning, then one might appeal to 1 Kings xi. 36 (cf. 2 Sam. xxi. 17), where נִיר appears to signify lamp, in which meaning it is once (2 Sam. xxii. 29) written נִיר (like חִיק); or since נִיר = נֵר (ground-form,

nawir, lightening) is as yet certainly established neither in the Heb. nor Syr., one might punctuate נֵר instead of נֹר, according to which the Greeks, Aram., and Luther, with Jerome, translate. But of the lamp of the godless we read at xiii. 9 and elsewhere, that it goeth out. We must here understand by נר the brilliant prosperity (Bertheau and others) of the wicked, or their "proud spirit flaming and flaring like a bright light" (Zöckler), which is contrary to the use of the metaphor as found elsewhere, which does not extend to a prosperous condition. We must then try another meaning for נֹר; but not that of yoke, for this is not Heb., but Aram.-Arab., and the interpretation thence derived by Lagarde: "Haughtiness and pride; but the godless for all that bear their yoke, viz. sin," seeks in vain to hide behind the "for all that" the breaking asunder of the two lines of the verse. In Heb. נֵר means that which lightens (burning) = lamp, נוֹר, the shining (that which burns) = fire, and נִיר, xiii. 23, from נִיר, to plough up (Targ. 1 Sam. viii. 12, יְמַנָּר = לְחָרֵשׁ) the fresh land, *i.e.* the breaking up of the fallow land; according to which the *Venet.* as Kimchi: *νέωμα ἀσεβῶν ἁμαρτία*, which as Ewald and Elster explain: "where a disposition of wicked haughtiness, of unbridled pride, prevails, there will also sin be the first-fruit on the field of action; נֹר, *novale*, the field turned up for the first time, denotes here the first-fruits of sin." But why just the first-fruits, and not the fruit in general? We are better to abide by the field itself, which is here styled נֹר, not שָׂדֶה (or as once in Jer. xxxix. 10, יֶגֶב); because with this word, more even than with שָׂדֶה, is connected the idea of agricultural work, of arable land gained by the digging up or the breaking up of one or more years' fallow ground (cf. *Pea* ii. 1, נִיר, Arab. *sikâk*, *opp.* בּוּר, Arab. *bûr*, *Menachoth* 85*a*, שְׂדוֹת מְנִירוֹת, a fresh broken-up field, *Erachin* 29*b*, נָר, *opp.* הֶבִיר, to let lie fallow), so that נֹר רְשָׁעִים may mean the cultivation of the fields, and generally the husbandry, *i.e.* the whole conduct and life of the godless. נֹר is here ethically metaph., but not like Hos. x. 12, Jer. iv. 3, where it means a new moral commencement of life; but like חרשׁ, *arare*, Job iv. 8, Hos. x. 13; cf. Prov. iii. 29. רָחַב is not adj. like xxviii. 25, Ps. ci. 5, but infin. like חָסַר, x. 21; and accordingly also רוּם is not adj. like חוּם, or past like סוּג, but infin. like Isa. x. 12. And חַטָּאת is the

pred. of the complex subject, which consists of רוּם עֵינַיִם, a haughty looking down with the eyes, רְחַב־לֵב, breadth of heart, *i.e.* excess of self-consciousness, and נֵר רְשָׁעִים taken as an *asyndeton summativum*: pride of look, and making oneself large of heart, in short, the whole husbandry of the godless, or the whole of the field cultivated by them, with all that grows thereon, is sin.

Ver. 5 The striving of the diligent is only to advantage.
And hastening all [excessive haste] only to loss;

or in other words, and agreeably to the Heb. construction:

The thoughts of the industrious are (reach) only to gain,
And every one who hastens—it (this his hastening) is only to loss.

Vid. at xvii. 21. At x. 4, Luther translates "the hand of the diligent," here "the plans of an expert [*endelichen*]," *i.e.* of one actively striving (xxii. 29, *endelich* = מָהִיר) to the end. The אָץ, hastening overmuch, is contrasted with the diligent; Luther well: but he who is altogether too precipitant. Everywhere else in the Proverbs אץ has a closer definition with it, wherefore Hitzig reads אֹצֵר, which must mean: he who collects together; but אץ along with חרוץ is perfectly distinct. The thought is the same as our "*Eile mit Weile*" [= *festina lente*], and Goethe's

Wie das Gestirn ohne Hast,
Aber ohne Rast
Drehe sich jeder
Um die eigne Last.

"Like the stars, without haste but without rest, let every one carry about his own burden," viz. of his calling that lies upon him. The fundamental meaning of אוץ is to throng, to urge (Ex. v. 13), here of impatient and inconsiderate rashness. While on the side of the diligent there is nothing but gain, such haste brings only loss; over-exertion does injury, and the work will want care, circumspection, and thoroughness. In the Book of Proverbs, the contrasts "gain" and "loss" frequently occur, xi. 24, xiv. 23, xxii. 16: profit (the increase of capital by interest), opp. loss (of capital, or of part thereof), as commercial terms.

Ver. 6 The gaining of treasures by a lying tongue
Is a fleeting breath of such as seek death.

One may, at any rate, after the free manner of gnomic resem-

blances and comparisons, regard "fleeting breath" and "such as seek death" as two separated predicates: such gain is fleeting breath, so those who gain are seeking death (Caspari's *Beiträge zu Jes.* p. 53). But it is also syntactically admissible to interpret the words rendered "seekers of death" as gen.; for such interruptions of the *st. constr.*, as here by נֹדֵף [fleeting], frequently occur, *e.g.* Isa. xxviii. 1, xxxii. 13; 1 Chron. ix. 13; and that an idea, in spite of such interruption, may be thought of as gen., is seen from the Arab.[1] But the text is unsettled. Symmachus, Syr., Targ., the *Venet.*, and Luther render the phrase מבקשׁי [seekers]; but the LXX. and Jerome read מוֹקְשֵׁי [snares] (cf. 1 Tim. vi. 9); this word Rashi also had before him (*vid.* Norzi), and Kennicott found it in several Codd. Bertheau prefers it, for he translates: . . . is fleeting breath, snares of death; Ewald and Hitzig go further, for, after the LXX., they change the whole proverb into: הֶבֶל רֹדֵף אֶל־מוֹקְשֵׁי מָוֶת (בְּמוֹקְשֵׁי), with פֹּעֵל in the first line. But *διώκει* of the LXX. is an incorrect rendering of נדף, which the smuggling in of the *ἐπὶ* (*παγίδας θανάτου*) drew after it, without our concluding therefrom that אל־מוקשׁי, or למוקשׁי (Lagarde), lay before the translators; on the contrary, the word which (Cappellus) lay before them, מוקשׁי, certainly deserves to be preferred to מבקשׁי: the possession is first, in view of him who has gotten it, compared to a fleeting (נֹדֵף, as Isa. xlii. 2) breath (cf. *e.g.* smoke, Ps. lxviii. 3), and then, in view of the inheritance itself and its consequences, is compared to the snares of death (xiii. 14, xiv. 27); for in פֹּעַל (here equivalent to עֲשׂוֹת, *acquisitio*, Gen. xxxi. 1; Deut. viii. 17) lie together the ideas of him who procures and of the thing that is procured or effected (*vid.* at xx. 11).

Ver. 7 The violence of the godless teareth them away,
For they have refused to do what is right.

The destruction which they prepare for others teareth or draggeth them away to destruction, by which wicked conduct brings punishment on itself; their own conduct is its own executioner (cf. i. 19); for refusing to practise what is right,

[1] *Vid.* Friedr. Philippi's *Status constructus*, p. 17, Anm. 3; and cf. therewith such constructions as (Arab.) *mân'u fadlah âlmahtâji*, *i.e.* a refuser of the needy, his beneficence = one who denies to the needy his beneficence.

they have pronounced judgment against themselves, and fallen under condemnation. Rightly Jerome, *detrahent*, with Aquila, *καταστράσει* = *j'gurrem* (as Hab. i. 15), from גָּרַר; on the contrary, the LXX. incorrectly, *ἐπιξενωθήσεται*, from גּוּר, to dwell, to live as a guest; and the *Venet.*, as Luther, in opposition to the *usus loq.*: *δεδίξεται* (fut. of *δεδίσσεσθαι*, to terrify), from גּוּר, to dread, fear, which also remains intrans., with the accus. following, Deut. xxxii. 27. The Syr. and the Targ. freely: robbery (Targ. רְבוּנָא, perhaps in the sense of usury) will seize them, viz. in the way of punishment. In Arab. *jarr* (*jariyratn*) means directly to commit a crime; not, as Schultens explains, *admittere crimen pœnam trahens*, but *attrahere* (*arripere*), like (Arab.) *jany* (*jinâyatn*), *contrahere crimen*; for there the crime is thought of as violent usurpation, here as wicked accumulation.

Ver. 8 Winding is the way of a man laden with guilt;
But the pure—his conduct is right.

Rightly the accentuation places together "the way of a man" as subject, and "winding" as predicate: if the poet had wished to say (Schultens, Bertheau) "one crooked in his way" (*quoad viam*), he would have contented himself with the phrase נֶחְפָּךְ דֶּרֶךְ. But, on the other hand, the accentuation is scarcely correct (the second *Munach* is a transformed *Mugrash*), for it interprets זָר as a second pred.; but זָר is adj. to אִישׁ. As חֲפַכְפַּךְ (synon. עֲקַלְקַל, פְּתַלְתֹּל) is a *hapax leg.*, so also *vazar*, which is equivalent to (Arab.) *mawziwr*, *crimine onustus*, from *wazira*, *crimen committere*, properly to charge oneself with a crime. The ancient interpreters have, indeed, no apprehension of this meaning before them; the LXX. obtain from the proverb a thought reminding us of Ps. xviii. 27, in which *vazar* does not at all appear; the Syr. and Targ. translate as if the *vav* of *vazar* introduces the conclusion: he is a barbarian (*nuchrojo*); Luther: he is crooked; Jerome also sets aside the syntax: *perversa via viri aliena est*; but, syntactically admissible, the *Venet.* and Kimchi, as the Jewish interpreters generally, *διαστροφωτάτη ὁδὸς ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀλλόκοτος*. Fleischer here even renounces the help of the Arab., for he translates: *Tortuosa est via viri criminibus onusti, qui autem sancte vivit, is recte facit*; but he adds thereto the remark that "*vazar* thus explained, with Cappellus, Schultens,

and Gesenius, would, it is true, corresponding to the Arab. *wazar*, have first the abstract meaning of a verbal noun from *waziva*;[1] the old explanation is therefore perhaps better: *tortuosa est via viri et deflectens* (*scil. a recta linea*, thus *devia est*), when the '*viri*' is to be taken in the general sense of 'many, this and that one;' the closer definition is reflected from the זָךְ of the second clause." But (1) זָר as an adj. signifies *peregrinus;* one ought thus rather to expect סָר, degenerated, corrupt, although that also does not rightly accord; (2) the verbal noun also, *e.g.* '*all*, passes over into a subst. and adj. signification (the latter without distinction of number and gender); (3) וָזֵר, after its adj. signification, is related to (Arab.) *wazyr*, as חָכָם is to *ḥakym*, רָחָב to *rḥyb;* it is of the same form as עָנֵג, with which it has in common its derivation from a root of similar meaning, and its ethical signification. In 8*b*, וְזַךּ is rightly accented as subj. of the complex pred. זַךְ is the pure in heart and of a good conscience. The laden with guilt (guilty) strikes out all kinds of crooked ways; but the pure needs no stealthy ways, he does not stand under the pressure of the bondage of sin, the ban of the guilt of sin; his conduct is straightforward, directed by the will of God, and not by cunning policy. Schultens: *Integer vitæ scelerisque purus non habet cur vacillet, cur titubet, cur sese contorqueat.* The choice of the designation וזך [and the pure] may be occasioned by זר (Hitzig); the expression 8*b* reminds us of xx. 11.

The group now following extends to ver. 18, where a new one begins with a variation of its initial verse.

Ver. 9 Better to sit on the pinnacle of a house-roof,
Than a contentious wife and a house in common.

We have neither to supplement the second line: than with a contentious wife . . . (Symmachus, Theodotion, Jerome, Luther), nor: than that one have a contentious . . . ; but the meaning is, that sitting on the roof-top better befits one, does better than a quarrelsome wife and a common house (rightly the Targ. and *Venet.*), *i.e.* in a common house; for the connecting together of the wife and the house by *vav* is a Semitic

[1] The *n. act* formed from *wazara* is *wazr*, *wizr*, *wizat*. These three forms would correspond to the Heb. vĕzĕr, vēzĕr, and zĕrĕth (z'rāh, cf. rĕdĕth, *r'dah*, Gen. xlvi. 3).

hendiadys, a juxtaposition of two ideas which our language would place in a relation of subordination (Fleischer). This *hendiadys* would, indeed, be scarcely possible if the idea of the married wife were attached to אִשָּׁה; for that such an one has with her husband a "house of companionship, *i.e.* a common house," is self-evident. But may it not with equal right be understood of the imperious positive mother-in-law of a widower, a splenetic shrewish aunt, a sickly female neighbour disputing with all the world, and the like? A man must live together with his wife in so far as he does not divorce her; he must then escape from her; but a man may also be constrained by circumstances to live in a house with a quarrelsome mother-in-law, and such an one may, even during the life of his wife, and in spite of her affection, make his life so bitter that he would rather, in order that he might have rest, sit on the pinnacle or ridge of a house-roof. פִּנָּה is the battlement (Zeph. i. 16) of the roof, the edge of the roof, or its summit; he who sits there does so not without danger, and is exposed to the storm, but that in contrast with the alternative is even to be preferred; he sits alone. Regarding the *Chethîb* מְדוֹנִים, *Kerî* מְדְיָנִים, *vid.* at vi. 14; and cf. the figures of the "continual dropping" for the continual scolding of such a wife, embittering the life of her husband, xix. 13.

Ver. 10 The soul of the godless hath its desire after evil;
His neighbour findeth no mercy in his eyes.

The interchange of perf. and fut. cannot be without intention. Löwenstein renders the former as *perf. hypotheticum*: if the soul of the wicked desires anything evil . . .; but the רָשָׁע wishes evil not merely now and then, but that is in general his nature and tendency. The perf. expresses that which is actually the case: the soul of the wicked has its desire directed (write אַוְּתָה with *Munach*, after Codd. and old Ed., not with *Makkeph*) toward evil, and the fut. expresses that which proceeds from this: he who stands near him is not spared. יְחֹן is, as at Isa. xxvi. 10, *Hoph.* of חָנַן, to incline, viz. oneself, compassionately toward any one, or to bend to him. But in what sense is בְּעֵינָיו added? It does not mean, as frequently, *e.g.* ver. 2, according to his judgment, nor, as at xx. 8, vi. 13: with his eyes, but is to be understood after the phrase מָצָא חֵן בְּעֵינֵי: his neighbour finds no

mercy in his eyes, so that in these words the sympathy ruling within him expresses itself: "his eyes will not spare his friends," *vid.* Isa. xiii. 18.

Ver. 11 When the scorner is punished, the simple is made wise;
And when insight is imparted to a wise man, he receives knowledge.

The thought is the same as at xix. 25. The mocker at religion and virtue is incorrigible, punishment avails him nothing, but yet it is not lost; for as a warning example it teaches the simple, who might otherwise be easily drawn into the same frivolity. On the other hand, the wise man needs no punishment, but only strengthening and furtherance: if "instruction" is imparted to him, he embraces it, makes it his own דַּעַת; for, being accessible to better insight, he gains more and more knowledge. De Dieu, Bertheau, and Zöckler make "the simple" the subject also in 11*b*: and if a wise man prospers, he (the simple) gains knowledge. But לְ הַשְׂכִּיל, used thus impersonally, is unheard of; wherefore Hitzig erases the לְ before חָכָם: if a wise man has prosperity. But השכיל does not properly mean to have prosperity, but only mediately: to act with insight, and on that account with success. The thought that the simple, on the one side, by the merited punishment of the mocker; on the other, by the intelligent prosperous conduct of the wise, comes to reflection, to reason, may indeed be entertained, but the traditional form of the proverb does not need any correction. הַשְׂכִּיל may be used not only transitively: to gain insight, Gen. iii. 6, Ps. ii. 10, and elsewhere, but also causatively: to make intelligent, with the accus. following, xvi. 23, Ps. xxxii. 8, or: to offer, present insight, as here with the dat.-obj. following (cf. xvii. 26). Instead of בְּעָנְשׁ־, the *Kametz* of which is false, Codd. and good Edd. have, rightly, בַּעֲנֹשׁ־. Hitzig, making "the wise" the subject to בהשכיל (and accordingly "the scorner" would be the subject in 11*a*), as a correct consequence reads בְּעָנְשׁ = בְּהֵעָנֵשׁ. For us, with that first correction, this second one also fails. "Both *infinitivi constr.*," Fleischer remarks, "are to be taken passively; for the Semitic infin., even of transitive form, as it has no designation of gender, time, and person, is an indeterminate *modus*, even in regard to the *generis verbi* (Act. and

Pass.)"[1] To this proverb with *u-behaskil* there is connected the one that follows, beginning with *maskil.*

Ver. 12 A righteous One marketh the house of the godless;
He hurleth the godless to destruction.

If we understand by the word צַדִּיק a righteous man, then 12*a* would introduce the warning which he gives, and the unexpressed subject of 12*b* must be God (Umbreit). But after such an *introitus*, יהוה ought not to be wanting. If in 12*a* "the righteous man" is the subject, then it presents itself as such also for the second parallel part. But the thought that the righteous, when he takes notice of the house of the godless, shows attention which of itself hurls the godless into destruction (Löwenstein), would require the sing. רשע in the conclusion; also, instead of מְסַלֵּף the fut. יְסַלֵּף would have been found; and besides, the judicial סַלֵּף (*vid.* regarding this word at xi. 3, xix. 3) would not be a suitable word for this confirmation in evil. Thus by צדיק the proverb means God, and מסלף has, as at xxii. 12, Job xii. 19, this word as its subject. "A righteous One" refers to the All-righteous, who is called, Job xxxiv. 17, "the All-just One," and by Rashi, under the passage before us, צַדִּיקוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם. Only do not translate with Bertheau and Zöckler: The Righteous One (All-righteous), for (1) this would require הַצַּדִּיק, and (2) הצדיק is never by itself used as an attributive designation of God. Rightly, Fleischer and Ewald: a Righteous One, viz. God. It is the indetermination which seeks to present the idea of the great and dreadful: a Righteous One, and such a Righteous One![2] השכיל with על, xvi. 20, or אֶל, Ps. xli. 2, Neh. viii. 13, here with לְ, signifies to give attention to anything, to look attentively on it. The two participles stand in the same line: *animum advertit . . . evertit.* Hitzig changes

[1] The Arab. National Grammarians, it is true, view the matter otherwise. When *ḳatlu zydn*, the putting to death of Zeid, is used in the sense of Zeid's becoming dead, according to their view the *fâ'l* (the *gen. subjecti*) is omitted; the full expression would be *ḳatlu 'amrn zaydnâ.* Since now *'amrn* is omitted, *zaydn* has in the gen. form taken the place of the *fâ'l*, but this gen. is the representative of the *acc. objecti.* Without thus going round about, we say: it is the *gen. objecti.*

[2] The Arabs call this indetermination *âlnkrt lalt'zym wallthwyl. Vid.* under Ps. ii. 12.

לְבֵיתוֹ into לְבֵית רָשָׁע, and makes רָשָׁע the subject of 12*b*; but the proverb as it lies before us is far more intelligible.

Ver. 13 He that stoppeth his ear at the cry of the poor—
He also calls and is not heard.

Only the merciful find mercy, Matt. v. 7; the unmerciful rich man, who has no ear for the cry of the דָּל, *i.e.* of him who is without support and means of subsistence, thus of one who is needing support, will also remain unheard when he himself, in the time of need, calls upon God for help. Cf. the parable of the unmerciful servant of the merciful king, Matt. xviii. 23 ff. מִן in מִזַּעֲקַת, as Isa. xxiii. 15, Gen. iv. 13, xxvii. 1; no preposition of our [German] language [nor English] expresses, as Fleischer here remarks, such a fulness of meaning as this מִן does, to which, after a verb of shutting up such as אטם (cf. xvii. 28), the Arab. عن would correspond, *e.g.* *â'my 'n âltryḳ*: blind, so that he does not see the way.

Ver. 14 A gift in secret turneth away anger;
And a bribe into the bosom violent wrath.

Hitzig reads with Symmachus, the Targ., and Jerome, יְכַבֶּה, and translates: "extinguishes anger;" but it does not follow that they did read יכבה; for the Talm. Heb. כָּפָה signifies to cover by turning over, *e.g.* of a vessel, *Sanhedrin* 77*a*, which, when it is done to a candle or a fire, may mean its extinction. But כפה of the post-bibl. Heb. also means to bend, and thence to force out (Aram. כְּפָא, כְּפִי), according to which Kimchi hesitates whether to explain: overturns = smothers, or: bends = forces down anger. The *Venet.* follows the latter signification: *κάμψει* (for Villoison's *καλύψει* rests on a false reading of the MS.). But there is yet possible another derivation from the primary signification, *curvare, flectere, vertere,* according to which the LXX. translates *ἀνατρέπει,* for which *ἀποτρέπει* would be yet better: כפה, to bend away, to turn off, *ἀρκεῖν, arcere,* altogether like the Arab. (compared by Schultens) *kfâ,* and *kfy, ἀρκεῖν,* to prevent, whence, *e.g.*, *ikfini hada:* hold that away from me, or: spare me that (Fleischer); with the words *hafika sharran* (Lat. *defendaris semper a malo*) princes were anciently saluted; *kfy* signifies "to suffice," because enough is there, where there is a keeping off of want. Accordingly we translate: *Donum clam acceptum avertit iram,* which also the

Syr. meant by *mephadka* (מְפַרֵק). This verb is naturally to be supplied to 14*b*, which the LXX. has recognised (it translates: but he who spares gifts, excites violent anger). Regarding שֹׁחַד, *vid.* at xvii. 8; and regarding בֶּחֱק, at xvii. 23. Also here חֵק (חֵיק = חֵיק), like Arab. *jayb*, *'ubb*, חֹב, denotes the bosom of the garment; on the contrary, (Arab.) *hijr*, *hidn*, חֵצֶן, is more used of that of the body, or that formed by the drawing together of the body (*e.g.* of the arm in carrying a child). A present is meant which one brings with him concealed in his bosom; perhaps 13*b* called to mind the judge that took gifts, Ex. xxiii. 8 (Hitzig).

Ver. 15 It is a joy to the just to do justice,
And a terror for them that work iniquity.

To act according to the law of rectitude is to these as unto death; injustice has become to them a second nature, so that their heart strives against rectitude of conduct; it also enters so little into their plan of life, and their economy, that they are afraid of ruining themselves thereby. So we believe, with Hitzig, Elster, Zöckler, and Luther, this must be explained in accordance with our interpretation of x. 29. Fleischer and others supplement the second parallel member from the first: וּפֹעֵל אָוֶן מְחִתָּה לְבַעֲלֵי אָיֶן; others render 15*b* as an independent sentence: ruin falls on those who act wickedly. But that ellipsis is hard and scarcely possible; but in general מחתה, as contrasted correlate to שִׂמְחָה, can scarcely have the pure objective sense of ruin or destruction. It must mean a revolution in the heart. Right-doing is to the righteous a pleasure (cf. x. 23); and for those who have אָוֶן, and are devoid of moral worth, and thus simply immoral as to the aim and sphere of their conduct, right-doing is something which alarms them: when they act in conformity with what is right, they do so after an external impulse only against their will, as if it were death to them.

Ver. 16 A man who wanders from the way of understanding,
Shall dwell in the assembly of the dead.

Regarding הַיְשָׂבֵל, *vid.* i. 3; and regarding רְפָאִים, ii. 18. The verb נוּחַ means to repose, to take rest, Job iii. 13, and to dwell anywhere, xiv. 33; but originally like (Arab.) *nâkh* and *hadd*, to lay oneself down anywhere, and there to come to rest; and that is the idea which is here connected with יָנוּחַ, for the figura-

tive description of יֹאבֵד or יָמוּת is formed after the designation of the subject, 16*a*: he who, forsaking the way of understanding, walks in the way of error, at length comes to the assembly of the dead; for every motion has an end, and every journey a goal, whether it be one that is self-appointed or which is appointed for him. Here also it is intimated that the way of the soul which loves wisdom and follows her goes in another direction than earthwards down into hades; hades and death, its background appear here as punishments, and it is true that as such one may escape them.

Ver. 17 He who loveth pleasure becometh a man of want;
He who loveth wine and oil doth not become rich.

In Arab. *samh* denotes the joyful action of the "cheerful giver," 2 Cor. ix. 7; in Heb. the joyful affection; here, like *faṣah*, pleasure, delight, festival of joy. Jerome: *qui diligit epulas*. For feasting is specially thought of, where wine was drunk, and oil and other fragrant essences were poured (cf. xxvii. 9; Amos vi. 6) on the head and the clothes. He who loves such festivals, and is commonly found there, becomes a man of want, or suffers want (cf. Judg. xii. 2, אִישׁ רִיב, a man of strife); such an one does not become rich (יַעֲשִׁיר, like x. 4, = עָשָׂה עֹשֶׁר, Jer. xvii. 11); he does not advance, and thus goes backwards.

Ver. 18 The godless becometh a ransom for the righteous;
And the faithless cometh into the place of the upright.

The thought is the same as at xi. 8. An example of this is, that the same world-commotion which brought the nations round Babylon for its destruction, put an end to Israel's exile: Cyrus, the instrument in God's hands for inflicting punishment on many heathen nations, was Israel's liberator, Isa. xliii. 3f. Another example is in the exchange of places by Haman and Mordecai, to which Rashi refers. כֹּפֶר is equivalent to λύτρον, ransom; but it properly signifies price of atonement, and generally, means of reconciliation, which covers or atones for the guilt of any one; the poll-tax and "oblations" also, Ex. xxx. 15 f., Num. xxxi. 50, are placed under this point of view, as blotting out guilt: if the righteousness of God obtains satisfaction, it makes its demand against the godless, and lets the righteous go free; or, as the substantival clause 18*b* expresses,

the faithless steps into the place of the upright, for the wrath passes by the latter and falls upon the former. Regarding בּוֹגֵד, *vid.* ii. 22. Thus, in contrast to the יָשָׁר, he is designated, who keeps faith neither with God nor man, and with evil intention enters on deceitful ways,—the faithless, the malicious, the assassin.

Ver. 19. With this verse, a doublet to ver. 9 (xxv. 24), the collector makes a new addition; in ver. 29 he reaches a proverb which resembles the closing proverb of the preceding group, in its placing in contrast the רשׁע and ישׁר ;—

It is better to dwell in a waste land,
Than a contentious wife and vexation.

The corner of the roof, Hitzig remarks, has been made use of, and the author must look further out for a lonely seat. But this is as piquant as it is devoid of thought; for have both proverbs the same author, and if so, were they coined at the same time? Here also it is unnecessary to regard מֵאֵשֶׁת as an abbreviation for מִשֶּׁבֶת עִם אשׁת. Hitzig supplies שֶׁבֶת, by which אשׁת, as the accus.-obj., is governed; but it is not to be supplied, for the proverb places as opposite to one another dwelling in a waste land (read שֶׁבֶת בְּאֶרֶץ־מִדְבָּר, with Codd. and correct Ed.) and a contentious wife (*Chethîb*, מִדְוָנִים; *Kerî*, מִדְיָנִים) and vexation, and says the former is better than the latter. For וְכַעַס [and vexation] is not, as translated by the ancients, and generally received, a second governed genitive to אשׁת, but dependent on מן, follows "contentious woman" (cf. 9*b*): better that than a quarrelsome wife, and at the same time vexation.

Ver. 20 Precious treasure and oil are in the dwelling of the wise;
And a fool of a man squanders it.

The wise spares, the fool squanders; and if the latter enters on the inheritance which the former with trouble and care collected, it is soon devoured. The combination אוֹצַר נֶחְמָד וְשֶׁמֶן [desirable treasure and oil] has something inconcinnate, wherefore the accentuation places אוֹצַר by itself by *Mehuppach Legarmeh;* but it is not to be translated "a treasure of that which is precious, and oil," since it is punctuated אוֹצַר, and not אוֹצַר; and besides, in that case מַחֲמַדִּים would have been used instead of נֶחְמָד. Thus by אוצר נחמד, a desirable and splendid capital in gold and things of value (Isa. xxiii. 18; Ps. xix. 11); and by שׁמן, mentioned by

way of example, stores in kitchen and cellar are to be thought of, which serve him who lives luxuriously, and afford noble hospitality,—a fool of a man (כְּסִיל אָדָם, as at xv. 20), who finds this, devours it, *i.e.* quickly goes through it, makes, in short, a *tabula rasa* of it; cf. בָּלַע, Isa. xxviii. 4, with בִּלַּע, 2 Sam. xx. 26, and Prov. xix. 28. The suffix of יְבַלְּעֶנּוּ refers back to אוֹצר as the main idea, or distributively also both to the treasure and the oil. The LXX. (*θησαυρὸς ἐπιθυμητὸς*) *ἀναπαύσεται ἐπὶ στόματος σοφοῦ, i.e.* ישכן בפה חכם, according to which Hitzig corrects; but the fool, he who swallows down "the precious treasure with a wise mouth," is a being we can scarcely conceive of. His taste is not at all bad; why then a fool? Is it perhaps because he takes more in than he can at one time digest? The reading of the LXX. is corrected by 20*b*.

Ver. 21 He that followeth after righteousness and kindness
Will obtain life, righteousness, and honour.

How we are to render צְדָקָה וָחֶסֶד is seen from the connection of xxi. 3 and Hos. vi. 7: *tsedakah* is conduct proceeding from the principle of self-denying compassionate love, which is the essence of the law, Mic. vi. 8; and *hěsĕd* is conduct proceeding from sympathy, which, placing itself in the room of another, perceives what will benefit him, and sets about doing it (cf. *e.g.* Job vi. 14: to him who is inwardly melted [disheartened] חֶסֶד is due from his neighbour). The reward which one who strives thus to act obtains, is designated 21*b* by חַיִּים and כָּבוֹד. Honour and life stand together, xxii. 4, when עֹשֶׁר precedes, and here צְדָקָה stands between, which, viii. 18, Ps. xxiv. 5, is thought of as that which is distributed as a gift of heaven, Isa. xlv. 8, which has glory in its train, Isa. lviii. 8; as Paul also says, "Whom He justified, them He also glorified." The LXX. has omitted *tsedakah*, because it can easily appear as erroneously repeated from 21*a*. But in reality there are three good things which are promised to those who are zealous in the works of love: a prosperous life, enduring righteousness, true honour. Life as it proceeds from God, the Living One, righteousness as it avails the righteous and those doing righteously before God, honour or glory (Ps. xxix. 3) as it is given (Ps. lxxxiv. 12) by the God of glory. Cf. with חיים צדקה, x. 2, and with צדקה, especially Jas. ii. 13, *κατακαυχᾶται ἔλεος κρίσεως*.

Ver. 22 A wise man scaleth a city of the mighty;
And casteth down the fortress in which they trusted.

Eccles. ix. 14 f. is a side-piece to this, according to which a single wise man, although poor, may become the deliverer of a city besieged by a great army, and destitute of the means of defence. עָלָה, *seq. acc.*, means to climb up, Joel ii. 7; here, of the scaling of a fortified town, viz. its fortress. עֹז is that which makes it עִיר עֹז, Isa. xxvi. 1: its armour of protection, which is designated by the genit. מִבְטָחָה, as the object and ground of their confidence. The vocalization מִבְטָחָה, for *mibtachcha* (cf. Jer. xlviii. 13 with Job xviii. 14), follows the rule Gesen. § 27, *Anm.* 2*b*. The suff., as in לְאַתְנַחְתָּהּ, Isa. xxiii. 17, is lightened, because of its *mappik*, *Michlol* 30*b*; *vid.* regarding the various grounds of these *formæ raphatæ pro mappicatis*, Böttcher, § 418. If a city is defended by ever so many valiant men, the wise man knows the point where it may be overcome, and knows how to organize the assault so as to destroy the proud fortress. With וַיֵּרֶד, he brings to ruin, cf. עַד יְרַדְתָּהּ, Deut. xx. 20.

Ver. 23 He that guardeth his mouth and his tongue,
Keepeth his soul from troubles.

xiii. 3 resembles this. He guardeth his mouth who does not speak when he does better to be silent; and he guardeth his tongue who says no more than is right and fitting. The troubles comprehend both external and internal evils, hurtful incidents and (נֶפֶשׁ) צָרוֹת לֵבָב, Ps. xxv. 17, xxxi. 8, *i.e.* distress of conscience, self-accusation, sorrow on account of the irreparable evil which one occasions.

Ver. 24 A proud and arrogant man is called mocker (free-spirit);
One who acteth in superfluity of haughtiness.

We have thus translated (vol. i. p. 39): the proverb defines almost in a formal way an idea current from the time of Solomon: לֵץ (properly, the distorter, *vid.* i. 7) is an old word; but as with us in the west since the last century, the names of *free-thinkers* and *esprits forts* (cf. Isa. xlvi. 12) have become current for such as subject the faith of the Church to destructive criticism, so then they were called לֵצִים, who mockingly, as men of full age, set themselves above revealed religion and prophecy (Isa. xxviii. 9); and the above proverb gives the meaning of

this name, for it describes in his moral character such a man. Thus we call one זֵד, haughty, and זֵד יָהִיר, *i.e.* destroying himself, and thus thoughtlessly haughty, who בְּעֶבְרַת זָדוֹן acts in superfluity or arrogance (*vid.* at xi. 2) of haughtiness; for not only does he inwardly raise himself above all that is worthy of recognition as true, of faith as certain, of respect as holy; but acting as well as judging frivolously, he shows reverence for nothing, scornfully passing sentence against everything. Abulwalîd (*vid.* Gesen. *Thes.*) takes יהיר in the sense of obstinate; for he compares the Arab. *jahr* (*jahar*), which is equivalent to *lijâj*, constancy, stubbornness. But in the Targ. and Talm. (*vid.* at Hab. ii. 5, Levy's Chald. *Wörterb.* under יָהִיר) יהר in all its offshoots and derivations has the sense of pride; we have then rather to compare the Arab. *istaihara*, to be insane (= *dhahb 'aklh, mens ejus alienata est*), perhaps also to *hajjir*, *mutahawwir*, being overthrown, *præceps*, so that יהיר denotes one who by his ὑπερφρονεῖν is carried beyond all σωφρονεῖν (*vid.* Rom. xii. 3), one who is altogether mad from pride. The Syr. *madocho* (Targ. מְרִיחָא), by which יהיר (Targ. יָהִיר) is rendered here and at Hab. ii. 5, is its synonym; this word also combines in itself the ideas foolhardy, and of one acting in a presumptuous, mad way; in a word, of one who is arrogant. Schultens is in the right way; but when he translates by *tumidus mole cava ruens*, he puts, as it is his custom to do, too much into the word; *tumidus*, puffed up, presents an idea which, etymologically at least, does not lie in it. The *Venet.*: ἀκρατὴς θρασὺς βωμολόχος τοὔνομά οἱ, which may be translated: an untractable reckless person we call a fool [*homo ineptus*], is not bad.

Ver. 25 The desire of the slothful killeth him;
For his hands refuse to be active.

The desire of the עָצֵל, Hitzig remarks, goes out first after meat and drink; and when it takes this direction, as hunger, it kills him indeed. But in this case it is not the desire that kills him, but the impossibility of satisfying it. The meaning is simply: the inordinate desire after rest and pleasure kills the slothful; for this always seeking only enjoyment and idleness brings him at last to ruin. תַּאֲוָה means here, as in *Kibroth ha-tava*, Num. xi. 34, inordinate longing after enjoyments. The proverb is connected by almost all interpreters (also Ewald,

Bertheau, Hitzig, Elster, Zöckler) as a tetrastich with ver. 25: he (the slothful) always eagerly desires, but the righteous giveth and spareth not. But (1) although צַדִּיק, since it designates one who is faithful to duty, might be used particularly of the industrious (cf. xv. 19), yet would there be wanting in 26*a* וְאֵין, xiii. 4, cf. xx. 4, necessary for the formation of the contrast; (2) this older Book of Proverbs consists of pure distichs; the only tristich, xix. 7, appears as the consequence of a mutilation from the LXX. Thus the pretended tetrastich before us is only apparently such.

Ver. 26 One always desireth eagerly;
But the righteous giveth and holdeth not back.

Otherwise Fleischer: *per totum diem avet avidus, i.e. avarus;* but that in הִתְאַוָּה תַּאֲוָה the verb is connected with its inner obj. is manifest from Num. xi. 4; it is the mode of expression which is called in the Greek syntax *schema etymologicum*, and which is also possible without an adj. joined to the obj., as in the ὕβριν θ'ὑβρίζεις (Eurip. *Herc. fur.* 706), the Arab. *mârâhu miryatn:* he had a strife with him. Euchel impossibly: necessities will continually be appeased, which would have required תִּתְאַוֶּה or מִתְאַוֶּה. The explanation also cannot be: each day presents its special demand, for כָּל־הַיּוֹם does not mean each day, but the whole day, *i.e.* continually. Thus we render התאוה with the most general subject (in which case the national grammarians supply הַמִּתְאַוֶּה): continually one longs longing, *i.e.* there are demands, solicitations, wishes, importunate petitions; but still the righteous is not embarrassed in his generosity, he gives as unceasingly (cf. Isa. xiv. 6, lviii. 1) as one asks. Thus the pref. is explained, which is related hypothetically to the fut. following: though one, etc.

Ver. 27 The sacrifice of the godless is an abomination;
How much more if it is brought for evil!

Line first = xv. 8*a*. Regarding the syllogistic אַף כִּי, *vid.* xii. 31, xv. 11; regarding זִמָּה, crime, particularly the sin of lewdness (from זָמַם, to press together, to collect the thoughts upon something, to contrive, cf. *raffinement de la volupté*), at x. 23. בְּזִמָּה is too vaguely rendered in the LXX. by παρονόμως, falsely by Jerome, *ex scelere* (cf. ἐξ ἀδίκου, Sir. xxxi. 18, with Mal. i. 13). The ב is not meant, as at Ezek. xxii. 11, of the

way and manner; for that the condition of life of the רשע is not a pure one, is not to be supposed. It is as Hitzig, rightly, that of price: for a transgression, *i.e.* to atone for it; one is hereby reminded, that he who had intercourse with a betrothed bondmaid had to present an *ascham* [trespass-offering], Lev. xix. 20–22. But frequently enough would it occur that rich sensualists brought trespass-offerings, and other offerings, in order thereby to recompense for their transgressions, and to purchase for themselves the connivance of God for their dissolute life. Such offerings of the godless, the proverb means, are to God a twofold and a threefold abomination; for in this case not only does the godless fail in respect of repentance and a desire after salvation, which are the conditions of all sacrifices acceptable to God, but he makes God directly a minister of sin.

Ver. 28 A false witness shall perish;
But he who heareth shall always speak truth.

The LXX. translate 28*b* by *ἀνὴρ δὲ φυλασσόμενος λαλήσει*. Cappellus supposes that they read לנצר for לנצח, which, however, cannot mean "taking care." Hitzig further imagines שׁמח for שׁמע, and brings out the meaning: "the man that rejoiceth to deliver shall speak." But where in all the world does נצר mean "to deliver"? It means, "to guard, preserve;" and to reach the meaning of "to deliver," a clause must be added with מִן, as מֵרָע. When one who speaks lies (עֵד כְּזָבִים), and a man who hears (אִישׁ שׁוֹמֵעַ, *plene*, and with the orthophonic Dagesh), are contrasted, the former is one who fancifully or malevolently falsifies the fact, and the latter is one who before he speaks hears in order that he may say nothing that he has not surely heard. As לֵב שֹׁמֵעַ, 1 Kings iii. 9, means an obedient heart, so here אִישׁ שׁוֹמֵעַ means a man who attentively hears, carefully proves. Such an one will speak לָנֶצַח, *i.e.* not: according to the truth, and not: for victory (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, *εἰς νῖκος*), *i.e.* so that accomplishes it (Oetinger); for the Heb. נֶצַח has neither that Arab. nor this Aram. signification; but, with the transference of the root meaning of radiating or streaming over, to time, continuous existence (*vid.* Orelli, *Synonyma der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, pp. 95–97), thus: he will speak for continuance, *i.e.* either: without ever requiring

to be silent, or, which we prefer: so that what he says stands; on the contrary, he who testifies mere fictions, *i.e.* avers that they are truth, is destroyed (28*a* = xix. 9*b*, cf. 5): he himself comes to nothing, since his testimonies are referred to their groundlessness and falsity; for שֶׁקֶר אֵין לוֹ רַגְלַיִם, the lie has no feet on which it can stand, it comes to nothing sooner or later.

Ver. 29. Another proverb with אִישׁ:—

A godless man showeth boldness in his mien;
But one that is upright—he proveth his way.

The *Chethîb* has יָבִין; but that the upright directeth, *dirigit*, his way, *i.e.* gives to it the right direction (cf. 2 Chron. xxvii. 6), is not a good contrast to the boldness of the godless; the *Kerî*, הֵבִין דַּרְכּוֹ, deserves the preference. Aquila, Symmachus, the Syr., Targ., and *Venet.* adhere to the *Chethîb*, which would be suitable if it could be translated, with Jerome, by *corrigit;* Luther also reads the verb with כ, but as if it were יָכִין (whoever is pious, his way will stand)—only the LXX. render the *Kerî* (*συνιεῖ*); as for the rest, the ancients waver between the *Chethîb* דַּרְכָּיו and the *Kerî* דַּרְכּוֹ: the former refers to manner of life in general; the latter (as at iii. 31 and elsewhere) to the conduct in separate cases; thus the one is just as appropriate as the other. In the circumstantial designation אִישׁ רָשָׁע (cf. xi. 7) we have the stamp of the distinction of different classes of men peculiar to the Book of Proverbs. הֵעֵז (to make firm, defiant) had, vii. 13, פָּנִים as accus.; the בְּ here is not that used in metaphoristic expressions instead of the accus. obj., which we have spoken of at xv. 4, xx. 30, but that of the means; for the face is thought of, not as the object of the action, but, after Gesen. § 138. 1, as the means of its accomplishment: the godless makes (shows) firmness, *i.e.* defiance, accessibility to no admonition, with his countenance; but the upright considers, *i.e.* proves (xiv. 8), his way. בִּין (הֵבִין) means a perceiving of the object in its specific peculiarity, an understanding of its constituent parts and essential marks; it denotes knowing an event analytically, as הַשְׂכִּיל, as well as synthetically (cf. Arab. *shakl*), and is thus used as the expression of a perception, which apprehends the object not merely immediately, but closely examines into its circumstances.

If we further seek for the boundaries, the proverbs regarding the rich and the poor, xxii. 2, 7, 16, present themselves as such, and this the more surely as xxii. 16 is without contradiction the terminus. Thus we take first together xxi. 30–xxii. 2.

Ver. 30 No wisdom and no understanding,
And no counsel is there against Jahve.

The expression might also be לִפְנֵי ה׳; but the predominating sense would then be, that no wisdom appears to God as such, that He values none as such. With לְנֶגֶד the proverb is more objective: there is no wisdom which, compared with His, can be regarded as such (cf. 1 Cor. iii. 19), none which can boast itself against Him, or can at all avail against Him (לנגד, as Dan. x. 12; Neh. iii. 37); whence it follows (as Job xxviii. 28) that the wisdom of man consists in the fear of God the Alone-wise, or, which is the same thing, the All-wise. Immanuel interprets חָכְמָה of theology, תְּבוּנָה of worldly science, עֵצָה of politics; but חכמה is used of the knowledge of truth, *i.e.* of that which truly is and continues; תבונה of criticism, and עצה of system and method; *vid.* at i. 2, viii. 14, from which latter passage the LXX. has substituted here גבורה instead of תבונה. Instead of לנגד ה׳ it translates *πρὸς τὸν ἀσεβῆ*, *i.e.* for that which is נגד ה׳ against Jahve.

Ver. 31 The horse is harnessed for the day of battle;
But with Jahve is the victory,

i.e. it remains with Him to give the victory or not, for the horse is a vain means of victory, Isa. xxxiii. 17; the battle is the Lord's, 1 Sam. xvii. 47, *i.e.* it depends on Him how the battle shall issue; and king and people who have taken up arms in defence of their rights have thus to trust nothing in the multitude of their war-horses (סוּס, horses, including their riders), and generally in their preparations for the battle, but in the Lord (cf. Ps. xx. 8, and, on the contrary, Isa. xxxi. 1). The LXX. translates הַתְּשׁוּעָה by *ἡ βοήθεια*, as if the Arab. name of victory, *naṣr*, proceeding from this fundamental meaning, stood in the text; תשועה (from ישׁע, Arab. *ws'*, to be wide, to have free space for motion) signifies properly prosperity, as the contrast of distress, oppression, slavery, and victory (cf. *e.g.* Ps. cxliv. 10, and יְשׁוּעָה, 1 Sam. xiv. 45). The post-bibl. Heb. uses נִצָּה

(נֶצַח) for victory; but the O. T. Heb. has no word more fully covering this idea than תְּשׁוּעָה (ישועה).[1]

Chap. xxii. 1 A good name has the preference above great riches;
For more than silver and gold is grace.

The proverb is constructed chiastically; the commencing word נִבְחָר (cf. xxi. 3), and the concluding word טוֹב, are the parallel predicates; rightly, none of the old translators have been misled to take together חֵן טוֹב, after the analogy of שֵׂכֶל טוֹב, iii. 14, xiii. 15. שֵׁם also does not need טוֹב for nearer determination; the more modern idiom uses שֵׁם טוֹב,[2] the more ancient uses שֵׁם alone (*e.g.* Eccles. vii. 1), in the sense of *ὄνομα καλόν* (thus here LXX.); for being well known (renowned) is equivalent to a name, and the contrary to being nameless (Job xxx. 8); to make oneself a name, is equivalent to build a monument in honour of oneself; possibly the derivation of the word from שָׁמָה, to be high, prominent, known, may have contributed to this meaning of the word *sensu eximio*, for שֵׁם has the same root word as שָׁמַיִם. Luther translates שֵׁם by *Das Gerücht* [rumour, fame], in the same pregnant sense; even to the present day, *renom*, *renommée*, *riputazione*, and the like, are thus used. The parallel חֵן signifies grace and favour (being beloved); grace, which brings favour (xi. 16); and favour, which is the consequence of a graceful appearance, courtesy, and demeanour (*e.g.* Esth. ii. 15).

Ver. 2 The rich and the poor meet together;
The creator of them all is Jahve.

From this, that God made them all, *i.e.* rich and poor in the totality of their individuals, it follows that the meeting together is His will and His ordinance; they shall in life push one against another, and for what other purpose than that this relation-

[1] In the old High German, the word for war is *urlag* (*urlac*), fate, because the issue is the divine determination, and *nôt* (as in "*der Nibelunge Not*"), as binding, confining, restraint; this *nôt* is the correlate to תְּשׁוּעָה, victory; מִלְחָמָה corresponds most to the French *guerre*, which is not of Romanic, but of German origin: the *Werre*, *i.e.* the *Gewirre* [complication, confusion], for נִלְחַם signifies to press against one another, to be engaged in close conflict; cf. the Homeric *κλόνος* of the turmoil of battle.

[2] *e.g. Aboth* iv. 17: there are three crowns: the crown of the Tôra, the crown of the priesthood, and the crown of royalty; but כֶּתֶר שֵׁם טוֹב, the crown of a good name, excels them all.

ship of mutual intercourse should be a school of virtue: the poor shall not envy the rich (iii. 31), and the rich shall not despise the poor, who has the same God and Father as himself (xiv. 31, xvii. 5; Job xxxi. 15); they shall remain conscious of this, that the intermingling of the diversities of station is for this end, that the lowly should serve the exalted, and the exalted should serve the lowly. xxix. 13 is a variation; there also for both, but particularly for the rich, lies in the proverb a solemn warning.

The group of proverbs beginning here terminates at ver. 7, where, like the preceding, it closes with a proverb of the rich and the poor.

Ver. 3 The prudent seeth the evil, and hideth himself;
But the simple go forward, and suffer injury.

This proverb repeats itself with insignificant variations, xxvii. 12. The *Kerî* וְנִסְתָּר makes it more conformable to the words there used. The *Chethîb* is not to be read וְיִסְתֹּר, for this *Kal* is *inusit.*, but וְיִסָּתֵר, or much rather וַיִּסָּתֵר, since it is intended to be said what immediate consequence on the part of a prudent man arises from his perceiving an evil standing before him; he sees, *e.g.*, the approaching overthrow of a decaying house, or in a sudden storm the fearful flood, and betimes betakes himself to a place of safety; the simple, on the contrary, go blindly forward into the threatening danger, and must bear the punishment of their carelessness. The *fut. consec.* 3*a* denotes the hiding of oneself as that which immediately follows from the being observant; the two *perf.* 3*b*, on the other hand, with or without וְ, denote the going forward and meeting with punishment as occurring contemporaneously (cf. Ps. xlviii. 6, and regarding these diverse forms of construction, at Hab. iii. 10). "The interchange of the sing. and plur. gives us to understand that several or many simple ones are found for one prudent man" (Hitzig). The *Niph.* of עָנַשׁ signifies properly to be punished by pecuniary fine (Ex. xxi. 22) (cf. the post-bibl. קָנַס, קָנַס, to threaten punishment, which appears to have arisen from *censere*, to estimate, to lay on taxes); here it has the general meaning of being punished, viz. of the self-punishment of want of foresight.

Ver. 4 The reward of humility is the fear of Jahve,
Is riches, and honour, and life.

As עֲנָוָה־צֶדֶק, Ps. xlv. 5, is understood of the two virtues, meekness and righteousness, so here the three Göttingen divines (Ewald, Bertheau, and Elster), as also Dunasch, see in עֲנָוָה יִרְאַת ה' an asyndeton; the poet would then have omitted *vav*, because instead of the copulative connection he preferred the appositional (Schultens: *præmium mansuetudinis quæ est reverentia Jehovæ*) or the permutative (the reward of humility; more accurately expressed: the fear of God). It is in favour of this interpretation that the verse following (ver. 5) also shows an asyndeton. Luther otherwise: where one abides in the fear of the Lord; and Oetinger: the reward of humility, endurance, calmness in the fear of the Lord, is . . .; Fleischer also interprets יראת ה' as xxi. 4, חטאת (*lucerna impiorum vitiosa*), as the accus. of the nearer definition. But then is the nearest-lying construction: the reward of humility is the fear of God, as all old interpreters understand 4*a* (*e.g.* Symmachus, ὕστερον πραΰτητος φόβος κυρίου), a thought so incomprehensible, that one must adopt one or other of these expedients? On the one side, we may indeed say that the fear of God brings humility with it; but, on the other hand, it is just as comformable to experience that the fear of God is a consequence of humility; for actually to subordinate oneself to God, and to give honour to Him alone, one must have broken his self-will, and come to the knowledge of himself in his dependence, nothingness, and sin; and one consequence by which humility is rewarded, may be called the fear of God, because it is the root of all wisdom, or as is here said (cf. iii. 16, viii. 18), because riches, and honour, and life are in its train. Thus 4*a* is a concluded sentence, which in 4*b* is so continued, that from 4*a* the predicate is to be continued: the reward of humility is the fear of God; it is at the same time riches . . . Hitzig conjectures רְאוּת ה', the beholding Jahve; but the *visio Dei* (*beatifica*) is not a dogmatic idea thus expressed in the O. T. עֵקֶב denotes what follows a thing, from עָקַב, to tread on the heels (Fleischer); for עָקֵב (Arab. *'akib*) is the heels, as the incurvation of the foot; and עֵקֶב, the consequence (cf. Arab. *'akb*, *'ukb*, *posteritas*), is mediated through the *v. denom.* עָקַב, to tread on the heels, to follow on the heels (cf.

denominatives, such as Arab. *batn*, *zahr*, *'ân*, עַיִן, to strike the body, the back, the eye).

Ver. 5 Thorns, snares, are on the way of the crooked;
He that guardeth his soul, let him keep far from them.

Rightly the *Venet.* ἄκανθαι παγίδες ἐν ὁδῷ στρεβλοῦ. The meaning of צִנִּים (plur. of צֵן, or צִנָּה, the same as צִנִּינִים) and פַּחִים (from פַּח, Arab. *fah*), stands fast, though it be not etymologically verified; the placing together of these two words (the LXX. obliterating the asyndeton: τρίβολος καὶ παγίδες) follows the scheme שׁמשׁ ירח, Hab. iii. 11. The עִקֵּשׁ־לֵב (perverse of heart, crooked, xvii. 20, xi. 20) drives his crooked winding way, corresponding to his habit of mind, which is the contrast and the perversion of that which is just, a way in which there are thorns which entangle and wound those who enter thereon, snares which unexpectedly bring them down and hold them fast as prisoners; the hedge of thorns, xv. 19, was a figure of the hindrances in the way of the wicked themselves. The thorn and snares here are a figure of the hindrances and dangers which go forth from the deceitful and the false in the way of others, of those who keep their souls, *i.e.* who outwardly and morally take heed to their life (xvi. 17, xiii. 3, pred. here subj.), who will keep, or are disposed to keep, themselves from these thorns, these snares into which the deceitful and perverse-hearted seek to entice them.

Ver. 6 Give to the child instruction conformably to His way;
So he will not, when he becomes old, depart from it.

The first instruction is meant which, communicated to the child, should be עַל־פִּי, after the measure (Gen. xliii. 7 = post-bibl. לְפִי and כְּפִי) of his way, *i.e.* not: of his calling, which he must by and by enter upon (Bertheau, Zöckler), which דַּרְכּוֹ of itself cannot mean; also not: of the way which he must keep in during life (*Kidduschin* 30*a*); nor: of his individual nature (Elster); but: of the nature of the child as such, for דֶּרֶךְ נַעַר is the child's way, as *e.g. derek col-haarets*, Gen. xix. 31, the general custom of the land; *derek Mitsrâyim*, Isa. x. 24, the way (the manner of acting) of the Egyptians. The instruction of youth, the education of youth, ought to be conformed to the nature of youth; the matter of instruction, the manner of instruction, ought to regulate itself according to the stage of

life, and its peculiarities; the method ought to be arranged according to the degree of development which the mental and bodily life of the youth has arrived at. The verb חָנַךְ is a denominative like עָקַב, ver. 4; it signifies to affect the taste, חֵךְ (= חִנֻּךְ), in the Arab. to put date syrup into the mouth of the suckling; so that we may compare with it the saying of Horace, [Ep. i. 2, 69]: *Quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem Testa diu.* In the post-bibl. Heb. חִנּוּךְ denotes that which in the language of the Church is called *catechizatio;* (לנער) ספר חנוך is the usual title of the catechisms. It is the fundamental and first requisite of all educational instruction which the proverb formulates, a suitable motto for the lesson-books of pedagogues and catechists. מִמֶּנָּה [from it] refers to that training of youth, in conformity with his nature, which becomes a second nature, that which is imprinted, inbred, becomes accustomed. Ver. 6 is wanting in the LXX.; where it exists in MSS. of the LXX., it is supplied from Theodotion; the Complut. translates independently from the Heb. text.

Ver. 7 A rich man will rule over the poor,
And the borrower is subject to the man who lends.

"This is the course of the world. As regards the sing. and plur. in 7*a*, there are many poor for one rich; and in the Orient the rule is generally in the hands of one" (Hitzig). The fut. denotes how it will and must happen, and the substantival clause 7*b*, which as such is an expression of continuance (Arab. *thabât, i.e.* of the remaining and continuing), denotes that contracting of debt brings naturally with it a slavish relation of dependence. לֹוֶה, properly he who binds himself to one *se ei obligat*, and מַלְוֶה, as xix. 17 (*vid. l.c.*), *qui alterum* (*mutui datione*) *obligat*, from לָוָה, Arab. *lwy*, to wind, turn, twist round (*cog.* root *laff*), whence with Fleischer is also to be derived the Aram. לְוָת, "into connection;" so אֶל, properly "pushing against," refers to the radically related אָלָה (= ולה), *contiguum esse.* אִישׁ מַלְוֶה is one who puts himself in the way of lending, although not directly in a professional manner. The pred. precedes its subject according to rule. Luther rightly translates: and he who borrows is the lender's servant, whence the pun on the proper names: "Borghart [= the borrower] is Lehnhart's [= lender's] servant."

The group now following extends to the end of this first collection of Solomon's proverbs; it closes also with a proverb of the poor and the rich.

Ver. 8 He that soweth iniquity shall reap calamity;
And the rod of his fury shall vanish away.

"Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (Gal. vi. 7); he that soweth good reapeth good, xi. 18; he that soweth evil reapeth evil, Job iv. 8; cf. Hos. x. 12 f. עַוְלָה is the direct contrast of צְדָקָה or יֹשֶׁר (*e.g.* Ps. cxxv. 3, cvii. 42), proceeding from the idea that the good is right, *i.e.* straight, *rectum;* the evil, that which departs from the straight line, and is crooked. Regarding אָוֶן, which means both perversity of mind and conduct, as well as destiny, calamity, *vid.* xii. 21. That which the poet particularly means by עַוְלָה is shown in 8*b*, viz. unsympathizing tyranny, cruel misconduct toward a neighbour. שֵׁבֶט עֶבְרָתוֹ is the rod which he who soweth iniquity makes another to feel in his anger. The saying, that an end will be to this rod of his fury, agrees with that which is said of the despot's sceptre, Isa. xiv. 5 f.; Ps. cxxv. 3. Rightly Fleischer: *baculus insolentiæ ejus consumetur h. e. facultas qua pollet alios insolenter tractandi evanescet.* Hitzig's objection, that a rod does not vanish away, but is broken, is answered by this, that the rod is thought of as brandished; besides, one uses כָּלָה of anything which has an end, *e.g.* Isa. xvi. 4. Other interpreters understand "the rod of his fury" of the rod of God's anger, which will strike the עָוֶל and יִכָּלֶה, as at Ezek. v. 13; Dan. xii. 7: "and the rod of His punishment will surely come" (Ewald, and similarly Schultens, Euchel, Umbreit). This thought also hovers before the LXX.: *πληγὴν δὲ ἔργων αὐτοῦ* (עברתו) *συντελέσει* (יְכַלֶּה). But if the rod of punishment which is appointed for the unrighteous be meant, then we would have expected וְכָלָה. Taken in the future, the כְּלוֹת of the שִׁבְטִ is not its *confectio* in the sense of completion, but its termination or annihilation; and besides, it lies nearer after 8*a* to take the suffix of עברתו subjectively (Isa. xiv. 6, xvi. 6) than objectively. The LXX. has, after ver. 8, a distich:—

ἄνδρα ἱλαρὸν καὶ δότην εὐλογεῖ ὁ θεός,
ματαιότητα δὲ ἔργων αὐτοῦ συντελέσει.

The first line (2 Cor. ix. 7) is a variant translation of 9*a* (cf. xxi. 17), the second (ושוא עברתו) is a similar rendering of 8*b*.

Ver. 9 He who is friendly is blessed;
Because he giveth of his bread to the poor.

The thought is the same as at xi. 25. טוֹב עָיִן (thus to be written without *Makkeph*, with *Munach* of the first word, with correct Codd., also 1294 and *Jaman*), the contrast of רַע עָיִן, xxiii. 6, xxii. 22, *i.e.* the envious, evil-eyed, ungracious (post-bibl. also צַר עָיִן), is one who looks kindly, is good-hearted, and as ἱλαρὸς δότης, shows himself benevolent. Such gentleness and kindness is called in the Mishna עָיִן טוֹבָה (*Aboth* ii. 13), or עָיִן יָפָה. Such a friend is blessed, for he has also himself scattered blessings (cf. גַּם־הוּא, xi. 25, xxi. 13); he has, as is said, looking back from the blessing that has happened to him, given of his bread (Luther, as the LXX., with partitive genitive: *seines brots* [= of his bread]) to the poor; cf. the unfolding of this blessing of self-denying love, Isa. viii. The LXX. has also here another distich:

Νίκην καὶ τιμὴν περιποιεῖται ὁ δῶρα δοὺς,
Τὴν μέντοι ψυχὴν ἀφαιρεῖται τῶν κεκτημένων.

The first line appears a variant translation of xix. 6*b*, and the second of i. 19*b*, according to which selfishness, in contrast to liberality, is the subject to be thought of. Ewald translates the second line:

And he (who distributes gifts) conquers the soul of the recipients.

But κεκτημένος = בַּעַל (בְּעָלִים) signifies the possessor, not the recipient of anything as a gift, who cannot also be here meant because of the μέντοι.

Ver. 10 Chase away the scorner, and contention goeth out,
And strife and reproach rest.

If in a company, a circle of friends, a society (LXX. ἔκβαλε ἐκ συνεδρίου), a wicked man is found who (*vid.* the definition of לֵץ, xxi. 24) treats religious questions without respect, moral questions in a frivolous way, serious things jestingly, and in his scornful spirit, his passion for witticism, his love of anecdote, places himself above the duty of showing reverence, veneration, and respect, there will arise ceaseless contentions and conflicts. Such a man one ought to chase away; then there will immediately go forth along with him dispeace (מָדוֹן), there will then be rest from strife and disgrace, viz. of the strife which such a one draws forth, and the disgrace which it brings on the

society, and continually prepares for it. קלון is commonly understood of the injury, abuse, which others have to suffer from the scoffer, or also (thus Fleischer, Hitzig) of the *opprobria* of the contentious against one another. But קלון is not so used; it means always disgrace, as something that happens, an experience, *vid.* at xviii. 3. The praise of one who is the direct contrast of a לין is celebrated in the next verse.

Ver. 11 He that loveth heart-purity,
Whose is grace of lips, the king is his friend.

Thus with Hitzig, it is to be translated not: he who loveth with a pure heart,—we may interpret טהור־לב syntactically in the sense of *puritate cordis* or *purus corde* (Ralbag, Ewald, after xx. 7), for that which follows אהב and is its supplement has to stand where possible as the accus. of the object; thus not: *qui amat puritatem cordis, gratiosa erunt labia ejus* (de Dieu, Geier, Schultens, C. B. Michaelis, Fleischer), for between heart-purity and graciousness of speech there exists a moral relation, but yet no necessary connection of sequence; also not: he who loves purity of heart, and grace on his lips (Aben Ezra, Schelling, Bertheau), for "to love the grace of one's own lips" is an awkward expression, which sounds more like reprehensible self-complacency than a praiseworthy endeavour after gracious speech. Excellently Luther:

"He who has a true heart and amiable speech,
The king is his friend."

טְהָרלֵב is not adjectival, but substantival; טְהָר is thus not the constr. of the mas. טָהוֹר, as Job xvii. 10, but of the segolate טֹהַר, or (since the ground-form of גְּבַהּ, 1 Sam. xvi. 7, may be גָּבַהּ as well as גֹּבַהּ) of the neut. טָהוֹר, like קָדֹשׁ, Ps. xlvi. 5, lxv. 5: that which is pure, the being pure = purity (Schultens). חֵן שְׂפָתָיו (gracefulness of his lips) is the second subject with the force of a relative clause, although not exactly thus thought of, but: one loving heart-purity, gracefulness on his lips—the king is his friend. Ewald otherwise: "he will be the king's friend," after the scheme xiii. 4; but here unnecessarily refined. A counsellor and associate who is governed by a pure intention, and connects therewith a gentle and amiable manner of speech and conversation, attaches the king to himself; the king is the רֵעֵהוּ (רֵעַ), the friend of such an one, and he also is "the friend

of the king," 1 Kings iv. 5. It is a Solomonic proverb, the same in idea as xvi. 13. The LXX., Syr., and Targ. introduce after אהב the name of God; but 11*b* does not syntactically admit of this addition. But it is worth while to take notice of an interpretation which is proposed by Jewish interpreters: the friend of such an one is a king, *i.e.* he can royally rejoice in him and boast of him. The thought is beautiful; but, as the comparison of other proverbs speaking of the king shows, is not intended.

Ver. 12 The eyes of Jahve preserve knowledge;
So He frustrateth the words of the false.

The phrase "to preserve knowledge" is found at v. 2; there, in the sense of to keep, retain; here, of protecting, guarding; for it cannot possibly be said that the eyes of God keep themselves by the rule of knowledge, and thus preserve knowledge; this predicate is not in accord with the eyes, and is, as used of God, even inappropriate. On the other hand, after "to preserve," in the sense of watching, guarding a concrete object is to be expected, cf. Isa. xxvi. 3. We need not thus with Ewald supply יוֹדֵעַ; the ancients are right that דַּעַת, knowledge, stands metonymically for איש (Meîri), or אנשי (Aben Ezra), or יודעי דעת (Arama); Schultens rightly: *Cognitio veritatis ac virtutis practica fertur ad homines eam colentes ac præstantes.* Where knowledge of the true and the good exists, there does it stand under the protection of God. 12*b* shows how that is meant, for there the perf. is continued in the second *consec. modus* (*fut. consec.*): there is thus protection against the assaults of enemies who oppose the knowledge which they hate, and seek to triumph over it, and to suppress it by their crooked policy. But God stands on the side of knowledge and protects it, and consequently makes vain the words (the outspoken resolutions) of the deceitful. Regarding סָלַף (סָלָף), *vid.* xi. 3 and xix. 3. The meaning of כּוֹלֵף דִּבְרֵי is here essentially different from that in Ex. xxiii. 8, Deut. xvi. 19: he perverteth their words, for he giveth them a bearing that is false, *i.e.* not leading to the end. Hitzig reads רעות [wickedness] for דעת, which Zöckler is inclined to favour: God keeps the evil which is done in His eyes, and hinders its success; but "to observe wickedness" is an ambiguous, untenable expression; the only passage that can be quoted in favour

of this "to observe" is Job vii. 20. The word דעת, handed down without variation, is much rather justified.

Ver. 13 The sluggard saith, "A lion is without,
I shall be slain in the midst of the streets."

Otherwise rendered, xxvi. 13. There, as here, the perf. אָמַר has the meaning of an abstract present, Gesen. § 126. 3. The activity of the industrious has its nearest sphere at home; but here a work is supposed which requires him to go forth (Ps. civ. 3) into the field (Prov. xxiv. 27). Therefore חוּץ stands first, a word of wide signification, which here denotes the open country outside the city, where the sluggard fears to meet a lion, as in the streets, *i.e.* the rows of houses forming them, to meet a רֹצֵחַ (מְרַצֵּחַ), *i.e.* a murder from motives of robbery or revenge. This strong word, properly to destroy, crush, Arab. *raṣkh*, is intentionally chosen: there is designed to be set forth the ridiculous hyperbolical pretence which the sluggard seeks for his slothfulness (Fleischer). Luther right well: "I might be murdered on the streets." But there is intentionally the absence of אוּלַי [perhaps] and of פֶּן [lest]. Meîri here quotes a passage of the moralists: ממופתי העצל הנבואה (prophesying) belongs to the evidences of the sluggard; and Euchel, the proverb העצלים מתנבאים (the sluggard's prophecy), *i.e.* the sluggard acts like a prophet, that he may palliate his slothfulness.

Ver. 14 A deep pit is the mouth of a strange woman;
He that is cursed of God falleth therein.

The first line appears in a different form as a synonymous distich, xxiii. 27. The LXX. translate *στόμα παρανόμου* without certainly indicating which word they here read, whether רַע (iv. 14), or רשע (xxix. 12), or נלז (iii. 32). xxiii. 27 is adduced in support of זָרוֹת (*vid.* ii. 16); זנות (harlots) are meant, and it is not necessary thus to read with Ewald. The mouth of this strange woman or depraved Israelitess is a deep ditch (שׁוּחָה עֲמֻקָּה, otherwise עֲמֻקָּה, as xxiii. 27*a*, where also occurs עֲמֻקָּה[1]), namely, a snare-pit into which he is enticed by her wanton words; the man who stands in fellowship with God is

[1] The text to Immanuel's *Comment.* (Naples 1487) has in both instances עֲמֻקָּה.

armed against this syren voice; but the זְעוּם ה', *i.e.* he who is an object of the divine זַעַם (*Venet.* κεχολωμένος τῷ ὀντωτῇ), indignation, punishing evil with evil, falls into the pit, yielding to the seduction and the ruin. Schultens explains זעום ה' by, *is in quem despumat indignabundus;* but the meaning *despumat* is not substantiated; זעם, cf. Arab. *zaghm*, is probably a word which by its sound denoted anger as a hollow roaring, and like pealing thunder. The LXX. has, after ver. 14, three tedious moralizing lines.

Ver. 15 Folly is bound to the heart of a child;
The rod of correction driveth it forth.

Folly, *i.e.* pleasure in stupid tricks, silly sport, and foolish behaviour, is the portion of children as such; their heart is as yet childish, and folly is bound up in it. Education first driveth forth this childish, foolish nature (for, as Menander says:

Ὁ μὴ δαρεὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ παιδεύεται),

and it effects this when it is unindulgently severe: the שֵׁבֶט מוּסָר (*vid.* xxiii. 13) removeth אִוֶּלֶת from the heart, for it imparts intelligence and makes wise (xxix. 15). The LXX. is right in rendering 16*a*: ἄνοια ἐξῆπται (from ἐξάπτειν) καρδίας νέου; but the Syr. has "here mangled the LXX., and in haste has read ἀνοίᾳ ἐξίπταται: folly makes the understanding of the child fly away" (Lagarde).

Ver. 16 Whosoever oppresseth the lowly, it is gain to him;
Whosoever giveth to the rich, it is only loss.

It is before all clear that לְהַרְבּוֹת and לְמַחְסוֹר, as at xxi. 5, לְמוֹתַר and למחסור, are contrasted words, and form the conclusions to the participles used, with the force of hypothetical antecedents. Jerome recognises this: *qui calumniatur pauperem, ut augeat divitias suas, dabit ipse ditiori et egebit.* So Rashi, who by עשיר thinks on heathen potentates. Proportionally better Euchel, referring עשׁק and נתן, not to one person, but to two classes of men: he who oppresses the poor to enrich himself, and is liberal toward the rich, falls under want. The antithetic distich thus becomes an integral one,—the antithesis manifestly intended is not brought out. This may be said also against Bertheau, who too ingeniously explains: He who oppresses the poor to enrich himself gives to a rich man, *i.e.* to himself, the

enriched, only to want, *i.e.* only to lose again that which he gained unrighteously. Ralbag is on the right track, for he suggests the explanation: he who oppresses the poor, does it to his gain, for he thereby impels him to a more energetic exercise of his strength; he who gives to the rich man does it to his own loss, because the rich man does not thank him for it, and still continues to look down on him. But if one refers לו to the poor, then it lies nearer to interpret אך למחסור of the rich: he who gives presents to the rich only thereby promotes his sleepy indolence, and so much the more robs him of activity (Elster); for that which one gives to him is only swallowed up in the whirlpool of his extravagance (Zöckler). Thus Hitzig also explains, who remarks, under 17*a*: "Oppression produces reaction, awakens energy, and thus God on the whole overrules events" (Ex. i. 12). Similarly also Ewald, who thinks of a mercenary, unrighteous rich man: God finally lifts up the oppressed poor man; the rich man always becoming richer, on the contrary, is "punished for all his wickedness only more and more." But with all these explanations there is too much read between the lines. Since אך למחסור (xi. 24, xxi. 5) refers back to the subject: himself to mere loss, so also will it be here; and the LXX., Symmachus, Jerome (cf. also the Syr. *auget malum suum*) are right when they also refer לו, not to the poor man, but to the oppressor of the poor. We explain: he who extorts from the poor enriches himself thereby; but he who gives to the rich has nothing, and less than nothing, thereby—he robs himself, has no thanks, only brings himself by many gifts lower and lower down. In the first case at least, 17*a*, the result corresponds to the intention; but in this latter case, 17*b*, one gains only bitter disappointment.

FIRST APPENDIX TO THE FIRST COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS.—XXII. 17–XXIV. 22.

The last group of distiches, beginning with x. 1, closed at xxii. 16 with a proverb of the poor and the rich, as that before the last, *vid.* at xxii. 7. In xxii. 17 ff., the law of the distich form is interrupted, and the tone of the introductory Mashals is again perceptible. Here begins an appendix to the older Book of Proverbs, introduced by these Mashals. *Vid.* regarding the style and proverbial form of this introduction, at pages 4 and 16 of vol. i.

xxii. 17–21, forming the introduction to this appendix, are these Words of the Wise:

Ver. 17 Incline thine ear and hear the words of the wise,
And direct thine heart to my knowledge!
18 For it is pleasant if thou keep them in thine heart;
Let them abide together on thy lips.
19 That thy trust may be placed in Jahve,
I have taught thee to-day, even thee!
20 Have not I written unto thee choice proverbs,
Containing counsels and knowledge,
21 To make thee to know the rule of the words of truth,
That thou mightest bring back words which are truth to them that send thee?

From x. 1 to xxii. 16 are the "Proverbs of Solomon," and not "The Words of the Wise;" thus the above *παραίνεσις* is not an epilogue, but a prologue to the following proverbs. The perfects הוֹדַעְתִּיךָ and כְּתַבְתִּי refer, not to the Solomonic proverbial discourses, but to the appendix following them; the preface commends the worth and intention of this appendix, and uses perfects because it was written after the forming of the collection. The author of this preface (*vid.* pp. 23, 36, vol. i.) is no other than the author of i.–ix. The הֲלֹא (with *Mehuppach*, after *Thorath Emeth*, p. 27) reminds us of iv. 20, v. 1. The phrase שִׁית לֵב, *animum advertere*, occurs again in the second appendix, xxiv. 32. נָעִים is repeated at xxiii. 8, xxiv. 4; but נָעַם with נֹעַם is common in the preface, i.–ix. כִּי־נָעִים contains, as at Ps. cxxxv. 3, cxlvii. 1, its subject in itself. כִּי־תִשְׁמְרֵם is not this subject: this that thou preservest them, which would have required rather the infin. שָׁמְרֵם (Ps. cxxxiii. 1) or לִשְׁמְרֵם; but it

supposes the case in which appears that which is amiable and praiseworthy: if thou preservest them in thy heart, *i.e.* makest them thoughtfully become thy mental possession. The suffix ם־ refers to the Words of the Wise, and mediately also to לְדַעְתִּי, for the author designates his practical wisdom דעתי, which is laid down in the following proverbs, which, although not composed by him, are yet penetrated by his subjectivity. Regarding בֶּטֶן, which, from meaning the inner parts of the body, is transferred to the inner parts of the mind, *vid.* under xx. 27. The clause 18*b*, if not dependent on כי, would begin with וְיִכֹּנוּ. The absence of the copula and the antecedence of the verb bring the optative rendering nearer. Different is the syntactical relation of v. 2, where the infin. is continued in the fin. The *fut. Niph.* יִכֹּנוּ, which, iv. 27, meant to be rightly placed, rightly directed, here means: to stand erect, to have continuance, *stabilem esse.* In ver. 19, the fact of instruction precedes the statement of its object, which is, that the disciple may place his confidence in Jahve, for he does that which is according to His will, and is subject to His rule. מִבְטַחֲךָ, in Codd. and correct editions with *Pathach* (*vid. Michlol* 184*b*); the ח is as virtually doubled; *vid.* under xxi. 22. In 19*b* the accentuation הוֹדַעְתִּיךָ הַיּוֹם is contrary to the syntax; Codd. and old editions have rightly הוֹדַעְתִּיךָ הַיּוֹם, for אַף־אַתָּה is, after Gesen. § 121. 3, an emphatic repetition of the "thee;" אַף, like גַּם, xxiii. 15; 1 Kings xxi. 19. Hitzig knows of no contrast which justifies the emphasis. But the prominence thus effected is not always of the nature of contrast (cf. Zech. vii. 5, have ye truly fasted to me, *i.e.* to serve me thereby), here it is strong individualizing; the *te etiam te* is equivalent to, thee as others, and thee in particular. Also that, as Hitzig remarks, there does not appear any reason for the emphasizing of "to-day," is incorrect: הַיּוֹם is of the same signification as at Ps. xcv. 7; the reader of the following proverbs shall remember later, not merely in general, that he once on a time read them, but that he to-day, that he on this definite day, received the lessons of wisdom contained therein, and then, from that time forth, became responsible for his obedience or his disobedience.

In 20*a* the *Chethîb* שלשום denotes no definite date; besides,

this word occurs only always along with תְּמוֹל (אֶתְמוֹל). Umbreit, Ewald, Bertheau, however, accept this "formerly (lately)," and suppose that the author here refers to a "Book for Youths," composed at an earlier period, without one seeing what this reference, which had a meaning only for his contemporaries, here denotes. The LXX. reads בְּחָכְמָה, and finds in 20*a*, contrary to the syntax and the *usus loq.*, the exhortation that he who is addressed ought to write these good doctrines thrice (*τρισσῶς*) on the tablet of his heart; the Syr. and Targ. suppose the author to say that he wrote them three times; Jerome, that he wrote them threefold—both without any visible meaning, since threefold cannot be equivalent to *manchfeltiglich* (Luther) [= several times, in various ways]. Also the *Kerî* שָׁלִשִׁים, which without doubt is the authentic word, is interpreted in many unacceptable ways; Rashi and Elia Wilna, following a Midrash explanation, think on the lessons of the Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa; Arama, on those which are referable to three classes of youth; Malbim (as if here the author of the whole Book of Proverbs, from i. to xxxi., spake), on the supposed three chief parts of the *Mishle;* Dächsel better, on i.–ix., as the product of the same author as this appendix. Schultens compares Eccles. iv. 12, and translates *triplici filo nexa.* Kimchi, Meîri, and others, are right, who gloss שלישים by דברים נכבדים, and compare נגידים, viii. 6; accordingly the *Veneta*, with the happy *quid pro quo*, by *τρισμέγιστα.* The LXX. translates the military שָׁלִישׁ by *τριστάτης*; but this Greek word is itself obscure, and is explained by Hesychius (as well as by Suidas, and in the *Etymologicum*) by *Regii satellites qui ternas hastas manu tenebant*, which is certainly false. Another Greek, whom Angellius quotes, says, under Ex. xv. 4, that *τριστάτης* was the name given to the warriors who fought from a chariot, every three of whom had one war-chariot among them; and this appears, according to Ex. xiv. 7, xv. 4, to be really the primary meaning. In the period of David we meet with the word שלישים as the name of the heroes (the *Gibbôrîm*) who stood nearest the king. The *shalish*-men form the *élite* troops that stood highest in rank, at whose head stood two triads of heroes, —Jashobeam at the head of the first trias, and thus of the *shalish*-men generally; Abishai at the head of the second trias,

who held an honourable place among the *shalish*-men, but yet reached not to that first trias, 2 Sam. xxiii. 8 ff. (=1 Chron. xi. 11 ff.). The name הַשָּׁלִשִׁים (*Apoc.* 2 Sam. xxiii. 8, הַשָּׁלְשִׁי, and ver. 13, 1 Chron. xxvii. 6, incorrectly הַשְּׁלִשִׁים) occurs here with reference to the threefold division of this principal host; and in regard to the use of the word in the time of Pharaoh, as well as in the time of the kings, it may be granted that *shalish* denoted the Three-man (*triumvir*), and then generally a high military officer; so that שָׁלִשִׁים here has the same relation to נגידים, viii. 6, as *ducalia* to *principalia*. The name of the chief men (members of the chief troop) is transferred to the chief proverbs, as, Jas. ii. 8, that law which stands as a king at the head of all the others is called the "royal law;" or, as Plato names the chief powers of the soul, *μέρη ἡγεμόνες*. As in this Platonic word-form, so *shalishim* here, like *negidim* there, is understood neut., cf. under viii. 6, and רִיקִים, xii. 11; יְשָׁרִים, xvi. 13. The ב of בְּמֹעֲצוֹת (occurring at i. 31 also) Fleischer rightly explains as the ב of uniting or accompanying: chief proverbs which contain good counsels and solid knowledge.

In the statement of the object in ver. 21, we interpret that which follows לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ not permutat.: *ut te docerem recta, verba vera* (Fleischer); but קְשֹׁט (ground-form to קֹשֶׁט, Ps. lx. 6) is the bearer of the threefold idea: *rectitudinem*, or, better, *regulam verborum veritatis*. The (Arab.) verb *kasiṭa* means to be straight, stiff, inflexible (synon. צדק, to be hard, tight, proportionately direct); and the name *kist* denotes not only the right conduct, the right measure (*quantitas justa*), but also the balance, and thus the rule or the norm. In 21*b*, אֲמָרִים אֱמֶת (as *e.g.* Zech. i. 13; *vid.* Philippi, *Status Constr.* p. 86 f.) is equivalent to אִמְרֵי אמת; the author has this second time intentionally chosen the appositional relation of connection: words which are truth; the idea of truth presents itself in this form of expression more prominently. Impossible, because contrary to the *usus loq.*, is the translation: *ut respondeas verba vera iis qui ad te mittunt* (Schultens, Fleischer), because שׁלח, with the accus. following, never means "to send any one." Without doubt השׁיב and שׁלח stand in correlation to each other: he who lets himself be instructed must be supposed to be in circumstances to bring home, to those that sent him out to learn, doctrines which are

truth, and thus to approve himself. The subject spoken of here is not a right answer or a true report brought back to one giving a commission; and it lies beyond the purpose and power of the following proverbs to afford a universal means whereby persons sent out are made skilful. The שְׁלָחִים [senders] are here the parents or guardians who send him who is to be instructed to the school of the teacher of wisdom (Hitzig). Yet it appears strange that he who is the learner is just here not addressed as "my son," which would go to the support of the expression, "to send to school," which is elsewhere unused in Old Hebrew, and the שִׁלְחִי of another are elsewhere called those who make him their *mandatar*, x. 26, xxv. 13; 2 Sam. xxiv. 13. The reference to the parents would also be excluded if, with Norzi and other editors, לִשְׁלָחֶךָ were to be read instead of לִשְׁלָחֶיךָ (the *Venet.* 1521, and most editions). Therefore the phrase לְשֹׁאֲלֶיךָ, which is preferred by Ewald, recommends itself, according to which the LXX. translates, *τοῖς προβαλλομένοις σοι*, which the Syro-Hexap. renders[1] by להנון דאחדין לך אוחדתא, *i.e.* to those who lay problems before thee (*vid.* Lagarde). The teacher of wisdom seeks to qualify him who reads the following proverbs, and permits himself to be influenced by them, to give the right answer to those who question him and go to him for counsel, and thus to become himself a teacher of wisdom.

After these ten lines of preliminary exhortation, there now begins the collection of the "Words of the Wise" thus introduced. A tetrastich which, in its contents, connects itself with the last proverb of the Solomonic collection, xxii. 16, forms the commencement of this collection:

Ver. 22 Rob not the lowly because he is lowly;
And oppress not the humble in the gate.
23 For Jahve will conduct their cause,
And rob their spoilers of life.

Though it may bring gain, as said xxii. 16*a*, to oppress the דַּל, the lowly or humble, yet at last the oppressor comes to ruin. The poet here warns against robbing the lowly because he

[1] The Syr. *n. fem. awchda* (אוּחְדָא, Ps. xlix. 5, Targ.) is equivalent to Heb. חִידָה, from (Syr.) *achd*, אחד = אחז, Neh. vii. 3, to shut up, properly, to lay hold on and retain; the Arab. *akhdhat* means magic, incantation; as seizing and making fast.

is lowly, and thus without power of defence, and not to be feared; and against doing injustice to the עָנִי, the bowed down, and therefore incapable of resisting in the gate, *i.e.* in the court of justice. These poor men have not indeed high human patrons, but One in heaven to undertake their cause: Jahve will conduct their cause (יָרִיב רִיבָם, as at xxiii. 10), *i.e.* will undertake their vindication, and be their avenger. דִּכָּא (דִּכָּה), Aram. and Arab. *dakk* (cf. דָּקַק, (Arab.) *dakk*), signifies to crush anything so that it becomes broad and flat, figuratively to oppress, synon. עָשַׁק (Fleischer). The verb קבע has, in Chald. and Syr., the signification to stick, to fix (according to which Aquila here translates *καθηλοῦν*, to nail; Jerome, *configere*); and as root-word to קֻבַּעַת, the signification to be arched, like (Arab.) *kab'*, to be humpbacked; both significations are here unsuitable. The connection here requires the meaning to rob; and for Mal. iii. 8 also, this same meaning is to be adopted, robbery and taking from one by force (Parchon, Kimchi), not: to deceive (Köhler, Keil), although it might have the sense of robbing by withholding or refraining from doing that which is due, thus of a sacrilege committed by omission or deception. The Talm. does not know the verb קבע in this meaning; but it is variously found as a dialectic word for גזל.[1] Schultens' etymological explanation, *capitium injicere* (after (Arab.) *kab'*, to draw back and conceal the head), is not satisfactory. The construction, with the double accus., follows the analogy of הִכָּהוּ נֶפֶשׁ and the like, Gesen. § 139. 2. Regarding the sing. נפֶשׁ, even where several are spoken of, *vid.* under i. 19.

Another tetrastich follows:

[1] Thus *Rosch ha-schana* 26*b*: Levi came once to N.N. There a man came to meet him, and cried out קבען פלניא. Levi knew not what he would say, and went into the Madrash-house to ask. One answered him: He is a robber (גזלן) said that one to thee; for it is said in the Scriptures (Mal. iii. 8), "Will a man rob God?" etc. (*vid. Wissenschaft Kunst Judenthum*, p. 243). In the Midrash, שוחר טוב, to Ps. lvii., R. Levi says that אתה קיבע לי is used in the sense of אתה גוזל לי. And in the Midrash *Tanchuma*, P. תרומה, R. Levi answers the question, "What is the meaning of קבע, Mal. iii. 8?"—It is an Arabic expression. An Arabian, when he wishes to say to another מה אתה גוזלני, says instead of it, מה אתה קובעני. Perhaps קבע is cogn. to קבץ; the R. קב coincides in several groups of languages (also the Turkish *kb*) with the Lat. *capere*.

Ver. 24 Have no intercourse with an angry man,
And with a furious man go thou not;
25 Lest thou adopt his ways,
And bring destruction upon thy soul.

The *Piel* רֵעָה, Judg. xiv. 20, signifies to make or choose any one as a friend or companion (רֵעַ, רֵעֶה); the *Hithpa.* הִתְרָעָה (cf. at xviii. 24), to take to oneself (for oneself) any one as a friend, or to converse with one; אַל־תִּתְרַע sounds like אַל־תִּשְׁתַּע, Isa. xli. 10, with *Pathach* of the closed syllable from the apocope. The angry man is called בַּעַל אַף, as the covetous man בַּעַל נֶפֶשׁ, xxiii. 2, and the mischievous man בַּעַל מְזִמּוֹת, xxiv. 8; *vid.* regarding בַּעַל at i. 19 and xviii. 9. אִישׁ חֵמוֹת is related superlat. to אִישׁ חֵמָה, xv. 18 (cf. xxix. 22), and signifies a hot-head of the highest degree. לֹא תָבוֹא is meant as warning (cf. xvi. 10*b*). בּוֹא אֵת, or בּוֹא עִם, Ps. xxvi. 4, to come along with one, is equivalent to go into fellowship or companionship with one, which is expressed by הָלַךְ אֵת, xiii. 20, as בּוֹא בְּ means, Josh. xxiii. 7, 12, to enter into communion with one, *venire in consuetudinem.* This בוא את is not a trace of a more recent period of the language. Also תֵּאָלַף, *discas*, cannot be an equivalent for it: Heb. poetry has at all times made use of Aramaisms as elegancies. אָלַף, Aram. יְלַף, Arab. *âlifa*, signifies to be entrusted with anything = to learn (*Piel* אִלֵּף, to teach, Job xv. 15, and in Elihu's speeches), or also to become confidential with one (whence אַלּוּף, companion, confidant, ii. 17); this אָלַף is never a Heb. prose word; the bibl. אַלּוּף is only used at a later period in the sense of teacher. אֹרְחוֹת are the ways, the conduct (ii. 20, etc.), or manner of life (i. 19) which any one enters upon and follows out, thus manners as well as lot, condition. In the phrase "to bring destruction," לקח is used as in our phrase *Schaden nehmen* [to suffer injury]; the ancient language also represented the forced entrance of one into a state as a being laid hold on, *e.g.* Job xviii. 20, cf. Isa. xiii. 8; here מוֹקֵשׁ is not merely equivalent to danger (Ewald, falsely: that thou takest not danger for thy soul), but is equivalent to destruction, sin itself is a snare (xxix. 6); to bring a snare for oneself is equivalent to suffer from being ensnared. Whosoever comes into a near relation with a passionate, furious man, easily accommodates himself to his manners, and, hurried forward by

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him and like him to outbreaks of anger, which does that which is not right before God, falls into ruinous complications.

A third distich follows:

Ver. 26 Be not among those who strike hands,
Among those who become surety for loans.
27 If thou hast nothing to pay,
Why shall he take away thy bed from under thee?

To strike hands is equivalent to, to be responsible to any one for another, to stake one's goods and honour for him, vi. 1, xi. 15, xvii. 18,—in a word, ערב, *seq. acc.*, to pledge oneself for him (Gen. xliii. 9), or for the loan received by him, מַשָּׁאָה, Deut. xxiv. 10 (from הִשָּׁה, with ב, of the person and accus. of the thing: to lend something to one on interest). The proverb warns against being one of such sureties (write בְּעֵרְבִים with God. 1294, and old impressions such as the Venice, 1521), against acting as they do; for why wouldest thou come to this, that when thou canst not pay (שָׁלֵם, to render a full equivalent reckoning, and, generally, to pay, vi. 31),[1] he (the creditor) take away thy bed from under thee?—for, as xx. 16 says, thus improvident suretyships are wont to be punished.

A fourth proverb—a distich—beginning with the warning אל:

Ver. 28 Remove not the perpetual landmark
Which thy ancestors have set up.

28*a* = xxiii. 10*a*. Regarding the inviolability of boundaries established by the law, *vid.* at xv. 25. גְּבוּל עוֹלָם denotes "the boundary mark set up from ancient times, the removal of which were a double transgression, because it is rendered sacred by its antiquity" (*Orelli*, p. 76). סוּג = נָסַג signifies to remove back, *Hiph.* to shove back, to move away. אֲשֶׁר has the meaning of (ὅριον) ὅ, τι, *quippe quod*. Instead of עולם, the *Mishna* reads, *Pea* v. 6, עולים, which in the Jerusalem Gemara one Rabbi understands of those brought up out of Egypt, another of the

[1] After Ben-Asher, the pointing is אִם־אֵין־לָהּ; while, on the contrary, Ben-Naphtali prefers אִם־אֵין לָהּ; *vid.* my *Genesis* (1869), pp. 74 (under i. 3) and 81. So, without any bearing on the sense, Ben-Asher points לָמָּה with *Tarcha*, Ben-Naphtali with *Mercha*.

poor; for "to rise" (in the world) is a euphemism (לשון כבוד) for "to come down" (be reduced in circumstances).[1]

After these four proverbs beginning with אל, a new series begins with the following tristich:

Ver. 29 Seest thou a man who is expert in his calling—
Before kings may he stand;
Not stand before obscure men;

i.e., he can enter into the service of kings, and needs not to enter into the service of mean men = he is entitled to claim the highest official post. חָזִיתָ, in xxvi. 12 = xxix. 20, interchanging with רָאִיתָ, is *perf. hypotheticum* (cf. xxiv. 10, xxv. 16): *si videris;* the conclusion which might begin with יְדַע כִּי expresses further what he who sees will have occasion to observe. Rightly Luther: *Sihestu einen Man endelich* (*vid.* at xxi. 5) *in seinem geschefft*, u.s.w. [=seest thou a man expert in his business, etc.]. מָהִיר denotes in all the three chief dialects one who is skilful in a matter not merely by virtue of external artistic ability, but also by means of intellectual mastery of it. הִתְיַצֵּב לִפְנֵי, to enter on the situation of a servant before any one; cf. Job i. 6, ii. 1. עָמַד לפני, 1 Sam. xvi. 21, 1 Kings x. 8. Along with the pausal form יִתְיַצָּב, there is also found in Codd. the form יִתְיַצָּב (the ground-form to יִתְיַצֵּב, whence that pausal form is lengthened), which Ben-Bileam defends, for he reckons this word among "the pathachized pausal forms." חֲשֻׁכִּים, in contrast to מְלָכִים, are the *obscuri = ignobiles*. The Targ. translate the Heb. דַּל and אֶבְיוֹן by חֲשִׁיכָא and חֲשׁוֹכָא. Kimchi compares Jer. xxxix. 10, where הָעָם הַדַּלִּים is translated by חֲשִׁיכַיָּא (cf. 2 Kings xxiv. 14, xxv. 12). חֶלְכָּה (חֶלְכָּה) is the old Heb. synonym in Ps. x. The poet seems here to transfer the Aram. *usus loq.* into the Heb.

Ver. 29, which speaks of a high position near the king, is appropriately followed by a hexastich referring to the slipperiness of the smooth ground of the king's court.

xxiii. 1 When thou sittest to eat with a ruler,
Consider well whom thou hast before thee.
2 And put thy knife to thy throat
If thou art a man of good appetite.
3 Be not lustful after his dainties,
Because it is deceitful food.

[1] As an analogical example, סַנְוֵי נְהוֹר, seeing clearly = blind.

The ל of לְלַחֹום is that of end: *ad cibum capiendum*, thus as one invited by him to his table; in prose the expression would be לֶאֱכֹל לֶחֶם; לָחַם, to eat, is poet., iv. 17, ix. 5. The fut. תָּבִין clothes the admonition in the form of a wish or counsel; the *infin. intens.* בִּין makes it urgent: consider well him whom thou hast before thee, viz. that he is not thine equal, but one higher, who can destroy thee as well as be useful to thee. With וְשַׂמְתָּ the jussive construction begun by תבין is continued. Zöckler and Dächsel, after Ewald and Hitzig, translate incorrectly: thou puttest . . ., the *perf. consec.* after an imperf., or, which is the same thing, a fut. meant optatively (*e.g.* Lev. xix. 18 with לא, and also ver. 34 without לא) continues the exhortation; to be thus understood, the author ought to have used the expression שַׂכִּין שַׂמְתָּ and not וְשׂמת שכין. Rightly Luther: "and put a knife to thy throat," but continuing: "wilt thou preserve thy life," herein caught in the same mistake of the idea with Jerome, the Syr., and Targ., to which נפשׁ here separates itself. שַׂכִּין (סַכִּין) (Arab. with the assimilated *a sikkîn*, plur. *sekâkîn*, whence *sekâkîni*, cutler) designates a knife (R. סך שך, to stick, *vid.* at Isa. ix. 10). לוּעַ, from לוּעַ, to devour, is the throat; the word in Aram. signifies only the cheek, while Lagarde seeks to interpret בְּלֹעֲךָ infinitively in the sense of (Arab.) *bwlw'ak*, if thou longest for (from *wl'a*); but that would make 2*b* a tautology. The verb לוּעַ (cf. Arab. *l'al'*, to pant for) shows for the substantive the same primary meaning as *glutus* from *glutire*, which was then transferred from the inner organ of swallowing (Kimchi, בית הבליעה, Parchon: זַהֲשָׁטָ, *œsophagus*) to the external. "Put a knife to thy throat, is a proverbial expression, like our: the knife stands at his throat; the poet means to say: restrain thy too eager desire by means of the strongest threatening of danger—threaten as it were death to it" (Fleischer). In בַּעַל נֶפֶשׁ, נפשׁ means, as at xiii. 2, desire, and that desire of eating, as at vi. 30. Rightly Rashi: if thou art greedy with hunger, if thou art a glutton; cf. Sir. xxxiv. (xxxi.) 12, "If thou sittest at a great table, then open not widely thy throat (*φάρυγγα*), and say not: There is certainly much on it!" The knife thus denotes the restraining and moderating of too good an appetite.

In 3*a* the punctuation fluctuates between תחאו (*Michlol*

131*a*) and תחתאו; the latter is found in Cod. 1294, the Erfurt 2 and 3, the Cod. *Jaman.*, and thus it is also to be written at ver. 6 and xxiv. 1; ויחתאו, 1 Chron. xi. 17 and Ps. xlv. 12, Codd. and older Edd. (*e.g.* Complut. 1517, Ven. 1515, 1521) write with *Pathach.* מַטְעַמּוֹת, from טַעַם, signifies savoury dishes, dainties, like (Arab.) *dhwâkt*, from *dhâk* (to taste, to relish); cf. *sapores*, from *sapere*, in the proverb: the tit-bits of the king burn the lips (*vid.* Fleischer, *Ali's Hundred Proverbs*, etc., pp. 71, 104). With והוא begins, as at iii. 29, a conditioning clause: since it is, indeed, the bread of deceit (the connection like עֵרֹב בַּזְּבִים, xxi. 28), food which, as it were, deceives him who eats it, *i.e.* appears to secure for him the lasting favour of princes, and often enough herein deceives him; cf. the proverb by Burckhardt and Meidani: whoever eats of the sultan's soup burns his lips, even though it may be after a length of time (Fleischer). One must come near to a king, says Calovius, hitting the meaning of the proverb, as to a fire: not too near, lest he be burned; nor too remote, so that he may be warmed therewith.

All the forms of proverbs run through these appended proverbs. There now follows a pentastich:

Ver. 4 Do not trouble thyself to become rich;
Cease from such thine own wisdom.
5 Wilt thou let thine eyes fly after it, and it is gone?
For it maketh itself, assuredly it maketh itself wings,
Like an eagle which fleeth toward the heavens.

The middle state, according to xxx. 8, is the best: he who troubleth himself (cf. xxviii. 20, hasteth) to become rich, placeth before himself a false, deceitful aim. יגע is essentially one with (Arab.) *waji'a*, to experience sorrow, *dolere*, and then signifies, like *πονεῖν* and *κάμνειν*, to become or to be wearied, to weary or trouble oneself, to toil and moil (Fleischer). The בִּינָה (cf. iii. 5) is just wisdom, prudence directed towards becoming rich; for striving of itself alone does not accomplish it, unless wisdom is connected with it, which is not very particular in finding out means in their moral relations; but is so much the more crafty, and, as we say, speculative. Rightly Aquila, the *Venet.*, Jerome, and Luther: take not pains to become rich. On the contrary, the LXX. reads אל תיגע להעשיר, stretch not thyself (if thou art poor) after a rich man; and the Syr. and Targ. אל תִּגַּע לְהַעֲשִׁיר,

draw not near to the rich man; but, apart from the uncertainty of the expression and the construction in both cases, poetry, and proverbial poetry too, does not prefer the article; it never uses it without emphasis, especially as here must be the case with it not elided. These translators thought that בּוֹ וגו׳, ver. 5, presupposed a subject expressed in ver. 4; but the subject is not הֶעָשִׁיר, but the עֹשֶׁר [riches] contained in לְהַעְשִׁיר. The self-intelligible *it* [in "it maketh wings," etc.] is that about which trouble has been taken, about which there has been speculation. That is a deceitful possession; for what has been gained by many years of labour and search, often passes away suddenly, is lost in a moment. To let the eyes fly after anything, is equivalent to, to direct a (flying) look toward it: wilt thou let thine eyes rove toward the same, and it is gone? *i.e.*, wilt thou expose thyself to the fate of seeing that which was gained with trouble and craft torn suddenly away from thee? Otherwise Luther, after Jerome: Let not thine eyes fly after that which thou canst not have; but apart from the circumstance that בּוֹ וְאֵינֶנּוּ cannot possibly be understood in the sense of *ad opes quas non potes habere* (that would have required באשׁר איננו), in this sense after the analogy of (ל) נשׂא נפשׁ אל, the end aimed at would have been denoted by לו and not by בו. Better Immanuel, after Rashi: if thou doublest, *i.e.* shuttest (by means of the two eyelids) thine eyes upon it, it is gone, *i.e.* has vanished during the night; but עוף, *duplicare*, is Aram. and not Heb. Rather the explanation is with Chajûg, after Isa. viii. 22f.: if thou veilest (darkenest) thine eyes, *i.e.* yieldest thyself over to carelessness; but the noun עֲפָעָפָה shows that עוף, spoken of the eyes, is intended to signify to fly (to rove, flutter). Hitzig too artificially (altering the expression to לְהַעְשִׁיר): if thou faintest, art weary with the eyes toward him (the rich patron), he is gone,—which cannot be adopted, because the form of a question does not accord with it. Nor would it accord if ואיננו were thought of as a conclusion: "dost thou let thy look fly toward it? It is gone;" for what can this question imply? The ו of ואיננו shows that this word is a component part of the question; it is a question *lla nakar*, *i.e.* in rejection of the subject of the question: wilt thou cast thy look upon it, and it is gone? *i.e.*, wilt thou experience instant loss of that which is gained by labour and acquired

by artifice? On בו, cf. Job vii. 8. עֵינֶיךָ וגו', "thou directest thine eyes to me: I am no more." We had in xii. 19 another mode of designating [viz. till I wink again] an instant. The *Chethîb* וגו' הֶתָעִיף is syntactically correct (cf. xv. 22, xx. 30), and might remain. The *Kerî* is mostly falsely accentuated הֶתְעִיף, doubly incorrectly; for (1) the tone never retreats from a shut syllable terminating in ִי, *e.g.* לְהָבִין, Isa. xl. 20; בַּהֲכִין, 1 Chron. i. 4; אָבִין, Job xxiii. 8; and (2) there is, moreover, wanting here any legitimate occasion for the retrogression of the tone; thus much rather the form הַתָּעִיף (with *Mehuppach* of the last, and *Zinnorith* of the preceding open syllable) is to be adopted, as it is given by Opitz, Jablonsky, Michaelis, and Reineccius.

The subject of 5*b* is, as of 5*a*, riches. That riches take wings and flee away, is a more natural expression than that the rich patron flees away,—a quaint figure, appropriate however at Nah. iii. 16, where the multitude of craftsmen flee out of Nineveh like a swarm of locusts. עשׂה has frequently the sense of *acquirere*, Gen. xii. 5, with לוֹ, *sibi acquirere*, 1 Sam. xv. 1; 1 Kings i. 15; Hitzig compares *Silius Ital.* xvi. 351: *sed tum sibi fecerat alas.* The *inf. intensivus* strengthens the assertion: it will certainly thus happen.

In 5*c* all unnecessary discussion regarding the *Chethîb* ועיף is to be avoided, for this *Chethîb* does not exist; the *Masora* here knows only of a simple *Chethîb* and *Kerî*, viz. וָעוּף (read וָעֹף), not of a double one (וָעִיף), and the word is not among those which have in the middle a י, which is to be read like ו. The manuscripts (*e.g.* also the Bragadin. 1615) have וָעֹף, and the *Kerî* יָעוּף; it is one of the ten words registered in the *Masora*, at the beginning of which a י is to be read instead of the written ו. Most of the ancients translate with the amalgamation of the *Kerî* and the *Chethîb:* and he (the rich man, or better: the riches) flees heavenwards (Syr., Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Jerome, and Luther). After the *Kerî* the *Venet.* renders: ὡς ἀετὸς πτήσεται τοῖς οὐρανοῖς (viz. ὁ πλοῦτος). Rightly the Targ.: like an eagle which flies to heaven (according to which also it is accentuated), only it is not to be translated "*am Himmel*" [to heaven], but "*gen Himmel*" [towards

heaven]: הַשָּׁמַיִם is the accusative of direction—the eagle flies heavenward. Bochart, in the *Hierozoïcon*, has collected many parallels to this comparison, among which is the figure in Lucian's *Timon*, where Pluto, the god of wealth, comes to one limping and with difficulty; but going away, outstrips in speed the flight of all birds. The LXX. translates *ὥσπερ ἀετοῦ καὶ ὑποστρέφει εἰς τὸν οἶκον τοῦ προεστηκότος αὐτοῦ*. Hitzig accordingly reads וְשָׁב לְבֵית מְשֻׁגְּבוֹ, and he (the rich patron) withdraws from thee to his own steep residence. But ought not *οἶκος τοῦ προεστηκότος αὐτοῦ* to be heaven, as the residence of Him who administers wealth, *i.e.* who gives and again takes it away according to His free-will?

There now follows a proverb with unequally measured lines, perhaps a heptastich:

Ver. 6 Eat not the bread of the jealous,
And let not thyself lust after his dainties;
7 For as one who calculates with himself, so is he:
"Eat and drink," saith he to thee;
But his heart is not with thee.
8 Thy morsel which thou hast enjoyed wilt thou cast up,
And hast lost thy pleasant words.

As טוֹב עַיִן, xxii. 9, *benignus oculo*, denotes the pleasantness and joy of social friendship; so here (cf. Deut. xv. 9; Matt. xv. 15) רַע עַיִן, *malignus oculo*, the envy and selfishness of egoism seeking to have and retain all for itself. The LXX. *ἀνδρὶ βασκάνῳ*, for the look of the evil eye, עין בישא, עין ויע (*cattivo occhio*), refers to enchantment; cf. *βασκαίνειν*, *fascinare*, to bewitch, to enchant, in modern Greek, to envy, Arab. *'an*, to eye, as it were, whence *ma'jûn*, *ma'în*, hit by the piercing look of the envious eye, *invidiæ*, as Apuleius says, *letali plaga percussus* (Fleischer). Regarding תִּתְאַו with *Pathach*, *vid.* the parallel line 3*a*. 7*a* is difficult. The LXX. and Syr. read שְׂעָר [hair]. The Targ. renders תַּרְעָא רְמָא, and thus reads שַׁעַר [fool], and thus brings together the soul of the envious person and a high portal, which promises much, but conceals only deception behind (Ralbag). Joseph ha-Nakdan reads[1] שָׁעַר with *sîn*; and Rashi, retaining the *schîn*, compares the "sour figs," Jer. xxix. 17.

[1] In an appendix to *Ochla We-Ochla*, in the University Library at Halle, he reads שׁעַר, but with פליגא [doubtful] added.

According to this, Luther translates: like a ghost (a monster of lovelessness) is he inwardly; for, as it appears in שָׁעַר, the goat-like spectre שָׂעִיר hovered before him. Schultens better, because more in conformity with the text: *quemadmodum suam ipsius animam abhorret* (*i.e.* as he does nothing to the benefit of his own appetite) *sic ille* (*erga alios multo magis*). The thought is appropriate, but forced. Hitzig for once here follows Ewald; he does not, however, translate: "like as if his soul were divided, so is it;" but: "as one who is divided in his soul, so is he;" but the verb שָׁעַר, to divide, is inferred from שַׁעַר, gate = division, and is as foreign to the extra-bibl. *usus loq.* as it is to the bibl. The verb שָׁעַר signifies to weigh or consider, to value, to estimate. These meanings Hitzig unites together: *in similitudinem arioli et conjectoris æstimat quod ignorat*, perhaps meaning thereby that he conjecturally supposes that as it is with him, so it is with others: he dissembles, and thinks that others dissemble also. Thus also Jansen explains. The thought is far-fetched, and does not cover itself by the text. The translation of the *Venet.* also: ὡς γὰρ ἐμέτρησεν ἐν ψυχῇ οἱ οὕτως ἐστίν (perhaps: he measures to others as penuriously as to himself), does not elucidate the text, but obscures it. Most moderns (Bertheau, Zöckler, Dächsel, etc.): as he reckons in his soul, so is he (not as he seeks to appear for a moment before thee). Thus also Fleischer: *quemadmodum reputat apud se, ita est* (*sc. non ut loquitur*), with the remark that שָׁעַר (whence שַׁעַר, measure, market value, Arab. *si'r*), to measure, to tax so as to determine the price, to reckon; and then like חָשַׁב, in general, to think, and thus also Meîri with the neut. rendering of *ita est.* But why this circumlocution in the expression? The poet ought in that case just to have written כִּי לֹא כְמוֹ דִבֶּר בִּשְׂפָתָיו כֵּן הוּא, for he is not as he speaks with his mouth. If one read שֹׁעֵר (Symmachus, εἰκάζων), then we have the thought adapted to the portrait that is drawn; for like one calculating by himself, so is he, *i.e.* he is like one who estimates with himself the value of an object; for which we use the expression: he reckons the value of every piece in thy mouth. However, with this understanding the punctuation also of שׁער as finite may be retained and explained after Isa. xxvi. 18: for as if he reckoned in his soul, so is he; but in this the perf. is

inappropriate; by the particip. one reaches the same end[1] by a smoother way. True, he says to thee: eat and drink (Song v. 1*b*), he invites thee with courtly words; but his heart is not with thee (בַּל, like xxiv. 23): he only puts on the appearance of joy if thou partakest abundantly, but there lurks behind the mask of liberal hospitality the grudging niggardly calculator, who poisons thy every bite, every draught, by his calculating, grudging look. Such a feast cannot possibly do good to the guest: thy meal (פַּת, from פָּתַת; cf. *κλᾶν τὸν ἄρτον*, Aram. פְּרַם לַחְמָא, to divide and distribute bread, whence פִּרְנָס, to receive aliment, is derived) which thou hast eaten thou wilt spue out, *i.e.* wilt vomit from disgust that thou hast eaten such food, so that that which has been partaken of does thee no good. פִּתְּךָ is also derived from פָּתָה:[2] has he deceived thee (with his courtly words), but with this אָכַלְתָּ, which, as the *Makkeph* rightly denotes, stands in an attributive relation to פתך, does not agree. תקיאֶנָּה is *Hiph.* of קוּא, as transitive: to make vomiting; in Arab. the fut. *Kal* of *ḳa* terminates in *î*. The fair words which the guest, as the *perf. consec.* expresses, has lavished, are the words of praise and thanks in which he recognises the liberality of the host appearing so hospitable. Regarding the penult. accenting of the *perf. consec.* by *Mugrasch*, as xxx. 9, *vid.* under Ps. xxvii. 1. Pinsker (*Babyl.-Hebr. Punktationssystem*, p. 134) conjectures that the line 8*b* originally formed the concluding line of the following proverb. But at the time of the LXX. (which erroneously expresses וְשִׂחֵת) it certainly stood as in our text.

Ver. 9. Another case in which good words are lost:

> Speak not to the ears of a fool,
> For he will despise the wisdom of thy words.

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[1] We may write בִּין הוּא: the *Mehuppach* (*Jethîb*) sign of the *Olewejored* standing between the two words represents also the place of the *Makkeph*; *vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 20.

[2] Immanuel makes so much of having recognised the verb in this פִּתְּךָ (and has he persuaded thee), that in the concluding part of his Divan (entitled *Machberoth Immanuel*), which is an imitation of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, he praises himself on this account in the paradise of King Solomon, who is enraptured by this explanation, and swears that he never meant that word otherwise.

To speak in the ears of any one, does not mean to whisper to him, but so to speak that it is distinctly perceived. בָּסִיל, as we have now often explained, is the intellectually heavy and dull, like *pinguis* and *tardus;* Arab. *balyd*, clumsy, intellectually immoveable (cf. *bld*, the place where one places himself firmly down, which one makes his point of gravity). The heart of such an one is covered over (Ps. cxix. 70), as with grease, against all impressions of better knowledge; he has for the knowledge which the words spoken design to impart to him, no susceptibility, no mind, but only contempt. The construction בּוּז לְ has been frequently met with from vi. 30.

The following proverb forms a new whole from component parts of xxii. 28 and xxii. 22 f.:

Ver. 10 Remove not ancient landmarks;
And into the fields of orphans enter thou not.
11 For their Saviour is a mighty one;
He will conduct their cause against thee.

בּוֹא בְּ separates itself here to the meaning of *injuste invadere et occupare;* French, *empiéter sur son voisin*, advance not into the ground belonging to thy neighbour (Fleischer). If orphans have also no *goel* among their kindred (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, ἀγχιστεύς) to redeem by purchase (Lev. xxv. 25) their inheritance that has passed over into the possession of another, they have another, and that a mighty Saviour, *Redemptor*, who will restore to them that which they have lost,—viz. God (Jer. l. 34),—who will adopt their cause against any one who has unjustly taken from them.

The following proverb warrants us to pause here, for it opens up, as a compendious echo of xxii. 17–21, a new series of proverbs of wisdom:

Ver. 12 Apply thine heart to instruction,
And thine ear to the utterances of knowledge.

We may, according as we accent in לְמוּסָר the divine origin or the human medium, translate, *offer disciplinæ* (Schultens), or *adhibe ad disciplinam cor tuum* (Fleischer). This general admonition is directed to old and young, to those who are to be educated as well as to those who are educated. First to the educator:

Ver. 13 Withhold not correction from the child;
For thou will beat him with the rod, and he will not die.
14 Thou beatest him with the rod,
And with it deliverest his soul from hell.

The exhortation, 13*a*, presupposes that education by word and deed is a duty devolving on the father and the teacher with regard to the child. In 13*b*, כִּי is in any case the relative conjunction. The conclusion does not mean: so will he not fall under death (destruction), as Luther also would have it, after Deut. xix. 21, for this thought certainly follows ver. 14; nor after xix. 18: so may the stroke not be one whereof he dies, for then the author ought to have written אַל־תְּמִיתֶנּוּ; but: he will not die of it, *i.e.* only strike if he has deserved it, thou needest not fear; the bitter medicine will be beneficial to him, not deadly. The אַתָּה standing before the double clause, ver. 14, means that he who administers corporal chastisement to the child, saves him spiritually; for שְׁאוֹל does not refer to death in general, but to death falling upon a man before his time, and in his sins, *vid.* xv. 24, cf. viii. 26.

The following proverb passes from the educator to the pupil:

Ver. 15 My son, if thine heart becometh wise,
My heart also in return will rejoice;
16 And my reins will exult
If thy lips speak right things.

Wisdom is inborn in no one. A true Arab. proverb says, "The wise knows how the fool feels, for he himself was also once a fool;"[1] and folly is bound up in the heart of a child, according to xxii. 15, which must be driven out by severe discipline. 15*b*, as many others, cf. xxii. 19*b*, shows that these "words of the wise" are penetrated by the subjectivity of an author; the author means: if thy heart becomes wise, so will mine in return, *i.e.* corresponding to it (cf. גַּם, Gen. xx. 6), rejoice. The thought of the heart in ver. 15 repeats itself in ver. 16, with reference to the utterance of the mouth. Regarding מֵישָׁרִים,

[1] The second part of the saying is, "But a fool knows not how a wise man feels, for he has never been a wise man." I heard this many years ago, from the mouth of the American missionary Schaufler, in Constantinople.

vid. i. 5. Regarding the "reins," כְּלָיוֹת (perhaps from כָּלָה, to languish, Job xix. 21), with which the tender and inmost affections are connected, *vid. Psychologie*, p. 268 f.

The poet now shows how one attains unto wisdom—the beginning of wisdom is the fear of God:

Ver. 17 Let not thine heart strive after sinners,
But after the fear of Jahve all the day.
18 Truly there is a future,
And thy hope shall not come to naught.

The LXX., Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther, and the Arab. interpreters, render 17*b* as an independent clause: "but be daily in the fear of the Lord." That is not a substantival clause (cf. xxii. 7), nor can it be an interjectional clause, but it may be an elliptical clause (Fleischer: from the prohibitive אל־תקנא is to be taken for the second parallel member the *v. subst.* lying at the foundation of all verbs); but why had the author omitted הֱיֵה? Besides, one uses the expressions, to act (עשׂה), and to walk (הלך) in the fear of God, but not the expression to be (היה) in the fear of God. Thus בְּיִרְאַת, like בַּחַטָּאִים, is dependent on אַל־תְּקַנֵּא; and Jerome, who translates: *Non æmuletur cor tuum peccatores, sed in timore Domini esto tota die*, ought to have continued: *sed timorem Domini tota die;* for, as one may say in Latin: *æmulari virtutes*, as well as *æmulari aliquem*, so also in Heb. קִנֵּא בְ, of the envying of those persons whose fortune excites to dissatisfaction, because one has not the same, and might yet have it, iii. 31, xxiv. 1, 19, as well as of emulation for a thing in which one might not stand behind others: envy not sinners, envy much rather the fear of God, *i.e.* let thyself be moved with eager desire after it when its appearance is presented to thee. There is no O. T. parallel for this, but the Syr. *tan* and the Greek ζηλοτυποῦν are used in this double sense. Thus Hitzig rightly, and, among the moderns, Malbim; with Aben Ezra, it is necessary to take ביראת for באישׁ יראת, this proverb itself declares the fear of God to be of all things the most worthy of being coveted.

In ver. 18, Umbreit, Elster, Zöckler, and others interpret the כִּי as assigning a reason, and the אִם as conditioning: for when the end (the hour of the righteous judgment) has come; Bertheau better, because more suitable to the יֵשׁ and the אַחֲרִית: when an

end (an end adjusting the contradictions of the present time) comes, as no doubt it will come, then thy hope will not be destroyed; but, on the other hand, the succession of words in the conclusion (*vid.* at iii. 34) opposes this; also one does not see why the author does not say directly כִּי יֵשׁ אַחֲרִית, but expresses himself thus conditionally.[1] If אִם is meant hypothetically, then, with the LXX. *ἐὰν γὰρ τηρήσῃς αὐτὰ ἔσταί σοι ἔκγονα*, we should supply after it תִּשְׁמְרֵנָּה, that had fallen out. Ewald's: much rather there is yet a future (Dächsel: much rather be happy there is . . .), is also impossible; for the preceding clause is positive, not negative. The particles כִּי אִם, connected thus, mean: for if (*e.g.* Lam. iii. 32); or also relatively: that if (*e.g.* Jer. xxvi. 15). After a negative clause they have the meaning of "unless," which is acquired by means of an ellipsis; *e.g.* Isa. lv. 10, it turns not back thither, unless it has watered the earth (it returns back not before then, not unless this is done). This "unless" is, however, used like the Lat. *nisi*, also without the conditioning clause following, *e.g.* Gen. xxviii. 17, *hic locus non est nisi domus Dei.* And hence the expression כִּי אִם, after the negation going before, acquires the meaning of "but," *e.g.* 17*b*: let not thy heart be covetous after sinners, for thou canst always be zealous for the fear of God, *i.e.* much rather for this, but for this. This pleonasm of אִם sometimes occurs where כִּי is not used confirmatively, but affirmatively: the "certainly if" forms the transition, *e.g.* 1 Kings xx. 6 (*vid.* Keil's *Comm. l.c.*), whose "if" is not seldom omitted, so that כִּי אִם has only the meaning of an affirmative "certainly," not "truly no," which it may also have, 1 Sam. xxv. 34, but "truly yes." Thus כִּי אִם is used Judg. xv. 7; 2 Sam. xv. 21 (where אִם is omitted by the *Kerî*); 2 Kings v. 20; Jer. li. 14; and thus it is also meant here, 18*a*, notwithstanding that כִּי אִם, in its more usual signification, "besides only, but, *nisi*," precedes, as at 1 Sam. xxi. 6, cf. 5. The objection by Hitzig, that with this explanation: "certainly there is a future," vers. 18 and 17 are at variance, falls to the ground, if one reflects on the Heb. idiom, in which the affirmative signification of כִּי is interpene-

[1] The form כִּי־אִם does not contradict the connection of the two particles. This use of the *Makkeph* is general, except in these three instances: Gen. xv. 4; Num. xxxv. 33; Neh. ii. 2.

trated by the confirmative. אַחֲרִית used thus pregnantly, as here (xxiv. 14), is the glorious final issue; the word in itself designates the end into which human life issues (cf. Ps. xxxvii. 37 f.); here, the end crowning the preceding course. Jeremiah (xxix. 11) in this sense connects אחרית ותקוה [end and expectation]. And what is here denied of the תִּקְוָה, the hope (not as certain Jewish interpreters dream, the thread of life) of him who zealously strives after the fear of God, is affirmed, at Ps. xxxvii. 38, of the godless: the latter have no continuance, but the former have such as is the fulfilling of his hope.

Among the virtues which flow from the fear of God, temperance is made prominent, and the warning against excess is introduced by the general exhortation to wisdom:

Ver. 19 Hear thou, my son, and become wise,
And direct thy heart straight forward on the way.
20 And be not among wine-drinkers,
And among those who devour flesh;
21 For the drunkard and glutton become poor,
And sleepiness clotheth in rags.

The אַתָּה, connected with שְׁמַע, imports that the speaker has to do with the hearer altogether by himself, and that the latter may make an exception to the many who do not hear (cf. Job xxxiii. 33; Jer. ii. 31). Regarding אִשֵּׁר, to make to go straight out, *vid.* at iv. 14; the *Kal*, ix. 6, and also the *Piel*, iv. 14, mean to go straight on, and, generally, to go. The way merely, is the one that is right in contrast to the many byways. Fleischer: "the way *sensu eximio*, as the Oriental mystics called the way to perfection merely (Arab.) *âlaṭryḳ;* and him who walked therein, *âlsâlak*, the walker or wanderer."[1] אַל־תְּהִי בְ, as at xxii. 26, the "Words of the Wise," are to be compared in point of style. The degenerate and perverse son is more clearly described, Deut. xxi. 20, as זוֹלֵל וְסֹבֵא. These two characteristics the poet distributes between 20*a* and 20*b*. סָבָא means to drink (whence סֹבֵא, drink = wine, Isa. i. 22) wine or other intoxicating drinks; Arab. *sabâ, vinum potandi causa emere.* To the יַיִן here added, בָּשָׂר in the parallel member corresponds, which

[1] Rashi reads בְּדֶרֶךְ לִבֵּךְ (walk), in the way of thy heart (which has become wise), and so Heidenheim found it in an old MS.; but בדרך is equivalent to בְּדֶרֶךְ בִּינָה, ix. 6.

consequently is not the fleshly body of the gluttons themselves, but the prepared flesh which they consume at their luxurious banquets. The LXX. incorrectly as to the word, but not contrary to the sense, "be no wine-bibber, and stretch not thyself after *picknicks* (*συμβολαῖς*), and buying in of flesh (*κρεῶν τε ἀγορασμοῖς*)," whereby זוללי is translated in the sense of the Aram. זָבְנִי (Lagarde). זָלַל denotes, intransitively, to be little valued (whence זוֹלֵל, *opp.* יָקָר, Jer. xv. 19), transitively to value little, and as such to squander, to lavish prodigally; thus: *qui prodigi sunt carnis sibi;* לְמוֹ is *dat. commodi.* Otherwise Gesenius, Fleischer, Umbreit, and Ewald: *qui prodigi sunt carnis suæ*, who destroy their own body; but the parallelism shows that flesh is meant wherewith they feed themselves, not their own flesh (בְּשָׂר לָמוֹ, like חֲמַת־לָמוֹ, Ps. lviii. 5), which, *i.e.* its health, they squander. זולל also, in phrase used in Deut. xxi. 20 (cf. with Hitzig the formula *φάγος καὶ οἰνοπότης*, Matt. xi. 19), denotes not the dissolute person, as the sensualist, *πορνοκόπος* (LXX.), but the *συμβολοκόπος* (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion), *κρεωβόρος* (*Venet.*), זֹלֵל בְּסָר (Onkelos), *i.e.* flesh-eater, ravenous person, glutton, in which sense it is rendered here, by the Syr. and Targ., by אסוט (אסיט), *i.e.* *ἄσωτος*. Regarding the metaplastic *fut. Niph.* יִוָּרֵשׁ (LXX. *πτωχεύσει*), *vid.* at xx. 13, cf. xi. 25. נוּמָה (after the form of בּוּשָׁה, הוּגָה, צוּרָה) is drowsiness, lethargy, long sleeping, which necessarily follows a life of riot and revelry. Such a slothful person comes to a bit of bread (xxi. 17); and the disinclination and unfitness for work, resulting from night revelry, brings it about that at last he must clothe himself in miserable rags. The rags are called קֶרַע and *ῥάκος*, from the rending (tearing), Arab. *ruḳ'at*, from the patching, mending. Lagarde, more at large, treats of this word here used for rags.

The *parainesis* begins anew, and the division is open to question. Vers. 22–24 can of themselves be independent distichs; but this is not the case with ver. 25, which, in the resumption of the address and in expression, leans back on ver. 22. The author of this appendix may have met with vers. 23 and 24 (although here also his style, as conformed to that of i. 9, is noticeable, cf. 23*b* with i. 2), but vers. 22 and 25 are the form which he has given to them.

Thus 22–25 are a whole:—

Ver. 22 Hearken to thy father, to him who hath begotten thee,
And despise not thy mother when she has grown old.
23 Buy the truth, and sell it not,
Wisdom and discipline and understanding.
24 The father of a righteous man rejoiceth greatly;
(And) he that is the father of a wise man—he will rejoice.
25 Let thy father and thy mother be glad;
And her that bare thee exult.

The ostastich begins with a call to childlike obedience, for שִׁמַע לְ, to listen to any one, is equivalent to, to obey him, *e.g.* Ps. lxxxi. 9, 14 (cf. "hearken to his voice," Ps. xcv. 7). זֶה יְלָדֶךָ is a relative clause (cf. Deut. xxxii. 18, without זֶה or אֲשֶׁר), according to which it is rightly accentuated (cf. on the contrary, Ps. lxxviii. 54). 22*b*, strictly taken, is not to be translated *neve contemne cum senuerit matrem tuam* (Fleischer), but *cum senuerit mater tua*, for the logical object to אַל־תָּבוּז is attracted as subj. of זָקְנָה (Hitzig). There now follows the exhortation comprehending all, and formed after iv. 7, to buy wisdom, *i.e.* to shun no expense, no effort, no privation, in order to attain to the possession of wisdom; and not to sell it, *i.e.* not to place it over against any earthly possession, worldly gain, sensual enjoyment; not to let it be taken away by any intimidation, argued away by false reasoning, or prevailed against by enticements into the way of vice, and not to become unfaithful to it by swimming with the great stream (Ex. xxiii. 2); for truth, אֱמֶת, is that which endures and proves itself in all spheres, the moral as well as the intellectual. In 23*b*, in like manner as i. 3, xxii. 4, a threefold object is given to קְנֵה instead of אמת: there are three properties which are peculiar to truth, the three powers which handle it: חָכְמָה is knowledge solid, pressing into the essence of things; מוּסָר is moral culture; and בִּינָה the central faculty of proving and distinguishing (*vid.* i. 3–5). Now ver. 24 says what consequences are for the parents when the son, according to the exhortation of 23, makes truth his aim, to which all is subordinated. Because in אמת the ideas of practical and theoretical truth are inter-connected. צַדִּיק and חָכָם are also here parallel to one another. The *Chethîb* of 24*a* is גּוֹל יָגוֹל, which Schultens finds tenable in view of (Arab.) *jal*, fut. *jajûlu* (to turn round; Heb. to turn oneself for joy)

but the Heb. *usus loq.* knows elsewhere only גִּיל יָגִיל, as the *Kerî* corrects. The LXX., misled by the *Chethîb*, translates καλῶς ἐκτρέφει (incorrect ἐκτρυφήσει), *i.e.* גַּדֵּל יְגַדֵּל. In 24*b*, וְיִשְׂמַח is of the nature of a pred. of the conclusion (cf. Gen. xxii. 24; Ps. cxv. 7), as if the sentence were: has one begotten a wise man, then (cf. xvii. 21) he has joy of him; but the *Kerî* effaces this *Vav apodosis*, and assigns it to יוֹלֵד as *Vav copul.*—an unnecessary mingling of the syntactically possible, more emphatic expression. This proverbial whole now rounds itself off in ver. 25 by a reference to ver. 22,—the Optative here corresponding to the Impr. and Prohib. there: let thy father and thy mother rejoice (LXX. εὐφρανέσθω), and let her that bare thee exult (here where it is possible the Optat. form וְתָגֵל).

Vers. 26–28. This hexastich warns against unchastity. What, in i.–ix., extended discourses and representations exhibited to the youth is here repeated in miniature pictures. It is the teacher of wisdom, but by him Wisdom herself, who speaks:

Ver. 26 Give me, my son, thine heart;
And let thine eyes delight in my ways.
27 For the harlot is a deep ditch,
And the strange woman a narrow pit.
28 Yea, she lieth in wait like a robber,
And multiplieth the faithless among men

We have retained Luther's beautiful rendering of ver. 26,[1] in which this proverb, as a warning word of heavenly wisdom and of divine love, has become dear to us. It follows, as Symmachus and the *Venet.*, the *Chethîb* תִּרְצֶנָּה (for תִּרְצֶינָה, like Ex. ii. 16; Job v. 12), the stylistic appropriateness of which proceeds from xvi. 7, as on the other hand the *Kerî* תִּצֹּרְנָה (cf. 1 Sam. xiv. 27) is supported by xxii. 12, cf. v. 2. But the correction is unnecessary, and the *Chethîb* sounds more affectionate, hence it is with right defended by Hitzig. The ways of wisdom are ways of correction, and particularly of chastity, thus placed over against "the ways of the harlot," vii. 24 ff. Accordingly the exhortation, ver. 26, verifies itself; warning, by ver. 27, cf. xxii. 14, where עֲמֻקָּה was written, here as at Job xii. 22, with the long vowel עֲמוּקָה (עֲמֻקָּה). בְּאֵר צָרָה interchanges

[1] The right punctuation of 26*a* is תְּנָה־בְנִי לִבְּךָ, as it is found in the editions: Ven. 1615; Basel 1619; and in those of Norzi and Michaelis.

with שׁוּחָה עמוקה, and means, not the fountain of sorrow (Löwenstein), but the narrow pit. בְּאֵר is fem. gen., xxvi. 21 f., and צַר means narrow, like *étroit* (old French, *estreit*), from *strictus*. The figure has, after xxii. 14, the mouth of the harlot in view. Whoever is enticed by her syren voice falls into a deep ditch, into a pit with a narrow mouth, into which one can more easily enter than escape from. Ver. 28 says that it is the artifice of the harlot which draws a man into such depth of wickedness and guilt. With אַף, which, as at Judg. v. 29, belongs not to הִיא but to the whole sentence, the picture of terror is completed. The verb חָתַף (whence Arab. *ḫataf*, death, natural death) means to snatch away. If we take חֶתֶף as *abstr.*: a snatching away, then it would here stand elliptically for חֶתֶף (בַּעַל) אִישׁ, which in itself is improbable (*vid.* vii. 22, עֶכֶס) and also unnecessary, since, as כֶּלֶב, עֶבֶד, הֶבֶל, etc. show, such *abstracta* can pass immediately into *concreta*, so that חֶתֶף thus means the person who snatches away, *i.e.* the street robber, *latro* (cf. חָמָס, (Arab.) *khataf*, Ps. x. 9, rightly explained by Kimchi as cogn.). In 28*b*, תּוֹסִיף cannot mean *abripit* (as LXX., Theodotion, and Jerome suppose), for which the word תִּסְפֶּה (תֹּאסֹף) would have been used.[1] But this verbal idea does not harmonize with the connection; תּוֹסִיף means, as always, *addit* (*auget*), and that here in the sense of *multiplicat*. The same thing may be said of בּוֹגְדִים as is said (xi. 15) of תּוֹקְעִים. Hitzig's objection, "הוֹסִיף, to multiply, with the accusative of the person, is not at all used," is set aside by xix. 4. But we may translate: the faithless, or: the breach of faith she increases. Yet it always remains a question whether בְּאָדָם is dependent on בּוגדים, as Eccles. viii. 9, cf. 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, on the verb of ruling (Hitzig), or whether, as frequently בָּאָדָם, *e.g.* Ps. lxxviii. 60, it means *inter homines* (thus most interpreters). Uncleanness leads to faithlessness of manifold kinds: it makes not only the husband unfaithful to his wife, but also the son to his parents, the scholar to his teacher and pastor, the servant (cf. the case of Potiphar's wife) to his master. The adulteress, inasmuch as she entices now one and now another into her net, increases the

[1] The Targ. translates 28*b* (here free from the influence of the Peshito) in the Syro-Palestinian idiom by וְצָאֵד אַבְנַיָּא שַׁבְרֵי, *i.e.* she seizes thoughtless sons.

number of those who are faithless towards men. But are they not, above all, faithless towards God? We are of opinion that not בוגדים, but תוסיף, has its complement in באדם, and needs it: the adulteress increases the faithless among men, she makes faithlessness of manifold kinds common in human society. According to this, also, it is accentuated; ובוגדים is placed as object by *Mugrasch*, and באדם is connected by *Mercha* with תוסיף.

Vers. 29–35. The author passes from the sin of uncleanness to that of drunkenness; they are nearly related, for drunkenness excites fleshly lust; and to wallow with delight in the mire of sensuality, a man, created in the image of God, must first brutalize himself by intoxication. The *Mashal* in the number of its lines passes beyond the limits of the distich, and becomes a Mashal ode.

Ver. 29 Whose is woe? Whose is grief?
Whose are contentions, whose trouble, whose wounds without cause?
Whose is dimness of eyes?
30 Theirs, who sit late at the wine,
Who turn in to taste mixed wine.
31 Look not on the wine as it sparkleth red,
As it showeth its gleam in the cup,
Glideth down with ease.
32 The end of it is that it biteth like a serpent,
And stingeth like a basilisk.
33 Thine eyes shall see strange things,
And thine heart shall speak perverse things;
34 And thou art as one lying in the heart of the sea,
And as one lying on the top of a mast.
35 "They have scourged me—it pained me not;
They have beaten me—I perceived it not.
When shall I have wakened from sleep?
Thus on I go, I return to it again."

The repeated לְמִי[1] asks who then has to experience all that; the answer follows in ver. 30. With אוֹי, the אֲבוֹי occurring only here accords; it is not a substantive from אָבָה (whence אֲבִיּוֹן) after the form of צְחוֹק, in the sense of *cgestas;* but, like the former [אוֹי], an interjection of sorrow (*Venet.* τίνι αἰ, τίνι φεῦ). Regarding מְדָנִים (*Chethîb* מְדוֹנִים), *vid.* at vi. 14.

[1] We punctuate לְמִי אֹוי, for that is Ben Asher's punctuation, while that of his opponent Ben Naphtali is לְמִי־אֹוי. *Vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 33.

שִׂיחַ signifies (*vid.* at vi. 22) meditation and speech, here sorrowful thought and sorrowful complaint (1 Sam. i. 16; Ps. lv. 18; cf. הֶגֶה, הָגִיג), *e.g.* over the exhausted purse, the neglected work, the anticipated reproaches, the diminishing strength. In the connection פְּצָעִים חִנָּם (cf. Ps. xxxv. 19) the accus. adv. חנם (French *gratuitement*) represents the place of an adjective: strokes which one receives without being in the situation from necessity, or duty to expect them, strokes for nothing and in return for nothing (Fleischer), wounds for a long while (Oetinger). חַכְלִלוּת עֵינַיִם is the darkening (clouding) of the eyes, from חָכַל, to be firm, closed, and transferred to the sensation of light: to be dark (*vid.* at Gen. xlix. 12; Ps. x. 8); the copper-nose of the drunkard is not under consideration; the word does not refer to the reddening, but the dimming of the eyes, and of the power of vision. The answer, ver. 30, begins, in conformity with the form of the question, with ל (write לַמְאַחֲרִים, with *Gaja* to ל, according to *Metheg-Setzung*, § 20, *Michlol* 46*b*): pain, and woe, and contention they have who tarry late at the wine (cf. Isa. v. 11), who enter (viz. into the wine-house, Eccles. ii. 4, the house of revelry) "to search" mingled drink (*vid.* at ix. 2; Isa. v. 22). Hitzig: "they test the mixing, as to the relation of the wine to the water, whether it is correct." But לַחְקוֹר is like גִּבּוֹרִים, Isa. v. 22, meant in mockery: they are heroes, viz. heroes in drinking; they are searchers, such, namely, as seek to examine into the mixed wine, or also: thoroughly and carefully taste it (Fleischer).

The evil consequences of drunkenness are now registered. That one may not fall under this common sin, the poet, ver. 31, warns against the attraction which the wine presents to the sight and to the sense of taste: one must not permit himself to be caught as a prisoner by this enticement, but must maintain his freedom against it. הִתְאַדֵּם, to make, *i.e.* to show oneself red, is almost equivalent to הַאְדִּים; and more than this, it presents the wine as itself co-operating and active by its red play of colours (Fleischer). Regarding the *antiptosis* (*antiphonesis*): Look not on the wine that is . . ., *vid.* at Gen. i. 3; yet here, where ראה means not merely "to see," but "to look at," the case is somewhat different. In 31*b*, one for the most part assumes that עֵינוֹ signifies the eye of the wine, *i.e.* the pearls which play

on the surface of the wine (Fleischer). And, indeed, Hitzig's translation, after Num. xi. 7: when it presents its appearance in the cup, does not commend itself, because it expresses too little. On the other hand, it is saying too much when Böttcher maintains that עין never denotes the mere appearance, but always the shining aspect of the object. But used of wine, עין appears to denote not merely aspect as such, but its gleam, glance; not its pearls, for which עֵינִי would be the word used, but shining glance, by which particularly the bright glance, as out of deep darkness, of the Syro-Palestinian wine is thought of, which is for the most part prepared from red (blue) grapes, and because very rich in sugar, is thick almost like syrup. Jerome translates עינו well: (*cum splenduerit in vitro*) *color ejus.* But one need not think of a glass; Böttcher has rightly said that one might perceive the glittering appearance also in a metal or earthen vessel if one looked into it. The *Chethîb* בכים is an error of transcription; the *Midrash* makes the remark on this, that בַּכִּים fits the wine merchant, and בַּכּוֹס the wine drinker. From the pleasure of the eye, 31*c* passes over to the pleasures of the taste: (that, or, as it) goeth down smoothly (Luther); the expression is like Eccles. vii. 10. Instead of הלך (like *jâry*, of fluidity) there stands here התהלך, commonly used of pleasant going; and instead of לְמֵישָׁרִים with ל, the norm בְּמֵישָׁרִים with ב of the manner; directness is here easiness, facility (Arab. *jusr*); it goes as on a straight, even way unhindered and easily down the throat.[1]

Ver. 32 shows how it issues with the wine, viz. with those who immoderately enjoy it. Is אַחֲרִיתוֹ [its end] here the subject, as at v. 4? We must in that case interpret יִשָּׁךְ and יַפְרִשׁ as attributives, as the Syr. and Targ. translate the latter, and Ewald both. The issue which it brings with it is like the serpent which bites, etc., and there is nothing syntactically opposed to this (cf. *e.g.* Ps. xvii. 12); the future, in contradistinction to the participle, would not express properties, but intimations of facts. But the end of the wine is not like a serpent, but like the bite of a serpent. The wine itself, and

[1] The English version is, "when it moveth itself aright," which one has perceived in the phenomenon of the tears of the wine, or of the movement in the glass. *Vid. Ausland*, 1869, p. 72.

independent of its consequences, is in and of itself like a serpent. In accordance with the matter, אחריתו may be interpreted, with Hitzig (after Jerome, *in novissimo*), as *acc. adverb.* = באחריתו, Jer. xvii. 11. But why did not the author more distinctly write this word 'בא? The syntactic relation is like xxix. 21: אחריתו is after the manner of a substantival clause, the subject to that which follows as its virtual predicate: "its end is: like a serpent it biteth = this, that it biteth like a serpent." Regarding צִפְעֹנִי, *serpens regulus* (after Schultens, from צפע = (Arab.) *saf'*, to breathe out glowing, scorching), *vid.* at Isa. vii. 8. The *Hiph.* הפריש Schultens here understands of the division of the liver, and Hitzig, after the LXX., Vulgate, and *Venet.*, of squirting the poison; both after the Arab. *farth.* But הפריש, Syr. *afrês*, also signifies, from the root-idea of dividing and splitting, to sting, *poindre, pointer*, as Rashi and Kimchi gloss, whence the Aram. פְּרָשׁ, an ox-goad, with which the ancients connect פרש (of the spur), the name for a rider, *eques*, and also a horse (cf. on the contrary, Fleischer in Levy, *W. B.* ii. 574); a serpent's bite and a serpent's sting (Lat. *morsus, ictus*, Varro: *cum pepugerit colubra*) are connected together by the ancients.[1]

The excited condition of the drunkard is now described. First, ver. 33 describes the activity of his imagination as excited to madness. It is untenable to interpret זָרוֹת here with Rashi, Aben Ezra, and others, and to translate with Luther: "so shall thine eyes look after other women" (*circumspicient mulieres impudicas*, Fleischer, for the meaning to perceive, to look about for something, to seek something with the eyes, referring to Gen. xli. 33). For זרות acquires the meaning of *mulieres impudicæ* only from its surrounding, but here the parallel תַּהְפֻּכוֹת (perverse things) directs to the neut. *aliena* (cf. xv. 28, רָעוֹת), but not merely in the sense of unreal things (Ralbag, Meîri), but: strange, *i.e.* abnormal, thus bizarre, mad, dreadful things. An old Heb. parable compares the changing circumstances which wine produces with the man-

[1] However, we will not conceal it, that the post-bibl. Heb. does not know הפריש in the sense of to prick, sting (the *Midrash* explains the passage by יפריש בין מיתה לחיים, *i.e.* it cuts off life); and the Nestorian Knanishu of Superghan, whom I asked regarding *aphrish*, knew only of the meanings "to separate" and "to point out," but not "to sting."

ner of the lamb, the lion, the swine, the monkey; here juggles and phantoms of the imagination are meant, which in the view and fancy of the drunken man hunt one another like monkey capers. Moreover, the state of the drunken man is one that is separated from the reality of a life of sobriety and the safety of a life of moderation, 34*a*: thou act like one who lies in the heart of the sea. Thus to lie in the heart, *i.e.* the midst, of the sea as a ship goes therein, xxx. 19, is impossible; there one must swim; but swimming is not lying, and to think on a situation like that of Jonah, i. 5, one must think also of the ship; but שׁכב does not necessarily mean "to sleep," and, besides, the sleep of a passenger in the cabin on the high sea is of itself no dangerous matter. Rightly Hitzig: in the depth of the sea (cf. Jonah ii. 4)—the drunken man, or the man overcome by wine (Isa. xxviii. 7), is like one who has sunk down into the midst of the sea; and thus drowned, or in danger of being drowned, he is in a condition of intellectual confusion, which finally passes over into perfect unconsciousness, cut off from the true life which passes over him like one dead, and in this condition he has made a bed for himself, as שׁכב denotes. With בלב, בְּרֹאשׁ stands in complete contrast: he is like one who lies on the top of the mast. חבל, after the forms דֹּבֶר, שֹׁלֵם, is the sail-yard fastened by ropes, חֲבָלִים (Isa. xxxiii. 23). To lay oneself down on the sail-yard happens thus to no one, and it is no place for such a purpose; but as little as one can quarter him who is on the ridge of the roof, in the *ʿAlîja*, because no one is able to lie down there, so little can he in the bower [*Mastkorb*] him who is here spoken of (Böttcher). The poet says, but only by way of comparison, how critical the situation of the drunkard is; he compares him to one who lies on the highest sail-yard, and is exposed to the danger of being every moment thrown into the sea; for the rocking of the ship is the greater in proportion to the height of the sail-yard. The drunkard is, indeed, thus often exposed to the peril of his life; for an accident of itself not great, or a stroke, may suddenly put an end to his life.

Ver. 35. The poet represents the drunken man as now speaking to himself. He has been well cudgelled; but because insensible, he has not felt it, and he places himself now where he will

sleep out his intoxication. Far from being made temperate by the strokes inflicted on him, he rejoices in the prospect, when he has awaked out of his sleep, of beginning again the life of drunkenness and revelry which has become a pleasant custom to him. חָלָה means not only to be sick, but generally to be, or to become, affected painfully; cf. Jer. v. 3, where חָלוּ is not the 3d pl. mas. of חִיל, but of חלה. The words מָתַי אָקִיץ are, it is true, a cry of longing of a different kind from Job vii. 4. The sleeping man cannot forbear from yielding to the constraint of nature: he is no longer master of himself, he becomes giddy, everything goes round about with him, but he thinks with himself: Oh that I were again awake! and so little has his appetite been appeased by his sufferings, that when he is again awakened, he will begin where he left off yesterday, when he could drink no more. מָתַי is here, after Nolde, Fleischer, and Hitzig, the relative *quando* (*quum*); but the bibl. *usus loq.* gives no authority for this. In that case we would have expected הֶקִיצוֹתִי instead of אָקִיץ. As the interrog. מתי is more animated than the relat., so also אוֹסִיף אֲבַקְשֶׁנּוּ is more animated (1 Sam. ii. 3) than אוסיף לְבַקֵּשׁ. The suffix of אבקשנו refers to the wine: raised up, he will seek that which has become so dear and so necessary to him.

After this divergence (in vers. 29–35) from the usual form of the proverb, there is now a return to the tetrastich:

xxiv. 1 Envy not evil men,
And desire not to have intercourse with them.
2 For their heart thinketh of violence,
And their lips speak mischief.

The warning, not to envy the godless, is also found at iii. 31, xxiii. 17, xxiv. 19, but is differently constructed in each of these passages. Regarding תִּתְאַו with *Pathach*, *vid.* at xxiii. 3. אַנְשֵׁי רָעָה (cf. רָע, xxviii. 5) are the wicked, *i.e.* such as cleave to evil, and to whom evil clings. The warning is grounded in this, that whoever have intercourse with such men, make themselves partners in greater sins and evil: for their heart broodeth (write כִּי שֹׁד, *Munach Dechî*) violence, *i.e.* robbery, plunder, destruction, murder, and the like. With שֹׁד (in the *Mishle* only here and at xxi. 7, cf. שֹׁדֵד, xix. 26) connects itself elsewhere חָמָס, here (cf. Hab. i. 3) עָמָל, *labor, molestia*, viz. those

who prepare it for others by means of slanderous, crafty, uncharitable talk.

Vers. 3, 4. The warning against fellowship with the godless is followed by the praise of wisdom, which is rooted in the fear of God.

Ver. 3 By wisdom is the house builded,
And by understanding is it established.
4 And by knowledge shall the chambers be filled
With all manner of precious and pleasant goods.

What is meant by the "building of the house" is explained at xiv. 1. It is wisdom, viz. that which originates from God, which is rooted in fellowship with Him, by which every household, be it great or small, prospers and attains to a successful and flourishing state; בּוֹנֵן, as parallel word to בָּנָה (iii. 19; Hab. ii. 12), is related to it as *statuere* to *extruere;* the *Hithpal* (as at Num. xxi. 17) means to keep oneself in a state of continuance, to gain perpetuity, to become established. That יִמָּלְאוּ by *Athnach* has not passed over into the pausal יִמָּלְאוּ, arises from this, that the *Athnach*, by the poetical system of accents, has only the force of the prose accent *Sakef;* the clause completes itself only by 4*b*; the pausal form on that account also is not found, and it is discontinued, because the *Athnach* does not produce any pausal effect (*vid.* at Ps. xlv. 6). The form of expression in ver. 4 is like i. 13, iii. 10. But the חֲדָרִים, of storerooms (LXX. as Isa. xxvi. 20, *ταμιεῖα*), and נְעִים, like xxii. 18, xxiii. 8, is peculiar to this collection.

Vers. 5, 6. The praise of wisdom is continued: it brings blessings in the time of peace, and gives the victory in war.

Ver. 5 A wise man is full of strength;
And a man of understanding showeth great power.
6 For with wise counsel shalt thou carry on successful war;
And safety is where counsellors are not wanting.

The ב of בַּעֲוֹן (thus with *Pathach* in old impressions, Cod. 1294, Cod. *Jaman.*, and elsewhere with the Masoretic note לית ומלא) introduces, as that of בְּכֹחַ, Ps. xxix. 4, the property in which a person or thing appears; the article (cf. הָעֻזִּים, ii. 13, Gesen. § 35, 2A) is that of gender. The parallel מאמין כח, a Greek translates by *ὑπὲρ κραταιὸν ἰσχύϊ* = מֵאַמִּיץ כֹּחַ (Job ix. 4; Isa. xl. 26). But after 5*a* it lies nearer that the poet means

to express the power which lies in wisdom itself (Eccles. vii. 19), and its superiority to physical force (xxi. 22); the LXX., Syr., and Targ. also, it is true, translate 5*a* as if מֵעָז (*præ potente*) were the words used. אִמֵּץ כֹּחַ means to strengthen the strength, and that is (Nah. ii. 2) equivalent to, to collect the strength (to take courage), here and at Amos ii. 14, to show strong (superior) strength. The reason is gathered from xx. 18*b* and xi. 14*b*. The לְךָ here added, Hitzig is determined to read תֵּעָשֶׂה: for with prudent counsel the war shall be carried out by thee. The construction of the passive with ל of the subject is correct in Heb. (*vid.* at xiv. 20) as well as in Aram.,[1] and עשׂה frequently means, in a pregnant sense: to complete, to carry out, to bring to an end; but the phrase עשׂה מלחמה means always to carry on war, and nothing further. לְךָ is the *dat. commod.*, as in נִלְחַם לְ, to wage war (to contend) for any one; *e.g.* Ex. xiv. 14. Instead of ברב, the LXX. reads בלב; regarding γεωργίου μεγάλου for מאמץ כח, without doubt a corrupt reading, *vid.* Lagarde.

Till now in this appendix we have found only two distichs (*vid.* vol. i. p. 17); now several of them follow. From this, that wisdom is a power which accomplishes great things, it follows that it is of high value, though to the fool it appears all too costly.

Ver. 7 Wisdom seems to the fool to be an ornamental commodity;
He openeth not his mouth in the gate.

Most interpreters take רָאמוֹת for רָמוֹת (written as at 1 Chron. vi. 58; cf. Zech. xiv. 10; רָאשׁ, Prov. x. 4; קָאם, Hos. x. 14), and translate, as Jerome and Luther: "Wisdom is to the fool too high;" the way to wisdom is to him too long and too steep, the price too costly, and not to be afforded. Certainly this thought does not lie far distant from what the poet would say; but why does he say חָכְמוֹת, and not חָכְמָה? This חכמות is not a numerical plur., so as to be translated with the *Venet.*: μετέωροι τῷ ἄφρονι αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι; it is a plur., as Ps. xlix. 4 shows; but, as is evident from the personification and the construction, i. 20, one inwardly multiplying and heightening, which is related to חכמה as science or the contents of knowledge is to knowledge. That this plur. comes here into view

[1] *Vid.* Nöldeke's *Neusyrische Gram.* p. 219, *Anm.*, and p. 416.

as in i.–ix. (*vid.* vol. i. p. 34), is definitely accounted for in these chapters by the circumstance that wisdom was to be designated, which is the *mediatrix* of all wisdom; here, to be designated in intentional symphony with ראמות, whose plur. ending *ôth* shall be for that very reason, however, inalienable. Thus ראמות will be the name of a costly foreign *bijouterie*, which is mentioned in the Book of Job, where the unfathomableness and inestimableness of wisdom is celebrated; *vid.* Job xxvii. 18, where we have recorded what we had to say at the time regarding this word. But what is now the meaning of the saying that wisdom is to the fool a pearl or precious coral? Joël Bril explains: "The fool uses the sciences like a precious stone, only for ornament, but he knows not how to utter a word publicly." This is to be rejected, because ראמות is not so usual a trinket or ornament as to serve as an expression of this thought. The third of the comparison lies in the rarity, costliness, unattainableness; the fool despises wisdom, because the expenditure of strength and the sacrifices of all kinds which are necessary to put one into the possession of wisdom deter him from it (Rashi). This is also the sense which the expression has when ראמות = רמות; and probably for the sake of this double meaning the poet chose just this word, and not פנינים, נביש, or any other name, for articles of ornament (Hitzig). The Syr. has incorrectly interpreted this play upon words: *sapientia abjecta stulto;* and the Targumist: the fool grumbles (מִתְרָעֵם) against wisdom.[1] He may also find the grapes to be sour because they hang too high for him; here it is only said that wisdom remains at a distance from him because he cannot soar up to its attainment; for that very reason he does not open his mouth in the gate, where the council and the representatives of the people have their seats: he has not the knowledge necessary for being associated in counselling, and thus must keep silent; and this is indeed the most prudent thing he can do.

Ver. 8. From wisdom, which is a moral good, the following proverb passes over to a kind of *σοφία δαιμονιώδης*:

He that meditateth to do evil,
We call such an one an intriguer.

[1] This explanation is more correct than Levy's: he lifts himself up (boasts) with wisdom.

A verbal explanation and definition like xxi. 24 (cf. vol. i. p. 40), formed like xvi. 21 from נבון. Instead of בַּעַל־מְזִמּוֹת [lord of mischief] in xii. 2, the expression is אִישׁ מ׳ (cf. at xxii. 24). Regarding מזמות in its usual sense, *vid.* v. 2. Such definitions have of course no lexicographical, but only a moral aim. That which is here given is designed to warn one against gaining for himself this ambiguous title of a refined (cunning, *versutus*) man; one is so named whose schemes and endeavours are directed to the doing of evil. One may also inversely find the turning-point of the warning in 8*b*: "he who projects deceitful plans against the welfare of others, finds his punishment in this, that he falls under public condemnation as a worthless intriguer" (Elster). But מזמות is a *ῥῆμα μέσον*, *vid.* v. 2; the title is thus equivocal, and the turning-point lies in the bringing out of his kernel: מְחַשֵּׁב לְהָרֵעַ = meditating to do evil.

Ver. 9. This proverb is connected by זמת with ver. 8, and by אויל with ver. 7; it places the fool and the mocker over against one another.

> The undertaking of folly is sin;
> And an abomination to men is the scorner,

Since it is certain that for 9*b* the subject is "the scorner," so also "sin" is to be regarded as the subject of 9*a*. The special meaning *flagitium*, as xxi. 27, זִמָּה will then not have here, but it derives it from the root-idea "to contrive, imagine," and signifies first only the collection and forthputting of the thoughts towards a definite end (Job xvii. 11), particularly the refined preparation, the contrivance of a sinful act. In a similar way we speak of a sinful beginning or undertaking. But if one regards sin in itself, or in its consequences, it is always a contrivance or desire of folly (*gen. subjecti*), or: one that bears on itself (*gen. qualitatis*) the character of folly; for it disturbs and destroys the relation of man to God and man, and rests, as Socrates in *Plato* says, on a false calculation. And the mocker (the mocker at religion and virtue) is תּוֹעֲבַת לָאָדָם. The form of combination stands here before a word with לְ, as at Job xviii. 2, xxiv. 5, and frequently. But why does not the poet say directly תועבת אָדָם? Perhaps to leave room for the double sense, that the mocker is not only an abomination to men, viz. to the better disposed; but also, for he makes others err as to

their faith, and draws them into his frivolous thoughts, becomes to them a cause of abomination, *i.e.* of such conduct and of such thoughts as are an abomination before God (xv. 9, 26).

Ver. 10. The last of these four distichs stands without visible connection:

Hast thou shown thyself slack in the day of adversity,
Then is thy strength small.

The perf. 10*a* is the hypothetic, *vid.* at xxii. 29. If a man shows himself remiss (xviii. 9), *i.e.* changeable, timorous, incapable of resisting in times of difficulty, then shall he draw therefrom the conclusion which is expressed in 10*b*. Rightly Luther, with intentional generalization, "he is not strong who is not firm in need." But the address makes the proverb an earnest admonition, which speaks to him who shows himself weak the judgment which he has to pronounce on himself. And the *paronomasia* צָרָה and צַר may be rendered, where possible, "if thy strength becomes, as it were, pressed together and bowed down by the difficulty just when it ought to show itself (viz. לְהַרְחִיב לְךָ), then it is limited, thou art a weakling." Thus Fleischer accordingly, translating: *si segnis fueris die angustiæ, angustæ sunt vires tuæ.* Hitzig, on the contrary, corrects after Job vii. 11, רוּחֶךָ, "*Klemm* (*klamm*) *ist dein Mut*" [=strait is thy courage]. And why? Of כח [strength], he remarks, one can say כּשׁל [it is weak] (Ps. xxxi. 11), but scarcely צר [strait, straitened]; for force is exact, and only the region of its energy may be wide or narrow. To this we answer, that certainly of strength in itself we cannot use the word כח in the sense here required; the confinement (limitation) may rather be, as with a stream, Isa. lix. 19, the increasing (heightening) of its intensity. But if the strength is in itself anything definite, then on the other hand its expression is something linear, and the force in view of its expression is that which is here called צר, *i.e.* not extending widely, not expanding, not inaccessible. צר is all to which narrow limits are applied. A little strength is limited, because it is little also in its expression.

Now, again, we meet with proverbs of several lines. The first here is a hexastich:

Ver. 11 Deliver them that are taken to death,
And them that are tottering to destruction, oh stop them!

12 If thou sayest, "We knew not of it indeed,"—
It is not so: The Weigher of hearts, who sees through it,
And He that observeth thy soul, He knoweth it,
And requiteth man according to his work.

If אם is interpreted as a particle of adjuration, then אִם־תַּחְשׁוֹךְ is equivalent to: I adjure thee, forbear not (cf. Neh. xiii. 25 with Isa. lviii. 1), viz. that which thou hast to do, venture all on it (LXX., Syr., Jerome). But the parallelism requires us to take together מָטִים לַהֲרֵג (such as with tottering steps are led forth to destruction) as object along with אם־תחשוך, as well as לְקֻחִים לָמָוֶת (such as from their condition are carried away to death, cf. Ex. xiv. 11) as object to הַצֵּל, in which all the old interpreters have recognised the *imper.*, but none the *infin.* (*eripere . . . ne cesses*, which is contrary to Heb. idiom, both in the position of the words and in the construction). אם also is not to be interpreted as an interrogative; for, thus expressed, *an retinetis* ought rather to have for the converse the meaning: thou shalt indeed not do it! (cf. *e.g.* Isa. xxix. 16.) And אם cannot be conditional: *si prohibere poteris* (Michaelis and others), for the fut. after אם has never the sense of a potential. Thus אם is, like לוּ, understood in the sense of *utinam*, as it is used not merely according to later custom (Hitzig), but from ancient times (cf. *e.g.* Ex. xxxii. 32 with Gen. xxiii. 13). כִּי־תֹאמַר (reminding[1] us of the same formula of the Rabbinical writings) introduces an objection, excuse, evasion, which is met by הֲלֹא; introducing "so say I on the contrary," it is of itself a reply, *vid.* Deut. vii. 17 f. זֶה we will not have to interpret personally (LXX. τοῦτον); for, since ver. 11 speaks of several of them, the neut. rendering (Syr., Targ., *Venet.*, Luther) in itself lies nearer, and זה, *hoc*, after ידע, is also in conformity with the *usus loq.*; *vid.* at Ps. lvi. 10. But the neut. זה does not refer to the moral obligation expressed in ver. 11; to save human life when it is possible to do so, can be unknown to no one, wherefore Jerome (as if the words of the text were אֵין לְאֵל יָדֵנוּ זה): *vires non suppetunt.* זה refers to the fact that men are led to the tribunal; only thus is explained the change of ידעתי, which was to be expected, into יָדַעְנוּ: the objection is, that one certainly did not know, viz. that matters had come to an

[1] *Vid.* my *hebräischen Römerbrief*, p. 14 f.

extremity with them, and that a short process will be made with them. To this excuse, with pretended ignorance, the reply of the omniscient God stands opposed, and suggests to him who makes the excuse to consider: It is not so: the Searcher of hearts (*vid.* at xvi. 2), He sees through it, viz. what goes on in thy heart, and He has thy soul under His inspection (נֹצֵר, as Job vii. 20; LXX. καὶ ὁ πλάσας; וְיֹצֵר, which Hitzig prefers, for he thinks that נצר must be interpreted in the sense of to guard, preserve; Luther rightly); He knows, viz., how it is with thy mind, He looks through it, He knows (cf. for both, Ps. cxxxix. 1–4), and renders to man according to his conduct, which, without being deceived, He judges according to the state of the heart, out of which the conduct springs. It is to be observed that ver. 11 speaks of one condemned to death generally, and not expressly of one innocently condemned, and makes no distinction between one condemned in war and in peace. One sees from this that the Chokma generally has no pleasure in this, that men are put to death by men, not even when it is done legally as punishment for a crime. For, on the one side, it is true that the punishment of the murderer by death is a law proceeding from the nature of the divine holiness and the inviolability of the divine ordinance, and the worth of man as formed in the image of God, and that the magistrate who disowns this law as a law, disowns the divine foundation of his office; but, on the other side, it is just as true that thousands and thousands of innocent persons, or at least persons not worthy of death, have fallen a sacrifice to the abuse or the false application of this law; and that along with the principle of recompensative righteousness, there is a principle of grace which rules in the kingdom of God, and is represented in the O. T. by prophecy and the Chokma. It is, moreover, a noticeable fact, that God did not visit with the punishment of death the first murderer, the murderer of the innocent Abel, his brother, but let the principle of grace so far prevail instead of that of law, that He even protected his life against any avenger of blood. But after that the moral ruin of the human race had reached that height which brought the Deluge over the earth, there was promulgated to the post-diluvians the word of the law, Gen. ix. 6, sanctioning this inviolable right of putting

to death by the hand of justice. The conduct of God regulates itself thus according to the aspect of the times. In the Mosaic law the greatness of guilt was estimated not externally (cf. Num. xxxv. 31), but internally, a very flexible limitation in its practical bearings. And that under certain circumstances grace might have the precedence of justice, the parable having in view the pardon of Absalom (2 Sam. xiv.) shows. But a word from God, like Ezek. xviii. 23, raises grace to a principle, and the word with which Jesus (John viii. 11) dismisses the adulteress is altogether an expression of this purpose of grace passing beyond the purpose of justice. In the later Jewish commonwealth, criminal justice was subordinated to the principle of predominating compassion; practical effect was given to the consideration of the value of human life during the trial, and even after the sentence was pronounced, and during a long time no sentence of death was passed by the Sanhedrim. But Jesus, who was Himself the innocent victim of a fanatical legal murder, adjudged, it is true, the supremacy to the sword; but He preached and practised love, which publishes grace for justice. He was Himself incarnate Love, offering Himself for sinners, the Mercy which Jahve proclaims by Ezek. xviii. 23. The so-called Christian state [*"Civitas Dei"*] is indeed in manifest opposition to this. But Augustine declares himself, on the supposition that the principle of grace must penetrate the new era, in all its conditions, that began with Christianity, for the suspension of punishment by death, especially because the heathen magistrates had abused the instrument of death, which, according to divine right, they had control over, to the destruction of Christians; and Ambrosius went so far as to impress it as a duty on a Christian judge who had pronounced the sentence of death, to exclude himself from the Holy Supper. The magisterial control over life and death had at that time gone to the extreme height of bloody violence, and thus in a certain degree it destroyed itself. Therefore Jansen changes the proverb (ver. 11) with the words of Ambrosius into the admonition: *Quando indulgentia non nocet publico, eripe intercessione, eripe gratia tu sacerdos, aut tu imperator eripe subscriptione indulgentiæ.* When Samuel Romilly's Bill to abolish the punishment of death for a theft amounting to the sum of

five shillings passed the English House of Commons, it was thrown out by a majority in the House of Lords. Among those who voted against the Bill were one archbishop and five bishops. Our poet here in the Proverbs is of a different mind. Even the law of Sinai appoints the punishment of death only for man-stealing. The Mosaic code is incomparably milder than even yet the *Carolina*. In expressions, however, like the above, a true Christian spirit rules the spirit which condemns all blood-thirstiness of justice, and calls forth to a crusade not only against the inquisition, but also against such unmerciful, cruel executions even as they prevailed in Prussia in the name of law in the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm I., the Inexorable.

Vers. 13, 14. The proverb now following stands in no obvious relation with the preceding. But in both a commencement is made with two lines, which contain, in the former, the principal thought; in this here, its reason:

Ver. 13 My son, eat honey, for it is good,
And honeycomb is sweet to thy taste.
14 So apprehend wisdom for thy soul:
When thou hast found it, there is a future,
And thy hope is not destroyed.

After its nearest fundamental thought, טוֹב, Arab. *tejjib*, means that which smells and tastes well; honey (דְּבַשׁ, from דָּבַשׁ, to be thick, consistent) has, besides, according to the old idea (*e.g.* in the Koran), healing virtue, as in general bitterness is viewed as a property of the poisonous, and sweetness that of the wholesome. וְנֹפֶת is second accus. dependent on אֱכָל־, for honey and honeycomb were then spoken of as different; נֹפֶת (from נָפַת, to pour, to flow out) is the purest honey (virgin-honey), flowing of itself out of the comb. With right the accentuation takes 13*b* as independent, the substantival clause containing the reason, "for it is good:" honeycomb is sweet to thy taste, *i.e.* applying itself to it with the impression of sweetness; עַל, as at Neh. ii. 5; Ps. xvi. 6 (Hitzig).

In the כֵּן of 14*a*, it is manifest that ver. 13 is not spoken for its own sake. To apprehend wisdom, is elsewhere equivalent to, to receive it into the mind, i. 2, Eccles. i. 17 (cf. דעת בינה, iv. 1, and frequently), according to which Böttcher also here

explains: learn to understand wisdom. But כן unfolds itself in 14*bc*: even as honey has for the body, so wisdom has for the soul, beneficent wholesome effects. דעה חכמה is thus not absolute, but is meant in relation to these effects. Rightly Fleischer: *talem reputa;* Ewald: *sic* (*talem*) *scito sapientiam* (*esse*) *animæ tuæ*, know, recognise wisdom as something advantageous to thy soul, and worthy of commendation. Incorrectly Hitzig explains אִם־מָצָאתָ, "if the opportunity presents itself." Apart from this, that in such a case the words would rather have been כִּי תִמְצָא, to find wisdom is always equivalent to, to obtain it, to make it one's own, iii. 13, viii. 35; cf. ii. 5, viii. 9. דְּעִי[1] stands for דְּעָה, after the form רְדִי; שְׁבִי (after Böttcher, § 396, not without the influence of the following commencing sound), cf. the similar transitions of ֶ into ֵ placed together at Ps. xx. 4; the form דְּעֵה is also found, but דְּעָה is the form in the *Cod. Hilleli*,[2] as confirmed by Moses Kimchi in *Comm.*, and by David Kimchi, *Michlol* 101*b*. With וְיֵשׁ begins the apodosis (LXX., Jerome, Targ., Luther, Rashi, Ewald, and others). In itself, ויש (cf. Gen. xlvii. 6) might also continue the conditional clause; but the explanation, *si inveneris* (*eam*) *et ad postremum ventum erit* (Fleischer, Bertheau, Zöckler), has this against it, that יֵשׁ אַחֲרִית does not mean: the end comes, but: there is an end, xxiii. 18; cf. xix. 18; here: there is an end for thee, viz. an issue that is a blessed reward. The promise is the same as at xxiii. 18. In our own language we speak of the hope of one being cut off; (Arab.) *jaz'a*, to be cut off, is equivalent to, to give oneself up to despair.

Ver. 15 Lie not in wait, oh wicked man, against the dwelling of the righteous;
Assault not his resting-place.
16 For seven times doth the righteous fall and rise again,
But the wicked are overthrown when calamity falls on them.

The אֹרֵב [lying in wait] and שֹׁדֵד [practising violence], against which the warning is here given, are not directed, as at i. 11, xix. 26, immediately against the person, but against the dwell-

[1] Write דְּעָה with *Illuj* after the preceding *Legarmeh*, like 12*b*, הוּא (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 28).

[2] *Vid.* Strack's *Prolegomena critica in V. T.* (1872), p. 19.

ing-place and resting-place (רֵבִץ, *e.g.* Jer. l. 6, as also נָוֶה, iii. 33) of the righteous, who, on his part, does injustice and wrong to no one; the warning is against coveting his house, Ex. xx. 17, and driving him by cunning and violence out of it. Instead of רָשָׁע, Symmachus and Jerome have incorrectly read רֶשַׁע, and from this misunderstanding have here introduced a sense without sense into ver. 15; many interpreters (Löwenstein, Ewald, Elster, and Zöckler) translate with Luther appositionally: as a wicked man, *i.e.* "with mischievous intent," like one stealthily lurking for the opportunity of taking possession of the dwelling of another, as if this could be done with a good intent: רשע is the vocative (Syr., Targ., *Venet.*: *ἀσεβές*), and this address (cf. Ps. lxxv. 5 f.) sharpens the warning, for it names him who acts in this manner by the right name. The reason, 16*a*, sounds like an echo of Job v. 19. שֶׁבַע signifies, as at Ps. cxix. 164, seven times; cf. מֵאָה, xvii. 10. וְקָם (not וָקָם) is *perf. consec.*, as וָחִי, *e.g.* Gen. iii. 22: and he rises afterwards (notwithstanding), but the transgressors come to ruin; בְּרָעָה, if a misfortune befall them (cf. xiv. 32), they stumble and fall, and rise no more.

Vers. 17, 18. Warning against a vindictive disposition, and joy over its satisfaction.

Ver. 17 At the fall of thine enemy rejoice not,
And at his overthrow let not thine heart be glad;
18 That Jahve see it not, and it be displeasing to Him,
And He turns away His anger from Him.

The *Chethîb*, which in itself, as the plur. of category, אוֹיְבִיךָ, might be tolerable, has 17*b* against it: with right, all interpreters adhere to the *Kerî* אוֹיִבְךָ (with *i* from *ē* in doubled close syllable, as in the like *Kerî*, 1 Sam. xxiv. 5). וּבְכָּשְׁלוֹ, for וּבְהִכָּשְׁלוֹ, is the syncope usual in the *inf. Niph.* and *Hiph.*, which in *Niph.* occurs only once with the initial guttural (as בֵּעָטֵךְ) or half guttural (לֵרָאוֹת). וְרַע is not adj. here as at 1 Sam. xxv. 3, but *perf.* with the force of a *fut.* (Symmachus: *καὶ μὴ ἀρέσῃ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ*). The proverb extends the duty of love even to an enemy; for it requires that we do good to him and not evil, and warns against rejoicing when evil befalls him. Hitzig, indeed, supposes that the noble morality which is expressed in ver. 17 is limited to a moderate extent by the motive assigned in 18*b*. Certainly the poet means to say that God could easily

give a gracious turn for the better, as to the punishment of the wicked, to the decree of his anger against his enemy; but his meaning is not this, that one, from joy at the misfortune of others, ought to desist from interrupting the process of the destruction of his enemy, and let it go on to its end; but much rather, that one ought to abstain from this joy, so as not to experience the manifestation of God's displeasure thereat, by His granting grace to him against whom we rejoice to see God's anger go forth.[1]

Vers. 19, 20. Warning against envying the godless for their external prosperity:

Be not enraged on account of evil-doers,
Envy not the godless;
20 For the wicked men shall have no future,
The light of the godless is extinguished.

Ver. 19 is a variation on Ps. xxxvii. 1; cf. also iii. 21 (where with בכל-דרכיו following the traditional תבחר is more appropriate than תחתר, which Hupfeld would here insert). תִּתְחַר is *fut. apoc.* of הִתְחָרָה, to be heated (to be indignant), distinguished from the *Tiphel* תַּחֲרֵה, to be jealous. The ground and occasion of being enraged, and on the other side, of jealousy or envy, is the prosperity of the godless, Ps. lxxiii. 3; cf. Jer. xii. 1. This anger at the apparently unrighteous division of fortune, this jealousy at the success in which the godless rejoice, rest on short-sightedness, which regards the present, and looks not on to the end. אַחֲרִית, merely as in the expression יֵשׁ אַח, 14*b* (cf. Ps. xxxvii. 37), always denotes the happy, glorious issue indemnifying for past sufferings. Such an issue the wicked man has not; his light burns brightly on this side, but one day it is extinguished. In 20*b* is repeated xiii. 9; cf. xx. 20.

Vers. 21, 22. A warning against rebellious thoughts against God and the king:

My son, honour Jahve and the king,
And involve not thyself with those who are otherwise disposed;
22 For suddenly their calamity ariseth,
And the end of their years, who knoweth it?

[1] This proverb, according to *Aboth* iv. 24, was the motto of that Samuel with the surname הקטן, who formulated ברכת המינים (the interpolation in the Schemone-Esre prayer directed against the schismatics): he thus distinguished between private enemies and the enemies of the truth.

The verb שָׁנָה, proceeding from the primary idea of folding (*complicare*, *duplicare*), signifies transitively to do twice, to repeat, xvii. 9, xxvi. 11, according to which Kimchi here inappropriately thinks on relapsing; and intransitively, to change, to be different, Esth. i. 7, iii. 8. The Syr. and Targ. translate the word שְׁטֵי, fools; but the *Kal* (טעמו) שָׁנָה occurs, indeed, in the Syr., but not in the Heb., in the meaning *alienata est* (*mens ejus*); and besides, this meaning, *alieni*, is not appropriate here. A few, however, with Saadia (cf. *Deutsch-Morgenländische Zeitschr.* xxi. 616), the dualists (Manichees), understand it in a dogmatic sense; but then שׁוֹנִים must be denom. of שְׁנַיִם, while much more it is its root-word. Either שׁונים means those who change, *novantes* = *novarum rerum studiosi*, which is, however, exposed to this objection, that the Heb. שׁנה, in the transitive sense to change, does not elsewhere occur; or it means, according to the *usus loq.*, *diversos* = *diversum sentientes* (C. B. Michaelis and others), and that with reference to 21*a*: המכוּרים דבריהם ומצותם (Meîri, Immanuel), or משׁנים מנהג החכמה (Ahron b. Joseph). Thus they are called (for it is a common name of a particular class of men) dissidents, oppositionists, or revolutionaries, who recognise neither the monarchy of Jahve, the King of kings, nor that of the earthly king, which perhaps Jerome here means by the word *detractoribus* (= *detractatoribus*). The *Venet.* incorrectly, σὺν τοῖς μισοῦσι, *i.e.* שׂוֹנְאִים. With ב at xiv. 10, הִתְעָרֵב meant to mix oneself up with something, here with עִם, to mix oneself with some one, *i.e.* to make common cause with him.

The reason assigned in ver. 22 is, that although such persons as reject by thought and action human and divine law may for a long time escape punishment, yet suddenly merited ruin falls on them. אֵיד is, according to its primary signification, weighty, oppressive misfortune, *vid.* i. 27. In יָקוּם it is thought of as hostile power (Hos. x. 14); or the rising up of God as Judge (*e.g.* Isa. xxxiii. 10) is transferred to the means of executing judgment. פִּיד (= פּוּד of פוד or פיד, Arab. *fâd*, fut. *jafûdu* or *jafîdu*, a stronger power of *bâd*, cogn. אבד) is destruction (Arab. *feid*, *fîd*, death); this word occurs, besides here, only thrice in the Book of Job. But to what does שְׁנֵיהֶם refer? Certainly not to Jahve and the king (LXX., Schultens, Umbreit, and Bertheau),

for in itself it is doubtful to interpret the genit. after פִּיד as designating the subject, but improper to comprehend God and man under one cipher. Rather it may refer to two, of whom one class refuse to God, the other to the king, the honour that is due (Jerome, Luther, and at last Zöckler); but in the foregoing, two are not distinguished, and the want of reverence for God, and for the magistrates appointed by Him, is usually met with, because standing in interchangeable relationship, in one and the same persons. Is there some misprint then in this word? Ewald suggests שְׁנֵיהֶם, *i.e.* of those who show themselves as שׁוֹנִים (*altercatores*) towards God and the king. In view of קְמֵיהֶם, Ex. xxxii. 25, this brevity of expression must be regarded as possible. But if this were the meaning of the word, then it ought to have stood in the first member (איד שׁניהם), and not in the second. No other conjecture presents itself. Thus שְׁנֵיהֶם is perhaps to be referred to the שׁוֹנִים, and those who engage with them: join thyself not with the opposers; for suddenly misfortune will come upon them, and the destruction of both (of themselves and their partisans), who knows it? But that also is not satisfactory, for after the address שְׁנֵיכֶם was to have been expected, 22*b*. Nothing remains, therefore, but to understand שְׁנֵיהֶם, with the Syr. and Targ., as at Job xxxvi. 11; the proverb falls into rhythms פִּתְאֹם and פִּיד, שׁוֹנִים and שְׁנֵיהֶם. But "the end of their year" is not equivalent to the hour of their death (Hitzig), because for this פִּידָם (cf. Arab. *feid* and *fîd*, death) was necessary; but to the expiring, the vanishing, the passing by of the year during which they have succeeded in maintaining their ground and playing a part. There will commence a time which no one knows beforehand when all is over with them. In this sense, "who knoweth," with its object, is equivalent to "suddenly ariseth," with its subject. In the LXX., after xxiv. 22, there follow one distich of the relations of man to the word of God as deciding their fate, one distich of fidelity as a duty towards the king, and the duty of the king, and one pentastich or hexastich of the power of the tongue and of the anger of the king. The Heb. text knows nothing of these three proverbs. Ewald has, *Jahrb.* xi. 18 f., attempted to translate them into Heb., and is of opinion that they are worthy of being regarded as original

component parts of i.–xxix., and that they ought certainly to have come in after xxiv. 22. We doubt this originality, but recognise their translation from the Heb. Then follows in the LXX. the series of Proverbs, xxx. 1–14, which in the Heb. text bear the superscription of "the Words of Agur;" the second half of the "Words of Agur," together with the "Words of Lemuel," stand after xxiv. 34 of the Heb. text. The state of the matter is this, that in the copy from which the Alexandrines translated the Appendix xxx.–xxxi. 9, stood half of it, after the "Words of the Wise" [which extend from xxii. 17 to xxiv. 22], and half after the supplement headed "these also are from wise men" [xxiv. 23–34], so that only the proverbial ode in praise of the excellent matron [xxxi. 10] remains as an appendix to the Book of Hezekiah's collection, xxv.–xxix.

SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIRST SOLOMONIC COLLECTION.—XXIV. 23–34.

There now follows a brief appendix to the older Book of Proverbs, bearing the superscription, 23*a*, "*These also are from wise men*," *i.e.* also the proverbs here following originate from wise men. The old translators (with the exception of Luther) have not understood this superscription; they mistake the *Lamed auctoris*, and interpret the ל as that of address: also these (proverbs) I speak to wise men, *sapientibus* (LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Venet.*). The formation of the superscription is like that of the Hezekiah collection, xxv. 1, and from this and other facts we have concluded (*vid.* vol. i. pp. 26, 27) that this second supplement originated from the same source as the extension of the older Book of Proverbs, by the appending of the more recent, and its appendices. The linguistic complexion of the proverbs here and there resembles that of the first appendix (cf. 29*b* with 12*d*, and ינעם, 25*a*, with נעים, xxii. 18, xxiii. 8, xxiv. 4); but, on the other hand, 23*b* refers back to xxviii. 21 of the Hezekiah collection, and in ver. 33 f. is repeated vi. 10 f. This appendix thus acknowledges

its secondary character; the poet in minute details stands in the same relation to the Solomonic Mashal as that in which in general he stands to the author of the Introduction, i.–ix. That 23*b* is not in itself a proverb, we have already (vol. i. p. 6) proved; it is the first line of a hexastich (*vid.* vol. i. p. 16).

Vers. 23*b*–25. The curse of partiality and the blessing of impartiality:

Respect of persons in judgment is by no means good:
24 He that saith to the guilty, "Thou art in the right,"
Him the people curse, nations detest.
25 But to them who rightly decide, it is well,
And upon them cometh blessing with good.

Partiality is either called שְׂאֵת פָּנִים, xviii. 5, respect to the person, for the partisan looks with pleasure on the פני, the countenance, appearance, personality of one, by way of preference; or הַכֵּר־פָּנִים, as here and at xxviii. 21, for he places one person before another in his sight, or, as we say, has a regard to him; the latter expression is found in Deut. i. 17, xvi. 19. הִכִּיר (*vid.* xx. 11) means to regard sharply, whether from interest in the object, or because it is strange. בַּל Heidenheim regards as weaker than לֹא; but the reverse is the case (*vid.* vol. i. p. 204), as is seen from the derivation of this negative (=*balj*, from בָּלָה, to melt, to decay); thus it does not occur anywhere else than here with the pred. adj. The two supplements delight in this בל, xxii. 29, xxiii. 7, 35. The thesis 23*b* is now confirmed in vers. 24 and 25, from the consequences of this partiality and its opposite: He that saith (אֹמְרוֹ, with *Mehuppach Legarmeh* from the last syllable, as rightly by Athias, Nissel, and Michaelis, *vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 32) to the guilty: thou art right, *i.e.* he who sets the guilty free (for רָשָׁע and צַדִּיק have here the forensic sense of the post-bibl. חַיָּב and זַכַּי), him they curse, etc.; cf. the shorter proverb, xvii. 15, according to which a partial, unjust judge is an abomination to God. Regarding נָקַב (קָבַב) here and at xi. 26, Schultens, under Job iii. 8, is right; the word signifies *figere*, and hence to distinguish and make prominent by distinguishing as well as by branding; cf. *defigere*, to curse, properly, to pierce through. Regarding זָעַם, *vid.* at xxii. 14. עַמִּים and לְאֻמִּים (from עָמַם and לָאַם, which both mean to bind and combine) are plur. of categ.: not merely

individuals, not merely families, curse such an unrighteous judge and abhor him, but the whole people in all conditions and ranks of society; for even though such an unjust judge bring himself and his favourites to external honour, yet among no people is conscience so blunted, that he who absolves the crime and ennobles the miscarriage of justice shall escape the *vox populi*. On the contrary, it goes well (יִנְעַם, like ii. 10, ix. 17, but here with neut. indef. subj. as ייטב, Gen. xii. 13, and frequently) with those who place the right, and particularly the wrong, fully to view; מוֹכִיחַ is he who mediates the right, Job ix. 33, and particularly who proves, censures, punishes the wrong, ix. 7, and in the character of a judge as here, Amos v. 10; Isa. xxix. 21. The genitive connection בִּרְכַּת־טוֹב is not altogether of the same signification as יֵין הַטּוֹב, wine of a good sort, Song vii. 10, and אֵשֶׁת רַע, a woman of a bad kind, vi. 24, for every blessing is of a good kind; the gen. טוב thus, as at Ps. xxi. 4, denotes the contents of the blessing; cf. Eph. i. 3, "with all spiritual blessings," in which the manifoldness of the blessing is presupposed.

Ver. 26. Then follows a distich with the watchword נְכֹחִים:

He kisseth the lips
Who for the end giveth a right answer.

The LXX., Syr., and Targ. translate: one kisseth the lips who, or: of those who . . .; but such a meaning is violently forced into the word (in that case the expression would have been שְׂפָתַי מֹשִׁיב or שִׂפְתֵי מֹשִׁיבִים). Equally impossible is Theodotion's *χείλεσι καταφιληθήσεται*, for יִשַּׁק cannot be the *fut. Niph.* Nor is it: lips kiss him who . . . (Rashi); for, to be thus understood, the word ought to have been לְמֹשִׁיב. מֹשִׁיב is naturally to be taken as the subj., and thus it supplies the meaning: he who kisseth the lips giveth an excellent answer, viz. the lips of him whom the answer concerns (Jerome, *Venet.*, Luther). But Hitzig ingeniously, "the words reach from the lips of the speaker to the ears of the hearer, and thus he kisses his ear with his lips." But since to kiss the ear is not a custom, not even with the Florentines, then a welcome answer, if its impression is to be compared to a kiss, is compared to a kiss on the lips. Hitzig himself translates: he commends himself with the lips who . . .; but נָשַׁק may mean to join oneself, Gen.

xli. 40, as kissing is equivalent to the joining of the lips; it does not mean intrans. to cringe. Rather the explanation: he who joins the lips together . . .; for he, viz. before reflecting, closed his lips together (suggested by Meîri); but נשׁק, with שׂפתים, brings the idea of kissing, *labra labris jungere*, far nearer. This prevails against Schultens' *armatus est* (*erit*) *labia*, besides נשׁק, certainly, from the primary idea of connecting (laying together) (*vid.* Ps. lxxviii. 9), to equip (arm) oneself therewith; but the meaning arising from thence: with the lips he arms himself . . . is direct nonsense. Fleischer is essentially right, *Labra osculatur* (*i.e. quasi osculum oblatum reddit*) *qui congrua respondet.* Only the question has nothing to do with a kiss; but if he who asks receives a satisfactory answer, an enlightening counsel, he experiences it as if he received a kiss. The Midrash incorrectly remarks under דְּבָרִים נְכֹחִים, "words of merited denunciation," according to which the Syr. translates. Words are meant which are corresponding to the matter and the circumstances, and suitable for the end (cf. viii. 9). Such words are like as if the lips of the inquirer received a kiss from the lips of the answerer.

Ver. 27. Warning against the establishing of a household where the previous conditions are wanting:

> Set in order thy work without,
> And make it ready for thyself beforehand in the fields,—
> After that then mayest thou build thine house.

The interchange of בַּחוּץ and בַּשָּׂדֶה shows that by מְלֶאכֶת הַשָּׂדֶה field-labour, 1 Chron. xxvii. 26, is meant. הכין, used of arrangement, procuring, here with מלאכה, signifies the setting in order of the work, viz. the cultivation of the field. In the parallel member, עַתָּדָהּ, carrying also its object, in itself is admissible: make preparations (LXX., Syr.); but the punctuation עַתָּדָהּ (Targ., *Venet.*; on the other hand, Jerome and Luther translate as if the words were ועתדה הַשָּׂדֶה) is not worthy of being contended against: set it (the work) in the fields in readiness, *i.e.* on the one hand set forward the present necessary work, and on the other hand prepare for that which next follows; thus: do completely and circumspectly what thy calling as a husbandman requires of thee,—then mayest thou go to the building and building up of thy house (*vid.* at ver. 3,

xiv. 1), to which not only the building and setting in order of a convenient dwelling, but also the bringing home of a housewife and the whole setting up of a household belongs; prosperity at home is conditioned by this—one fulfils his duty without in the fields actively and faithfully. One begins at the wrong end when he begins with the building of his house, which is much rather the result and goal of an intelligent discharge of duty within the sphere of one's calling. The *perf.*, with ו after a date, such as אַחַר, עוֹד מְעַט, and the like, when things that will or should be done are spoken of, has the fut. signification of a *perf. consec.*, Gen. iii. 5; Ex. xvi. 6 f., xvii. 4; Ewald, § 344*b*.

Ver. 28. Warning against unnecessary witnessing to the disadvantage of another:

> Never be a causeless witness against thy neighbour;
> And shouldest thou use deceit with thy lips?

The phrase עֵד־חִנָּם does not mean a witness who appears against his neighbour without knowledge of the facts of the case, but one who has no substantial reason for his giving of testimony; חִנָּם means groundless, with reference to the occasion and motive, iii. 30, xxiii. 29, xxvi. 2. Other designations stood for false witnesses (LXX., Syr., Targ.). Rightly Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther, without, however, rendering the gen. connection עד־חנם, as it might have been by the adj.

In 28*b*, Chajûg derives וְהִפְתִּיתָ from פָּתַת, to break in pieces, to crumble; for he remarks it might stand, with the passing over of *ô* into *î*, for וְהִפְתּוֹתָ [and thou wilt whisper]. But the ancients had no acquaintance with the laws of sound, and therefore with *naive* arbitrariness regarded all as possible; and Böttcher, indeed, maintains that the *Hiphil* of פתת may be הפתית as well as הפתות; but the former of these forms with *î* could only be metaplastically possible, and would be הִפְתִּיתָ (*vid.* Hitzig under Jer. xi. 20). And what can this *Hiph.* of פתת mean? "To crumble" one's neighbours (Chajûg) is an unheard of expression; and the meanings, to throw out crumbs, viz. crumbs of words (Böttcher), or to speak with a broken, subdued voice (Hitzig), are extracted from the rare Arab. *fatâfit* (*fatafiṭ*), for which the lexicographers note the meaning of a secret, moaning sound. When we see והפתית standing along with בִּישָׁפָתֶיךָ, then

before all we are led to think of פתה [to open], xx. 19; Ps. lxxiii. 36. But we stumble at the interrog. הַ, which nowhere else appears connected with ו. Ewald therefore purposes to read וְהִפְתִּיתָ [and will open wide] (LXX. μηδὲ πλατύνου): "that thou usest treachery with thy lips;" but from הִפְתָּה, to make wide open, Gen. ix. 27, "to use treachery" is, only for the flight of imagination, not too wide a distance. On הֲ, *et num*, one need not stumble; וַהֲלוֹא, 2 Sam. xv. 35, shows that the connection of a question by means of ו is not inadmissible; Ewald himself takes notice that in the Arab. the connection of the interrogatives أَ and هَلْ with و and ف is quite common;[1] and thus he reaches the explanation: wilt thou befool then by thy lips, *i.e.* pollute by deceit, by inconsiderate, wanton testimony against others? This is the right explanation, which Ewald hesitates about only from the fact that the interrog. הַ comes in between the ו *consec.* and its *perf.*, a thing which is elsewhere unheard of. But this difficulty is removed by the syntactic observation, that the *perf.* after interrogatives has often the modal colouring of a conj. or optative, *e.g.* after the interrog. pronoun, Gen. xxi. 7, *quis dixerit*, and after the interrogative particle, as here and at 2 Kings xx. 9, *iveritne*, where it is to be supplied (*vid.* at Isa. xxxviii. 8). Thus: *et num persuaseris* (*deceperis*) *labiis tuis*, and shouldest thou practise slander with thy lips, for thou bringest thy neighbour, without need, by thy uncalled for rashness, into disrepute? "It is a question, *âl'nakar* (cf. xxiii. 5), for which أَ (not هَلْ), in the usual Arab. interrogative: how, thou wouldest? one then permits the inquirer to draw the negative answer: "No, I will not do it" (Fleischer).

Ver. 29. The following proverb is connected as to its subject with the foregoing: one ought not to do evil to his neighbour without necessity; even evil which has been done to one must not be requited with evil:

> Say not, "As he hath done to me, so I do to him:
> I requite the man according to his conduct."

[1] We use the forms *âwa*, *âba*, *âthâmm*, for we suppose the interrogative to the copula; we also say *fahad*, *vid. Mufaṣṣal*, p. 941.

On the ground of public justice, the *talio* is certainly the nearest form of punishment, Lev. xxiv. 19 f.; but even here the Sinaitic law does not remain in the retortion of the injury according to its external form (it is in a certain manner practicable only with regard to injury done to the person and to property), but places in its stead an atonement measured and limited after a higher point of view. On pure moral grounds, the *jus talionis* ("as thou to me, so I to thee") has certainly no validity. Here he to whom injustice is done ought to commit his case to God, xx. 22, and to oppose to evil, not evil but good; he ought not to set himself up as a judge, nor to act as one standing on a war-footing with his neighbour (Judg. xv. 11); but to take God as his example, who treats the sinner, if only he seeks it, not in the way of justice, but of grace (Ex. xxxiv. 6 f.). The expression 29*b* reminds of xxiv. 12. Instead of לְאָדָם, there is used here, where the speaker points to a definite person, the phrase לְאִישׁ. Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther translate: to each one, as if the word were vocalized thus, לְאִישׁ (Ps. lxii. 13).

A Mashal ode of the slothful, in the form of a record of experiences, concludes this second supplement (*vid.* vol. i. p. 17):

Vër. 30 The field of a slothful man I came past,
And the vineyard of a man devoid of understanding.
31 And, lo! it was wholly filled up with thorns;
Its face was covered with nettles;
And its wall of stones was broken down.
32 But I looked and directed my attention to it;
I saw it, and took instruction from it:
33 "A little sleep, a little slumber,
A little folding of the hands to rest.
34 Then cometh thy poverty apace,
And thy want as an armed man."

The line 29*b* with לְאִישׁ is followed by one with אִישׁ. The form of the narrative in which this warning against drowsy slothfulness is clothed, is like Ps. xxxvii. 35 f. The distinguishing of different classes of men by אִישׁ and אָדָם (cf. xxiv. 20) is common in proverbial poetry. עָבַרְתִּי, at the close of the first parallel member, retains its *Pathach* unchanged. The description: and, lo! (וְהִנֵּה, with *Pazer*, after *Thorath Emeth*, p. 34, Anm. 2), it was . . . refers to the vineyard, for גֶּדֶר אֲבָנָיו

(its stone wall, like Isa. ii. 20, "its idols of silver") is, like Num. xxii. 24, Isa. v. 5, the fencing in of the vineyard. עָלָה כֻלּוֹ, *totus excreverat (in carduos)*, refers to this as subject, cf. in Ausonius: *apex vitibus assurgit;* the Heb. construction is as Isa. v. 6, xxxiv. 13; Gesen. § 133, 1, Anm. 2. The sing. קִמּוֹשׁוֹן of קִמְּשׁוֹנִים does not occur; perhaps it means properly the weed which one tears up to cast it aside, for (Arab.) *kumâsh* is matter dug out of the ground.[1] The ancients interpret it by *urticæ;* and חָרוּל, plur. חֲרִלִּים (as from חָרָל), R. חר, to burn, appears, indeed, to be the name of the nettle; the botanical name (Arab.) *khullar* (beans, pease, at least a leguminous plant) is from its sound not Arab., and thus lies remote.[2] The Pual כָּסּוּ sounds like Ps. lxxx. 11 (cf. כָּלּוּ, Ps. lxxii. 20); the position of the words is as this passage of the Psalm; the Syr., Targ., Jerome, and the *Venet.* render the construction actively, as if the word were כִּסּוּ.

In ver. 32, Hitzig proposes to read וְאֶחֱזֶה: and I stopped (stood still); but אחז is trans., not only at Eccles. vii. 9, but also at ii. 15: to hold anything fast; not: to hold oneself still. And for what purpose the change? A contemplating and looking at a thing, with which the turning and standing near is here connected, manifestly includes a standing still; רָאִיתִי, after וְאֶחֱזֶה, is, as commonly after הביט (*e.g.* Job xxxv. 5, cf. Isa. xlii. 18), the expression of a lingering looking at an object after the attention has been directed to it. In modern impressions, ואחזה אנכי are incorrectly accentuated; the old editions have rightly ואחזה with *Rebîa;* for not וא׳ אנכי, but אנכי אשית are connected. In viii. 17, this prominence of the personal pronoun serves for the expression of reciprocity; elsewhere, as *e.g.* Gen. xxi. 24, 2 Kings vi. 3, and particularly, frequently in Hosea, this circumstantiality does not make the subject prominent, but the action; here the suitable extension denotes that he rightly makes his comments at leisure (Hitzig). שִׁית לֵב is, as at xxii. 17, the turning of attention and reflection;

[1] This is particularly the name of what lies round about on the ground in the Bedouin tents, and which one takes up from thence (from *kamesh*, cogn. קבץ קמץ, *ramasser*, cf. the journal המגיד, 1871, p. 287*b*); in modern Arab., linen and matter of all kinds; *vid. Bochart*, under *linge* and *étoffe*.

[2] Perhaps ὄλυρα, *vid.* Lagarde's *Gesamm. Abhandl.* p. 59.

elsewhere לָקַח מוּסָר, to receive a moral, viii. 10, Jer. vii. 28, is here equivalent to, to abstract, deduce one from a fact, to take to oneself a lesson from it. In vers. 33 and 34 there is a repetition of vi. 9, 10. Thus, as ver. 33 expresses, the sluggard speaks to whom the neglected piece of ground belongs, and ver. 34 places before him the result. Instead of כְּמַהֲלֵךְ of the original passage [vi. 9, 10], here מִתְהַלֵּךְ, of the coming of poverty like an avenging Nemesis; and instead of וּמַחְסֹרֶךָ, here וּמַחְסֹרֶיךָ (the Cod. *Jaman.* has it without the י), which might be the *plene* written pausal form of the sing. (*vid.* at vi. 3, cf. vi. 11), but is more surely regarded as the plur.: thy deficits, or wants; for to thee at one time this, and at another time that, and finally all things will be wanting. Regarding the variants רֵאשֶׁךָ and רִישֶׁךָ (with א in the original passage, here in the borrowed passage with י), *vid.* at x. 4. כְּאִישׁ מָגֵן is translated in the LXX. by ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς δρομεύς (*vid.* at vi. 11); the Syr. and Targ. make from it a נַבְרָא טַבְלָרָא, *tabellarius*, a letter-carrier, coming with the speed of a courier.

SECOND COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS.—XXV.-XXIX.

The older Solomonic Book of Proverbs, with its introduction, i. 9, and its two supplements, (1) xxii. 17–xxiv. 22, (2) xxiv. 23–34, is now followed by a more modern Solomonic Book of Proverbs, a second extensive series of מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה, which the collector has introduced with the superscription:

xxv. 1 These also are proverbs of Solomon,
Which the men of Hezekiah the king of Judah have collected.

Hezekiah, in his concern for the preservation of the national literature, is the Jewish Pisistratos, and the "men of Hezekiah" are like the collectors of the poems of Homer, who were employed by Pisistratos for that purpose. גַּם־אֵלֶּה is the subject, and in Cod. 1294, and in the editions of Bomberg 1515, Hartmann 1595, Nissel, Jablonsky, Michaelis, has *Dechî*. This title is like that of the second supplement, xxiv. 23. The form of the name חִזְקִיָּה, abbreviated from יְחִזְקִיָּהוּ (חִזְקִיָּהוּ), is not

favourable to the derivation of the title from the collectors themselves. The LXX. translates: *Αὗται αἱ παιδεῖαι Σαλωμῶντος αἱ ἀδιάκριτοι* (cf. Jas. iii. 17), *ἃς ἐξεγράψαντο οἱ φίλοι Ἐζεκίου*, for which Aquila has *ἃς μετῆραν ἄνδρες Ἐζεκίου*, Jerome, *transtulerunt*. הֶעְתִּיק signifies, like (Arab.) *nsah*, נָסַח, to snatch away, to take away, to transfer from another place; in later Heb.: to transcribe from one book into another, to translate from one language into another: to take from another place and place together; the Whence? remains undetermined: according to the anachronistic rendering of the Midrash מגניזתם, *i.e.* from the Apocrypha; according to Hitzig, from the mouths of the people; more correctly Euchel and others: from their scattered condition, partly oral, partly written. *Vid.* regarding העתיק, Zunz, in *Deutsch-Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxv. 147 f., and regarding the whole title, vol. i. pp. 5, 6; regarding the forms of proverbs in this second collection, vol. i. p. 17; regarding their relation to the first, and their end and aim, vol. i. pp. 25, 26. The first Collection of Proverbs is a Book for Youth, and this second a Book for the People.

Ver. 2. It is characteristic of the purpose of the book that it begins with proverbs of the king:

> It is the glory of God to conceal a thing;
> And the glory of the king to search out a matter.

That which is the glory of God and the glory of the king in itself, and that by which they acquire glory, stand here contrasted. The glory of God consists in this, to conceal a matter, *i.e.* to place before men mystery upon mystery, in which they become conscious of the limitation and insufficiency of their knowledge, so that they are constrained to acknowledge, Deut. xxix. 28, that "secret things belong unto the Lord our God." There are many things that are hidden and are known only to God, and we must be contented with that which He sees it good to make known to us.[1] The honour of kings, on the contrary, who as pilots have to steer the ship of the state (xi. 14), and as supreme judges to administer justice (1 Kings iii. 9), consists in this, to search out a matter, *i.e.* to place in the

[1] Cf. von Lasaulx, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, p. 128 f.: "God and Nature love to conceal the beginning of things."

light things that are problematical and subjects of controversy, in conformity with their high position, with surpassing intelligence, and, in conformity with their responsibility, with conscientious zeal. The thought that it is the glory of God to veil Himself in secrecy (Isa. lv. 15; cf. 1 Kings viii. 12), and of the king, on the contrary, not to surround himself with an impenetrable nimbus, and to withdraw into inaccessible remoteness,—this thought does not, immediately at least, lie in the proverb, which refers that which is concealed, and its contrary, not to the person, but to a matter. Also that God, by the concealment of certain things, seeks to excite to activity human research, is not said in this proverb; for 2*b* does not speak of the honour of wise men, but of kings; the searching out, 2*b*, thus does not refer to that which is veiled by God. But since the honour of God at the same time as the welfare of men, and the honour of the king as well as the welfare of his people, is to be thought of, the proverb states that God and the king promote human welfare in very different ways,—God, by concealing that which sets limits to the knowledge of man, that he may not be uplifted; and the king, by research, which brings out the true state of the matter, and thereby guards the political and social condition against threatening danger, secret injuries, and the ban of offences unatoned for. This proverb, regarding the difference between that which constitutes the honour of God and of the king, is followed by one which refers to that in which the honour of both is alike.

Ver. 3 The heavens in height, and the earth in depth,
And the heart of kings are unsearchable.

This is a proverb in the priamel-form, *vid.* p. 13. The *praeambulum* consists of three subjects to which the predicate אֵין חֵקֶר [= no searching out] is common. "As it is impossible to search through the heavens and through the earth, so it is also impossible to search the hearts of common men (like the earth), and the hearts of kings (like the heavens)" (Fleischer). The meaning, however, is simple. Three unsearchable things are placed together: the heavens, with reference to their height, stretching into the impenetrable distance; the earth, in respect to its depth, reaching down into the immeasurable abyss; and the heart of kings—it is this third thing which the proverb

particularly aims at—which in themselves, and especially with that which goes on in their depths, are impenetrable and unsearchable. The proverb is a warning against the delusion of being flattered by the favour of the king, which may, before one thinks of it, be withdrawn or changed even into the contrary; and a counsel to one to take heed to his words and acts, and to see to it that he is influenced by higher motives than by the fallacious calculation of the impression on the view and disposition of the king. The ל in both cases is the expression of the reference, as *e.g.* at 2 Chron. ix. 22. וְאֶרֶץ, not = וְהָאָרֶץ, but like Isa. xxvi. 19, lxv. 17, for וָאָרֶץ, which generally occurs only in the *st. constr.*

There now follows an emblematic (*vid.* vol. i. p. 10) tetrastich:

Ver. 4 Take away the dross from silver,
So there is ready a vessel for the goldsmith;
5 Take away the wicked from the king,
And his throne is established by righteousness.

The form הָגוֹ (cf. the *inf. Poal* הֹגוֹ, Isa. lix. 13) is regarded by Schultens as showing a ground-form הָגַו; but there is also found *e.g.* עָשׂוֹ, whose ground-form is עָשַׂי; the verb הָגָה, R. הג (whence Arab. *hajr*, *discedere*), cf. נָגָה (whence הִגָּה, *semovit*, 2 Sam. xx. 13 = Syr. *âwagy*, cf. Arab. *âwjay*, to withhold, to abstain from), signifies to separate, withdraw; here, of the separation of the סִיגִים, the refuse, *i.e.* the dross (*vid.* regarding the *plena scriptio*, Baer's *krit. Ausg. des Jesaia*, under i. 22); the goldsmith is designated by the word צוֹרֵף, from צָרַף, to turn, change, as he who changes the as yet drossy metal by means of smelting, or by purification in water, into that which is pure. In 5*a* הגה is, as at Isa. xxvii. 8, transferred to a process of moral purification; what kind of persons are to be removed from the neighbourhood of the king is shown by Isa. i. 22, 23. Here also (as at Isa. *l.c.*) the emblem or figure of ver. 4 is followed in ver. 5 by its moral antitype aimed at. The punctuation of both verses is wonderfully fine and excellent. In ver. 4, ויצא is not pointed וְיֵצֵא, but as the consecutive *modus* וַיֵּצֵא; this first part of the proverb refers to a well-known process of art: the dross is separated from the silver (*inf. absol.*, as xii. 7, xv. 22), and so a vessel (utensil) proceeds from the goldsmith, for he

manufactures pure silver; the ל is here similarly used as the designation of the subject in the passive, xiii. 13, xiv. 20. In ver. 5, on the contrary, וְיִכּוֹן (וַיִּכֹּן) is not the punctuation used, but the word is pointed indicatively וְיִכּוֹן; this second part of the proverb expresses a moral demand (*inf. absol.* in the sense of the imperative, Gesen. § 131, 4*b* like xvii. 12, or an optative or concessive conjunction): let the godless be removed, לִפְנֵי מֶלֶךְ, *i.e.* not from the neighbourhood of the king, for which the words are מִלִּפְנֵי מלך; also not those standing before the king, *i.e.* in his closest neighbourhood (Ewald, Bertheau); but since, in the absolute, הָגֹה, not an act of another in the interest of the king, but of the king himself, is thought of: let the godless be removed from before the king, *i.e.* because he administers justice (Hitzig), or more generally: because after that Psalm (ci.), which is the "mirror of princes," he does not suffer him to come into his presence. Accordingly, the punctuation is בְּצֶדֶק, not בְּצֶדֶק (xvi. 12); because such righteousness is meant as separates the רָשָׁע from it and itself from him, as Isa. xvi. 5 (*vid.* Hitzig), where the punctuation of בַּחֶסֶד denotes that favour towards Moab seeking protection. There now follows a second proverb with מלך, as the one just explained was a second with מלכים: a warning against arrogance before kings and nobles:

Ver. 6 Display not thyself before the king,
And approach not to the place of the great.
7 For better that one say to thee, "Come up hither,"
Than that they humble thee before a prince,
Whom thine eyes had seen.

The גְּדֹלִים are those, like xviii. 16, who by virtue of their descent and their office occupy a lofty place of honour in the court and in the state. נָדִיב (*vid.* under viii. 16) is the noble in disposition and the nobleman by birth, a general designation which comprehends the king and the princes. The *Hithpa.* הִתְהַדֵּר is like the reflex forms xii. 9, xiii. 7, for it signifies to conduct oneself as הָדוּר or נֶהְדָּר (*vid.* xx. 29), to play the part of one highly distinguished. עָמַד has, 6*b*, its nearest signification: it denotes, not like נִצַּב, standing still, but approaching to, *e.g.* Jer. vii. 2. The reason given in ver. 7 harmonizes with the rule of wisdom, Luke xiv. 10 f.: better is the saying to thee, *i.e.* that one say to thee (Ewald, § 304*b*), עֲלֵה הֵנָּה (so the *Olewejored* is

to be placed), προσανάβηθι ἀνώτερον (thus in Luke), than that one humble thee לְפָנֵי נָדִיב, not: because of a prince (Hitzig), for לפני nowhere means either *pro* (xvii. 18) or *propter*, but before a prince, so that thou must yield to him (cf. xiv. 19), before him whom thine eyes had seen, so that thou art not excused if thou takest up the place appropriate to him. Most interpreters are at a loss to explain this relative. Luther: "which thine eyes must see," and Schultens: *ut videant oculi tui.* Michaelis, syntactically admissible: *quem videre gestiverunt oculi tui*, viz. to come near to him, according to Bertheau, with the request that he receives some high office. Otherwise Fleischer: before the king by whom thou and thine are seen, so much the more felt is the humiliation when it comes upon one after he has pressed so far forward that he can be perceived by the king. But נדיב is not specially the king, but any distinguished personage whose place he who has pressed forward has taken up, and from which he must now withdraw when the right possessor of it comes and lays claim to his place. אֲשֶׁר is never used in poetry without emphasis. Elsewhere it is equivalent to ὅντινα, *quippe quem*, here equivalent to ὅνπερ, *quem quidem.* Thine eyes have seen him in the company, and thou canst say to thyself, this place belongs to him, according to his rank, and not to thee,—the humiliation which thou endurest is thus well deserved, because, with eyes to see, thou wert so blind. The LXX., Syr., Symmachus (who reads 8*a*, לָרֹב, εἰς πλῆθος), and Jerome, refer the words "whom thine eyes had seen" to the proverb following; but אשר does not appropriately belong to the beginning of a proverb, and on the supposition that the word לָרִב is generally adopted, except by Symmachus, they are also heterogeneous to the following proverb:

Ver. 8 Go not forth hastily to strife,
That it may not be said, "What wilt thou do in the end thereof,
When now thy neighbour bringeth disgrace upon thee?"
9 Art thou striving with thy neighbour? strive with him,
But disclose not the secret of another;
10 That he who heareth it may not despise thee,
And thine evil name depart no more,

Whether רִיב in לָרִיב is *infin.*, as at Judg. xxi. 22, or *subst.*, as at

2 Chron. xix. 8, is not decided: *ad litigandum* and *ad litem* harmonize. As little may it be said whether in אַל־תֵּצֵא [go not forth], a going out to the gate (court of justice), or to the place where he is to be met who is to be called to account, is to be thought of; in no respect is the sense metaphorical: let not thyself transgress the bounds of moderation, *ne te laisse pas emporter;* יָצָא לָרִב is correlate to בּוֹא לָרוֹב, Judg. xxi. 22. The use of פֶּן in 8*b* is unprecedented. Euchel and Löwenstein regard it as an *imper.*: reflect upon it (test it); but פֶּנָּה does not signify this, and the interjectional הַם does not show the possibility of an *imper. Kal* פֶּן, and certainly not פֶּן (פֶּן). The conj. פֶּן is the connecting form of an original subst. (= *panj*), which signifies a turning away. It is mostly connected with the future, according to which Nolde, Oetinger, Ewald, and Bertheau explain מה *indefinite*, something, viz. unbecoming. In itself, it may, perhaps, be possible that פן מה was used in the sense of *ne quid* (*Venet. μήποτέ τι*); but "to do something," for "to commit something bad," is improbable; also in that case we would expect the words to be thus: פֶּן תַּעֲשֶׂה מה. Thus מה will be an interrogative, as at 1 Sam. xx. 10 (*vid.* Keil), and the expression is brachylogical: that thou comest not into the situation not to know what thou oughtest to do (Rashi: פֶּן תָּבֹא לִידֵי לֹא תֵדַע מה לַעֲשׂוֹת), or much rather anakoluth.; for instead of saying פֶּן־לֹא תֵדַע מַה־לַּעֲשׂוֹת, the poet, shunning this unusual פֶּן לֹא, adopts at once the interrogative form: that it may not be said at the end thereof (viz. of the strife): what wilt thou do? (Umbreit, Stier, Elster, Hitzig, and Zöckler.) This extreme perplexity would occur if thy neighbour (with whom thou disputest so eagerly and unjustly) put thee to shame, so that thou standest confounded (כלם, properly to hurt, French *blesser*). If now the summons 9*a* follows this warning against going out for the purpose of strife: fight out thy conflict with thy neighbour, then רִיבְךָ, set forth with emphasis, denotes not such a strife as one is surprised into, but that into which one is drawn, and the *tuam* in *causam tuam* is accented in so far as 9*b* localizes the strife to the personal relation of the two, and warns against the drawing in of an אַחֵר, *i.e.* in this case, of a third person: and expose not the secret of another אַל־תְּגַל (after *Michlol* 130*a*, and Ben-Bileam, who places the word under the פתחין בס״ם,

is vocalized with *Pathach* on ג, as is Cod. 1294, and elsewhere in correct texts). One ought not to bring forward in a dispute, as material of proof and means of acquittal, secrets entrusted to him by another, or secrets which one knows regarding the position and conduct of another; for such faithlessness and gossiping affix a stigma on him who avails himself of them, in the public estimation, ver. 10; that he who hears it may not blame thee (חַפֵּר = Aram. חְפַר, *vid.* under xiv. 34), and the evil report concerning thee continue without recall. Fleischer: *ne infamia tua non recedat i. e. nunquam desinat per ora hominum propagari*, with the remark, "in דִּבָּה, which properly means a stealthy creeping on of the rumour, and in שׁוּב lies a (Arab.) *tarshyh*," *i.e.* the two ideas stand in an interchangeable relation with a play upon the words: the evil rumour, once put in circulation, will not again retrace its steps; but, on the contrary, as Virgil says:

Mobilitate viget viresque acquirit eundo.

In fact, every other can sooner rehabilitate himself in the public estimation than he who is regarded as a prattler, who can keep no secret, or as one so devoid of character that he makes public what he ought to keep silent, if he can make any use of it in his own interest. In regard to such an one, the words are continually applicable, *hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto*, xx. 19. The LXX. has, instead of ורבתך 10*b*, read ומריבתך, and translated it with the addition of a long appendix: "They quarrel, and hostilities will not cease, but will be to thee like death. Kindness and friendship deliver, let these preserve thee, that thou mayest not become one meriting reproaches (Jerome: *ne exprobrabilis fias*), but guard thy ways, εὐσυναλλάκτως."

The first emblematical distich of this collection now follows:

Ver. 11 Golden apples in silver salvers.
A word spoken according to its circumstances.

The Syr. and Jerome vocalize דִּבַּר דָּבָר, and the Targ. דְּבַר דִּבֵּר; both are admissible, but the figure and that which is represented are not placed in so appropriate a relation as by דָּבָר דִּבֵּר; the wonderfully penetrating expression of the text, which is rendered by the traditional *nikkud*, agrees here with the often occurring דִּבֵּר (= מְדַבֵּר), also its passive דָּבוּר. The defective

writing is like, *e.g.*, בָּטֶחַ, Ps. cxii. 7, and gives no authority to prefer דְּבָר = מְרֻבָּר (Böttcher). That דִּבְרֵי, corresponding to the plur. מַפּוּחֵי, is not used, arises from this, that דבר is here manifestly not a word without connection, but a sentence of motive, contents, and aim united. For עַל־אָפְנָיו, the meaning of בְּעִתּוֹ presents itself from xv. 23, according to which, among the old interpreters, Symmachus, Jerome, and Luther render "at its time." Abulwalîd compared the Arab. *âiffan* (*âibban*, also *'iffan*, whence *'aly 'iffanihi, justo tempore*), which, as Orelli has shown in his *Synon. der Zeitbegriffe*, p. 21 f., comes from the roots *af ab*, to drive (from within) going out, time as consisting of individual moments, the one of which drives on the other, and thus denotes time as a course of succession. One may not hesitate as to the prep. עַל, for אפנים would, like עִתּוֹת, denote the circumstances, the relations of the time, and עַל would, as *e.g.* in עַל־פִּי and עַל־דִּבְרָתִי, have the meaning of *κατά*. But the form אָפְנָיו, which like חָפְנָיו, Lev. xvi. 12, sounds dualistic, appears to oppose this. Hitzig supposes that אָפְנַיִם may designate the time as a circle, with reference to the two arches projecting in opposite directions, but uniting themselves together; but the circle which time describes runs out from one point, and, moreover, the Arab. names for time *âjaf*, *âifaf*, and the like, which interchange with *âiffan*, show that this does not proceed from the idea of circular motion. Ewald and others take for אפניו the meaning of wheels (the *Venet.*, after Kimchi, *ἐπὶ τῶν τροχῶν αὐτῆς*), whereby the form is to be interpreted as dual of אֹפֶן = אוֹפָן, "a word driven on its wheels,"—so Ewald explains: as the potter quickly and neatly forms a vessel on his wheels, thus a fit and quickly framed word. But דבר signifies to drive cattle and to speak = to cause words to follow one another (cf. Arab. *syâḳ*, pressing on = flow of words), but not to drive = to fashion in that artisan sense. Otherwise Böttcher, "a word fitly spoken, a pair of wheels perfect in their motion," to which he compares the common people "in their jesting," and adduces all kinds of heterogeneous things partly already rejected by Orelli (*e.g.* the Homeric *ἐπιτροχάδην*, which is certainly no commendation). But "jesting" is not appropriate here; for what man conceives of human speech as a carriage, one only sometimes compares that of a babbler to a sledge, or says of him that he

shoves the cart into the mud.[1] Is it then thus decided that אֹפַנָּיו is a dual? It may be also like אַשְׁרַי, the plur. especially in the adverbial expression before us, which readily carried the abbreviation with it (*vid.* Gesen. *Lehrgebr.* § 134, Anm. 17). On this supposition, Orelli interprets אֹפַן from אָפַן, to turn, in the sense of turning about, circumstances, and reminds of this, that in the post.-bibl. Heb. this word is used as indefinitely as τρόπος, *e.g.* באופן מה, *quodammodo* (*vid.* Reland's *Analecta Rabbinica*, 1723, p. 126). This late Talm. usage of the word can, indeed, signify nothing as to the bibl. word; but that אֲפָנִים, abbreviated אָפָנִים, can mean circumstances, is warranted by the synon. אוֹדוֹת. Aquila and Theodotion appear to have thus understood it, for their ἐπὶ ἁρμόζουσιν αὐτῷ, which they substitute for the colourless οὕτως of the LXX., signifies: under the circumstances, in accordance therewith. So Orelli thus rightly defines: "אפנים denote the *âḥwâl*, circumstances and conditions, as they form themselves in each turning of time, and those which are ascribed to דבר by the suffix are those to which it is proper, and to which it fits in. Consequently a word is commended which is spoken whenever the precise time arrives to which it is adapted, a word which is thus spoken at its time as well as at its place (van Dyk, *fay mahllah*), and the grace of which is thereby heightened." Aben Ezra's explanation, על פנים הראויים, in the approved way, follows the opinion of Abulwalîd and Parchon, that אפנין is equivalent to פנין (cf. *aly wajhihi, sua ratione*), which is only so far true, that both words are derived from R. פן, to turn. In the figure, it is questionable whether by תַּפּוּחֵי זָהָב, apples of gold, or gold-coloured apples, are meant (Luther: as pomegranates and citrons); thus oranges are meant, as at Zech. iv. 12. הַזָּהָב denotes golden oil. Since כֶּסֶף, besides, signifies a metallic substance, one appears to be under the necessity of thinking of apples of gold; cf. the brazen pomegranates. But (1) apples of gold of natural size and massiveness are obviously too great to make it probable that such artistic productions are meant; (2) the material of

[1] It is something different when the weaver's beam, *minwâl* in Arab., is metaph. for kind and manner: they are *'aly minwâl wâḥad*, is equivalent to they are of a like calibre, Arab. *kalib*, which is derived from καλόπους (καλοπόδιον), a shoemaker's last.

the emblem is usually not of less value than that of which it is the emblem (Fleischer); (3) the Scriptures are fond of comparing words with flowers and fruits, x. 31, xii. 14, xiii. 2, xviii. 20, and to the essence of the word which is rooted in the spirit, and buds and grows up to maturity through the mouth and the lips, the comparison with natural fruits corresponds better in any case than with artificial. Thus, then, we interpret "golden apples" as the poetic name for oranges, *aurea mala*, the Indian name of which with reference to *or* (gold) was changed into the French name *orange*, as our *pomeranze* is equivalent to *pomum aurantium*. מַשְׂכִּיּוֹת is the plur. of מַשְׂכִּית, already explained, xviii. 11; the word is connected neither with שָׂכַךְ, to twist, wreathe (Ewald, with most Jewish interpreters[1]), nor with שָׂכָה, to pierce, *infigere* (Redslob, *vid.* under Ps. lxxiii. 7); it signifies medal or ornament, from שָׂכָה, to behold (cf. שִׂכְיָה, *θέα* = *θέαμα*, Isa. ii. 6), here a vessel which is a delight to the eyes. In general the *Venet.* rightly, *ἐν μορφώμασιν ἀργύρου*; Symmachus and Theodotion, more in accordance with the fundamental idea, *ἐν περιβλέπτοις ἀργύρου*; the Syr. and Targ. specially: in vessels of embossed work (נְגִידֵי, from נגד, to draw, to extend); yet more specially the LXX., *ἐν ὁρμίσκῳ σαρδίου*, on a chain of cornelian stone, for which, perhaps, *ἐν φορμίσκῳ* (Jäger) *ἀργυρίου*, in a little silver basket, is the original phrase. Aquila, after *Bereschith rabba* c. 93, translates by *μῆλα χρύσου ἐν δίσκοις ἀργυφίου*. Jerome: *in lectis argenteis*, appears to have fallen into the error of taking משכב for משכב, *lectus*. Hitzig here emends a self-made *ἅπαξ λεγ.* Luther's "golden apples in silver baskets" is to be preferred.[2] A piece of sculpture which represents fruit by golden little disks or points within groups of leaves is not meant,—for the proverb does not speak of such pretty little apples,—but golden oranges are meant. A word in accordance with the circumstances which

[1] On this proceeds also the beautiful interpretation by Maimuni in the preface to *More Nebuchim: Maskiyyôth sont des ciselures rétieulaires*, etc., according to Munk's translation from the Arab. text, *vid.* Kohut's *Pers. Pentateuch-Uebers.* (1871), p. 356. Accordingly Jewish interpreters (*e.g.* Elia Wilna) understand under אפנין the four kinds of writing: פשט, רמז, דרוש, and סוד, which are comprehended under the memorial word פרדס.

[2] A favourite expression of Goethe's, *vid.* Büchmann's *Geflügelte Worte*, 1688.

occasion it, is like golden oranges which are handed round in silver salvers or on silver waiters. Such a word is, as adopting another figure we might say, like a well-executed picture, and the situation into which it appropriately fits is like its elegant frame. The comparison with fruit is, however, more significant; it designates the right word as a delightful gift, in a way which heightens its impression and its influences.

Ver. 12. Another proverb continues the commendation of the effective word; for it represents, in emblem, the interchangeable relation of speaker and hearer:

> A golden earring and an ornament of fine gold—
> A wise preacher to an ear that heareth;

i.e., as the former two ornaments form a beautiful *ensemble*, so the latter two, the wise preacher of morality and an attentive ear, form a harmonious whole: עַל, down upon, is explained by Deut. xxxii. 2. נֶזֶם, at xi. 12, standing along with בְּאַף, meant a ring for the nose; but here, as elsewhere, it means an earring (LXX., Jerome, *Venet.*), translated by the Syr. and Targ. by קְדָשָׁא, because it serves as a talisman. A ring for the nose[1] cannot also be here thought of, because this ornament is an emblem of the attentive ear: willingly accepted chastisement or instruction is an ear-ornament to him who hears (Stier). But the gift of the wise preacher, which consists in rightly dividing the word of truth, 2 Tim. ii. 15, is as an ornament for the neck or the breast חֲלִי (= Arab. *khaly*, fem. חֲלִיָה = *hilyt*), of fine gold (כֶּתֶם, jewel, then particularly precious gold, from כָּתַם, Arab. *katam*, *recondere*).[2] The *Venet.* well: κόσμος ἀπυρο-

[1] *Vid.* Geiger's *Zeitschrift*, 1872, pp. 45–48, where it is endeavoured to be shown that נזם, as an earring, is rejected from the later biblical literature, because it had become "an object used in the worship of idols," and that the word was used only of a ring for the nose as a permissible ornament, while עניל was used for the earring. But that does not apply to the Solomonic era; for that, in the passage under review, נזם signifies a ring for the nose, is only a supposition of Geiger's, because it accords with his construction of history.

[2] Hitzig compares Arab. *kumêt;* but this means bayard, as Lagarde remarks, the Greek κόμαιθος; and if by כתם gold foxes (gold money) are to be thought of, yet they have nothing whatever to do with bayards (red-brown horses); cf. Boehmer, *de colorum nominibus equinorum*, in his *Roman. Stud.* Heft 2, 1872, p. 285.

χρύσου (fine gold); on the contrary (perhaps in want of another name for gold), כתם is translated, by the LXX. and Syr., by sardine; by the Targ., by emerald; and by Jerome, by *margaritum*.[1] It looks well when two stand together, the one of whom has golden earrings, and the other wears a yet more precious golden necklace—such a beautiful mutual relationship is formed by a wise speaker and a hearer who listens to his admonitions.

Ver. 13. The following comparative tristich refers to faithful service rendered by words:

Like the coolness of snow on a harvest day
Is a faithful messenger to them that send him:
He refresheth the soul of his master.

The coolness (צִנָּה from צָנַן, to be cool) of snow is not that of a fall of snow, which in the time of harvest would be a calamity, but of drink cooled with snow, which was brought from Lebanon or elsewhere, from the clefts of the rocks; the peasants of Damascus store up the winter's snow in a cleft of the mountains, and convey it in the warm months to Damascus and the coast towns. Such a refreshment is a faithful messenger (*vid.* regarding צִיר, xiii. 17, here following קְצִיר as a kind of echo) to them that send him (*vid.* regarding this plur. at x. 26, cf. xxii. 21); he refreshes, namely (ו *explicativum*, as *e.g.* Ezek. xviii. 19, *etenim filius*, like the ו *et quidem*, Mal. i. 11, different from the ו of conditional clause xxiii. 3), the soul of his master; for the answer which he brings to his master refreshes him, as does a drink of snow-cooled water on a hot harvest day.

Ver. 14. This proverb relates to the word which promises much, but remains unaccomplished:

Clouds and wind, and yet no rain—
A man who boasteth with a false gift.

Incorrectly the LXX. and Targ. refer the predicate contained in the concluding word of the first line to all the three subjects; and equally incorrectly Hitzig, with Heidenheim, interprets מַתַּת שֶׁקֶר, of a gift that has been received of which one boasts,

[1] Another Greek translates πίνωσις χρυσῆ. This πίνωσις is a philological mystery, the solution of which has been attempted by Bochart, Letronne, and Field.

although it is in reality of no value, because by a lying promise a gift is not at all obtained. But as לחם כזבים, xxiii. 3, is bread which, as it were, deceives him who eats it, so מתת שׁקר is a gift which amounts to a lie, *i.e.* a deceitful pretence. Rightly Jerome: *vir gloriosus et promissa non complens.* In the Arab. *salid*, which Fleischer compares, the figure 14*a* and its counterpart 14*b* are amalgamated, for this word signifies both a boaster and a cloud, which is, as it were, boastful, which thunders much, but rains only sparsely or not at all. Similar is the Arab. *khullab*, clouds which send forth lightning, and which thunder, but yet give no rain; we say to one, *magno promissor hiatu:* thou art (Arab.) *kabarakn khullabin*, *i.e.* as Lane translates it: "Thou art only like lightning with which is no rain." Schultens refers to this proverbial Arabic, *fulmen nubis infecundæ.* Liberality is called (Arab.) *nadnay*, as a watering, cf. xi. 25. The proverb belongs to this circle of figures. It is a saying of the German peasants, "*Wenn es sich wölket, so will es regnen*" [when it is cloudy, then there will be rain]; but according to another saying, "*nicht alle Wolken regnen*" [it is not every cloud that yields rain]. "There are clouds and wind without rain."

Three proverbs follow, which have this in common, that they exhort to moderation:

Ver. 15 By forbearance is a judge won over,
And a gentle tongue breaketh the bone.

קָצִין (*vid.* vi. 7) does not denote any kind of distinguished person, but a judge or a person occupying a high official position. And פָּתָה does not here mean, to talk over or delude; but, like Jer. xx. 7, to persuade, to win over, to make favourable to one; for אֹרֶךְ אַפַּיִם (*vid.* xiv. 29) is dispassionate calmness, not breaking out into wrath, which finally makes it manifest that he who has become the object of accusation, suspicion, or of disgrace, is one who nevertheless has right on his side; for indecent, boisterous passion injures even a just cause; while, on the contrary, a quiet, composed, thoughtful behaviour, which is not embarrassed by injustice, either experienced or threatened, in the end secures a decision in our favour. "Patience overcomes" is an old saying. The soft, gentle tongue (cf. רַךְ, xv. 1) is the opposite of a passionate,

sharp, coarse one, which only the more increases the resistance which it seeks to overcome. "Patience," says a German proverb, "breaks iron;" another says, "Patience is stronger than a diamond." So here: a gentle tongue breaketh the bone (גֶּרֶם = עֶצֶם, as at xvii. 22), it softens and breaks to pieces that which is hardest. Sudden anger makes the evil still worse; long-suffering, on the contrary, operates convincingly; cutting, immoderate language, embitters and drives away; gentle words, on the contrary, persuade, if not immediately, yet by this, that they remain as it were unchangeable.

Ver. 16. Another way of showing self-control:

Hast thou found honey? eat thy enough,
Lest thou be surfeited with it, and vomit it up.

Honey is pleasant, salutary, and thus to be eaten sparingly, xxiv. 13, but *ne quid nimis*. Too much is unwholesome, 27*a*: *αὐτοῦ καὶ μέλιτος τὸ πλέον ἐστὶ χολή, i.e.* even honey enjoyed immoderately is as bitter as gall; or, as Freidank says: *des honges süeze erdriuzet sô mans ze viel geniuzet* [the sweetness of honey offends when one partakes too much of it]. Eat if thou hast found any in the forest or the mountains, דַּיֶּךָּ, thy enough (LXX. *τὸ ἱκανόν*; the *Venet. τὸ ἀρκοῦν σοι*), *i.e.* as much as appeases thine appetite, that thou mayest not become surfeited and vomit it out (וְהַקְּאתוֹ with *Tsere*, and א quiesc., as at 2 Sam. xiv. 10; *vid. Michlol* 116*a*, and Parchon under קיא). Fleischer, Ewald, Hitzig, and others, place vers. 16 and 17 together, so as to form an emblematic tetrastich; but he who is surfeited is certainly, in ver. 16, he who willingly enjoys, and in 17, he to whom it is given to enjoy without his will; and is not, then, ver. 16 a sentence complete in itself in meaning? That it is not to be understood in a purely dietetic sense (although thus interpreted it is a rule not to be despised), is self-evident. As one can suffer injury from the noblest of food if he overload his stomach therewith, so in the sphere of science, instruction, edification, there is an injurious overloading of the mind; we ought to measure what we receive by our spiritual want, the right distribution of enjoyment and labour, and the degree of our ability to change it *in succum et sanguinem*,—else it at last awakens in us dislike, and becomes an evil to us.

Ver. 17. This proverb is of a kindred character to the foregoing. "If thy comrade eats honey," says an Arabic proverb quoted by Hitzig, "do not lick it all up." But the emblem of honey is not continued in this verse:

Make rare thy foot in thy neighbour's house,
Lest he be satiated with thee, and hate thee.

To make one's foot rare or dear from a neighbour's house is equivalent to: to enter it seldom, and not too frequently; הוֹקִיר includes in itself the idea of keeping at a distance (Targ. כְּלֵה רַגְלֵךְ; Symmachus, ὑπόστειλον; and another: φίμωσον πόδα σου), and יָקָר has the sense of the Arab. 'an, and is not the comparative, as at Isa. xiii. 12: regard thy visit dearer than the house of a neighbour (Heidenheim). The proverb also is significant as to the relation of friend to friend, whose reciprocal love may be turned into hatred by too much intercourse and too great fondness. But רֵעֶךָ is including a friend, any one with whom we stand in any kind of intercourse. "Let him who seeks to be of esteem," says a German proverb, "come seldom;" and that may be said with reference to him whom his heart draws to another, and also to him who would be of use to another by drawing him out of the false way and guiding on the right path,—a showing of esteem, a confirming of love by visiting, should not degenerate into forwardness which appears as burdensome servility, as indiscreet self-enjoyment; nor into a restless impetuosity, which seeks at once to gain by force that which one should allow gradually to ripen.

Vers. 18–22. This group of proverbs has the word רֵעַ in each of them, connecting them together. The first of the group represents a false tongue:

Ver. 18 A hammer, and a sword, and a sharp arrow—
A man that beareth false witness against his neighbour.

An emblematic, or, as we might also say, an iconological proverb; for 18*a* is a *quodlibet* of instruments of murder, and 18*b* is the subscription under it: that which these weapons of murder accomplish, is done to his neighbour by a man who bears false witness against him—he ruins his estate, takes away his honour, but yet more: he murders him, at one time more grossly, at another time with more refinement; at one time slowly, at another time more quickly. מַפִּיץ, from פּוּץ, is equiva-

lent to מַפִּיץ, and מַפֵּץ from נָפַץ; the Syr. and Targ. have instead פדועא (פדיעא) from פָּדַע = פָּצַע; the word פְּרִיעָא, on which Hitzig builds a conjecture, is an error of transcription (*vid.* Lagarde and Levy). The expression, 18*b*, is from the decalogue, Ex. xx. 16; Deut. v. 17. It is for the most part translated the same here as there: he who speaks against his neighbour as a false witness. But rightly the LXX., Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther: false testimony. As אֵל signifies both that which is mighty = power, and Him who is mighty = God, so עֵד signifies both him who bears testimony and the testimony that is borne, properly that which repeats itself and thereby strengthens itself; accordingly we say עָנָה עֵד, to give testimony in reply,—viz. to the judge who asks,—or generally to offer testimony (even unasked); as well as ענה לְעֵד, Deut. xxxi. 21, *i.e.* as evidence (Jerome, *pro testimonio*). The prep. ב with this ענה has always the meaning of *contra*, also at 1 Sam. xii. 3; Gen. xxx. 33 is, however, open to question.

Ver. 19 A worthless tooth and an unsteady foot—
Trust in a faithless man in the day of need.

The form רְעָה (with *Mercha* on the antepenult), Isa. xxix. 19, takes the place of an *inf. absol.*; רְעָה here (about the tone syllable of which *Dechî* does not decide, thus without doubt *Milra*) is certainly not a subst.: tooth of breaking (Gesen.); for how strange such a designation of a worthless tooth! שֵׁן is indeed mas. in 1 Sam. xiv. 5, but it can also be used as fem., as רֶגֶל, which is for the most part fem., also occurs as mas., Böttch. § 650. Böttcher, in the new *Aehrenlese*, and in the *Lehrbuch*, takes רֹעָה as fem. of an adj. רֹעַ, after the form חֹל; but חל is not an adj., and does not form a fem., although it means not merely profanity, but that which is profane; this is true also of the Aram. חוּל; for חוּלְתָּא, Esth. ii. 9, Targ., is a female name mistaken by Buxtorf. Are we then to read רָעָה, with Hitzig, after the LXX.?—an unimportant change. We interpret the traditional רְעָה, with Fleischer, as derived from רוֹעֲעָה, from רוּעַע, breaking to pieces (crumbling), in an intransitive sense. The form מוּעָדֶת is also difficult. Böttcher regards it as also, *e.g.* Aben Ezra after the example of Gecatilia as *part. Kal.* = מוֹעֶדֶת, "only on account of the pausal tone and the combination of the two letters מע with *û* instead of *ô*." But

this vocal change, with its reasons, is merely imaginary. מוּעֶדֶת is the *part. Pual*, with the preformative מְ struck out, Ewald 169*d*. The objection that the *part. Pual* should be מְמֹעָד, after the form מְבֹעָר, does not prove anything to the contrary; for מוּעֶדֶת cannot be the fem. so as not to coincide with the fem. of the *part. Kal.*, cf. besides to the long *û* the form without the Dagesh יוּקָשִׁים, Eccles. ix. 12 = מְיֻקָּשִׁים (Arnheim, *Gramm.* p. 139). רֶגֶל מוּעֶדֶת is a leg that has become tottering, trembling. He who in a time of need makes a faithless man his ground of confidence, is like one who seeks to bite with a broken tooth, and which he finally crushes, and one who supports himself on a shaking leg, and thus stumbles and falls. The gen. connection מִבְטַח בּוֹגֵד signifies either the ground of confidence consisting in a faithless man, or the confidence placed in one who is faithless. But, after the Masora, we are to read here, as at Ps. lxv. 6, מִבְטָח, which *Michlol* 184*a* also confirms, and as it is also found in the Venice 1525, Basel 1619, and in Norzi. This מִבְטָח is constr. according to Kimchi, notwithstanding the *Kametz*; as also מִשְׁקָל, Ezra viii. 30 (after Abulwalîd, Kimchi, and Norzi). In this passage before us, מִבְטָח בּוֹגֵד may signify a deceitful ground of confidence (cf. Hab. ii. 5), but the two other passages present a genit. connection of the words. We must thus suppose that the ָ of מִבְטָח and מִשְׁקָל, in these three passages, is regarded as fixed, like the *â* of the form (Arab.) *mif'âl*.

The above proverb, which connects itself with ver. 18, not only by the sound רע, but also by שׁן, which is assonant with שִׁנַּיִם, is followed by another with the catchword רע:

Ver. 20 He that layeth aside his coat on a day of frost, vinegar on nitre,
And he who welcomes with songs a dejected heart.

Is not this intelligible, sensible, ingenious? All these three things are wrong. The first is as wrong as the second, and the third, which the proverb has in view, is morally wrong, for one ought to weep with those that weep, Rom. xii. 15; he, on the contrary, who laughs among those who weep, is, on the most favourable judgment, a fool. That which is wrong in 20*a*, according to Böttcher in the *Aehrenlese*, 1849, consists in this, that one in severe cold puts on a fine garment. As if

there were not garments which are at the same time beautiful and keep warm! In the new *Aehrenlese* he prefers the reading מְשַׁנֶּה: if one changes his coat. But that surely he might well enough do, if the one were warmer than the other! Is it then impossible that מַעֲדֶה, in the connection, means *transire faciens* = *removens?* The *Kal* עָדָה, *transiit*, occurs at Job xxviii. 8. So also, in the poetic style, הֶעְדָּה might be used in the sense of the Aram. אַעְדִּי. Rightly Aquila, Symmachus, *περιαιρῶν*; the *Venet.* better, *ἀφαιρούμενος* (Mid.). בֶּגֶד is an overcoat or mantle, so called from covering, as לְבוּשׁ (R. לב, to fasten, fix), the garment lying next the body, *vid.* at Ps. xxii. 19. Thus, as it is foolish to lay off upper clothing on a frosty day, so it is foolish also to pour vinegar on nitre; carbonic acid nitre, whether it be mineral (which may be here thought of) or vegetable, is dissolved in water, and serves diverse purposes (*vid.* under Isa. i. 25); but if one pours vinegar on it, it is destroyed. לֵב־רָע[1] is, at xxvi. 23 and elsewhere, a heart morally bad, here a heart badly disposed, one inclined to that which is evil; for שִׁיר שָׁר is the contrast of קוֹנֵן קִינָה, and always the consequence of a disposition joyfully excited; the inconsistency lies in this, that one thinks to cheer a sorrowful heart by merry singing, if the singing has an object, and is not much more the reckless expression of an animated pleasure in view of the sad condition of another. שִׁיר עַל signifies, as at Job xxxiii. 27, to sing to any one, to address him in singing; cf. דִּבֶּר עַל, Jer. vi. 10, and particularly עַל־לֵב, Hos. ii. 16; Isa. xl. 2. The ב of בְּשִׁרִים is neither the partitive, ix. 5, nor the transitive, xx. 30, but the instrumental; for, as *e.g.* at Ex. vii. 20, the obj. of the action is thought of as its means (Gesen. § 138, Anm. 3*); one sings "with songs," for definite songs underlie his singing. The LXX., which the Syr., Targ., and Jerome more or less follow, has formed from this proverb one quite different: "As vinegar is hurtful to a wound, so an injury to the body makes the heart sorrowful; as the moth in clothes, and the worm in wood, so the sorrow of a man injures his heart." The wisdom of this pair of proverbs is not worth much, and after all inquiry little or nothing comes of it. The Targ. at least preserves the

[1] The writing wavers between עַל לֵב־רָע (cf. עַל עַם־זָדֵל) and עַל־לֵב רָע.

figure 20*b*: as he who pours vinegar (Syr. *chalo*) on nitre; the Peshito, however, and here and there also the Targum, has *jathro* (arrow-string) instead of *nethro* (nitre). Hitzig adopts this, and changes the tristich into the distich:

He that meeteth archers with arrow on the string,
Is like him who singeth songs with a sad heart.

The Hebrew of this proverb of Hitzig's (מֹרֶה קֶרַע עַל־יֶתֶר) is unhebraic, the meaning dark as an oracle, and its moral contents *nil*.

Ver. 21 If thine enemy hunger, feed him with bread;
And if he thirst, give him water to drink.
Ver. 22 For thereby thou heapest burning coals on his head,
And Jahve will recompense it to thee.

The translation of this proverb by the LXX. is without fault; Paul cites therefrom Rom. xii. 20. The participial construction of 22*a*, the LXX., rightly estimating it, thus renders: for, doing this, thou shalt heap coals on his head. The expression, "thou shalt heap" (σωρεύσεις), is also appropriate; for חָתָה certainly means first only to fetch or bring fire (*vid.* vi. 27); but here, by virtue of the *constructio prægnans* with עַל, to fetch, and hence to heap up,—to pile upon. Burning pain, as commonly observed, is the figure of burning shame, on account of undeserved kindness shown by an enemy (Fleischer). But how burning coals heaped on the head can denote burning shame, is not to be perceived, for the latter is a burning on the cheeks; wherefore Hitzig and Rosenmüller explain: thou wilt thus bring on him the greatest pain, and appease thy vengeance, while at the same time Jahve will reward thy generosity. Now we say, indeed, that he who rewards evil with good takes the noblest revenge; but if this doing of good proceed from a revengeful aim, and is intended sensibly to humble an adversary, then it loses all its moral worth, and is changed into selfish, malicious wickedness. Must the proverb then be understood in this ignoble sense? The Scriptures elsewhere say that guilt and punishment are laid on the head of any one when he is made to experience and to bear them. Chrysostom and others therefore explain after Ps. cxl. 10 and similar passages, but thereby the proverb is morally falsified, and ver. 22 accords with ver. 21, which counsels not to the avenging of oneself,

but to the requital of evil with good. The burning of coals laid on the head must be a painful but wholesome consequence; it is a figure of self-accusing repentance (Augustine, Zöckler), for the producing of which the showing of good to an enemy is a noble motive. That God rewards such magnanimity may not be the special motive; but this view might contribute to it, for otherwise such promises of God as Isa. lviii. 8–12 were without moral right. The proverb also requires one to show himself gentle and liberal toward a needy enemy, and presents a twofold reason for this: first, that thereby his injustice is brought home to his conscience; and, secondly, that thus God is well-pleased in such practical love toward an enemy, and will reward it;—by such conduct, apart from the performance of a law grounded in our moral nature, one advances the happiness of his neighbour and his own.

The next group of proverbs extends from ver. 23 to ver. 28.

Ver. 23 Wind from the north produceth rain;
And a secret tongue a troubled countenance.

The north is called צָפוֹן, from צָפַן, to conceal, from the firmament darkening itself for a longer time, and more easily, like the old Persian *apâkhtara*, as (so it appears) the starless, and, like *aquilo*, the north wind, as bringing forward the black clouds. But properly the "fathers of rain" are, in Syria, the west and the south-west; and so little can צפון here mean the pure north wind, that Jerome, who knew from his own experience the changes of weather in Palestine, helps himself, after Symmachus (διαλύει βροχήν), with a *quid pro quo* out of the difficulty: *ventus aquilo dissipat pluvias;* the Jewish interpreters (Aben Ezra, Joseph Kimchi, and Meîri) also thus explain, for they connect together תחולל, in the meaning חמנע, with the unintelligible חלילה (far be it!). But צפון may also, perhaps like ζόφος (*Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxi. 600 f.), standing not without connection therewith, denote the north-west; and probably the proverb emphasized the northern direction of the compass, because, according to the intention of the similitude, he seeks to designate such rain as is associated with raw, icy-cold weather, as the north wind (xxvii. 16, LXX., Sir. xliii. 20) brings along with it. The names of the winds are *gen. fem.*, *e.g.* Isa. xliii. 6. תְּחוֹלֵל (Aquila, ὠδίνει;

cf. viii. 24, ὠδινήθην) has in Codd., *e.g.* the *Jaman.*, the tone on the penult, and with *Tsere Metheg* (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 21) serving as העמדה. So also the Arab. *nataj* is used of the wind, as helping the birth of the rain-clouds. Manifestly פְּנִים נִזְעָמִים, countenances manifesting extreme displeasure (*vid.* the *Kal* זָעַם, xxiv. 24), are compared to rain. With justice Hitzig renders פנים, as *e.g.* John ii. 6, in the plur. sense; because, for the influence which the tongue slandering in secret (Ps. ci. 5) has on the slandered, the "sorrowful countenance" would not be so characteristic as for the influence which it exercises on the mutual relationships of men: the secret babbler, the confidential communication throwing suspicion, now on this one and now on that one, behind their backs, excites men against one another, so that one shows to another a countenance in which deep displeasure and suspicion express themselves.

Ver. 24 Better to sit on the top of a roof,
Than a quarrelsome woman and a house in common.

A repetition of xxi. 9.

Ver. 25 Fresh water to a thirsty soul;
And good news from a far country.

Vid. regarding the form of this proverb, vol. i. p. 9; we have a similar proverb regarding the influence of good news at xv. 30. Fresh cold water is called at Jer. xviii. 14 מַיִם קָרִים; *vid.* regarding קָר, xviii. 27. "עָיַף, cogn. יָעֵף and עוּף, properly to become darkened, therefore figuratively like (Arab.) *gushiya 'alyh*, to become faint, to become feeble unto death, of the darkness which spreads itself over the eyes" (Fleischer).

This proverb, with the figure of "fresh water," is now followed by one with the figure of a "fountain":

Ver. 26 A troubled fountain and a ruined spring—
A righteous man yielding to a godless man.

For the most part, in מוֹט one thinks of a yielding in consequence of being forced. Thus *e.g.* Fleischer: as a troubled ruined spring is a misfortune for the people who drink out of it, or draw from it, so is it a misfortune for the surrounding of the righteous, when he is driven from his dwelling or his possession by an unrighteous man. And it is true: the righteous can be compared to a well (מעין, well-spring, from עַיִן, a well, as an eye of the earth, and מקור, fountain, from קוּר, R. קר,

כר, to round out, to dig out), with reference to the blessing which flows from it to its surroundings (cf. x. 11 and John vii. 38). But the words "yielding to" (contrast "stood before," 2 Kings x. 4, or Josh. vii. 12), in the phrase "yielding to the godless," may be understood of a spontaneous as well as of a constrained, forced, wavering and yielding, as the expression in the Psalm בַּל־אֶמּוֹט [*non movebor*, Ps. x. 6] affirms the certainty of being neither inwardly nor outwardly ever moved or shaken. The righteous shall stand fast and strong in God without fearing the godless (Isa. li. 12 f.), unmoveable and firm as a brazen wall (Jer. i. 17 f.). If, however, he is wearied with resistance, and from the fear of man, or the desire to please man, or from a false love of peace he yields before it, and so gives way,—then he becomes like to a troubled fountain (רֶפֶשׁ, cogn. רָמַס, Ezek. xxxiv. 18; Isa. xli. 25; Jerome: *fons turbatus pede*), a ruined spring; his character, hitherto pure, is now corrupted by his own guilt, and now far from being a blessing to others, his wavering is a cause of sorrow to the righteous, and an offence to the weak—he is useful no longer, but only injurious. Rightly Lagarde: "The verse, one of the most profound of the whole book, does not speak of the misfortune, but of the fall of the righteous, whose sin compromises the holy cause which he serves, 2 Sam. xii. 14." Thus also *e.g.* Löwenstein, with reference to the proverb *Sanhedrin* 92*b*: also in the time of danger let not a man disown his honour. Bachja, in his *Ethics*, referring to this figure, 26*a*, thinks of the possibility of restoration: the righteous wavers only for the moment, but at last he comes right (מהמוטט ועולה). But this interpretation of the figure destroys the point of the proverb.

Ver. 27. This verse, as it stands, is scarcely to be understood. The *Venet.* translates 27*b* literally: ἔρευνά τε δόξας αὐτῶν δόξα; but what is the reference of this בְּבֻרָם? Euchel and others refer it to men, for they translate: "to set a limit to the glory of man is true glory;" but the "glory of man" is denoted by the phrase כְּבוֹד אָדָם, not by בְּבֻרָם; and, besides, חֵקֶר does not mean measure and limit. Oetinger explains: "To eat too much honey is not good; whereas the searching after their glory, viz. of pleasant and praiseworthy things, which are likened to honey, is glory, cannot be too much done,

and is never without utility and honour;" but how can כְּבֻדָּם be of the same meaning as כְּבֹד הדברים אשר or הנמשלים כְּהִבָּשׁ— such an abbreviation of the expression is impossible. Schultens, according to Rashi: *vestigatio gravitatis eorum est gravitas, i.e.* the searching out of their difficulty is a trouble; better Vitringa (since כבוד nowhere occurs in this sense of *gravitas molesta ac pondere oppressura*): *investigatio præstantiæ eorum est gloriosa;* but Vitringa, in order to gain a connection to 27*a*, needs to introduce *etiamsi*, and in both explanations the reference of the כְּבֻדָּם is imaginary, and it by no means lies near, since the Scripture uses the word כבוד of God, and His kingdom and name, but never of His law or His revelation. This also is an argument against Bertheau, who translates: the searching out of their glory (viz. of the divine law and revelation) is a burden, a strenuous occupation of the mind, since חקר does not in itself mean searching out, and is equivocally, even unintelligibly, expressed, since כבוד denotes, it is true, here and there, a great multitude, but never a burden (as כֹּבֶד). The thought which Jerome finds in 27*b*: *qui scrutator est majestatis opprimetur a gloria*, is judicious, and connects itself synonym. with 27*a;* but such a thought is unwarranted, for he disregards the suff. of כְּבֻדָּם, and renders כבוד in the sense of difficulty (oppression). Or should it perhaps be vocalized כְּבֻדִּם (Syr., Targ., Theodotion, δεδοξασμένα = נִכְבָּדוֹת)? Thus vocalized, Umbreit renders it in the sense of *honores;* Elster and Zöckler in the sense of *difficultates* (*difficilia*); but this plur., neither the biblical, nor, so far as I know, the post-bibl. usage of the word has ever adopted. However, the sense of the proverb which Elster and Zöckler gain is certainly that which is aimed at. We accordingly translate:

> To surfeit oneself in eating honey is not good,
> But as an inquirer to enter on what is difficult is honour.

We read כְּבֻדִּם instead of כְּבֻדָּם. This change commends itself far more than כְּבֹד מְכַבּוֹד (וחקר), according to which Gesenius explains: *nimium studium honoris est sine honore*—impossible, for חֵקֶר does not signify *nimium studium*, in the sense of striving, but only that of inquiry: one strives after honour, but does not study it. Hitzig and Ewald, after the example of J. D. Michaelis, Arnoldi, and Ziegler, betake themselves therefore to

the Arabic; Ewald explains, for he leaves the text unchanged: "To despise their honour (that is, of men) is honour (true, real honour);" Hitzig, for he changes the text like Gesenius: "To despise honour is more than honour," with the ingenious remark: To obtain an order [*insigne ordinis*] is an honour, but not to wear it then for the first time is its *bouquet*. Nowhere any trace either in Hebrew or in Aramaic is to be found of the verb חקר, to despise (to be despised), and so it must here remain without example.[1] Nor have we any need of it. The change of כִּבְדָם into כְּבֻדִם is enough. The proverb is an antithetic distich; 27*a* warns against inordinate longing after enjoyments, 27*b* praises earnest labour. Instead of דְּבַשׁ הַרְבּוֹת, if honey in the mass were intended, the words would have been דְּבַשׁ הַרְבֵּה (Eccles. v. 11; 1 Kings x. 10), or at least הַרְבּוֹת דְּבַשׁ (Amos iv. 9); הרבות can only be a *n. actionis*, and אָכֹל דְּבַשׁ its inverted object (cf. Jer. ix. 4), as Böttcher has discerned: to make much of the eating of honey, to do much therein is not good (cf. ver. 16). In 27*b* Luther also partly hits on the correct rendering: "and he who searches into difficult things, to him it is too difficult," for which it ought to be said: to him it is an honour. כְּבֻדִם, viz. דברים, signifies difficult things, as רֵיקִים, xii. 11, vain things. The Heb. כָּבֵד, however, never means difficult to be understood or comprehended (although more modern lexicons say this),[2] but always only burdensome and heavy, *gravis*, not *difficilis*. כבדים are also things of which the חֵקֶר, *i.e.* the fundamental searching into them (xviii. 17, xxv. 2 f.), costs an earnest effort, which perhaps, according to the first impression, appears to surpass the available strength (cf. Ex. xviii. 18). To overdo oneself in eating honey is not good; on the contrary, the searching into difficult subjects is nothing less than an eating of honey, but an honour. There is here a *paronomasia*. Fleischer translates it: *explorare gravia grave est;* but we render *grave*

[1] The Hebrew meaning *investigare*, and the equivalent Arabic *ḥakr*, *contemnere* (*contemtui esse*), are derivations from the primary meaning (R. חק): to go down from above firmly on anything, and thus to press in (to cut in), or also to press downward.

[2] Cf, Sir. iii. 20 f. with Ben-Sira's Heb. text in my *Gesch. der jüd. Poesie*, p. 204 (vers. 30–32); nowhere does this adj. כבד appear here in this warning against meditating over the transcendental.

est not in the sense of *molestiam creat*, but *gravitatem parit* (weight = respect, honour).

(Ver. 28. This verse, counselling restraint as to the spirit, is connected with the foregoing, which counsels to self-control as to enjoyment:

A city broken through, now without walls—
A man without self-control over his spirit.

A "city broken down" is one whose wall is "broken," 2 Chron. xxxii. 5, whether it has met with breaches (פְּרָצִים), or is wholly broken; in the former case also the city is incapable of being defended, and it is all one as if it had no wall. Such a city is like a man "who hath no control over his own spirit" (for the accentuation of the Heb. words here, *vid.* *Thorath Emeth*, p. 10): *cujus spiritui nulla cohibitio* (Schultens), *i.e.* *qui animum suum cohibere non potest* (Fleischer: עצר, R. צר, to press together, to oppress, and thereby to hold back). As such a city can be plundered and laid waste without trouble, so a man who knows not to hold in check his desires and affections is in constant danger of blindly following the impulse of his unbridled sensuality, and of being hurried forward to outbreaks of passion, and thus of bringing unhappiness upon himself. There are sensual passions (*e.g.* drunkenness), intellectual (*e.g.* ambition), mingled (*e.g.* revenge); but in all of these a false *ego* rules, which, instead of being held down by the true and better *ego*, rises to unbounded supremacy.[1] Therefore the expression used is not לְנַפְשׁוֹ, but לְרוּחוֹ; desire has its seat in the soul, but in the spirit it grows into passion, which in the root of all its diversities is selfishness (*Psychol.* p. 199); self-control is accordingly the ruling of the spirit, *i.e.* the restraining (keeping down) of the false enslaved ego-life by the true and free, and powerful in God Himself.

xxvi. 1. There now follows a group of eleven proverbs of the fool; only the first of the group has after it a proverb of different contents, but of similar form:

As snow in summer, and rain in harvest;
So honour befitteth not a fool.

If there is snow in high summer (קַיִץ, to be glowing hot), it is contrary to nature; and if there is rain in harvest, it is (accord-

[1] *Vid.* Drbal's *Empirische Psychologie*, § 137.

ing to the alternations of the weather in Palestine) contrary to what is usually the case, and is a hindrance to the ingathering of the fruits of the field. Even so a fool and respect, or a place of honour, are incongruous things; honour will only injure him (as according to xix. 10, luxury); he will make unjust use of it, and draw false conclusions from it; it will strengthen him in his folly, and only increase it. נָאוֶה (= נַאֲוִי) is the adj. to the *Pil.* נֵאָוָה, Ps. xciii. 5 (plur. נָאוִי); נָאוָה, xix. 10, and נָאוָה, xvii. 7, are also masc. and fem. of the adj., according to which, that which is said under xix. 10 is to be corrected. Symmachus and Theodotion have translated *οὐκ ἔπρεψεν*, and have therefore read נאה. The root word is נָאָה (as שָׁחָה to שָׁחַוָה)=נָוָה, to aim at something (*vid.* Hupfeld under Ps. xxiii. 2).

Ver. 2. This verse is formed quite in the same way as the preceding:

> As the sparrow in its fluttering, as the swallow in its flying,
> So the curse that is groundless: it cometh not.

This passage is one of those fifteen (*vid.* under Ps. c. 3) in which the לא of the text is changed by the *Kerî* into לו; the Talm., Midrash, and Sohar refer this לו partly to him who utters the curse himself, against whom also, if he is a judge, such inconsiderate cursing becomes an accusation by God; partly to him who is cursed, for they read from the proverb that the curse of a private person also (הדיוט, *ἰδιώτης*) is not wont to fall to the ground, and that therefore one ought to be on his guard against giving any occasion for it (*vid.* Norzi). But Aben Ezra supposes that לא and לו interchange, as much as to say that the undeserved curse falls on him (לו) who curses, and does not fall (לא) on him who is cursed. The figures in 2*a* harmonize only with לא, according to which the LXX., the Syr., Targ., *Venet.*, and Luther (against Jerome) translate, for the principal matter, that the sparrow and the swallow, although flying out (xxvii. 8), return home again to their nest (Ralbag), would be left out of view in the comparison by לו. This emphasizes the fluttering and flying, and is intended to affirm that a groundless curse is a פִּרְחַ בְּאֲוִיר, aimless, *i.e.* a thing hovering in the air, that it fails and does not take effect. Most interpreters explain the two *Lameds* as declaring the destination: *ut passer* (*sc. natus est*) *ad vagandum*, as the sparrow, through

necessity of nature, roves about ... (Fleischer). But from xxv. 3 it is evident that the *Lamed* in both cases declares the reference or the point of comparison: as the sparrow in respect to its fluttering about; etc. The names of the two birds are, according to Aben Ezra, like dreams without a meaning; but the Romanic exposition explains rightly צִפּוֹר by *passereau*, and דְּרוֹר by *hirondelle*, for צפור (Arab. *'usfuwr*), twitterer, designates at least preferably the sparrow, and דרור the swallow, from its flight shooting straight out, as it were radiating (*vid.* under Ps. lxxxiv. 4); the name of the sparrow, *dûrî* (found in courtyards), which Wetstein, after Saadia, compares to דרור, is etymologically different.[1] Regarding חִנָּם, *vid.* under xxiv. 28. Rightly the accentuation separates the words rendered, "so the curse undeserved" (קְלָלַת, after Kimchi, *Michlol* 79*b*, קְלָלַת), from those which follow; לֹא תָבֹא is the explication of כֵּן: thus hovering in the air is a groundless curse—it does not come (בוא, like *e.g.* Josh. xxi. 43). After this proverb, which is formed like ver. 1, the series now returns to the "fool."

Ver. 3 A whip for the horse, a bridle for the ass,
And a rod for the back of fools.

J. D. Michaelis supposes that the order should be reversed: a bridle for the horse, a whip for the ass; but Arnoldi has here discovered the figure of speech *merismus* (cf. x. 1); and Hitzig, in the manner of the division, the rhythmical reason of the combination (cf. שֵׂם חם ויפת for שֵׂם יפת וחם): whip and bridle belong to both, for one whips a horse (Neh. iii. 2) and also bridles him; one bridles an ass (Ps. xxxii. 9) and also whips him (Num. xxii. 28 f.). As whip and bridle are both serviceable and necessary, so also serviceable and necessary is a rod, לְגֵו כְּסִילִים, x. 13, xix. 29.

Ver. 4 Answer not the fool according to his folly,
Lest thou thyself also become like unto him.

After, or according to his folly, is here equivalent to recognising the foolish supposition and the foolish object of his question, and thereupon considering it, as if, *e.g.*, he asked why the ignorant man was happier than the man who had much knowledge, or how one may acquire the art of making gold; for "a

[1] It is true that the Gemara to *Negaïm*, xiv. 1, explains the Mishnic צִפֳּרִים הַדְּרוֹר, "house-birds," for it derives דרור from דור, to dwell.

fool can ask more than ten wise men can answer." He who recognises such questions as justifiable, and thus sanctions them, places himself on an equality with the fool, and easily himself becomes one. The proverb that follows affirms apparently the direct contrary:

Ver. 5 Answer the fool according to his folly,
Lest he regard himself as wise.

עֲנֵה־כְסִיל (with *Makkeph*, and *Gaja*, and *Chatef*[1]) here stands opposed to אַל־תַּעַן כְּסִיל. The Gospel of John, *e.g.* v. 31, cf. viii. 31,[2] is rich in such apparently contradictory sayings. The *sic et non* here lying before us is easily explained; after, or according to his folly, is this second time equivalent to, as is due to his folly: decidedly and firmly rejecting it, making short work with it (returning a sharp answer), and promptly replying in a way fitted, if possible, to make him ashamed. Thus one helps him, perhaps, to self-knowledge; while, in the contrary case, one gives assistance to his self-importance. The Talmud, *Schabbath* 30*b*, solves the contradiction by referring ver. 4 to worldly things, and ver. 5 to religious things; and it is true that, especially in the latter case, the answer is itself a duty toward the fool, and toward the truth. Otherwise the Midrash: one ought not to answer when one knows the fool as such, and to answer when he does not so know him; for in the first instance the wise man would dishonour himself by the answer, in the latter case he would give to him who asks the importance appertaining to a superior.

Ver. 6 He cutteth off the feet, he drinketh injury,
Who transacteth business by a fool.

He cutteth off, *i.e.* his own feet, as we say: he breaks his neck, *il se casse le cou;* Lat. *frangere brachium, crus, coxam; frangere navem* (Fleischer). He thinks to supplement his own two legs by those of the messenger, but in reality he cuts them off; for not only is the commission not carried out, but it is even badly carried out, so that instead of being refreshed (xiii.

[1] Thus after Ben Asher; while, on the contrary, Ben Naphtali writes עֲנֵה כְסִיל with *Munach*, *vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 41.

[2] *Vid.* my dissertation on three little-observed passages in the Gospel of John, and their practical lessons, in the *Evang. luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1869, Nos. 37, 38.

17, xxv. 13) by the quick, faithful execution of it, he has to swallow nothing but damage; cf. Job xxxiv. 7, where, however, drinking scorn is meant of another (LXX.), not his own; on the contrary, חָמָס here refers to injury suffered (as if it were חֲמָסוֹ, for the suff. of חמס is for the most part objective); cf. the similar figures x. 26. So שָׁלַח בְּיַד, to accomplish anything by the mediation of another, cf. Ex. iv. 13; with דבר (דברים), 2 Sam. xv. 36. The reading מִקְצֵה (Jerome, Luther, *claudus*) is unnecessary; since, as we saw, מִקְצֵה includes it in the *sibi*. The Syr. reads, after the LXX. (the original text of which was ἐκ τῶν ποδῶν ἑαυτοῦ), מִקְצֶה, for he errs, as also does the Targumist, in thinking that מקצה can be used for מקצץ; but Hitzig adopts this reading, and renders: "from the end of the legs he swallows injury who sends messages by a fool." The end of the legs are the feet, and the feet are those of the foolish messenger. The proverb in this form does not want in boldness, but the wisdom which Hitzig finds in it is certainly not mother-wit.[1] Böttcher, on his part, also with מִקְצֵה, renders: "from the end of his feet he drinks in that which is bitter . . ." —that also is too artificial, and is unintelligible without the explanation of its discoverer. But that he who makes a fool his messenger becomes himself like unto one who cuts off his own legs, is a figure altogether excellent.

Ver. 7 The hanging down of the legs of a lame man;
And a proverb in a fool's mouth.

With reference to the obscure דַּלְיוּ, the following views have been maintained:—(1) The form as punctuated appears directly as an imperative. Thus the LXX. translate, the original text of which is here: ἀφελοῦ πορείαν κυλλῶν (conj. Lagarde's) καὶ παροιμίαν ἐκ στόματος ἀφρόνων, which the Syr. (with its imitator, the Targ.) has rendered positively: "If thou canst give the power of (sound) going to the lame, then wilt thou also receive (prudent) words from the mouth of a fool." Since Kimchi, דַּלְיוּ has been regarded by many as the softening of the *Imp. Piel* דַּלֵּה, according to which the *Venet.* translates: ἐπάρατε

[1] The *Venet.* translates שְׂטֵה by ἄνους, so שְׂטֵה (the post-bibl. designation of a fool)—one of the many indications that this translator is a Jew, and as such is not confined in his knowledge of language only to the bibl. Hebrew.

κνήμας χωλοῦ; and Bertheau and Zöckler explain: always take away his legs from the lame, since they are in reality useless to him, just as a proverb in the mouth of the fool is useless,—something that without loss might be never there." But why did not the poet write הָרִימוּ, or הָסִירוּ, or קָחוּ, or the like? דָּלִי, to carry away, to dispense with, is Syriac (Targ. *Jer.* I., under Deut. xxxii. 50), but not Hebrew. And how meaningless is this expression! A lame man would withstand a surgeon (as he would a murderer) who would amputate his legs; for lame legs are certainly better than none, especially since there is a great distinction between a lame man (פִּסֵּחַ, from פָּסַח, *luxare;* cf. (Arab.) *fasaḥ, laxare, vid.* Schultens) who halts or goes on crutches (2 Sam. iii. 29), and one who is maimed (paralytic), who needs to be carried. It comes to this, that by this rendering of 7*a* one must, as a consequence, with the LXX., regard וּמָשָׁל [and a proverb] as object. accus. parallel to שֹׁקִים [legs]; but "to draw a proverb from one's mouth" is, after xx. 5, something quite different from to tear a proverb away from him, besides which, one cannot see how it is to be caught. Rather one would prefer: *attollite crura claudi* (*ut incedat, et nihil promovebitis*); but the כֵּן of מִפִּסֵּחַ does not accord with this, and 7*b* does not connect itself with it. But the explanation: "take away the legs from a lame man who has none, at least none to use, and a proverb in the mouth of fools, when there is none," is shattered against the "leg-taking-away," which can only be used perhaps of frogs' legs. (2) Symmachus translates: ἐξέλιπον κνῆμαι ἀπὸ χωλοῦ; and Chajûg explains דָּלִיּוּ as 3 *pret. Kal*, to which Kimchi adds the remark, that he appears to have found דָּלְיוּ, which indeed is noted by Norzi and J. H. Michaelis as a variant. But the Masoretic reading is דַּלְיוּ, and this, after Gesenius and Böttcher (who in this, without any reason, sees an Ephraimitic form of uttering the word), is a softened variation from דַּלְיוּ. Only it is a pity that this softening, while it is supported by *alius* = ἄλλος, *folium* = φύλλον, *faillir* = *fallere*, and the like, has yet not a single Hebrew or Semitic example in its favour. (3) Therefore Ewald finds, "all things considered," that it is best to read דָּלְיוּ, "the legs are too loose for the lame man to use them." But, with Dietrich, we cannot

concur in this, nor in the more appropriate translation: "the legs of the lame hang down loose," to say nothing of the clearly impossible: "high are the legs of the lame (one higher than the other)," and that because this form דַּלְיוּ for דַּלְיָיוּ also occurs without pause, Ps. lvii. 2, lxxiii. 2, cxxii. 6, Isa. xxi. 12; but although thus, as at Ps. xxxvi. 9, lxviii. 32, at the beginning of a clause, yet always only in connection, never at the beginning of an address. (4) It has also been attempted to interpret דַּלְיֵי as abstr., *e.g.* Euchel: "he learns from a cripple to dance, who seeks to learn proverbs from the mouth of a fool." דַּלְיוּ שְׂחָקִים must mean the lifting up of the legs = springing and dancing. Accordingly Luther translates:

> "As dancing to a cripple,
> So does it become a fool to speak of wisdom."

The thought is agreeable, and according to fact; but these words do not mean dancing, but much rather, as the Arabic shows (*vid.* Schultens at xx. 5, and on the passage before us), a limping, waddling walk, like that of ducks, after the manner of a well-bucket dangling to and fro. And דַּלְיוּ, after the form כַּלְבוּ, would be an unheard-of Aramaism. For forms such as שָׂחוּ, swimming, and שָׁלוּ, security, Ps. xxx. 7, on which C. B. Michaelis and others rest, cannot be compared, since they are modified from *sachw*, *salw*, while in דַּלְיוּ the *û* ending must be, and besides the Aramaic דַּלְיוּ must in *st. constr.* be דַּלְיוּת. Since none of these explanations are grammatically satisfactory, and besides דַּלְיוּ = דַּלְלוּ = דַּלּוּ gives a parallel member which is heterogeneous and not conformable to the nature of an emblematical proverb, we read דַּלְוִי after the forms שָׁקְוִי, צָפְוִי (cf. חָבוּק, vi. 10, xxiv. 33), and this signifies loose, hanging down, from דָּלָה, to hang at length and loosely down, or transitively: to hang, particularly of the hanging down at length of the bucket-rope, and of the bucket itself, to draw water from the well. The מִן is similar to that of Job xxviii. 4, only that here the connecting of the hanging down, and of that from which it hangs down, is clear. Were we to express the purely nominally expressed emblematical proverb in the form of a comparative one, it would thus stand as Fleischer translates it: *ut laxa et flaccida dependent* (*torpent*) *crura a claudo, sic sententia in ore stultorum* (*sc. torpet h. e. inutilis est*). The fool can

as little make use of an intelligent proverb, or moral maxim (*dictum sententiosum*), as a lame man can of his feet; the word, which in itself is full of thought, and excellent, becomes halting, lame, and loose in his mouth (Schultens: *deformiter claudicat*); it has, as spoken and applied by him, neither hand nor foot. Strangely, yet without missing the point, Jerome: *quomodo pulcras frustra habet claudus tibias, sic indecens est in ore stultorum parabola.* The lame man possibly has limbs that appear sound; but when he seeks to walk, they fail to do him service,—so a *bon-mot* comes forth awkwardly when the fool seeks to make use of it. Hitzig's conjecture: as leaping of the legs on the part of a lame man . . ., Böttcher has already shown sufficient reasons for rejecting; leaping on the part of any one, for the leaping of any one, were a court style familiar to no poet.

Ver. 8. This proverb presents to us a new difficulty.

> As one binds a stone in a sling,
> So is he who giveth honour to a fool.

This translation is warranted by tradition, and is in accordance with the actual facts. A sling is elsewhere called קֶלַע; but that מִרְגֻּמָה also in the passage before us signifies a sling (from רָגַם, to throw with stones = to stone or to throw stones = to sling, cf. Targ. Esth. v. 14 רָגַם, of David's slinging stones against Goliath), is supported by the LXX., Syr., and Targ. on the one side, and the Jewish Glossists on the other (Rashi: *fronde*, Ital. *frombola*). Rightly the LXX. renders כִּצְרוֹר as a verb: ὡς ἀποδεσμεύει; on the contrary, the Syr. and Targ. regard it as a substantive: as a piece of stone; but צְרוֹר as a substantive does not mean a piece, as one would put into a sling to use as a weapon, but a grain, and thus a little piece, 2 Sam. xvii. 13; cf. Amos ix. 9. Erroneously Ewald: "if one binds to the sling the stone which he yet seeks to throw, then all his throwing and aiming are in vain; so it is in vain to give to a fool honour which does not reach him." If one seeks to sling a stone, he must lay the *lapis missilis* so in the sling that it remains firm there, and goes forth only by the strong force of the slinging; this fitting in (of the stone), so that it does not of itself fall out, is expressed by צָרַר בְּ (cf.

xxx. 4; Job xxvi. 8). The giving is compared to the binding, the stones to the honour, and the sling to the fool: the fool is related to the honour which one confers on him, as the stone to the sling in which one lays it—the giving of honour is a slinging of honour. Otherwise (after Kimchi) the *Venet.* ὡς συνδεσμὸς λίθου ἐν λιθάδι, *i.e.* as Fleischer translates: *ut qui crumenam gemmarum plenam in acervum lapidum conjicit.* Thus also Ralbag, Ahron b. Josef, and others, and lastly Zöckler. The figure is in the form of an address, and מַרְגֵּמָה (from רָגַם, *accumulare, congerere, vid.* under Ps. lxvii. 28) might certainly mean the heaping of stones. But אֶבֶן is not used in the sense of אֶבֶן יְקָרָה (precious stone); also one does not see why one precious stone is not enough as the figure of honour, and a whole heap is named; but in the third place, כֵּן נוֹתֵן requires for כִּצְרוֹר a verbal signification. Therefore Jerome translates: *sicut qui mittit lapidem in acervum Mercurii;* in this the echo of his Jewish teacher, for the Midrash thus explains literally: every one who gives honour to a fool is like one who throws a stone on a heap of stones consecrated to Mercury. Around the Hermes (ἑρμαί), *i.e.* pillars with the head of Mercury (*statuæ mercuriales* or *viales*), were heaps of stones (ἕρμακες), to which the passer-by was wont to throw a stone; it was a mark of honour, and served at the same time to improve the way, whose patron was Mercurius (מרקוליס). It is self-evident that this Græco-Roman custom to which the Talm. make frequent reference, cannot be supposed to have existed in the times of Solomon. Luther translates independently, and apparently rendering into German that *in acervum Mercurii:* that is as if one threw a precious stone on the "*Rabenstein,*" *i.e.* the heap of stones raised at the foot of the gallows. This heap of stones is more natural and suitable to the times of Solomon than the heap of stones dedicated to Mercury, if, like Gussetius, one understands מרגמה of a heap of stones, *supra corpus lapidatum.* But against this and similar interpretations it is enough to remark that כצרור cannot signify *sicut qui mittit.* Had such a meaning been intended, the word would have been כְּהַשְׁלִיךְ or כְּמַשְׁלִיךְ. Still different is the rendering of Joseph Kimchi, Aben Ezra, and finally Löwenstein: as when one wraps up a stone in a piece of purple stuff. But אַרְגָּמָן, purple, has nothing to do with the verb

רָנַם; it is, as the Aramaic אַרְנְוָן shows, a compound word; the supposition of a denom. מִרְגֶּמָה thus proceeds from a false etymological supposition. And Hitzig's combination of מרגמה with (Arab.) *munjam*, handle and beam of a balance (he translates: as a stone on the beam of a balance, *i.e.* lies on it), is nothing but refined ingenuity, since we have no need at all of such an Arab. word for a satisfactory clearing up of מרגמה. We abide by the rendering of the sling. Böttcher translates: a sling that scatters; perhaps מרגמה in reality denotes such a sling as throws many stones at once. Let that, however, be as it may: that he who confers a title of honour, a place of honour, and the like, on a fool, is like one who lays a stone in a sling, is a true and intelligibly formed thought: the fool makes the honour no honour; he is not capable of maintaining it; that which is conferred on him is uselessly wasted.

Ver. 9 A thorn goeth into the hand of a drunkard,
And a proverb in a fool's mouth;

i.e., if a proverb falls into a fool's mouth, it is as if a thorn entered into the hand of a drunken man; the one is as dangerous as the other, for fools misuse such a proverb, which, rightly used, instructs and improves, only to the wounding and grieving of another, as a drunken man makes use of the pointed instrument which he has possession of for coarse raillery, and as a welcome weapon of his strife. The LXX., Syr. (Targ. ?), and Jerome interpret עָלָה in the sense of shooting up, *i.e.* of growing; Böttcher also, after xxiv. 31 and other passages, insists that the thorn which has shot up may be one that has not grown to perfection, and therefore not dangerous. But thorns grow not in the hand of any one; and one also does not perceive why the poet should speak of it as growing in the hand of a drunken man, which the use of the hand with it would only make worse. We have here עָלָה בְיָדִי, *i.e.* it has come into my hand, commonly used in the *Mishna*, which is used where anything, according to intention, falls into one's hands, as well as where it comes accidentally and unsought for, *e.g.* *Nazir* 23a, מי שנתכוון לעלות בידו בשר חזיר ועלה בידו בשר טלה, he who designs to obtain swine's flesh and (accidentally) obtains lamb's flesh. Thus rightly Heidenheim, Löwenstein, and the *Venet.*: *ἄκανθα ἀνέβη εἰς*

χεῖρα μεθύοντος. חוֹחַ signifies a thorn bush, 2 Kings xiv. 9,[1] as well as a thorn, Song ii. 2, but where not the thorns of the rose, and indeed no rose at all, is meant. Luther thinks of the rose with the thorn when he explains: "When a drunkard carries and brandishes in his hand a thorn bush, he scratches more with it than allows the roses to be smelled—so a fool with the Scriptures, or a right saying, often does more harm than good." This paraphrase of Luther's interprets עלה ביד more correctly than his translation does; on the other hand, the latter more correctly is satisfied with a thorn twig (as a thorn twig which pierces into the hand of a drunken man); the roses are, however, assumed contrary to the text. This holds good also against Wessely's explanation: "the Mashal is like a rose not without thorns, but in the mouth of a fool is like a thorn without a rose, as when a drunken man seeks to pluck roses and gains by his effort nothing but being pierced by thorns." The idea of roses is to be rejected, because at the time when this proverb was formed there were no roses in Palestine. The proverb certainly means that a right Mashal, *i.e.* an ingenious excellent maxim, is something more and better than a חוֹחַ (the prick as of the Jewish thorn, *Zizyphus vulgaris*, or the *Christus*-thorn, the *Ziz. spina Christi*); but in the mouth of a fool such a maxim becomes only a useless and a hurtful thing; for the fool so makes use of it, that he only embarrasses others and recklessly does injury to them. The LXX. translates מֹשֵׁל by δουλεία, and the Aram. by שַׁטְיוּתָא; how the latter reached this "folly" is not apparent; but the LXX. vocalized מֹשֶׁל, according to which Hitzig, at the same time changing שִׂכּוֹר into שֶׁכּוֹר, translates: "thorns shoot up by the hand of the hireling, and tyranny by the mouth of fools." Although a hired labourer, yet, on this account, he is not devoid of conscience; thus 9*a* so corrected has something in its favour: one ought, as far as possible, to do all with his own hand; but the thought in 9*b* is far-fetched, and if Hitzig explains that want of judgment in the state councils creates despotism, so, on the other hand, xxiv. 7 says that the fool cannot give counsel in the gate, and therefore he holds his mouth.

[1] The plur. חֲוָחִים, 1 Sam. xiii. 6, signifies not thorn bushes, but rock-splitting; in Damascus, *chôcha* means a little gate in the wing of a large door; *vid.* Wetstein's *Nordarabien*, p. 23.

Ver. 10. All that we have hitherto read is surpassed in obscurity by this proverb, which is here connected because of the resemblance of ושבר to שכור. We translate it thus, vocalizing differently only one word:

Much bringeth forth from itself all;
But the reward and the hirer of the fool pass away.

The LXX. translates *πολλὰ χειμάζεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἀφρόνων* (all the flesh of fools suffers much), *συντριβήσεται γὰρ ἡ ἔκστασις αὐτῶν*, which is in Hebrew:

רב מחולל כל בְּשַׂר כסיל
יִשָּׁבֵר עֲבָרָתָם

An unfortunate attempt so to rectify the words that some meaning might be extracted from them. The first line of this translation has been adopted by the Syr. and Targ., omitting only the כל, in which the self-condemnation of this deciphering lies (for כל בשר means elsewhere, humanity, not the whole body of each individual); but they translate the second line as if the words were:

יִשְׁבַּר עֹבֵר יָם

i.e., and the drunken man sails over the sea (עברים is separated into עבר ים, as בבקרים, Amos vi. 12, is to be separated into בַּבָּקָר יָם); but what does that mean? Does it mean that to a drunkard (but שִׁכּוֹר, the drunken man, and not סִבְאָ, the drunkard, is used) nothing remains but to wander over the sea? or that the drunken man lets his imagination wander away over the sea, while he neglects the obligation that lies upon him? Symmachus and Theodotion, with the Midrâsh (Rashi) and Saadia (Kimchi), take שׁכר in 10*b* = סגר (like Isa. xix. 10, שֹׁכְרֵ = embankment, cf. סַכָּרִין, *Kelîm*, xxiii. 5); the former translates by *καὶ ὁ φράσσων ἄφρονα ἐμφράσσει τὰς ὀργὰς αὐτοῦ*, the latter by *καὶ φιμῶν ἄφρονα φιμοῖ χόλους*, yielding to the imagination that עֲבָרִים, like עֲבָרוֹת, may be the plur. of עֶבְרָה, anger. Jerome punctuates רב as, xxv. 8, רַב, and interprets, as Symmachus and Theodotion, שִׁבֵּר both times = סִגֵּר, translating: *Judicium determinat causas, et qui imponit stulto silentium iras mitigat;* but רב does not mean *judicium*, nor מחולל *determinat*, nor כל *causas*. As Gussetius, so also Ralbag (in the first of his three explanations), Meîri, Elia

Wilna interpret the proverb as a declaration regarding quarrelsome persons: he causeth woe to all, and hireth fools, hireth transgressors, for his companions; but in that case we must read רַב for רַב; מְחוֹלֵל, bringing woe, would be either the *Po.* of חָלַל, to bore through, or *Pilel* of חִיל (חוּל), to put into distress (as with pangs); but עֹבְרִים, transgressors = sinners, is contrary to the O. T. *usus loq.*, xxii. 3 (xxvii. 12) is falsely cited in its favour; besides, for רַב there should have been at least אִישׁ רַב, and why וְשֹׂכֵר is repeated remains inexplicable. Others take מחולל-כל as the name of God, the creator of all men and things; and truly this is the nearest impression of these two words, for חוֹלֵל is the usual designation for divine production, *e.g.* Ps. xc. 2. Accordingly Kimchi explains: The Lord is the creator of all, and He gives to fools and to transgressors their maintenance; but עֹבְרִים, transgressors, is Mishnic, not bibl.; and שָׂכַר means to hire, but not to supply with food. The proverb is thus incapable of presenting a thought like Matt. v. 45 (He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good). Others translate: "The Lord is creator of all, and takes fools, takes idlers, into His service." Thus rendered, the proverb is offensive; wherefore Rashi, Moses Kimchi, Arama, and others regard the Mashal as in the mouth of fools, and thus they take vers. 9 and 10 together as a tetrastich. Certainly this second collection of proverbs contains also tetrastiches; but vers. 9 and 10 cannot be regarded as together forming a tetrastich, because רַב (which is valid against Kimchi also) cannot mean God the Lord: רַב, Lord, is unheard of in bibl. Heb., and at least the word מָרַב must be used for God. The *Venet.* on this account does not follow Kimchi, but translates, *Ἄρχων πλάττει πάντα, καὶ μισθοῦται μωρὸν καὶ μισθοῦται ὡς παραβάτης* (ought to have been *παραβάτας*); but who could this cunning man be? Perhaps the *Venet.* is to be understood, after Gecatilia (in Rashi): a great (rich) man performs all manner of things; but if he hires a fool, it is as if he hired the first best who pass along the way. But that חולל is used in the general sense of to execute, to perform, is without example, and improbable. Also the explanation: a ruler brings grief, *i.e.* severe oppression, upon all (Abulwalîd, Immanuel, Aben Ezra, who, in his smaller grammar, explains רַב = רָב after Isa. xlix. 9;

C. B. Michaelis: *dolore afficit omnes*), does not recommend itself; for חוֹלֵל, whether it be from חלל, Isa. li. 9 (to bore through), or from חיל, Ps. xxix. 9 (to bring on the pangs of birth), is too strong a word for hurting; also the clause, thus generally understood, is fortunately untrue. Translated as by Euchel: "the prominent persons destroy all; they keep fools in pay, and favour vagabonds,"—it sounds as if it had been picked up in an assembly of democrats. On the other hand, the proverb, as translated by Luther:

> A good master maketh a thing right;
> But he who hireth a bungler, by him it is spoiled,

is worthy of the Book of Proverbs. The second line is here freely rendered, but it is also appropriate, if we abide closer by the words of the text, in this connection. Fleischer: *Magister* (*artifex peritus*) *effingit omnia* (i.e. *bene perficit quæcunque ei committuntur*); *qui autem stultum conducit, conducit transeuntes* (i.e. *idem facit ac si homines ignotos et forte transeuntes ad opus gravius et difficilius conduceret*). Thus also Gesenius, Böttcher, and others, who all, as Gecatilia above, explain עברים, τοὺς τυχόντας, the first best. But we are reluctantly constrained to object to this thought, because רַב nowhere in bibl. Hebrew signifies a master; and the ו of the second וְשֹׂכֵר cannot bear that rendering, *ac si*. And if we leave it out, we nevertheless encounter a difficulty in חוֹלֵל, which cannot be used of human production. Many Christian interpreters (Cocceius, Schultens, Schelling, Ewald, Bertheau, Stier, Zöckler) give to רב a meaning which is found in no Jewish interpreter, viz. *sagittarius*, from רָבַב (רָבָב), Gen. xlix. 23 (and perhaps Ps. xviii. 15), after the forms צַר, שַׂר, the plur. of which, רַבִּים, is found at Job xvi. 13, Jer. l. 29, but in a connection which removes all doubt from the meaning of the word. Here also רַב may be more closely defined by מְחוֹלֵל; but how then does the proverb stand? "an archer who wounds everything, and he who hires a fool, and hires passers-by" (Ewald: street-runners), *i.e.* they are alike. But if the archer piercing everything is a comic *Hercules furens*, then, in order to discover the resemblance between the three, there is need of a portion of ingenuity, such as is only particularly assigned to the favoured. But it is also

against the form and the usage of the word to interpret עברים simply of rogues and vagabonds. Several interpreters have supposed that רב and כל must stand in a certain interchangeable relation to each other. Thus, *e.g.*, Ahron b. Josef: "Much makes amazement to all, but especially one who hires a fool. . . ." But this "especially" (before all) is an expression smuggled in. Agreeing with Umbreit and Hitzig, we translate line first; but in translating line second, we follow our own method:

Much bringeth all out of it;

i.e., where there is much, then one has it in his power, if he begins right, to undertake everything. רַב has by כֹּל the definition of a neuter, so as to designate not only many men, Ex. xix. 21, but also much ability in a pecuniary and facultative sense (cf. the subst. רֹב, Isa. lxiii. 7; Ps. cxlv. 7); and of the much which bringeth forth all out of itself, effects all by itself, חולל with equal right might be used, as xxv. 23, of the north wind. The antithesis 10*b* takes this form:

But the reward (read וּשְׂכַר) and the master (who hires him for wages) of the fool pass away,

i.e. perish; עֹבְרִים, as if עֹבֵר, is used of chaff, Isa. xxix. 5; of stubble, Jer. xiii. 24; of shadow, Ps. cxliv. 4. That which the fool gains passes away, for he squanders it; and he who took him into his service for wages is ruined along with him, for his work is only pernicious, not useful. Although he who possesses much, and has great ability, may be able to effect everything of himself, yet that is not the case when he makes use of the assistance therein of foolish men, who not only do not accomplish anything, but, on the contrary, destroy everything, and are only ruinous to him who, with good intention, associates them with himself in his work. That the word must be more accurately וְשֹׂכֵר, instead of וְשֹׂכְרוֹ, one may not object, since וְשֹׂכֵר is perfectly unambiguous, and is manifestly the object.

Ver. 11. The series of proverbs regarding fools is continued:

Like a dog which returneth to his vomit,
Is a fool who cometh again with his folly.

שָׁב is like שׁוֹנֶה, particip.; only if the punctuation were כְּכֶלֶב, ought "which returneth to his vomit" to be taken as a

relative clause (*vid.* under Ps. xxxviii. 14). Regarding עַל as designating the *terminus quo* with verbs of motions, *vid.* Köhler under Mal. iii. 24. On קָיָא = קִיא, cf. xxiii. 8. Luther rightly: as a dog devours again his vomit. The LXX. translate: ὥσπερ κύων ὅταν ἐπέλθῃ ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔμετον; the reference in 2 Pet. ii. 22: κύων ἐπιστρέψας ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐξέραμα, is thus not from the LXX.; the *Venet.* is not connected with this N. T. citation, but with the LXX., if its accordance with it is not merely accidental. To devour again its vomit is common with the dog.[1] Even so, it is the manner of fools to return again in word and in deed to their past folly (*vid.* regarding שָׁנָה with ב of the object, xvii. 9); as an Aram. popular saying has it: the fool always falls back upon his foolish conduct.[2] He must needs do so, for folly has become to him a second nature; but this "must" ceases when once a divine light shines forth upon him. The LXX. has after ver. 11 a distich which is literally the same as Sir. iv. 21.

Ver. 12 Seest thou a man who is wise in his own eyes?
The fool hath more hope than he.

Regarding the *perf. hypotheticum* רָאִיתָ, *vid.* at xxii. 29. Line second is repeated, xxix. 20, unchanged. מִמֶּנּוּ, *præ eo*, is equivalent to the Mishnic יוֹתֵר מִכָּךְ, *plus quam ei*. As the conversion of a sinner, who does not regard himself as righteous, is more to be expected than that of a self-righteous man (Matt. ix. 12 f.), so the putting right of a fool, who is conscious that he is not wise (cf. xxiv. 7), is more likely to be effected than that of one deeming himself wise; for the greatest hindrance to any turning toward that which is better lies in the delusion that he does not need it.[3] Thus far the group of proverbs regarding fools.

There follows now a group of proverbs regarding the slothful:

Ver. 13 The slothful saith there is a lion without,
A lion in the midst of the streets;

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[1] *Vid.* Schulze's *Die bibl. Sprichwörter der deutschen Sprache*, p. 71 f.

[2] *Vid.* Wahl's *Das Sprichwort der heb.-aram. Literatur*, p. 147; Duke's *Rabbin. Blumenlese*, p. 9.

[3] The Targum has 12*b* after Codd. פָּקַח סַכְלָא טַב מִנֵּיהּ (= Syr. *pekach*, *expedit*, *convenit*, *melius est*), it is far better circumstanced regarding the fool han regarding him. *Vid.* Geiger's *Zeitschr.* vi. (1868), p. 154.

cf. the original of this proverb, xxii. 13. שׁוּעָל, to say nothing of שַׁחַל, is not the jackal; שַׁחַל is the bibl. name for the lion. בֵּין is the more general expression for בְּקָרֶב, Isa. v. 25; by the streets he thinks of the rows of houses that form them.

Ver. 14 The door turneth on its hinges,
And the sluggard on his bed.

The comparison is clear. The door turns itself on its hinges, on which it hangs, in and out, without passing beyond the narrow space of its motion; so is the fool on his bed, where he turns himself from the one side to the other. He is called עָצֵל, because he is fast glued to the place where he is (Arab. *'azila*), and cannot be free (contrast of the active, cf. Arab. *ḥafyf*, moving nimbly, *agilis*). But the door offers itself as a comparison, because the diligent goes out by it to begin his work without (xxiv. 27; Ps. civ. 23), while the sluggard rolls himself about on his bed. The hook, the hinge, on which the door is moved, called צִיר, from צוּר, to turn,[1] has thus the name of חִפּוּשׂ.

Ver. 15 The slothful has thrust his hand into the dish,
It is hard for him to bring it back to his mouth again.

A variation of xix. 24; the fut. יְשִׁיבֶנָּה there, is here explained נִלְאָה לְהָשִׁיבָהּ עַל.

Ver. 16 The sluggard is wise in his own eyes,
More than seven men who give an excellent answer.

Between slothfulness and conceit there exists no inward necessary mutual relation. The proverb means that the sluggard as such regards himself as wiser than seven, who all together answer well at any examination: much labour—he thinks with himself—only injures the health, blunts men for life and its joys, leads only to over-exertion; for the most prudent is, as a general rule, crack-brained. Böttcher's "*maulfaule*" [slow to speak] belongs to the German style of thinking; עטל לשנא in Syr. is not he who is slow to speak, but he who has a

[1] The Arab. verb signifies radically: to turn, like the Persian verbs *kashatn* and *kardydan*, and like our "*werden*" [to grow, turn], accords with *vertere* (Fleischer).

faltering tongue.[1] Seven is the number of manifoldness in completed unfolding (ix. 1). Mêîri thinks, after Ezra vii. 14, on the council of seven of the Asiatic ruler. But seven is a round number of plurality, ver. 25, xxiv. 16, vi. 31. Regarding טַעַם, *vid.* at xi. 22.

A series of proverbs which recommend the love of peace, for they present caricatures of the opposite:

Ver. 17 He seizeth by the ears a dog passing by,
Who is excited by a strife which concerns him not.

According to the accentuation in the text, the proverb is to be translated with Fleischer: *Qualis est qui prehendit aures canis, talis est qui forte transiens ira abripitur propter rixam alienam* (*eique temere se immiscet*). Since he is cautioned against unwarranted interference, the expression מִתְעָרֵב בְּדִין might have been used (xiv. 10), according to which the Syr. translates; but עַל־רִיב substantiates the originality of מִתְעַבֵּר (*vid.* xiv. 16, xx. 2). On the other hand, the placing together, without any connection of the two participles, is perplexing; why not עֹבֵר וּמִתְעַבֵּר? For it is certainly not meant, that falling into a passion he passes by; but that passing by, he falls into a passion; for he stands to this object. The Targumist, feeling this also, renders עֹבֵר in the sense of being angry, but contrary to the *usus loq.* Wherefore the conjecture of Euchel and Abramsohn commends itself, that עֹבֵר belongs to כלב—the figure thereby becomes more distinct. To seize one's own dog by the ear is not dangerous, but it is not advisable to do this with a strange dog. Therefore עבר belongs as a necessary attribute to the dog. The dog accidentally passing by corresponds to the strife to which one stands in no relation (רִיב לֹא־לוֹ, *vid.* regarding the *Makkeph*, Baer's *Genesis*, p. 85, *not.* 9). Whoever is excited to passion about a strife that does not belong to him, is like one who lays hold by the ears (the LXX. arbitrarily: by the tail) of a dog that is passing by—to the one or to the other it happens right when he brings evil upon himself thereby.

Vers. 18, 19. These verses form a tetrastich:

Ver. 18 As a man who casteth brands,
And arrows, and death;

[1] The Aram. עטל is the Hebr. עצל, as עֲטָא=עֲצָה; but in Arab. corresponds not to *'atal*, but to *'azal*.

19 So is the man who deceiveth his neighbour,
And saith: I only make sport.

The old translations of מתלהלה are very diverse. Aquila has rendered it by *κακοηθιζόμενος*; Symmachus: *πειρώμενοι*; the Syr.: the vainglorious; the Targ.: מְהַהַת (from נָהַת), a successor (spiritually); Jerome: *noxius* (injurious; for which Luther: secret). There is thus no traditional translation. Kimchi explains the word by השתגע (*Venet.* *ἐξεστώς*); Aben Ezra by השתטה (from שטה), to behave thoughtlessly, foolishly; but both erroneously, confounding with it וַתְּלַהּ, Gen. xlvii. 13, which is formed from לָהָה and not from לָהַה, and is related to לָאָה, according to which מתלהלה would designate him who exerts himself (Rashi, המתיגע), or who is worn out (Saadia: who does not know what to do, and in weariness passes his time). The root לָהַה (לָה, whence the reflex form הִתְלַהְלֵהַּ, like הִתְמַהְמֵהַּ, from מָהַה, מָהּ) leads to another primary idea. The root לָהּ presents in (Arab.) *âliha* (*vid.* Fleischer in the *Comm. zur Genesis*, p. 57), *waliha*, and *taliha*, formed from the 8th form of this verb (*aittalah*), the fundamental meaning of internal and external unrest; these verbs are used of the effect of fear (shrinking back from fear), and, generally, the want of self-command; the Syr. *otlahlah*, to be terrified, *obstupescere*, confirms this primary conception, connecting itself with the R. לה. Accordingly, he who shoots every possible death-bringing arrow, is thought of as one who is beside himself, one who is of confused mind, in which sense the passive forms of (Arab.) *âlah* and *talah* are actually used. Schultens' reference to (Arab.) *lâh micare*, according to which כמתלהלה must mean *sicut ludicram micationem exercens* (Böttcher: one who exerts himself; Malbim: one who scoffs, from הֶתֵל), is to be rejected, because מתלהלה must be the direct opposite of מְיַשֵּׁחַק; and Ewald's comparison of (Arab.) *wâh* and *akhkh*, to be entangled, distorted, *lâh*, to be veiled, confounds together heterogeneous words. Regarding זִקִּים (from זָנַק), burning arrows, *vid.* under Isa. l. 11. Death stands third, not as comprehensive (that which is deadly of every kind), but as a climax (yea, even death itself). The בֵּן of the principal sentence, correlate to כְּ of the contiguous clause, has the *Makkeph* in our editions; but the laws of the metrical *Makkeph* require בֵּן אִישׁ (with *Munach*), as it occurs

e.g. in Cod. 1294. A man who gives vent to his malice against his neighbour, and then says: seest thou not that . . . (הֲלֹא, like Arab. *âlâ*), *i.e.* I am only jesting, I have only a joke with thee: he exhibits himself as being mad, who in blind rage scatters about him deadly arrows.

There now follow proverbs regarding the *nirgân*, the slanderer (*vid.* regarding the formation and import of this word at xvi. 28):

Ver. 20 Where the wood faileth, the fire goeth out;
And where no tale-bearer, discord cometh to silence.

Wood, as material for building or for burning, is called, with the plur. of its product, עֲצִים. Since אֶפֶס is the absolute end of a thing, and thus expresses its no longer existing, so it was more appropriate to wood (Fleischer: *consumtis lignis*) than to the tale-bearer, of whom the proverb says the same thing as xxii. 10 says of the mocker.

Ver. 21 Black coal to burning coal, and wood to fire;
And a contentious man to stir up strife.

The *Venet.* translates פֶּחָם by *καρβών*, and נַחְלָה by *ἄνθραξ*; the former (from פָּחַם, Arab. *faḥuma*, to be deep black) is coal in itself; the latter (from נָחַל, *jaḥam*, to set on fire, and intrans. to burn), coal in a glowing state (*e.g.* xxv. 22; Ezek. i. 13). Black coal is suited to glowing coal, to nourish it; and wood to the fire, to sustain it; and a contentious man is suited for and serves this purpose, to kindle up strife. חָרַר signifies to be hot, and the *Pilpel* חִרְחֵר, to heat, *i.e.* to make hot or hotter. The three—coal, wood, and the contentious man—are alike, in that they are a means to an end.

Ver. 22 The words of the tale-bearer are like dainty morsels;
And they glide down into the innermost parts.

A repetition of xviii. 8.

The proverbs next following treat of a cognate theme, hypocrisy (the art of dissembling), which, under a shining [*gleissen*] exterior,[1] conceals hatred and destruction:

Ver. 23 Dross of silver spread over an earthen vessel—
Lips glowing with love and a base heart.

[1] *Vid.* regarding *gleisen* (to give a deceitful appearance) and *gleissen* (to throw a dazzling appearance), Schmitthenner-Weigand's *Deutsches Wörterbuch.*

Dross of silver is the so-called *glätte* (French, *litharge*), a combination of lead and oxygen, which, in the old process of producing silver, was separated (Luther: *silberschaum*, *i.e.* the silver litharge; Lat. *spuma argenti*, having the appearance of foam). It is still used to glaze over potter's ware, which here (Greek, *κέραμος*) is briefly called חֶרֶשׂ for כְּלִי חֶרֶשׂ; for the vessel is better in appearance than the mere potsherd. The glossing of the earthenware is called צָפָה עַל-חֶרֶשׂ, which is applicable to any kind of covering (צָפָה, R. צף, to spread or lay out broad) of a less costly material with that which is more precious. 23*a* contains the figure, and 23*b* its subscription: יֹקְדִים דַּלָּקִים וְלֵב רָע. Thus, with the taking away of the *Makkeph* after Codd., to be punctuated: burning lips, and therewith a base heart; burning, that is, with the fire of love (Meîri, אֵשׁ הַחֹשֶׁק), while yet the assurances of friendship, sealed by ardent kisses, serve only to mask a far different heart. The LXX. translate דלקים [burning] by λεῖα, and thus have read חלקים [smooth], which Hitzig without reason prefers; burning lips (Jerome, incorrectly: *tumentia*; Luther, after Deut. xxxii. 33, חמת: *Gifftiger mund* = a poisonous mouth) are just flattering, and at the same time hypocritical[1] lips. Regarding יֹקְדִים as masc., *vid.* vol. i. p. 119; לֵב רָע means, at xxv. 20, *animus mœstus*; here, *inimicus*. The figure is excellent: one may regard a vessel with the silver gloss as silver, and it is still earthen; and that also which gives forth the silver glance is not silver, but only the refuse of silver. Both are suitable to the comparison: the lips only glitter, the heart is false (Heidenheim).

Vers. 24 and 25 form a tetrastich.

Ver. 24 With his lips the hater dissembleth,
And in his heart he museth deceit.
25 If he maketh his voice agreeable, believe him not,
For seven abominations are in his heart.

[1] Schultens explains the *labia flagrantia* by *volubiliter prompta et diserta*. But one sees from the Arab. *dhaluḳa*, to be loose, lightly and easily moved (*vid.* in Fleischer's *Beiträgen zur arab. Sprachkunde* the explanation of the designation of the liquid expressed with the point of the tongue by *dhalḳiyyt*, at i. 26, 27; cf. de Sacy's *Grammar*), and *dalḳ*, to draw out (of the sword from its scabbard), to rinse (of water), that the meaning of the Heb. דלק, to burn, from R. דל, refers to the idea of the flickering, tongue-like movement of the flame.

All the old translators (also the *Venet.* and Luther) give to יְנַכֵּר the meaning, to become known; but the *Niph.* as well as the *Hithpa.* (*vid.* at xx. 11; Gen. xlvii. 7) unites with this meaning also the meaning to make oneself known: to make oneself unknown, unrecognisable = (Arab.) *tanakkr*, *e.g.* by means of clothing, or by a changed expression of countenance.[1] The contrast demands here this latter signification: *labiis suis alium se simulat osor, intus in pectore autem reconditum habet dolum* (Fleischer). This rendering of יָשִׁית מִרְמָה is more correct than Hitzig's ("in his breast) he prepares treachery;" for שׁית מרמה is to be rendered after שׁית עָצוֹת, Ps. xiii. 3 (*vid.* Hupfeld's and also our comm. on this passage), not after Jer. ix. 7; for one says שׁית מוֹקְשִׁים, to place snares, שׁית אֹרֶב, to lay an ambush, and the like, but not to place or to lay deceit. If such a dissembler makes his voice agreeable (*Piel* of חָנַן only here, for the form Ps. ix. 14 is, as it is punctuated, *Kal*), trust not thyself to him (הַאֲמִין, with ב: to put firm trust in anything, *vid. Genesis*, p. 312[2]); for seven abominations, *i.e.* a whole host of abominable thoughts and designs, are in his heart; he is, if one may express it, after Matt. xii. 45, possessed inwardly of seven devils. The LXX. makes a history of 24*a*: an enemy who, under complaints, makes all possible allowances, but in his heart τεκταίνεται δόλους. The history is only too true, but it has no place in the text.

Ver. 26 Hatred may conceal itself behind deceit:
Its wickedness shall be exposed in the assembly.

Proverbs which begin with the fut. are rarely to be found, it is

[1] *Vid.* de Goeje's *Fragmenta Hist. Arab.* ii. (1871), p. 94. The verb נכר, primarily to fix one's attention, sharply to contemplate anything, whence is derived the meanings of knowing and of not knowing, disowning. The account of the origin of these contrasted meanings, in Gesenius-Dietrich's *Lexicon*, is essentially correct; but the Arab. *nakar* there referred to means, not sharpness of mind, from *nakar* = הַכִּיר, but from the negative signification prevailing in the Arab. alone, a property by which one makes himself worthy of being disowned: craftiness, cunning, and then also *in bonam partem:* sagacity.

[2] The fundamental idea of firmness in האמין is always in the subject, not the object. The Arabic interpreters remark that *âman* with *b* expresses recognition, and with *l* submission (*vid.* Lane's *Lexicon* under *âman*); but in Hebr. האמין with ב *fiducia fidei*, with ל *assensus fidei;* the relation is thus not altogether the same.

true; yet, as we have seen, xii. 26, they are sometimes to be met with in the collection. This is one of the few that are of such a character; for that the LXX. and others translate *ὁ κρύπτων*, which gives for רֵעֲתוֹ a more appropriate reference, does not require us to agree with Hitzig in reading הַכֵּסֶה (xii. 16, 23),—the two clauses rendered fut. stand in the same syntactical relation, as *e.g.* Job xx. 24. Still less can the rendering of במשאון by *συνίστησι δόλον*, by the LXX., induce us to read with Hitzig אִוֶּן הֹרֵשׁ, especially since it is doubtful whether the Heb. words which floated before those translators (the LXX.) have been fallen upon. מַשָּׂאוֹן (beginning and ending with a formative syllable) is certainly a word of rare formation, to be compared only to מִסְהָרוֹן, Judg. iii. 23; but since the nearest-lying formation מַשָּׂא signifies usury (from נָשָׂא, to credit) (according to which Symmachus, *διὰ λήμματα*, to desire gain), it is obvious that the language preferred this double formation for the meaning deceiving, illusion, or, exactly: fraud. It may also be possible to refer it, like מְשׁוֹאוֹת (*vid.* under Ps. xxiii. 18), to שׁוֹא = שָׁאָה, to be confused, waste, as this is done by Parchon, Kimchi (*Venet. ἐν ἐρημίᾳ*), Ralbag, and others; מִשְׁאוֹן, in this sense of deepest concealment, certainly says not a little as the contrast of קָהָל [an assembly], but יְשִׁימוֹן [a desert] stood ready for the poet to be used in this sense; he might also have expressed himself as Job xxx. 3, xxxviii. 27. The selection of this rare word is better explained if it denotes the superlative of deceit,—a course of conduct maliciously directed toward the deception of a neighbour. That is also the impression which the word has made on Jerome (*fraudulenter*), the Targ. (בְּמוּרְסָתָא, in grinding), Luther (to do injury), and according to which it has already been explained, *e.g.* by C. B. Michaelis and Oetinger ("with dissembled, deceitful nature"). The punctuation of תכסה, Codd. and editions present in three different forms. Buxtorf in his *Concordance* (also Fürst), and the Basel *Biblia Rabbinica*, have the form תְּכַסֶּה; but this is a mistake. Either תִּכָּסֶה (*Niph.*) or תִּכַּסֶּה (*Hithpa.*, with the same assimilation of the preformative ת as in תְּכֻבַּס, Lev. xiii. 55; נִכַּפֵּר, Deut. xxi. 8) is to be read; Kimchi, in his *Wörterbuch*, gives תִּכַּסֶּה, which is certainly better supported. A surer contrast of במשאון and בקהל remains in our interpretation; only we translate not

as Ewald: "hatred seeks to conceal itself by hypocrisy," but: in deceitful work. Also we refer רָעָתוֹ, not to בִּמְשׂאוֹן, but to שִׂנְאָה, for hatred is thought of in connection with its personal representative. We see from 26*b* that hatred is meant which not only broods over evil, but also carries it into execution. Such hatred may conceal itself in cunningly-contrived deception, yet the wickedness of the hater in the end comes out from behind the mask with the light of publicity.

Ver. 27 He who diggeth a pit falleth therein;
And he that rolleth up a stone, upon himself it rolleth back.

The thought that destruction prepared for others recoils upon its contriver, has found its expression everywhere among men in divers forms of proverbial sayings; in the form which it here receives, 27*a* has its oldest original in Ps. vii. 16, whence it is repeated here and in Eccles. x. 8, and Sir. xxvii. 26. Regarding כֹּרֶה, *vid.* at xvi. 27. בָּהּ here has the sense of *in eam ipsam;* expressed in French, the proverb is: *celui qui creuse la fosse, y tombera;* in Italian: *chi cava la fossa, caderà in essa.* The second line of this proverb accords with Ps. vii. 17 (*vid.* Hupfeld and Riehm on this passage). It is natural to think of the rolling as a rolling upwards; cf. Sir. xxvii. 25, ὁ *βάλλων λίθον εἰς ὕψος ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ βάλλει, i.e.* throws it on his own head. וְגֹלֵל אֶבֶן is to be syntactically judged of like xviii. 13.

Ver. 28 The lying tongue hateth those whom it bruiseth;
And a flattering mouth causeth ruin.

The LXX., Jerome, the Targ., and Syr. render יְשַׂנֵּא דכיו in the sense of *non amat veritatem;* they appear by דכיו to have thought of the Aram. דַּכְיָא, that which is pure; and thus they gain nothing else but an undeniable plain thought. Many Jewish interpreters gloss: מוכיחיו, also after the Aram.: דַּכָּיו = מְדַכָּיו; but the Aram. דַּכִּי does not mean pure in the sense of being right, therefore Elia Wilna understands him who desires to justify himself, and this violent derivation from the Aram. thus does not lead to the end. Luther, translating: "a false tongue hates those who punish it," explains, as also Gesenius, *conterentes = castigantes ipsam;* but דָּךְ signifies, according to the usage of the language before us, "bruised" (*vid.* Ps. ix. 10), not: bruising; and the thought that the liar hates him who listens to him, leads *ad absurdum;* but that he does not love him

who bruises (punishes) him, is self-evident. Kimchi sees in דַּכָּיו another form of דַּכָּא; and Meîri, Jona Gerundi in his ethical work (שׁערי תשׁובה = The gates of Repentance), and others, accordingly render דכיו in the sense of עָנְיָו (עָנִיו): the lying tongue hates—as Löwenstein translates—the humble [pious]; also that for דַּכָּיו, by the omission of ו, דַּכָּי = זַכָּי may be read, is supposable; but this does not harmonize with the second half of the proverb, according to which לְשׁוֹן שֶׁקֶר must be the subject, and ישׂנא דכיו must express some kind of evil which proceeds from such a tongue. Ewald: "the lying tongue hates its master (אֲדֹנָיו)," but that is not in accordance with the Heb. style; the word in that case should have been בְּעָלָיו. Hitzig countenances this אדניו, with the remark that the tongue is here personified; but personified, the tongue certainly means him who has it (Ps. cxx. 3). Böttcher's conjecture יְשַׁנֵּא דָכָיו, "confounds their talk," is certainly a curiosity. Spoken of the sea, those words would mean, "it changes its surge." But is it then at all necessary to uncover first the meaning of 28*a*? Rashi, Arama, and others refer דַּכָּיו to דַּכִּים = נִדְכָּאִים (מְדֻכְּאִים). Thus also perhaps the *Venet.*, which translates τοὺς ἐπιτριμμοὺς (not: ἐπιτετριμμένους) αὐτῆς. C. B. Michaelis: *Lingua falsitatis odio habet contritos suos, h. e. eos quos falsitate ac mendacio lædit contritosque facit.* Hitzig objects that it is more correct to say: *conterit perosos sibi.* And certainly this lay nearer, on which account Fleischer remarks: in 28*a* there is to be supposed a poetic transposition of the ideas (Hypallage): *homo qui lingua ad calumnias abutitur conterit eos quos odit.* The poet makes ישׂנא the main conception, because it does not come to him so readily to say that the lying tongue bruises those against whom it is directed, as that it is hatred, which is active in this. To say this was by no means superfluous. There are men who find pleasure in repeating and magnifying scandalously that which is depreciatory and disadvantageous to their neighbour unsubstantiated, without being at all conscious of any particular ill-will or personal enmity against him; but this proverb says that such untruthful tongue-thrashing proceeds always from a transgression of the commandment, "Thou shalt not hate thy brother," Lev. xix. 17, and not merely from the want of love, but from a state of mind which is the direct

opposite of love (*vid.* x. 18). Ewald finds it incongruous that 28*a* speaks of that which others have to suffer from the lying tongue, whereas the whole connection of this proverb requires that the tongue should here be regarded as bringing ruin upon its owner himself. But of the destruction which the wicked tongue prepares for others many proverbs also speak, *e.g.* xii. 13, cf. xvii. 4, לְשׁוֹן הַוּוֹת; and 28*b* does not mention that the smooth tongue (written וּפֶה־חָלָק with *Makkeph*) brings injury upon itself (an idea which must be otherwise expressed; cf. xiv. 32), but that it brings injury and ruin on those who have pleasure in its flatteries (חֲלָקוֹת, Ps. xii. 3; Isa. xxx. 10), and are befooled thereby: *os blandiloquum* (*blanditiis dolum tegens*) *ad casum impellit, sc. alios* (Fleischer).

xxvii. In the group 1–6 of this chapter every two proverbs form a pair. The first pair is directed against unseemly boasting:

Ver. 1 Boast not thyself of to-morrow,
For thou knowest not what a day bringeth forth.

The ב of בְּיוֹם is like, *e.g.* that in xxv. 14, the ב of the ground of boasting. One boasts of to-morrow when he boasts of that which he will then do and experience. This boasting is foolish and presumptuous (Luke xii. 20), for the future is God's; not a moment of the future is in our own power, we know not what a day, this present day or to-morrow (Jas. iv. 13), will bring forth, *i.e.* (cf. Zeph. ii. 2) will disclose, and cannot therefore order anything beforehand regarding it. Instead of לֹא־תֵדַע (with *Kametz* and *Mugrash*), לֹא־תֵדַע (thus *e.g.* the Cod. *Jaman*) is to be written; the Masora knows nothing of that pausal form. And instead of מַה־יֵּלֵד יוֹם, we write מַּה יֵּלֶד יוֹם with *Zinnorith.* יֵלֶד before יוֹם has the tone thrown back on the *penult.*, and consequently a shortened *ult.*; the Masora reckons this word among the twenty-five words with only one *Tsere.*

Ver. 2 Let another praise thee, and not thine own mouth;
A stranger, and not thine own lips.

The negative לֹא is with פִּיךָ, as in (Arab.) *ghyra fyk*, bound into one compact idea: that which is not thine own mouth (Fleischer), "not thine own lips," on the other hand, is not to be interpreted as corresponding to it, like אַל־נָכְרִי, xii. 28; since

after the prohibitive אַל, יְהַלֶּלְךָ [praise thee] easily supplies itself. זָר is properly the stranger, as having come from a distance, and נָכְרִי he who comes from an unknown country, and is himself unknown (*vid.* under xxvi. 24); the idea of both words, however, passes from *advena* and *alienigena* to *alius*. There is certainly in rare cases a praising of oneself, which is authorized because it is demanded (2 Cor. xi. 18), which, because it is offered strongly against one's will, will be measured by truth (x. 13); but in general it is improper to applaud oneself, because it is a vain looking at oneself in a glass; it is indecent, because it places others in the shade; imprudent, because it is of no use to us, but only injures, for *propria laus sordet*, and as Stobäus says, *οὐδὲν οὕτως ἄκουσμα φορτικὸν ὡς ὁ καθ' αὑτοῦ ἔπαινος*. Compare the German proverb, "*Eigenlob stinkt, Freundes Lob hinkt, fremdes Lob klingt*" [= self-praise stinks, a friend's praise is lame, a stranger's praise sounds].

The second pair of proverbs designates two kinds of violent passion as unbearable:

Ver. 3 The heaviness of a stone, the weight of sand—
A fool's wrath is heavier than both.

We do not translate: *Gravis est petra et onerosa arena*, so that the substantives stand for strengthening the idea, instead of the corresponding adjective (Fleischer, as the LXX., Jerome, Syr., Targum); the two pairs of words stand, as 4*a*, in genit. relation (cf. on the contrary, xxxi. 30), and it is as if the poet said: represent to thyself the heaviness of a stone and the weight of sand, and thou shalt find that the wrath of a fool compared thereto is still heavier, viz. for him who has to bear it; thus heavier, not for the fool himself (Hitzig, Zöckler, Dächsel), but for others against whom his anger goes forth. A Jewish proverb (*vid.* Tendlau, No. 901) says, that one knows a man by his wine-glass (כוס), his purse (כיס), and his anger (כעס), viz. how he deports himself in the tumult; and another says that one reads what is in a man ביום כעסו, when he is in an ill-humour. Thus also כעס is to be here understood: the fool in a state of angry, wrathful excitement is so far not master of himself that the worst is to be feared; he sulks and shows hatred, and rages without being appeased; no one can calculate

what he may attempt, his behaviour is unendurable. Sand, חוֹל,[1] as it appears, as to the number of its grains innumerable, so as to its mass (in weight) immeasurable, Job vi. 3; Sir. xxii. 13. נָטַל the *Venet.* translates, with strict regard to the etymology, by *ἄρμα.*

Ver. 4 The madness of anger, and the overflowing of wrath—
And before jealousy who keeps his place!

Here also the two pairs of words 4*a* stand in connection; אַכְזְרִיּוּת (for which the Cod. *Jaman.* has incorrectly אכזריות) is the connecting form; *vid.* regarding אַכְזָרִי, v. 9. Let one imagine the blind, relentless rage of extreme excitement and irritation, a boiling over of anger like a water-flood, which bears everything down along with it—these paroxysms of wrath do not usually continue long, and it is possible to appease them; but jealousy is a passion that not only rages, but reckons calmly; it incessantly ferments through the mind, and when it breaks forth, he perishes irretrievably who is its object. Fleischer generalizes this idea: "enmity proceeding from hatred, envy, or jealousy, it is difficult or altogether impossible to withstand, since it puts into operation all means, both secretly and openly, to injure the enemy." But after vi. 34 f., cf. Song viii. 8, there is particularly meant the passion of scorned, mortified, deceived love, viz. in the relation of husband and wife.

The third pair of proverbs passes over from this special love between husband and wife to that subsisting between friends:

Ver. 5 Better is open accusation
Than secret love.

An integral distich; מֵאַהֲבָה has *Munach*, and instead of the second Metheg *Tarcha*, after *Thorath Emeth*, p. 11. Zöckler, with Hitzig, incorrectly: better than love which, from false indulgence, keeps concealed from his neighbour his faults, when he ought to tell him of them. That would require the phrase אהבה מַסְתֶּרֶת, not מִסְתָּרֶת. Dächsel, in order to accommodate the text to this meaning, remarks: concealed censure is concealed love; but it is much rather the neglected duty of love,—love without mutual discipline is weak, faint-hearted,

[1] Sand is called by the name חול (חיל), to change, whirl, particularly to form sand-wreaths, whence (Arab.) *al-Habil*, the region of moving sand; *vid.* Wetzstein's *Nord-arabien*, p. 56.

and, if it is not too blind to remark in a friend what is worthy of blame, is altogether too forbearing, and essentially without conscience; but it is not "hidden and concealed love." The meaning of the proverb is different: it is better to be courageously and sternly corrected—on account of some fault committed—by any one, whether he be a foe or a friend, than to be the object of a love which may exist indeed in the heart, but which fails to make itself manifest in outward act. There are men who continually assure us of the reality and depth of their friendship; but when it is necessary for them to prove their love to be self-denying and generous, they are like a torrent which is dry when one expects to drink water from it (Job vi. 15). Such "secret" love, or, since the word is not נִסְתֶּרֶת, but מְסֻתֶּרֶת, love confined to the heart alone, is like a fire which, when it burns secretly, neither lightens nor warms; and before such a friend, any one who frankly and freely tells the truth has by far the preference, for although he may pain us, yet he does us good; while the former deceives us, for he leaves us in the lurch when it is necessary to love us, not merely in word and with the tongue, but in deed and in truth (1 John iii. 18). Rightly Fleischer: *Præstat correptio aperta amicitiæ tectæ*, i.e. *nulla re probatæ*.

Ver. 6 Faithful are the wounds of a friend,
And overloaded [plentiful] the kisses of an enemy.

The contrast to נֶאֱמָנִים, true, *i.e.* honourable and good (with the transference of the character of the person to his act), would be *fraudulenta* (Jerome), or נהפכות, *i.e.* false (Ralbag); Ewald seeks this idea from עתר, to stumble, make a false step;[1] Hitzig, from עתר = (Arab.) *dadhr*, whence *dâdhir*, *perfidus*, to gain from; but (1) the comparison does not lie near, since usually the Arab. ث corresponds to the Heb. שׁ, and the Arab. ذ to the Heb. ז; (2) the Heb. עתר has already three meanings, and it is not advisable to load it with yet another meaning assumed for this passage, and elsewhere not found. The three meanings are the following: (*a*) to smoke, Aram. עֲטַר,

[1] Thus also Schultens in the *Animadversiones*, which later he fancied was derived from עתר, *nidor*, from the meaning *nidorosa*, and thence *virulenta*.

whence עָתָר, vapour, Ezek. viii. 11, according to which the *Venet.*, with Kimchi's and Parchon's *Lex.*, translates: the kisses of an enemy *συνωμίχλωνται*, *i.e.* are fog; (*b*) to sacrifice, to worship, Arab. *atar*; according to which Aquila: *ἱκετικά* (as, with Grabe, it is probably to be read for *ἑκούσια* of the LXX.); and agreeably to the *Niph.*, but too artificially, Arama: obtained by entreaties = constrained; (*c*) to heap up, whence *Hiph.* הֶעְתִּיר, Ezek. xxxv. 13, cf. Jer. xxxiii. 6, according to which Rashi, Meîri, Gesenius, Fleischer, Bertheau, and most explain, cogn. with עָשַׁר, whose Aram. form is עְתַר, for עֹשֶׁר is properly a heap of goods or treasures.[1] This third meaning gives to the kisses of an enemy a natural adjective: they are too abundant, so much the more plentiful to veil over the hatred, like the kisses by means of which Judas betrayed his Lord, not merely denoted by *φιλεῖν*, but by *καταφιλεῖν*, Matt. xxvi. 49. This, then, is the contrast, that the strokes inflicted by one who truly loves us, although they tear into our flesh (פֶּצַע, from פָּצַע, to split, to tear open), yet are faithful (cf. Ps. cxli. 5); on the contrary, the enemy covers over with kisses him to whom he wishes all evil. Thus also נעתרות forms an indirect contrast to נאמנים.

In 7–10 there is also visible a weaving of the external with the internal. First, there are two proverbs, in each of which there is repeated a word terminating with נ.

Ver. 7 A satisfied soul treadeth honeycomb under foot;
And a hungry soul—everything bitter is (to it) sweet.

It is unnecessary to read תָּבוּז (Hitzig); תָּבוּס is stronger; "to tread with the feet" is the extreme degree of scornful despite. That satiety and hunger are applicable to the soul, *vid.* under x. 3. In 7*b*, the adverb לָהּ, relative to the *nomin. absol.*, like xxviii. 7, but not xiii. 18. "Hunger is the best cook," according to a German proverb; the Hebrew proverb is so formed that it is easily transferred to the sphere of the soul. Let the man whom God has richly satisfied with good things guard himself against ingratitude towards the Giver, and against an undervaluing of the gifts received; and if they are spiritual blessings, let him guard himself against self-satisfaction and

[1] *Vid.* regarding this word, Schlottmann in *Deutsch.-Morgenl. Zeitschrift*, xxiv. 665, 668.

self-contentment, which is, in truth, the worst poverty, Rev. iii. 17; for life without God is a constant hunger and thirst. There is in worldly things, even the most pleasing, a dissatisfaction felt, and a dissatisfaction awakening disgust; and in spiritual life, a satiety which supposes itself to be full of life, but which is nothing else than the decay of life, than the changing of life into death.

Ver. 8 As a bird that wandereth from her nest,
So is a man that wandereth from his home.

It is not a flying out that is meant, from which at any moment a return is possible, but an unwilling taking to flight (LXX. 8*b*: ὅταν ἀποξενωθῇ; *Venet.*: πλανούμενον . . . πλανούμενος); for נוֹדֵד עוֹף, Isa. xvi. 2, cf. Jer. iv. 25, birds that have been frightened; and נֹדֵד, xxi. 15 f., designates the fugitive; cf. נָע וָנָד, Gen. iv. 14, and above, xxvi. 2, where נוד designates aimless roving about. Otherwise Fleischer: "warning against unnecessary roaming about, in journeyings and wanderings far from home: as a bird far from its nest is easily wounded, caught, or killed, so, on such excursions, one easily comes to injury and want. One may think of a journey in the East. The Arabs say, in one of their proverbs: *âlsafar ḳaṭ'at man âlklyym* (= journeying is a part of the pains of hell)." But נדד here is not to be understood in the sense of a *libere vagari*. Rightly C. B. Michaelis: *qui vagatur extorris et exul à loco suo sc. natali vel habitationis ordinariæ*. This proverb mediately recommends the love of one's fatherland, *i.e.* "love to the land in which our father has his home; on which our paternal mansion stands; in which we have spent the years of our childhood, so significant a part of one's whole life; from which we have derived our bodily and intellectual nourishment; and in which home we recognise bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh." [1] But next it says, that to be in a strange land must be an unhappiness, because a man never feels better than at home, as the bird in its nest. We say: *Heimat* [home]—this beautiful word becomes the German language, which has also coined the expressive idea of *Heimweh* [longing for home]; the

[1] Gustave Baur's article "Vaterlandsliebe," in Schmid's *Pädagogischer Encyklopädie*.

Heb. uses, to express the idea of home, the word מקומי; and of fatherland, the word ארצי or אדמתי. The Heb. שְׁבוּת corresponds[1] to the German *Elend*, but = *Ellend, elilenti*, of another land, strange.

The two following proverbs have in common the catchword רֵעַ, and treat of the value of friendship :—

Ver. 9 Oil and frankincense rejoice the heart;
And the sweet discourse of a friend from a counselling of soul.

Regarding the perfuming with dry aromas, and sprinkling with liquid aromas, as a mark of honour towards guests, and as a

[1] The translators transfer to this place a note from vol. ii. p. 191 f. of the author's larger *Comm. ü. den Psalter*, to which Delitzsch refers the reader:—"The modern High German adj. *elend*, middle High German *ellende*, old High German *alilandi*, *elilendi*, or *elilenti*, is composed of *ali* and *land*. The adj. *ali* occurs only in old High German in composition. In the Gothic it is found as an independent adj., in the sense of *alius* and ἄλλος (*vid.* Ulfilas, Gal. v. 10). The primary meaning of *elilenti* is consequently: of another country, foreign. In glosses and translations it is rendered by the Lat. words *peregrinus*, *exul*, *advena*, also *captivus*. In these meanings it occurs very frequently. In the old High German translation of Ammonius, *Diatessaron*, *sive Harmoniæ in quatuor Evangelica*, the word proselytism, occurring in Matt. xxiii. 15, is rendered by *elilantan*. To the adj. the old High German subst. corresponds. This has the meaning *exilium*, *transmigratio*, *captivitas*. The connection *in elilenti* or *elilentes*, used adverbially, is rendered by the Lat. *peregre*. In the middle High German, however, the proper signification of both words greatly predominates. But as, in the old High German, the idea of *miser* is often at the same time comprehended in the proper signification: he who is miserable through banishment, imprisonment, or through sojourning in a strange land; thus, in several places of the middle High German, this derived idea begins to separate itself from the fundamental conception, so that *ellende* comes in general to be called *miser*. In the new High German this derived conception is almost alone maintained. Yet here also, in certain connections, there are found traces of the original idea, *e.g. in's Elend schicken*, for to banish. Very early also the word came to be used, in a spiritual sense, to denote our present abode, in contrast to paradise or the heavenly kingdom. . . . Thus, *e.g.* in one of Luther's hymns, when we pray to the Holy Ghost:

"Das er vns behüte, an vnserm ende;
Wenn wir heim farn aus diesem elende."

[That He guard us to our end
When we go home from this world.]

—Rud. von Raumer.

means of promoting joyful social fellowship, *vid.* at vii. 16 f., xxi. 17. The pred. יְשַׂמַּח comprehends frankincense or oil as the two sides of one and the same thing; the LXX. introduces, from Ps. civ. 15, also wine. It also reads ומתק רעה as one word, וּמִתְקְרָעָה: *καταῤῥήγνυται δὲ ὑπὸ συμπτωμάτων ψυχή*, which Hitzig regards as original; for he translates, understanding מֵעֵצוֹת after Ps. xiii. 3, "but the soul is torn by cares." But why מתקרעה, this *Hithpa.* without example, for נִקְרָעָה? and now connected with מִן in the sense of *ὑπό*! And what does one gain by this Alexandrian wisdom [of the LXX.]—a contrast to 9*a* which is altogether incongruous? Döderlein's rendering accords far better with 9*a*: "but the sweetness of a friend surpasses fragrant wood." But although this rendering of the word [עֵצָה] by "fragrant wood" is found in Gesen. *Lex.*, from one edition to another, yet it must be rejected; for the word signifies wood as the contents of trees, the word for aromatic wood must be עֲצִים; and if the poet had not intentionally aimed at dubiety, he ought to have written עֲצֵי בֹשֶׂם, since נפשׁ, with the exception of Isa. iii. 20, where it is beyond doubt, nowhere means fragrance. If we read עצת and נפשׁ together, then we may suppose that the latter designates the soul, as at Ps. xiii. 3; and the former, counsel (from the verb יָעַץ). But to what does the suffix of רֵעֵהוּ refer? One may almost conjecture that the words originally were וּמֶתֶק נֶפֶשׁ מֵעֲצַת רֵעֵהוּ, and the sweetness of the soul (*i.e.* a sweet relish for it, cf. ver. 7 and xvi. 24) consists in the counsel of a friend, according to which Jerome translates: *et bonis amici consiliis anima dulceratur*. By this transposition רעהו refers back to נפשׁ; for if *nephesh* denote a person or a living being, it can be construed *ad sensum* as masc., *e.g.* Num. xxxi. 28. But the words may remain in the order in which they are transmitted to us. It is possible that רֵעֵהוּ is (Böttcher refers to Job xii. 4) of the same meaning as הֵרֵעַ (the friend of one = the friend), as כֻּלּוֹ denotes directly the whole; חֲצִיוֹ, the half; עִתּוֹ, the right time. Recognising this, Cocceius, Umbreit, Stier, and Zöckler explain: sweetness, *i.e.* the sweet encouragement (מֶתֶק, in the sense of "sweetness (grace) of the lips," xvi. 21) of a friend, is better than one's own counsel, than prudence seeking to help oneself, and trusting merely to one's own resources; thus also Rashi: better than

what one's own soul advises him. But (1) נפשׁ cannot mean one's own person (oneself) in contrast to another person; and (2) this does not supply a correct antithesis to 9*a*. Thus מן will not express the preference, but the origin. Accordingly Ewald, *e.g.*, explains: the sweetness of a friend whom one has proceedeth from the counsel of soul, *i.e.* from such counsel as is drawn from a deep, full soul. But no proof can be brought from the usage of the language that עצת־נפשׁ can be so meant; these words, after the analogy of רעת נפשׁ, xix. 2, mean ability to give counsel as a quality of the soul (viii. 14; Job xii. 13), *i.e.* its ability to advise. Accordingly, with Bertheau, we explain ישׁמח־לב as the common predicate for 9*a* and 9*b*: ointment and perfume rejoice the heart, and (the Syr., Targ., well: even so) the sweet exhortation of a friend, from a soul capable of rendering counsel; also, this and this, more than that fragrance. This proverb is formed in the same way as xxvi. 9, 14. In this explanation רעהו is well referred back to לב: and (more than) the sweet advice of his friend. But not so that רעהו is equivalent to רֵעַ הַלֵּב, for one does not thus speak; but the construction is as when we say, in the German language: *Nichts thut einem Herzen woler als wenn sein Freund es mitfühlend tröstet* [nothing does more good to a heart than when a friend sympathizingly comforts it]; or: *Zage nicht, tief betrübtes Herz! Dein Freund lebt und wird dir bald sich zeigen* [Be not dismayed, deeply-troubled heart! thy friend lives, and will soon show himself to thee]. In such cases the word "*Herz*" [heart] does not designate a distinct part of the person, but, synecdochically, it denotes the whole person.

Ver. 10. Another proverb, consisting of three lines, in commendation of friendship:

> Thine own friend and the friend of thy father forsake not,
> And into thy brother's house go not in the day of thy misfortune—
> Better is a near neighbour than a far-off brother.

In our editions רֵעֲךָ is incorrectly pointed with *Pasek* after it, so that the accent is *Asla Legarmeh*; the *Pasek* is, after the example of older editions, with Norzi, to be cancelled, so that only the conjunctive *Asla* remains; "thine own and the friend of thy father" denotes the family friend, like some family

heirloom, descending from father to son. Such an old tried friend one must certainly not give up. The *Kerî* changes the second ורעה into וְרֵעַ, but וְרֵעֵהּ (which, after the Masora in *st. constr.*, retains its *segol*, Ewald, § 211*e*) is also admissible, for a form of comparison (Hitzig) this רֵעֵהּ is not, but the fuller form of the abbreviated רֵעַ, from רָעָה, to take care of, to tend, to pasture—an infinitive formation (= רְעִי) like the cogn. رَاعٍ a participial. Such a proved friend one ought certainly not to give up, and in the time of heavy trial (*vid.* regarding אֵיד, i. 26) one should go to him and not to a brother's house—it is by this supposed that, as xviii. 24 says, there is a degree of friendship (cf. xvii. 17) which in regard to attachment stands above that of mere fraternal relationship, and it is true; blood-relationship, viewed in itself, stands as a relationship of affection on natural grounds below friendship, which is a relationship of life on moral grounds. But does blood-relationship exclude friendship of soul? cannot my brother be at the same time my heart-friend? and is not friendship all the firmer when it has at the same time its roots in the spirit and in natural grounds? The poet seems to have said this, for in 10*c*, probably a popular saying (cf. "*Besser Nachbar an der Wand als Bruder über Land*" [Better a neighbour by one's side than a brother abroad]), he gives to his advice a foundation, and at the same time a limitation which modifies its ruggedness. But Dächsel places (like Schultens) in קָרוֹב and רָחוֹק meanings which the words do not contain, for he interprets them of inward nearness and remoteness; and Zöckler reads between the lines, for he remarks, a "near neighbour" is one who is near to the oppressed to counsel and help them, and a "distant brother" is one who with an unamiable disposition remains far from the oppressed. The state of the matter is simple. If one has a tried friend in neighbourly nearness, so in the time of distress, when he needs consolation and help, he must go to this friend, and not first to the house of a brother dwelling at a distance, for the former certainly does for us what the latter probably may and probably may not do for us.

Ver. 11. This proverb has, in common with the preceding tristich, the form of an address:

Become wise, my son, and make my heart rejoice,
That I may give an answer to my accusers.

Better than "be wise" (Luther), we translate "become wise" (LXX. *σοφὸς γίνου*); for he who is addressed might indeed be wise, though not at present so, so that his father is made to listen to such deeply wounding words as these, "Cursed be he who begat, and who educated this man" (Malbim). The cohortative clause 11*b* (cf. Ps. cxix. 42) has the force of a clause with a purpose (Gesen. § cxxviii. 1): *ut habeam quod iis qui me convicientur regerere possim;* it does not occur anywhere in the Hezekiah collection except here.

Ver. 12. ערום appears to lean on חכם.

The prudent man seeth the misfortune, hideth himself;
The simple pass on, suffer injury.

= xxii. 3, where ופתיים for פתאים, ונסתר for נסתר, and ונענשו for נענשו; the three *asyndeta* make the proverb clumsy, as if it counted out its seven words separately to the hearer. Ewald, § 349*a*, calls it a "*Steinschrift*" [an inscription on a stone]. The perfects united in pairs with, and yet more without, *Vav*, express the coincidence[1] as to time.

Ver. 13. ערום alliterates with ערב.

Take from him the garment, for he hath become surety for another,
And for the sake of a strange matter put him under bonds.

= xx. 16, *vid.* there. נכריה we interpret neut. (LXX. *τὰ ἀλλότρια*; Jerome, *pro alienis*), although certainly the case occurs that one becomes surety for a strange woman (Aquila, Theodotion, *περὶ ξένης*), by whose enticements and flatteries he

[1] The second *Munach* is at xxii. 3, as well as here, according to the rule xviii. 4 of the *Accentuationssystem*, the transformation of the *Dechi*, and preserves its value of interpunction; the *Legarmeh* of ערום is, however, a disjunctive of less force than *Dechi*, so that thus the sequence of the accents denotes that ערום ראה רעה is a clause related to ונסתר as a hypothetical antecedent: if the prudent sees the calamity, then he hides himself from it. This syntactic relation is tenable at xxii. 3, but not here at xxvii. 12. Here, at least, ערום would be better with *Rebia*, to which the following *Dechi* would subordinate itself. The prudent seeth the evil, concealeth himself; or also, prudent is he who sees the evil, hides himself. For of two disjunctives before *Athnach*, the first, according as it is greater or less than the second, retains either *Legarmeh* (*e.g.* Ps. i. 5, lxxxvi. 12, lxxxviii. 14, cix. 14) or *Rebia* (xii. 2; Ps. xxv. 2, lxix. 9, cxlvi. 5).

is taken, and who afterwards leaves him in the lurch with the debts for which he had become security, to show her costly favour to another.

Ver. 14. This proverb, passing over the three immediately intervening, connects itself with vers. 9 and 10. It is directed against cringing, noisy complimenting:

He who blesseth his neighbour with a loud voice, rising early in the morning,
It is reckoned as a curse to him.

The first line is intentionally very heavy, in order to portray the *empressement* of the maker of compliments: he calls out to another his good wishes with a loud voice, so as to make the impression of deep veneration, of deeply felt thankfulness, but in reality to gain favour thereby, and to commend himself to greater acts of kindness; he sets himself to meet him, having risen up (הַשְׁכִּים, adverbial *inf. abs.*; cf. Jer. xliv. 4 with xxv. 4) early in the morning, to offer his *captatio benevolentiæ* as speedily as possible; but this salutation of good wishes, the affected zeal in presenting which is a sign of a selfish, calculating, servile soul, is reckoned to him as קְלָלָה, viz. before God and every one who can judge correctly of human nature, also before him who is complimented in so ostentatious and troublesome a manner, the true design of which is thus seen. Others understand the proverb after the example of *Berachoth* 14*a*, that one ought to salute no one till he has said his morning's prayer, because honour is due before all to God (the Book of Wisdom, x. 28); and others after *Erachin* 16*a*, according to which one is meant who was invited as a guest of a generous lord, and was liberally entertained, and who now on the public streets blesses him, *i.e.* praises him for his nobility of mind—such blessing is a curse to him whom it concerns, because this trumpeting of his praise brings upon him a troublesome, importunate crowd. But plainly the particularity of בְּקוֹל וגו׳ lays the chief emphasis on the servility manifested; and one calls to mind the case of the clients besieging the doors of their patrons, those *clientes matutini*, each of whom sought to be the first in the *salutatio* of his distinguished wealthy patron.

Ver. 15. This proverb passes from the *complimentarius* to its opposite, a shrewish wife:

A continual dropping in a rainy day
And a contentious woman are alike.

Thus we have already translated (vol. i. p. 9), where, when treating of the manifold forms of parabolic proverbs, we began with this least poetic, but at the same time remarked that vers. 15 and 16 are connected, forming a tetrastich, which is certainly the case according to the text here lying before us. In verse 15, xix. 13*b* is expanded into a distich, and made a complete verse. Regarding דֶּלֶף טוֹרֵד, *vid.* the explanation there given. The noun סַגְרִיר, which the Syr. translates by ܣܓܪܝܪ, but the Targumist retains, because it is in common use in the post.-bibl. Heb. (*Bereschith rabba*, c. 1) and the Jewish Aramaic, signifies violent rain, after the Jewish interpreters, because then the people remain shut up in their houses; more correctly, perhaps, from the unbroken continuousness and thickness (cf. the Arab. *insajara*, to go behind each other in close column) with which the rain pours down. Regarding מְדָנִים, *Kerî* מְדָיָנִים, *vid.* vi. 14; the genit. connection of אֵשֶׁת מ׳ we had already at xxi. 9. The form נִשְׁתָּוָה is doubtful. If accented, with Löwenstein and others, as *Milra*, then we would have a *Nithkatal* before us, as at Num. i. 47, or a *Hothkatal* — a passive form of the *Kal*, the existence of which, however, is not fully established. Rather this word is to be regarded as נִשְׁתַּוָּה (*Nithpa.* as Deut. xxi. 8; Ezek. xxiii. 48) without the *dagesh*, and lengthened; the form of the word נִשְׁתָּוָה, as found in the Cod. *Jaman.*, aims at this. But the form נִשְׁתָּוָה is better established, *e.g.* by Cod. 1294, as *Milel.* Kimchi, *Michlol* 131*a* (cf. Ewald, § 132*c*), regards it as a form without the *dagesh*, made up of the *Niph.* and *Hithpa.*, leaving the *penultima* toning unexplained. Bertheau regards it as a voluntative: let us compare (as נִשְׁתָּעָה, Isa. xli. 23); but as he himself says, the reflexive form does not accord with this sense. Hitzig has adopted the right explanation (cf. Olshausen, § 275, and Böttcher, § 1072, who, however, registers it at random as an Ephraimitism). נִשְׁתָּוָה is a *Niphal*, with a transposition of consonants for נִשְׁוָתָה, since נִשְׁוָתָה passes over into נִשְׁתָּוָה. Such is now the *genus* in the arrangement; the *Milra* form would be as masc. syntactically inaccurate. "The finite following the subjects is regulated by

the gender and number of that which is next before it, as at 2 Sam. iii. 22, xx. 20; Ps. lv. 6; Job xix. 15" (Hitzig).

Ver. 16. This verse stands in close connection with the preceding, for it speaks of the contentious woman:

> He that restraineth her restraineth the wind,
> And oil meeteth his right hand.

The connection of the plur. subject צֹפְנֶיהָ = *quicunque eam cohibet*, with a sing. predicate, is not to be disputed (*vid.* iii. 18 and xxviii. 16, *Chethîb*); but can צפן gain from the meaning of preserving, laying up, also the meanings of keeping, of confining, and shutting up?—for these meanings we have בָּלָא and עָצַר (cf. צָרַר, xxx. 4). In 16*b* it lies nearer to see in יְמִינוֹ the object of the clause (oil meeteth his right hand) than the subject (his right hand meeteth oil), for the gender of ימין directs to יָד (*e.g.* Ezek. xv. 6*b*; cf. 6*a*, where נֶאֱדָרִי is as to gender indifferent): it is fem., while on the contrary שֶׁמֶן is generally masc. (cf. Song i. 3). There is no reason for regarding ימינו as an adverbial accus. (he meets oil with his right hand), or, with Hitzig, as a second subject (he meets oil, his right hand); the latter, in the order of the words lying before us, is not at all possible. We suppose that יִקְרָא, as at Gen. xlix. 1, is equivalent to יִקָּרֶה (Ewald, § 116*c*), for the explanation *oleum dexteræ ejus præconem agit* (Cocceius, Schultens) does not explain, but only darkens; and *oleum dexterâ suâ legit*, i.e. *colligit* (Fleischer), is based on an untenable use of the word. As one may say of person to person, קָרָה, *occurrit tibi*, Num. xxv. 18, so also יִקְרָא (יִקָּרֶה), of a thing that meets a man or one of his members; and if we compare לִקְרַאת and קָרֵי, then for 16*b* the meaning is possible: oil meets his right hand; the quarrelsome woman is like oil that cannot be held in the hand, which struggles against that which holds it, for it always glides out of the hand. Thus also Luther: "and seeks to hold oil with his hand," as if he read יִקְמֹץ. In fact, this word was more commonly used as the expression of untenableness than the colourless and singular word יקרא, which, besides, is so ambiguous, that none of the old translators has thought on any other קרא than that which signifies "to call," "to name." The Jewish interpreters also adhere to this nearest lying קרא, and, moreover, explain, as the Syr., Targ., Aquila, Symmachus, Jerome, and the *Venet.*, שֶׁמֶן ימינו,

according to the accentuation as genit. connected, *e.g.* Rashi: he calls for oil to his right hand, viz. as the means of purification from leprosy, Lev. viii. 14 [xiv. 16]; and Aben Ezra: even when he calls for oil to his right hand, *i.e.* would move them to silence with the precious anointing oil. Perhaps ver. 16 was originally an independent proverb as follows:

צפני הון צפן רוח
ושמן ימינו יקרא

He who layeth up riches in store layeth up the wind,
And he nameth them the fat of his right hand;

i.e., he sees in them that which makes his right hand fat and strong (שָׁמֶן, as at Ps. cix. 24, *opp.* Zech. xi. 17; cf. בְּמִשְׁמַנָּיו, Isa. x. 16, and regarding Ἐσμούν, the Phœnician god of health, at Isa. lix. 10), and yet it is only the wind, *i.e.* something that is worthless and transient, which he stored up (צָפַן, as at xiii. 22, and in מַצְפְּנָיו, Obad. ver. 6). הון is used as it frequently occurs in the Book of Proverbs, *e.g.* xi. 4, and the whole proverb expresses by another figure the same as xviii. 11. The fact that צפון (רוח), xxv. 23, and as a contrast thereto in the compass ימין (the south), hovered before the poet, may not have been without its influence on the choice of the words and expression here.

Ver. 17. This proverb expresses the influence arising from the intercourse of man with man:

Iron is sharpened by iron,
And a man may sharpen the appearance of another.

When the Masora reads יַחַד, Ewald remarks, it interprets the word as denoting "at the same time," and the further meaning of the proverb must then accord therewith. Accordingly he translates: "iron together with iron! and one together with the face of another!" But then the prep. ב or עם is wanting after the second יחד—for יַחַד is, in spite of Ewald, § 217*h*, never a prep. —and the "face," 17*b*, would be a perplexing superfluity. Hitzig already replies, but without doing homage to the traditional text-punctuation, that such a violence to the use of language, and such a darkening of the thought, is not at all to be accepted. He suggests four ways of interpreting יחד: (1) the adverb יַחַד, united, properly (taken accusat.) union; (2) יַחַד, Ps. lxxxvi. 11, imper. of the *Piel* יִחַד, unite; (3) יַחַד, Job iii. 6,

jussive of the *Kal* חָדָה, *gaudeat;* and (4) as Kimchi, in *Michlol* 126*a*, jussive of the *Kal* חָדָה (= חָדַד) *acuere*, after the form תַּחַז, Mic. iv: 11. וַיַּחַץ, Gen. xxxii. 8, etc. *in p.* יָחַד, after the form אָחַז, Job xxiii. 9. וַיִּחַל, 2 Kings i. 2 (= וַיְחִלָּא, 2 Chron. xvi. 12). If we take יחד with בַּרְזֶל, then it is *à priori* to be supposed that in יחד the idea of sharpening lies; in the Arab. iron is simply called *hadyda* = حَدِيد, that which is sharpened, sharp; and a current Arab. proverb says: *alhadyd balhadyd yuflah* = *ferrum ferro diffinditur* (*vid.* Freytag under the word *falah*). But is the traditional text-punctuation thus understood to be rightly maintained? It may be easily changed in conformity with the meaning, but not so that with Böttcher we read יְחַד and יַחַד, the *fut. Kal* of חָדַד: "iron sharpeneth itself on iron, and a man sharpeneth himself over against his neighbour"—for פני after a verb to be understood actively, has to be regarded as the object—but since יְחַד is changed into יְחַד (*fut. Hiph.* of חָדַד), and יַחַד into יְחַד or יְחַד (*fut. Hiph.* of חָדַד, after the form אָחֵף, *incipiam*, Deut. ii. 25, or אָחֵל, *profanabo*, Ezek. xxxix. 7; Num. xxx. 3). The passive rendering of the idea 17*a* and the active of 17*b* thus more distinctly appear, and the unsuitable jussive forms are set aside: *ferrum ferro exacuitur, et homo exacuit faciem amici sui* (Jerome, Targ., the *Venet.*). But that is not necessary. As וַיַּעַל may be the *fut.* of the *Hiph.* (he brought up) as well as of the *Kal* (he went up), so יְחַד may be regarded as *fut. Kal*, and יַחַד as *fut. Hiph.* Fleischer prefers to render יְחַד also as *Hiph.*: *aciem exhibet*, like יְעַשִּׁיר, *divitias acquirit*, and the like; but the jussive is not favourable to this supposition of an intransitive (inwardly transitive) *Hiph.* It may indeed be said that the two jussives appear to be used, according to poetic licence, with the force of indicatives (cf. under xii. 26), but the repetition opposes it. Thus we explain: iron is sharpened [*gewetzt*, Luther uses this appropriate word] by iron (ב of the means, not of the object, which was rather to be expected in 17*b* after xx. 30), and a man whets פני, the appearance, the deportment, the nature, and manner of the conduct of his neighbour. The proverb requires that the intercourse of man with man operate in the way of sharpening the manner and forming the habits and character; that one help another to culture and polish of manner, rub off his ruggedness, round

his corners, as one has to make use of iron when he sharpens iron and seeks to make it bright. The jussive form is the oratorical form of the expression of that which is done, but also of that which is to be done.

The following three proverbs are connected with 17 in their similarity of form :—

Ver. 18 Whosoever watcheth the fig-tree will enjoy its fruit;
And he that hath regard to his master attaineth to honour.

The first member is, as in ver. 17, only the means of contemplating the second; as faithful care of the tree has fruit for a reward, so faithful regard for one's master, honour; נָצַר is used as at Isa. xxvii. 3, שָׁמַר as at Hos. iv. 10, etc.—the proverb is valid in the case of any kind of master up to the Lord of lords. The fig-tree presented itself, as Heidenheim remarks, as an appropriate figure; because in the course of several years' training it brings forth its fruit, which the language of the Mishna distinguishes as פגין, unripe, בוחל, half ripe, and צמל, fully ripe. To fruit in the first line corresponds honour in the second, which the faithful and attentive servant attains unto first on the part of his master, and then also from society in general.

Ver. 19 As it is with water, face correspondeth to face,
So also the heart of man to man.

Thus the traditional text is to be translated; for on the supposition that כַּמַּיִם must be used for כְּבַמַּיִם, yet it might not be translated: as in waters face corresponds to face (Jerome: *quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus respicientium*), because כְּ (*instar*) is always only a prep. and never conj. subordinating to itself a whole sentence (*vid.* under Ps. xxxviii. 14). But whether כַּמַּיִם, "like water," may be an abridgment of a sentence: "like as it is with water," is a question, and the translation of the LXX. (Syr., Targ., Arab.), *ὥσπερ οὐχ ὅμοια πρόσωπα προσώποις, κ.τ.λ.*, appears, according to Böttcher's ingenious conjecture, to have supposed כאשר במים, from which the LXX. derived כְּאֵין דֹּמִים, *sicut non pares*. The thought is beautiful: as in the water-mirror each one beholds his own face (Luther: *der Scheme* = the shadow), so out of the heart of another each sees his own heart, *i.e.* he finds in another the dispositions and feelings of his own heart (Fleischer)—the face finds in water its

reflection, and the heart of a man finds in man its echo; men are *ὁμοιοπαθεῖς*, and it is a fortunate thing that their heart is capable of the same sympathetic feelings, so that one can pour into the heart of another that which fills and moves his own heart, and can there find agreement with it, and a re-echo. The expression with ל is extensive: one corresponds to another, one belongs to another, is adapted to the other, turns to the other, so that the thought may be rendered in manifold ways; the divinely-ordained mutual relationship is always the ground-thought. This is wholly obliterated by Hitzig's conjecture כְּמוּם, "what a mole on the face is to the face, that is man's heart to man," *i.e.* the heart is the dark spot in man, his *partie honteuse*. But the Scripture nowhere speaks of the human heart after this manner, at least the Book of Proverbs, in which לב frequently means directly the understanding. Far more intelligible and consistent is the conjecture of Mendel Stern, to which Abrahamsohn drew my attention: כַּמַּיִם הַפָּנִים לְפָנִים, like water (viz. flowing water), which directs its course always forward, thus (is turned) the heart of man to man. This conjecture removes the syntactic harshness of the first member without changing the letters, and illustrates by a beautiful and excellent figure the natural impulse moving man to man. It appears, however, to us, in view of the LXX., more probable that כַּמַּיִם is abbreviated from the original כאשר במים (cf. xxiv. 29).

The following proverb has, in common with the preceding, the catchword האדם, and the emphatic repetition of the same expression:

Ver. 20 The under-world and hell are not satisfied,
And the eyes of man are not satisfied.

A *Kerî* ואברון is here erroneously noted by Löwenstein, Stuart, and others. The *Kerî* to וַאֲבַדּוֹ is here ואבדו, which secures the right utterance of the ending, and is altogether wanting[1] in many MSS. (*e.g.* Cod. *Jaman*). The stripping off of the ו from the ending וּ is common in the names of persons and places (*e.g.* שְׁלֹמֹה, LXX. *Σολομών* and שְׁלֹה); we write at pleasure either וּ or וֹ— (*e.g.* מְנוּדוֹ), Olsh. § 215*g*. אֲבַדֹּה (אֲבַדּוֹ) of the

[1] In Gesen. *Lex.* this אבדה stands to the present day under אֲבַדֹּה.

nature of a proper name, is already found in its full form אֲבַדּוֹן at xv. 11, along with שְׁאוֹל; the two synonyms are, as was there shown, not wholly alike in the idea they present, as the underworld and realm of death, but are related to each other almost the same as Hades and Gehenna; אבדון is what is called[1] in the Jonathan-Targum בֵּית אֲבַדְנָא, the place of destruction, *i.e* of the second death (מוֹתָא תִנְיָנָא). The proverb places Hades and Hell on the one side, and the eyes of man on the other, on the same line in respect of their insatiableness. To this Fleischer adds the remark: cf. the Arab. *al'ayn l'a taml'aha all'a altrab*, nothing fills the eyes of man but at last the dust of the grave—a strikingly beautiful expression! If the dust of the grave fills the open eyes, then they are full—fearful irony! The eye is the instrument of seeing, and consequently in so far as it always looks out farther and farther, it is the instrument and the representation of human covetousness. The eye is filled, is satisfied, is equivalent to: human covetousness is appeased. But first "the desire of the eye," 1 John ii. 16, is meant in the proper sense. The eyes of men are not satisfied in looking and contemplating that which is attractive and new, and no command is more difficult to be fulfilled than that in Isa. xxxiii. 15, "... that shutteth his eyes from seeing evil." There is therefore no more inexhaustible means, *impiæ speculationis*, than the desire of the eyes.

There follow here two proverbs which have in common with each other the figures of the crucible and the mortar:

Ver. 21 The crucible for silver and the furnace for gold,
And a man according to the measure of his praise;

i.e., silver and gold one values according to the result of the smelting crucible and the smelting furnace; but a man, according to the measure of public opinion, which presupposes that which is said in xii. 8, "according to the measure of his wisdom is a man praised." מְהֻלָּל is not a ῥῆμα μέσον like our *Leumund* [renown], but it is a graduated idea which denotes fame down to evil *Lob* [fame], which is only *Lob* [praise] *per antiphrasin*. Ewald otherwise: "according to the measure of his glorying;" or Hitzig better: "according to the measure with which he praises himself," with the remark: "מהלל is not the act, the

[1] *Vid.* Frankel, *Zu dem Targum der Propheten* (1872), p. 25.

glorifying of self, but the object of the glorying (cf. מבטח, מדון), *i.e.* that in which he places his glory." Böttcher something further: "one recognises him by that which he is generally wont to praise in himself and others, persons and things." Thus the proverb is to be understood; but in connection with xii. 8 it seems to us more probable that מהלל is thought of as going forth from others, and not as from himself. In line first, xvii. 3*a* is repeated; the second line there is conformable to the first, according to which it should be here said that the praise of a man is for him what the crucible and the furnace is for metal. The LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, and the *Venet.* read לְפִי מְהַלְלוֹ, and thereby obtain more concinnity. Luther accordingly translates:

A man is tried by the mouth of his praise,
As silver in the crucible and gold in the furnace.

Others even think to interpret man as the subject examining, and so they vocalize the words. Thus *e.g.* Fleischer: *Qualis est catinus argento et fornax auro, talis sit homo ori a quo laudatur*, so that "mouth of his praise" is equivalent to the man who praises him with his mouth. But where, as here, the language relates to relative worth, the supposition for לְפִי, that it denotes, as at xii. 8, *pro ratione*, is tenable. And that the mouth of him who praises is a smelting crucible for him who is praised, or that the praised shall be a crucible for the mouth of him who praises, would be a wonderful comparison. The LXX. has here also an additional distich which has no place in the Heb. text.

Ver. 22 Though thou bruise a fool in a mortar among grit with a pestle,
Yet would not his folly depart from him.

According to the best accredited accentuations, אִם־תְּכַתֻּשׁ has *Illuj.* and בַּמְּכָתֵּשׁ has *Pazer*, not *Rebia*, which would separate more than the *Dechi*, and disturb the sequence of the thoughts. The first line is long; the chief disjunctive in the sphere of the *Athnach* is *Dechi* of הָר', this disjoins more than the *Pazer* of בַּמְּ', and this again more than the *Legarmeh* of אֶת־הָאִוִּיל. The ה of הָרִפּוֹת does not belong to the stem of the word (Hitzig), but is the article; רִפּוֹת (from רוּף, to shake, to break; according

to Schultens, from רָפַת, to crumble, to cut in pieces, after the form קִיטוֹר, which is improbable) are bruised grains of corn (peeled grain, grit), here they receive this name in the act of being bruised; rightly Aquila and Theodotion, ἐν μέσῳ ἐμπτισσομένων (grains of corn in the act of being pounded or bruised), and the *Venet.* μέσον τῶν πτισανῶν.[1] In בְּעֲלִי (thus to be written after *Michlol* 43*b*, not בְּעֲלִי, as Heidenheim writes it without any authority) also the article is contained. מכתּשׁ is the vessel, and the ב of בעלי is *Beth instrumenti;* עֲלִי (of lifting up for the purpose of bruising) is the club, pestle (Luther: *stempffel* = pounder); in the Mishna, *Beza* i. 5, this word denotes a pounder for the cutting out of flesh. The proverb interprets itself: folly has become to the fool as a second nature, and he is not to be delivered from it by the sternest discipline, the severest means that may be tried; it is not indeed his substance (Hitzig), but an inalienable accident of his substance.

Vers. 23–27. An exhortation to rural industry, and particularly to the careful tending of cattle for breeding, forms the conclusion of the foregoing series of proverbs, in which we cannot always discern an intentional grouping. It is one of the Mashal-odes spoken of vol. i. p. 12. It consists of 11 = 4 + 7 lines.

Ver. 23 Give heed to the look of thy small cattle,
Be considerate about the herds.
24 For prosperity continues not for ever;
And does the diadem continue from generation to generation?
25 (But) the hay is gone, and the after-growth appears,
And the grass of the mountains is gathered:
26 Lambs serve to clothe thee,
And goats are the price of a field.
27 And there is plenty of goats' milk for thy nourishment,
And for the nourishment of thy house,
And subsistence for thy maidens.

The beginning directs to the fut., as is not common in these proverbs, *vid.* xxvi. 26. With ידע, to take knowledge, which is strengthened by the *inf. intensivus*, is interchanged שִׁית לֵב, which means at xxiv. 32 to consider well, but here, to be careful regarding anything. צאן is the small or little cattle, thus sheep and goats. Whether לַעֲדָרִים (here and at Isa. xvii. 2) contains the

[1] The LXX. translates ἐν μέσῳ συνεδρίου, and has thereby misled the Syr., and mediately the Targum.

article is questionable (Gesen. § 35. 2 *A*), and, since the herds are called הָעֲדָרִים, is not probable; thus: direct thy attention to the herds, that is, to this, that thou hast herds. פָּנִי is the external side in general; here, the appearance which the sheep present; thus their condition as seen externally. In ver. 24 I formerly regarded נֵזֶר as a synonym of גֵּז, to be understood of the produce of wool, or, with Hitzig, of the shearing of the meadow, and thus the produce of the meadow. But this interpretation of the word is untenable, and ver. 25 provides for ver. 24, thus understood, no natural continuation of thought. That חֹסֶן signifies a store, fulness of possessions, property, and abundance, has already been shown under xv. 6; but נֵזֶר is always the mark of royal, and generally of princely dignity, and here denotes, *per meton. signi pro re signata*, that dignity itself. With the negative expression in 24*a* the interrogative in 24*b* is interchanged as at Job xl. 9, with the implied negative answer; וְאִם, of an oath (" and truly not," as at Isa. lxii. 8), presents the same thought, but with a passionate colouring here unnecessary. Rightly Fleischer: " ready money, moveable property, and on the other hand the highest positions of honour, are far more easily torn away from a man, and secure to him far less of quiet prosperity, than husbandry, viewed particularly with respect to the rearing of cattle." In other words: the possession of treasures and of a lofty place of power and of honour has not in itself the security of everlasting duration; but rural economy, and particularly the rearing of cattle, gives security for food and clothing. The *Chethîb* לדור דור is found, *e.g.* at Ex. iii. 15; the *Kerî* לְדוֹר וָדוֹר substitutes the more usual form. If ver. 25 was an independent whole (Hitzig: grass vanishes and fresh green appears, etc.), then the meaning here and onward would be that in the sphere of husbandry it is otherwise than is said in ver. 24: there that which is consumed renews itself, and there is an enlarging circulation. But this contrast to ver. 24 must be expressed and formed unambiguously. The connection is rather this, that ver. 23 commends the rearing of cattle, ver. 24 confirms it, and 25 ff. discuss what real advantages, not dependent on the accidents of public and social life, it brings.

I rejoice to agree with Fleischer in the opinion that the perfects of ver. 25 form a complex hypothetical antecedent to ver.

26: *Quum evanuerit gramen* (*sc. vetus*) *et apparuerint herbæ recentes et collecta fuerint pabula montium, agni vestitui tuo* (*inservient*) *et pretium agri* (*sc. a te emendi*) *erunt hirci, i.e.* then wilt thou nourish thy herds of sheep and goats with the grass on thy fields, and with the dried gathered hay; and these will yield for thee, partly immediately and partly by the money derived therefrom (viz. from the valuable goats not needed for the flocks), all that is needful for thy life. He also remarks, under נָגְלָה, that it means to make a place void, empty (viz. to quit the place, *évacuer la forteresse*); hence to leave one's fatherland or home, to wander abroad; thus, rhetorically and poetically of things and possessions: to disappear. חָצִיר (from חָצַר, to be green) is hay, and דֶּשֶׁא the after-growing second crop (aftergrass); thus a meadow capable of being mowed a second time is thought of. עִשְׂבוֹת הָרִים (with *Dag. dirimens*, as *e.g.* עַנְבֵי, Deut. xxxii. 32) are the herbage of the mountains. The time when one proceeds to sheep-shearing, ver. 25 cannot intend to designate; it sets before us an interesting rural harvest scene, where, after a plentiful ingathering of hay, one sees the meadows again overspread with new grass (Ewald); but with us the shearing of sheep takes place in the month of May, when the warm season of the year is just at hand. The poet means in general to say, that when the hay is mown and now the herbage is grown up, and also the fodder from the mountains (Ps. cvi. 20) has been gathered home, when thus the barns are filled with plenty, the husbandman is guaranteed against the future on all sides by his stock of cattle. חֲלֵב (from חָלָב, Arab. *halyb*, with *halab*) is the usual metaplastic connecting form of חָלָב, milk. דֵּי (from דַּי, like חֵי from חַי), generally connected with the genitive of the person or thing, for which anything is sufficient (*e.g.* xxv. 16, דַּיְּךָ, to which Fleischer compares Arab. *hasbuha, tassuha kifayuha*), has here the genitive of the thing of which, or in which, one has enough. The complex subject-conception is limited by *Rebia*, and the governing דֵּי has the subordinated disjunctive *Legarmeh*. עִזִּים is a word of two genders (*epicoenum*), Gesen. § 107, 1*d*. In וְחַיִּים the influence of the לְ still continues; one does not need to supply it meanwhile, since all that maintains and nourishes life can be called חיים (*vita* = *victus*), *e.g.* iii. 22. The LXX. translates בֵּיתֶךָ by

σῶν θεραπόντων, and omits (as also the Syr., but not the Syro-Hexap.) the last line as now superfluous; but that the maids attending to the cattle—by whom we particularly think of milkers—are especially mentioned, intentionally presents the figure of a well-ordered household, full of varied life and activity (Job xl. 29).

This Mashal-ode, commending the rearing of cattle, is a boundary. The series of proverbs beginning with the next chapter is not, however, a commencement, like that at xxii. 17; and Hitzig's supposition, that xxviii. 1–16 and xxii. 17 ff. have one and the same author, stands on a false foundation. The second proverb of the twenty-eighth chapter shows directly that this new series of proverbs is subordinated to the aim of the Hezekiah-collection beginning with xxv., and thus has to be regarded as an original component part of it. The traces of the post-exilian period which Hitzig discovers in xxviii. 1–16 are not sufficient to remove the origin of the proverbs so far down from the times of Hezekiah. We take the first group, xxviii. 1–11, together; for מבין and יבינו, pervading these eleven proverbs, gives to them, as a whole, a peculiar colouring; and xxviii. 12 presents itself as a new beginning, going back to ver. 2, which ver. 1 precedes as a prelude.

xxviii. 1 The godless flee without any one pursuing them;
But the righteous are bold like a lion.

We would misinterpret the sequence of the accents if we supposed that it denoted רָשָׁע as obj.; it by no means takes וְאֵין־רֹדֵף as a parenthesis. רשע belongs thus to נָסוּ as collective sing. (cf. *e.g.* Isa. xvi. 4*b*);[1] in 1*b*, יִבְטָח, as comprehensive or distributive (individualizing) singular, follows the plur. subject. One cannot, because the word is vocalized כְּכְפִיר and not בַּכְּפִיר, regard יבטח as an attributive clause thereto (Ewald, like Jerome, *quasi leo confidens*); but the article, denoting the idea of kind, does not certainly always follow כ. We say, indifferently, כָּאֲרִי or כַּאֲרִי, כַּלָּבִיא or כְּלָבִיא, and always כְּאַרְיֵה, not כַּאַרְיֵה. In itself, indeed, יבטח may be used absolutely: he is confident, undismayed, of the lion as well as of the leviathan, Job xl. 23. But

[1] The Targum of xxviii. 1*a* is, in *Bereschith rabba*, c. 84, עֲרַק רַשִׁיעָא וְלָא רְדִיפִין לֵהּ; that lying before us is formed after the Peshito.

it is suitable thus without any addition for the righteous, and נסו and יבטח correspond to each other as predicates, in accordance with the parallelism; the accentuation is also here correct. The perf. נסו denotes that which is uncaused, and yet follows: the godless flee, pursued by the terrible images that arise in their own wicked consciences, even when no external danger threatens. The fut. יבטח denotes that which continually happens: the righteous remains, even where external danger really threatens, bold and courageous, after the manner of a young, vigorous lion, because feeling himself strong in God, and assured of his safety through Him.

Ver. 2. There now follows a royal proverb, whose key-note is the same as that struck at xxv. 2, which states how a country falls into the *οὐκ ἀγαθόν* of the rule of the many:

Through the wickedness of a land the rulers become many;
And through a man of wisdom, of knowledge, authority continues.

If the text presented בְּפִשְׁעַ as Hitzig corrects, then one might think of a political revolt, according to the usage of the word, 1 Kings xii. 19, etc.; but the word is בִּפְשָׁעַ,[1] and פֶּשַׁע (from פָּשַׁע, *dirumpere*) is the breaking through of limits fixed by God, apostasy, irreligion, *e.g.* Mic. i. 5. But that many rulers for a land arise from such a cause, shows a glance into the Book of Hosea, *e.g.* vii. 16: "They return, but not to the Most High (*sursum*); they are become like a deceitful bow; their princes shall then fall by the sword;" and viii. 4: "They set up kings, but not by me; they have made princes, and I knew it not." The history of the kingdom of Israel shows that a land which apostatizes from revealed religion becomes at once the victim of party spirit, and a subject of contention to many would-be rulers, whether the fate of the king whom it has rejected be merited or not. But what is now the contrast which 2*b* brings forward? The translation by Bertheau and also by Zöckler is impossible: "but through intelligent, prudent men, he (the prince) continueth long." For 2*a* does not mean a frequent changing of the throne, which in itself may not be a punishment for the sins of the people, but the appearance at the same time of many pretenders to the throne, as was the

[1] Thus to be written with *Gaja* here and at xxix. 6, after the rule of *Metheg-Setzung*, § 42.

case in the kingdom of Israel during the interregnum after the death of Jeroboam II., or in Rome at the time of the thirty tyrants; יְאֵרִיךְ must thus refer to one of these "many" who usurp for a time the throne. בְּאָדָם may also mean, xxiii. 28, *inter homines;* but אָדָם, with adjective following, *e.g.* xi. 7, xii. 23, xvii. 18, xxi. 16, always denotes one; and that translation also changes the כֵּן into a "so," "then" introducing the concluding clause, which it altogether disregards as untranslatable. But equally impossible is Böttcher's: "among intelligent, prudent people, one continues (in the government)," for then the subject-conception on which it depends would be slurred over. Without doubt כֵּן is here a substantive, and just this subject-conception. That it may be a substantive has been already shown at xi. 19. There it denoted integrity (properly that which is right or genuine); and accordingly it means here, not the *status quo* (Fleischer: *idem rerum status*), but continuance, and that in a full sense: the jurisdiction (properly that which is upright and right), *i.e.* this, that right continues and is carried on in the land. Similarly Heidenheim, for he glosses כן by מכון הארץ; and Umbreit, who, however, unwarned by the accent, subordinates this כן [in the sense of "right"] to יֹדֵעַ as its object. Zöckler, with Bertheau, finds a difficulty in the *asyndeton* מֵבִין יֹדֵעַ. But these words also, Neh. x. 29, stand together as a formula; and that this formula is in the spirit and style of the Book of Proverbs, passages such as xix. 25, xxix. 7 [1] show. A practical man, and one who is at the same time furnished with thorough knowledge, is thus spoken of, and prudence and knowledge of religious moral character and worth are meant. What a single man may do under certain circumstances is shown in xxi. 22; Eccles. ix. 15. Here one has to think of a man of understanding and spirit at the helm of the State, perhaps as the nearest counsellor of the king. By means of such an one, right continues long (we do not need to supply לִהְיוֹת after "continues long"). If, on the one side, the State falls asunder by the evil conduct of the inhabitants of the

[1] The three connected words ובאדם מבין ידע have, in Löwenstein, the accents *Mercha, Mercha, Mugrash;* but the Venetian, 1515, 20, Athias, v. d. Hooght, and Hahn, have rightly *Tarcha, Mercha, Mugrash,*—to place two *Merchas* is Ben-Naphtali's manner.

land, on the other hand a single man who unites in himself sound understanding and higher knowledge, for a long time holds it together.

Ver. 3. A proverb of a tyrant here connects itself with that of usurpers:

> A poor man and an oppressor of the lowly—
> A sweeping rain without bringing bread.

Thus it is to be translated according to the accents. Fleischer otherwise, but also in conformity with the accents: *Quales sunt vir pauper et oppressor miserorum, tales sunt pluvia omnia secum abripiens et qui panem non habent, i.e.* the relation between a poor man and an oppressor of the needy is the same as that between a rain carrying all away with it and a people robbed thereby of their sustenance; in other words: a prince or potentate who robs the poor of their possessions is like a pouring rain which floods the fruitful fields—the separate members of the sentence would then correspond with each other after the scheme of the chiasmus. But the comparison would be faulty, for גֶּבֶר רָשׁ and אֵין לֶחֶם fall together, and then the explanation would be *idem per idem.* A "sweeping rain" is one which has only that which is bad, and not that which is good in rain, for it only destroys instead of promoting the growth of the corn; and as the Arab, according to a proverb compared by Hitzig, says of an unjust sultan, that he is a stream without water, so an oppressor of the helpless is appropriately compared to a rain which floods the land and brings no bread. But then the words, "a poor man and an oppressor of the lowly," must designate one person, and in that case the Heb. words must be accentuated, גֶּבֶר רָשׁ וְעֹשֵׁק דַּלִּים (cf. xxix. 4*a*). For, that the oppressor of the helpless deports himself toward the poor man like a sweeping rain which brings no bread, is a saying not intended to be here used, since this is altogether too obvious, that the poor man has nothing to hope for from such an extortioner. But the comparison would be appropriate if 3*a* referred to an oppressive master; for one who belongs to a master, or who is in any way subordinated to him, has before all to expect from him that which is good, as a requital for his services, and as a proof of his master's condescending sympathy.

It is thus asked whether "a poor man and an oppressor of the lowly" may be two properties united in the person of one master. This is certainly possible, for he may be primarily a poor official or an upstart (Zöckler), such as were the Roman proconsuls and procurators, who enriched themselves by impoverishing their provinces (cf. LXX. xxviii. 15); or a hereditary proprietor, who seeks to regain what he has lost by extorting it from his relatives and workmen. But רִשׁ (poor) is not sufficient to give this definite feature to the figure of the master; and what does this feature in the figure of the master at all mean? What the comparison 3*b* says is appropriate to any oppressive ruler, and one does not think of an oppressor of the poor as himself poor; he may find himself in the midst of shattered possessions, but he is not poor; much rather the oppressor and the poor are, as *e.g.* at xxix. 13, contrasted with each other. Therefore we hold, with Hitzig, that רִשׁ of the text is to be read *rosh*, whether we have to change it into רֹאשׁ, or to suppose that the Jewish transcriber has here for once slipped into the Phœnician writing of the word;[1] we do not interpret, with Hitzig, גֶּבֶר רֹאשׁ in the sense of *ἄνθρωπος δυνάστης*, Sir. viii. 1, but explain: a man (or master = גְּבִיר) is the head (cf. *e.g.* Judg. xi. 8), and oppresses the helpless. This rendering is probable, because גֶּבֶר רָשׁ, a poor man, is a combination of words without a parallel; the Book of Proverbs does not once use the expression אִישׁ רָשׁ, but always simply רָשׁ (*e.g.* xxviii. 6, xxix. 13); and גֶּבֶר is compatible with חָכָם and the like, but not with רִשׁ. If we stumble at the isolated position of רֹאשׁ, we should consider that it is in a certain measure covered by דַּלִּים; for one has to think of the גבר, who is the רֹאשׁ, also as the רֹאשׁ of these דלים, as one placed in a high station who numbers poor people among his subordinates. The LXX. translates *ἀνδρεῖος ἐν ἀσεβείαις* as if the words of the text were גֶּבֶר רָשָׁע (cf. the interchange of גֶּבֶר and גִּבּוֹר in both texts of Ps. xviii. 26), but what the LXX. read must have been גִּבּוֹר לְהַרְשִׁיעַ (Isa. v. 22); and what can גִּבּוֹר here mean? The statement here made refers to the ruinous conduct of a גֶּבֶר, a man of standing, or גְּבִיר, a high lord, a "wicked ruler," xxviii. 15. On the

[1] The Phœn. writes רש (*i.e.* רֹשׁ, *rus*); *vid.* Schröder's *Phönizische Gram.* p. 133; cf. Gesen. *Thes.* under רֹאשׁ.

contrary, what kind of rain the rule of an ideal governor is compared to, Ps. lxxii. 1–8 tells.

Ver. 4 They who forsake the law praise the godless;
But they who keep the law become angry with them,

viz. the godless, for רָשָׁע is to be thought of collectively, as at ver. 1. They who praise the godless turn away from the revealed word of God (Ps. lxxiii. 11–15); those, on the contrary, who are true to God's word (xxix. 18) are aroused against them (*vid.* regarding גרה, xv. 18), they are deeply moved by their conduct, they cannot remain silent and let their wickedness go unpunished; הִתְגָּרָה is zeal (excitement) always expressing itself, passing over into actions (syn. הִתְעוֹרֵר, Job xvii. 8).

Ver. 5. A similar antithetic distich:

Wicked men understand not what is right;
But they who seek Jahve understand all.

Regarding the gen. expression אַנְשֵׁי־רָע, *vid.* under ii. 14. He who makes wickedness his element, falls into the confusion of the moral conception; but he whose end is the one living God, gains from that, in every situation of life, even amid the greatest difficulties, the knowledge of that which is morally right. Similarly the Apostle John (1 John ii. 20): "ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things" (οἴδατε πάντα): *i.e.*, ye need to seek that knowledge which ye require, and which ye long after, not without yourselves, but in the new divine foundation of your personal life; from thence all that ye need for the growth of your spiritual life, and for the turning away from you of hostile influences, will come into your consciences. It is a potential knowledge, all-comprehensive in its character, and obviously a human relative knowledge, that is here meant.

Ver. 6. What is stated in this proverb is a conclusion from the preceding, with which it is also externally connected, for רש (= ראש), רשע, רע, and now רש, follow each other:

Better a poor man who walketh in his innocence,
Than a double-going deceiver who is rich thereby.

A variation of xix. 1. Stainlessness, *integritas vitæ*, as a consequence of unreserved devotion to God, gives to a man with poverty a higher worth and nobility than riches connected with

falsehood which "halts between two opinions" (1 Kings xviii. 21), and appears to go one way, while in reality it goes another. The two ways דְּרָכִים (cf. Sir. ii. 12, *οὐαὶ ἁμαρτωλῷ . . . ἐπιβαίνοντι ἐπὶ δύο τρίβους*) are, as ver. 18, not ways going aside to the right or to the left of the right way, but the evil way which the deceiver truly walks in, and the good way which he pretends to walk in (Fleischer); the two ways of action placed over against one another, by one of which he masks the other.

Ver. 7 He who keepeth instruction is a wise son;
But he that is a companion of profligates bringeth his father into shame.

We have translated תורה at ver. 4 by "law;" here it includes the father's instruction regarding the right way of life. נוֹצֵר תּוֹרָה, according to the nearest lying syntax, has to be taken as pred. זוֹלְלִים are such as squander their means and destroy their health, *vid.* under xxiii. 20 f. רָעָה signifies, as frequently from the idea of (cf. xxix. 3) pasturing, or properly of tending, to take care of, and to have fellowship with. יַכְלִים [shall put to shame] denotes both that he himself does disgrace to him, and that he brings disgrace to him on the part of others.

Ver. 8. This verse continues a series of proverbs (commencing in ver. 7) beginning with a participle:

He who increaseth his wealth by interest and usury,
Gathereth it for one who is benevolent toward the lowly.

Wealth increased by covetous plundering of a neighbour does not remain with him who has scraped it together in so relentless a manner, and without considering his own advantage; but it goes finally into the possession of one who is merciful towards the poor, and thus it is bestowed in a manner that is pleasing to God (cf. xiii. 22, Job xxii. 16 f.). The *Kerî*, which drops the second ב, appears to wish to mitigate the sharpness of the distinction of the second idea supposed in its repetition. But Lev. xxv. 35–37, where an Israelite is forbidden to take usury and interest from his brother, the two are distinguished; and Fleischer rightly remarks that there נשך means usury or interest taken in money, and תרבית usury or interest taken in kind; *i.e.*, of that which one has received

in loan, such as grain, or oil, etc., he gives back more than he has received. In other words: נֶשֶׁךְ is the name of the interest for the capital that is lent, and מַרְבִּית, or, as it is here called תּוֹרְבִית, the more, the addition thereto, the increase (Luther: *vbersatz*). This meaning of gain by means of lending on interest remains in נֶשֶׁךְ; but תּוֹרְבִית, according to the later *usus loq.*, signifies gain by means of commerce, thus business-profit, *vid. Baba Mezîa*, v. 1. Instead of יְקַבְּצֶנּוּ, more recent texts have the *Kal*[1] יְקַבְּצֶנּוּ. לְחוֹנֵן also is, as xiv. 31, xix. 17, *part. Kal*, not *inf. Poel: ad largiendum pauperibus* (Merc., Ewald, Bertheau), for there the person of him who presents the gift is undefined; but just this, that it is another and better-disposed, for whom, without having it in view, the collector gathers his stores, is the very point of the thought.

Ver. 9 He who turneth away his ear not to hear of the law,
Even his prayer is an abomination.

Cf. xv. 8 and the argument 1 Sam. xv. 22. Not only the evil which such an one does, but also the apparent good is an abomination, an abomination to God, and *eo ipso* also in itself: morally hollow and corrupt; for it is not truth and sincerity, for the whole soul, the whole will of the suppliant, is not present: he is not that for which he gives himself out in his prayer, and does not earnestly seek that which he presents and expresses a wish for in prayer.

Ver. 10. A tristich beginning with a participle:

He who misleads the upright into an evil way,
He shall fall into his own pit;
But the innocent shall inherit that which is good.

In the first case, xxvi. 27 is fulfilled: the deceiver who leads astray falls himself into the destruction which he prepared for others, whether he misleads them into sin, and thus mediately prepares destruction for them, or that he does this immediately

[1] If, as Hitzig, after J. H. Michaelis, remarks, the word were Ben-Asher's יְקַבְּצֶנּוּ, then it would be thus rightly punctuated by Clodius and the moderns. Kimchi, in the *Wörterbuch* under קָבַץ, adduces this word as Ben-Asher's. But the Masora knows nothing of it. It marks יְקַבְּצֶנּוּ, Jer. xxxi. 10, with לית as *unicum*, and thus supposes for the passage before us יְקַבְּצֶנּוּ, which certainly is found in MSS., and is also marked on the margin with לית as *unicum*.

by enticing them into this or that danger; for בְּדֶרֶךְ רָע may be understood of the way of wicked conduct, as well as of the experience of evil, of being betrayed, robbed, or even murdered. That those who are misled are called יְשָׁרִים, explains itself in the latter case: that they are such as he ought to show respect towards, and such as deserved better treatment, heightens the measure of his guilt. If we understand being morally led astray, yet may we not with Hitzig here find the "theory" which removes the punishment from the just and lays it on the wicked. The clause xi. 8 is not here applicable. The first pages of the Scripture teach that the deceiver does not by any means escape punishment; but certainly the deceiver of the upright does not gain his object, for his diabolical joy at the destruction of such an one is vain, because God again helps him with the right way, but casts the deceiver so much the deeper down. As the idea of דרך רע has a twofold direction, so the connections of the words may be genitival (*via mali*) as well as adjectival (*via mala*). בִּישְׁחוּתוֹ is not incorrectly written for בִּשּׁוּחָתוֹ, for שְׁחִית occurs (only here) with שְׁחוּת as its warrant both from שָׁחָה, to bend, to sink; cf. לְוּת under iv. 24. In line third, opposite to "he who misleads," stand "the innocent" (pious), who, far from seeking to entice others into the evil way and bring them to ruin, are unreservedly and honestly devoted to God and to that which is good; these shall inherit good (cf. iii. 35); even the consciousness of having made no man unhappy makes them happy; but even in their external relations there falls to them the possession of all good, which is the divinely ordained reward of the good.

Ver. 11 A rich man deems himself wise;
But a poor man that hath understanding searcheth him out,

or, as we have translated, xviii. 17, goes to the bottom of him, whereby is probably thought of the case that he seeks to use him as a means to an ignoble end. The rich man appears in his own eyes to be a wise man, *i.e.* in his self-delusion he thinks that he is so; but if he has anything to do with a poor man who has intelligence, then he is seen through by him. Wisdom is a gift not depending on any earthly possession.

We take vers. 12-20 together. A proverb regarding riches

closes this group, as also the foregoing is closed, and its commencement is related in form and in its contents to ver. 2:

Ver. 12 When righteous men triumph, the glory is great;
And when the godless rise, the people are searched for.

The first line of this distich is parallel with xxix. 2; cf. xi. 10*a*, 11*a*: when the righteous rejoice, viz. as conquerors (cf. *e.g.* Ps. lx. 8), who have the upper hand, then תִּפְאֶרֶת, bright prosperity, is increased; or as Fleischer, by comparison of the Arab. *yawm alazynt* (day of ornament = festival day), explains: so is there much festival adornment, *i.e.* one puts on festival clothes, *signum pro re signata*: thus all appears festal and joyous, for prosperity and happiness then show themselves forth. רַבָּה is adj. and pred. of the substantival clause; Hitzig regards it as the attribute: "then is there great glory;" this supposition is possible (*vid.* vii. 26, and under Ps. lxxxix. 51), but here it is purely arbitrary. 28*a* is parallel with 12*b*: if the godless arise, attain to power and prominence, these men are spied out, *i.e.* as we say, after Zeph. i. 12, they are searched for as with lamps. יְחֻפַּשׂ אָדָם is to be understood after Obadiah, ver. 6, cf. ii. 4: men are searched out, *i.e.* are plundered (in which sense Heidenheim regards חפשׂ as here a transposition from חשׂף), or, with reference to the secret police of despotism: they are subjected to an espionage. But a better gloss is יִסָּתֵר אָדָם 28*a*: the people let themselves be sought for, they keep themselves concealed in the inside of their houses, they venture not out into the streets and public places (Fleischer), for mistrust and suspicion oppress them all; one regards his person and property nowhere safer than within the four walls of his house; the lively, noisy, variegated life which elsewhere rules without, is as if it were dead.

Ver. 13 He that denieth his sin shall not prosper;
But he that acknowledgeth and forsaketh it shall obtain mercy.

Thus is this proverb translated by Luther, and thus it lives in the mouth of the Christian people. He who falsely disowns, or with self-deception excuses, if he does not altogether justify his sins, which are discernible as פְּשָׁעִים, has no success; he remains, after Ps. xxxii., in his conscience and life burdened with a secret ban; but he who acknowledges (the LXX. has ἐξηγούμενος

instead of ἐξομολογούμενος, as it ought to be) and forsakes (for the *remissio* does not follow the *confessio*, if there is not the accompaniment of *nova obedientia*) will find mercy (יִרחם, as Hos. xiv. 4). In close connection therewith stands the thought that man has to work out his salvation "with fear and trembling" (Phil. ii. 12).

Ver. 14 Well is it with the man who feareth always:
But he that is stiff-necked shall fall into mischief.

The *Piel* פַּחֵד occurs elsewhere only at Isa. li. 13, where it is used of the fear and dread of men; here it denotes the anxious concern with which one has to guard against the danger of evil coming upon his soul. Aben Ezra makes God the object; but rather we are to regard sin as the object, for while the truly pious is one that "fears God," he is at the same time one that "feareth evil." The antithesis extends beyond the nearest lying contrast of fleshly security; this is at the same time more or less one who hardens or steels his heart (מַקְשֶׁה לִבּוֹ), viz. against the word of God, against the sons of God in his heart, and against the affectionate concern of others about his soul, and as such rushes on to his own destruction (יִפּוֹל בְּרָעָה, as at xvii. 20).

This general ethical proverb is now followed by one concerning the king:

Ver. 15 A roaring lion and a ravening bear
Is a foolish ruler over a poor people,

i.e. a people without riches and possessions, without lasting sources of help,—a people brought low by the events of war and by calamities. To such a people a tyrant is a twofold terror, like a ravenous monster. The LXX. translate מוֹשֵׁל רָשָׁע by ὃς τυραννεῖ πτωχὸς ὤν, as if רשׁ had been transferred to this place from ver. 3. But their translation of רשׁע, xxix. 7, wavers between ἀσεβής and πτωχός, and of the bear they make a wolf וְדֹב, dialectical דֵּיב. שׁוֹקֵק designates a bear as lingering about, running hither and thither, impelled by extreme hunger (*Venet.* ἐπιοῦσα), from שָׁקַק = שׁוּק, to drive, which is said of nimble running, as well as of urging impulses (cf. under Gen. iii. 16), viz. hunger.

Ver. 16. Another proverb of the king:

O prince devoid of understanding and rich in oppression!
He that hateth unrighteous gain continueth long.

The old interpreters from the LXX. interpret וְרַב מְעֹשָׁקוֹת as pred. (as also Fleischer: *princeps qui intelligentiæ habet parum idem oppressionis exercet multum*); but why did not the author use the word הוּא or וְהוּא instead of this ambiguous inconvenient ן? Hitzig regards the first term as a nominative absolute, which does not assume a suffix in the second line. But examples such as 27*a*, xxvii. 7*b*, are altogether of a different sort; there occurs a reference that is in reality latent, and only finds not expression; the clause following the nominative is related to it as its natural predicate, but here 15*b* is an independent clause standing outside of any syntactical relation to 15*a*. Heidenheim has acknowledged that here there lies before us a proverb not in the form of a mere declaration, but of a warning address, and thus also it is understood by Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, and Zöckler. The accentuation seems to proceed on the same supposition. It is the only passage in the Book of Proverbs where נָגִיד, of the supreme ruler of the people, and where the plur. תְּבוּנוֹת, occur; it is not therefore at all strange if the proverb also has something strange in its formation. Often enough, proverbs are in the form of an address to a son, and generally to their reader; why not also one at least to the king? It is a proverb as when I say: Oh thou reckless, merry fellow! he who laughs much will sometimes weep long. Thus here the address is directed to the prince who is devoid of all wisdom and intelligence, which are necessary for a prince; but on this account the more earnest in exhortation to say to him that only one who hates defrauding the people attains an old age; thus that a prince who plunders the people wantonly shortens his life as a man, and his position as a ruler (cf. שְׁנֵיהֶם, xxiv. 22). The *Kerî* שְׁנָא has the tone thrown back on the *penult.*, as the *Chethîb* שְׁנָאִי would also have it, cf. לְמָצְאִי, viii. 9. The relation of a plur. subj. to a sing. pred. is as at xxvii. 16. Regarding בֶּצַע, *vid.* under i. 19. A confirmation of this proverb directing itself to princes is found in Jer. xxii. 13–19, the woe pronounced upon Jehoiakim. And a glance at the woe pronounced in Hab. ii. 12, shows how easily ver. 17 presents itself in connection.

Ver. 17 A man burdened with the guilt of blood upon his soul
Fleeth to the pit; let no one detain him.

Luther translates: "A man that doeth violence to the blood

of any one," as if he had read the word עֹשֵׁק. Löwenstein persuades himself that עָשֻׁק may mean "having oppressed," and for this refers to לָבוּשׁ, having clothed, in the Mishna נָשׁוּי, רָכוּב, Lat. *coenatus, juratus;* but none of all these cases are of the same nature, for always the conduct designated is interpreted as a suffering of that which is done, *e.g.* the drawing on, as a being clothed; the riding, as a being ridden, etc. Of עָשֻׁק, in the sense of the oppression of another, there is no such *part. pass.* as throws the action as a condition back upon the subject. This is valid also against Aben Ezra, who supposes that עָשֻׁק means oppressing after the forms אָנוּר, שָׁדוּד, שָׁכוּן, for of שָׁכֵן, settled = dwelling, that which has just been said is true; that אָנוּר is equivalent to אָגֵר, cf. regarding it under xxx. 1, and that יְשָׁדוּד, Ps. cxxxvii. 8, is equivalent to שֹׁדֵד, is not true. Kimchi adds, under the name of his father (Joseph Kimchi), also שָׁחוּם, Jer. ix. 7 = שׁוֹחֵט; but that "slaughtered" can be equivalent to slaughtering is impossible. Some MSS. have the word עָשֵׁק, which is not inadmissible, but not in the sense of "accused" (Löwenstein), but: persecuted, exposed to war; for עָשַׁק signifies to treat hostilely, and post-bibl. generally to aspire after or pursue anything, *e.g.* עֲסוֹק בְּדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה, R. עשׂ (whence *Piel contrectare*, cf. Isa. xxiii. 2, according to which עשׂק appears to be an intensifying of this עשׂה). However, there is no ground for regarding עָשֻׁק[1] as not original, nor in the sense of "hard pressed;" for it is not used of avenging persecution, but: inwardly pressed, for Isa. xxxviii. 14 עָשְׁקָה also signifies the anguish of a guilty conscience. Whoever is inwardly bowed down by the blood of a man whom he has murdered, betakes himself to a ceaseless flight to escape the avenger of blood, the punishment of his guilt, and his own inward torment; he flees and finds no rest, till at last the grave (בּוֹר according to the Eastern, *i.e.* the Babylonian, mode of writing בּוֹר) receives him, and death accomplishes the only possible propitiation of the murderer. The exhortation, "let no one detain him," does not mean that one should not lay hold on the fugitive; but, since תָּמַךְ בְּ does not mean merely to hold fast, but to hold right, that

[1] Böttcher supposes much rather עָשֻׁק = מְעֻשָּׁק; also, xxv. 11, דָּבֻר = מְדֻבָּר; but that does not follow from the *defectiva scriptio*, nor from anything else.

one should not afford him any support, any refuge, any covering or security against the vengeance which pursues him; that one should not rescue him from the arm of justice, and thereby invade and disturb the public administration of justice, which rests on moral foundations; on the other side, the Book of Proverbs, xxiv. 11 f., has uttered its exhortation to save a human life whenever it is possible to do so. The proverb lying before us cannot thus mean anything else than that no one should give to the murderer, as such, any assistance; that no one should save him clandestinely, and thereby make himself a partaker of his sin. Grace cannot come into the place of justice till justice has been fully recognised. Human sympathy, human forbearance, under the false title of grace, do not stand in contrast to this justice. We must, however, render אל־יתמכו־בו not directly as an admonition against that which is immoral; it may also be a declaration of that which is impossible: only let no one support him, let no one seek to deliver him from the unrest which drives him from place to place. This is, however, in vain; he is unceasingly driven about to fulfil his lot. But the translation: *nemine eum sustinente* (Fleischer), is inadmissible; a mere declaration of a fact without any subjective colouring is never אל *seq. fut.*

Ver. 18 He who walketh blamelessly is helped,
And he who is perverse in a double way suddenly perisheth.

The LXX. translate תמים by δικαίως (as the accusative of manner), Aquila and Theodotion by τέλειος; but it may also be translated τέλειον or τελειότητα, as the object accus. of ii. 7. Instead of עִקֵּשׁ דְּרָכִים, ver. 6, there is here נֶעְקָשׁ דְּרָכִים, obliquely directed in a double way, or reflex bending himself. At ver. 6 we have interpreted the *dual* דְּרָכִים rightly, thus בְּאַחַת cannot refer back to one of these two ways; besides, דֶּרֶךְ as fem. is an anomaly, if not a solecism. בְּאַחַת signifies, like the Aram. בְּחַדָּא, either all at once (for which the Mish. כְּאַחַת, Aram. כַּחֲדָא), or once (= בְּפַעַם אַחַת), and it signifies in the passage before us, not: once, *aliquando*, as Nolde, with Flacius, explains, but: all at once, *i.e.* as Geier explains: *penitus, sic ut pluribus casibus porro non sit opus.* Schultens compares:

"*Procubuit moriens et humum semel ore momordit.*"[1]

[1] *Æneid*, xi. 418.

Rightly Fleischer: *repente totus concidet.*

Ver. 19 He who cultivateth his land is satisfied with bread,
And he that graspeth after vanities is satisfied with poverty.

A variation of xii. 11. The pred. here corresponds to its contrast. On רִישׁ (here and at xxxi. 7), instead of the more frequent רֵאשׁ, cf. x. 4.

To this proverb of the cultivation of the land as the sure source of support, the next following stands related, its contents being cognate:

Ver. 20 A strong, upright man is enriched with blessings;
But he that hastens to become rich remains not unpunished.

אִישׁ אֱמוּנִים, xx. 6, as well as אֱמוּנוֹת אִישׁ, denotes a man *bonæ fidei;* but the former expression refers the description to a constancy and certainty in the relations of favour and of friendship, here to rectitude or integrity in walk and conduct; the plur. refers to the all-sidedness and the ceaselessness of the activity. בְּרָכוֹת is related, as at x. 6: the idea comprehends blessings on the side of God and of man, thus *benedictio rei* and *benedictio voti.* On the contrary, he who, without being careful as to the means, is in haste to become rich, remains not only unblessed, but also is not guiltless, and thus not without punishment; also this לֹא יִנָּקֶה (*e.g.* vi. 29), frequently met in the Mishle, is, like ברכות, the union of two ideas, for generally the bibl. mode of conception and language comprehends in one, sin, guilt, and punishment.

With a proverb, in the first half of which is repeated the beginning of the second appendix, xxiv. 23, a new group commences:

Ver. 21 Respect of persons is not good;
And for a morsel of bread a man may become a transgressor.

Line first refers to the administration of justice, and line second —the special generalized—to social life generally. The "morsel of bread," as example of a bribe by means of which the favour of the judge is purchased, is too low a conception. Hitzig well: "even a trifle, a morsel of bread (1 Sam. ii. 36), may, as it awakens favour and dislike within us, thus in general call forth in the will an inclination tending to draw one aside from the line of strict rectitude." Geier compares A. Gellius' *Noct.*

Att. i. 15, where Cato says of the Tribune Cœlius: *Frusto panis conduci potest vel ut taceat vel ut loquatur.*

Ver. 22 The man of an evil eye hasteneth after riches,
And knoweth not that want shall come upon him.

Hitzig renders אִישׁ וגו׳ [the man of an evil eye] as appos. of the subject; but in that case the phrase would have been אישׁ רע עין נבהל להון (cf. *e.g.* xxix. 1). רע עין (xxiii. 6) is the jealous, envious, grudging, and at the same time covetous man. It is certainly possible that an envious man consumes himself in ill-humour without quietness, as Hitzig objects; but as a rule there is connected with envy a passionate endeavour to raise oneself to an equal height of prosperity with the one who is the object of envy; and this zeal, proceeding from an impure motive, makes men blind to the fact that thereby they do not advance, but rather degrade themselves, for no blessing can rest on it; discontentedness loses, with that which God has assigned to us, deservedly also that which it has. The *pret.* נִבְהַל, the expression of a fact; the *part.* נִבְהָל, the expression of an habitual characteristic action; the word signifies *præceps* (*qui præceps fertur*), with the root-idea of one who is unbridled, who is not master of himself (*vid.* under Ps. ii. 5, and above at xx. 21). The phrase wavers between נִבְהָל (Kimchi, under בהל; and Norzi, after Codd. and old editions) and נִבְהַל (thus, *e.g.*, Cod. *Jaman*); only at Ps. xxx. 8 נבהל stands unquestioned. חֶסֶר [want] is recognised by Symmachus, Syr., and Jerome. To this, as the authentic reading, cf. its ingenious rendering in *Bereschith Rabba*, c. 58, to Gen. xxiii. 14. The LXX. reads, from 22*b*, that a חסיד, ἐλεήμων, will finally seize the same riches, according to which Hitzig reads חֶסֶד, disgrace, shame (cf. xxv. 10).

Ver. 23 He that reproveth a man who is going backwards,
Findeth more thanks than the flatterer.

It is impossible that *aj* can be the suffix of אַחֲרַי; the Talmud, *Tamid* 28*a*, refers it to God; but that it signifies: after my (Solomon's) example or precedence (Aben Ezra, Ahron b. Josef, *Venet.*, J. H. Michaelis), is untenable — such a name given by the teacher here to himself is altogether aimless. Others translate, with Jerome: *Qui corripit hominem gratiam postea inveniet apud eum magis, quam ille qui per linguæ blandi-*

menta decipit, for they partly purpose to read אַחֲרֵי־כֵן, partly to give to אַחַר the meaning of *postea*. אחרי, Ewald says, is a notable example of an adverb. Hitzig seeks to correct this adv. as at Neh. iii. 30 f., but where, with Keil, אַחֲרָו is to be read; at Josh. ii. 7, where אחרי is to erased; and at Deut. ii. 30, where the traditional text is accountable. This אחרי may be formed like אָזַי and מָתַי; but if it had existed, it would not be a ἅπαξ λεγ. The accentuation also, in the passage before us, does not recognise it; but it takes אַחֲרֵי and אדם together, and how otherwise than that it appears, as Ibn-Jachja in his *Grammar*, and Immanuel[1] have recognised it, to be a noun terminating in *aj*. It is a formation, like לְפָנַי, 1 Kings vi. 10 (cf. Olshausen's *Lehrb.* p. 428 f.), of the same termination as שָׁדַי, חַנַּי, and in the later Aram.-Heb. זַבַּי, and the like. The variant אַחֲרַי, noticed by Heidenheim, confirms it; and the distinction between different classes of men (*vid.* vol. i. p. 39) which prevails in the Book of Proverbs favours it. A אדם אחרי is defined, after the manner of Jeremiah (vii. 24): a man who is directed backwards, and not לְפָנִים, forwards. Not the renegade—for מוכיח, *opp.* מחליק לשון, does not lead to so strong a conception—but the retrograder is thus called in German: *Rückläufige* [one who runs backwards] or *Rückwendige* [one who turns backwards], who turns away from the good, the right, and the true, and always departs the farther away from them (Immanuel: going backwards in his nature or his moral relations). This centrifugal direction, leading to estrangement from the fear of Jahve, or, what is the same thing, from the religion of revelation, would lead to entire ruin if unreserved and fearless denunciation did not interpose and seek to restrain it; and he who speaks[2] so truly, openly, and earnestly home to the conscience of one who is on the downward course, gains for himself thereby, on the part of him whom he has directed aright, and on the part of all who are well disposed, better thanks (and also, on the part of God, a better reward, James

[1] Abulwalîd (*Rikma*, p. 69) also rightly explains אַחֲרֵי, as a characterizing epithet, by אחרני (turned backwards).

[2] Löwenstein writes מוֹכִיחַ, after *Metheg-Setzung*, § 43, not incorrectly; for the following word, although toned on the first syllable, begins with guttural having the same sound.

v. 19 f.) than he who, speaking to him, smoothis his tongue to say to him who is rich, or in a high position, only that which is agreeable. *Laudat adulator, sed non est verus amator.* The second half of the verse consists, as often (Ps. lxxiii. 8; Job xxxiii. 1; cf. *Thorath Emeth*, p. 51), of only two words, with *Mercha Silluk.*

Ver. 24 He who robbeth his father and mother, and saith: It is no wrong,
Is a companion of the destroyer.

The second line is related to xviii. 9*b*. Instead of *dominus perditionis* there found, there is here אִישׁ מַשְׁחִית, *vir perdens* (*perditor*); the word thus denotes a man who destroys, not from revenge, but from lust, and for the sake of the life of men, and that which is valuable for men; thus the spoiler, the incendiary, etc. Instead of אָח there, here we have חָבֵר in the same sense. He who robs his parents, *i.e.* takes to himself what belongs to them, and regards his doing so as no particular sin,[1] because he will at last come to inherit it all (cf. xx. 21 with xix. 26), is to be likened to a man who allows himself in all offences against the life and property of his neighbour; for what the deed of such a son wants in external violence, it makes up in its wickedness, because it is a rude violation of the tenderest and holiest demands of duty.

Ver. 25 The covetous stirreth up strife;
But he that trusteth in Jahve is richly comforted.

Line first is a variation of xv. 18*a*; רְחַב־נֶפֶשׁ is not to be interchanged with רְחַב־לֵב, xxi. 4. He is of a wide heart who haughtily puffs himself up, of a wide soul (cf. with Schultens הרחיב נפשו, of the opening up of the throat, or of revenge, Isa. v. 14; Hab. ii. 5) who is insatiably covetous; for לב is the spiritual, and נפשׁ the natural, heart of man, according to which the widening of the heart is the overstraining of self-consciousness, and the widening of the soul the overstraining of passion. Rightly the LXX., according to its original text: *ἄπληστος ἀνὴρ κινεῖ* (thus with Hitzig for *κρινεῖ*) *νείκη*. Line second is a variation of xvi. 20, xxix. 25. Over against the insatiable is he who trusts in God (וּבֹטֵחַ, with *Gaja* to the vocal, concluding

[1] Accentuate וְאֹמֵר אֵין פָּשַׁע without *Makkeph*, as in Codd. 1294 and old editions.

the word, for it follows a word accented on the first syllable, and beginning with a guttural; cf. אַיִן, xxix. 2; יֵפֶן, xxix. 18), that He will bestow upon him what is necessary and good for him. One thus contented is easily satisfied (compare with the word xi. 25, xiii. 4, and with the matter, x. 3, xiii. 24), is externally as well as internally appeased: while that other, never contented, has no peace, and creates dispeace around him.

The following proverb assumes the בֹּטֵחַ of the foregoing:[1]

Ver. 26 He that trusteth in his own heart is a fool;
But he that walketh in wisdom shall escape.

From the promise in the second line, Hitzig concludes that a courageous heart is meant, but when by itself לֵב never bears this meaning. He who trusteth in his own heart is not merely one who is guided solely "by his own inconsiderate, defiant impulse to act" (Zöckler). The proverb is directed against a false subjectivity. The heart is that fabricator of thoughts, of which, as of man by nature, nothing good can be said, Gen. vi. 5, viii. 21. But wisdom is a gift from above, and consists in the knowledge of that which is objectively true, that which is normatively godlike. הֹלֵךְ בְּחָכְמָה is he who so walks that he has in wisdom a secure authority, and has not then for the first time, when he requires to walk, need to consider, to reckon, to experiment. Thus walking in the way of wisdom, he escapes dangers to which one is exposed who walks in foolish confidence in his own heart and its changeful feelings, thoughts, imaginations, delusions. One who thoughtlessly boasts, who vainly dreams of victory before the time, is such a person; but confidence in one's own heart takes also a hundred other forms. Essentially similar to this proverb are the words of Jer. ix. 22 f., for the wisdom meant in 26*b* is there defined at ver. 23.

Ver. 27 He that giveth to the poor suffereth no want;
But he that covereth his eyes meeteth many curses.

In the first line the pronoun לוֹ, referring back to the subject noun, is to be supplied, as at xxvii. 7 לָהּ. He who gives to the poor has no want (מַחְסוֹר), for God's blessing reimburses

[1] We take the opportunity of remarking that the tendency to form together certain proverbs after one catchword is found also in German books of proverbs; *vid.* Paul, *Ueber die urspr. Anord. von Freidanks Bescheidenheit* (1870), p. 12.

him richly for what he bestows. He, on the other hand, who veils (מַעְלִים, cf. the *Hithpa.*, Isa. lviii. 7) his eyes so as not to see the misery which calls forth compassion, or as if he did not see the misery which has a claim on his compassion; he is (becomes) rich in curses, *i.e.* is laden with the curses of those whose wants he cared not for; curses which, because they are deserved, change by virtue of a divine requital (*vid.* Sir. iv. 5f.; Tob. iv. 7) into all kinds of misfortunes (*opp.* רַב־בְּרָכוֹת, 20*a*). מְאֵרָה is constructed after the form מְגֻרָה, מְקֻרָה from אָרַר.

The following proverb resembles the beginnings xxviii. 2, 12. The proverbs xxviii. 28, xxix. 1, 2, 3, form a beautiful square grasp, in which the first and third, and the second and fourth, correspond to one another.

Ver. 28 When the godless rise up, men hide themselves;
And when they perish, the righteous increase.

Line first is a variation of 12*b*. Since they who hide themselves are merely called men, people, the meaning of יִרְבּוּ is probably not this, that the righteous then from all sides come out into the foreground (Hitzig), but that they prosper, multiply, and increase as do plants, when the worms, caterpillars, and the like are destroyed (Fleischer); Löwenstein glosses יִרְבּוּ by יגדלו, they become great = powerful, but that would be Elihu's style, Job xxxiii. 12, which is not in common use; the names of masters and of those in authority, רַב, רַבִּי, רַבָּן, רַבָּנוּת, are all derived from רָבַב, not from רָבָה. The increase is to be understood of the prosperous growth (to become great = to increase, as perhaps also Gen. xxi. 10) of the congregation of the righteous, which gains in the overthrow of the godless an accession to its numbers; cf. xxix. 2, and especially 16.

xxix. 1. A general ethical proverb here follows:

A man often corrected who hardeneth his neck,
Shall suddenly go to ruin without remedy.

Line second = vi. 15*b*. The connection אִישׁ תּוֹכָחוֹת must make the nearest impression on a reader of the Book of Proverbs that they mean a censurer (reprehender), but which is set aside by what follows, for the genit. after אִישׁ is, xvi. 29, xxvi. 21, xxix. 10, xiii. 20, the designation of that which proceeds from the subject treated. And since תּוֹכָחוֹת, Ps. xxxvii. 15, Job xxiii. 4, denotes counter evidence, and generally rejoinders, thus

in the first line a reasoner is designated who lets nothing be said to him, and nothing be shown to him, but contradicts all and every one. Thus *e.g.* Fleischer: *vir qui correptus contradicit et cervicem obdurat.* But this interpolated *correptus* gives involuntary testimony of this, that the nearest lying impression of the אִישׁ תו׳ suffers a change by מַקְשֶׁה עֹרֶף: if we read הקשה (לב) ערף with תו׳, the latter then designates the *correptio*, over against which is placed obstinate boldness (Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther), and תו׳ shows itself thus to be *gen. objecti*, and we have to compare the gen. connection of איש, as at xviii. 23, xxi. 17, or rather at 1 Kings xx. 42 and Jer. xv. 10. But it is unnecessary, with Hitzig, to limit תו׳ to divine infliction of punishment, and after Hos. v. 9, Isa. xxxvii. 3, to read תּוֹכֵחוּת [punishment], which occurs, Ps. cxlix. 7, in the sense of punishment inflicted by man.[1] Besides, we must think first not of actual punishment, but of chastening, reproving words; and the man to whom are spoken the reproving words is one whose conduct merits more and more severe censure, and continually receives correction from those who are concerned for his welfare. Hitzig regards the first line as a conditional clause: "Is a man of punishment stiff-necked?" . . . This is syntactically impossible. Only מקשה ערף could have such force: a man of punishment, if he . . . But why then did not the author rather write the words והוא מקשה ערף? Why then could not מקשה ערף be a co-ordinated further description of the man? Cf. *e.g.* Ex. xvii. 21. The door of penitence, to which earnest, well-meant admonition calls a man, does not always remain open. He who with stiff-necked persistence in sin and in self-delusion sets himself in opposition to all endeavours to save his soul, shall one day suddenly, and without the prospect and possibility of restoration (cf. Jer. xix. 11), become a wreck. *Audi doctrinam si vis vitare ruinam.* The general ethical proverb is here followed by one that is political:

Ver. 2 When the righteous increase, the people rejoice;
And when a godless man ruleth, the people mourn.

Regarding בְּרִבּוֹת צַדִּיק (Aquila rightly, ἐν τῷ πληθῦναι δικαίους), *vid.* at xxviii. 28. If the righteous form the majority, or are

[1] *Vid.* Zunz, "Regarding the Idea and the Use of *Tokhecha*," in Steinschneider's *Heb. Bibliographia*, entitled המזכיר, 1871, p. 70 f.

in such numbers that they are the party that give the tone, that form the predominant power among the people (Fleischer, *cum incrementa capiunt justi*), then the condition of the people is a happy one, and their voice joyful (xi. 10); if, on the contrary, a godless man or (after xxviii. 1) godless men rule, the people are made to sigh (יֵאָנַח עָם, with the *Gaja*, according to rule). "There is reason," as Hitzig remarks, "why עם should be placed first with, and then without, the article." In the first case it denotes the people as those among whom there is such an increase of the righteous; in the second case, the article is wanting, because it is not generally used in poetry; and, besides, its absence makes the second line consist of nine syllables, like the first. This political proverb is now followed by one of general ethics:

Ver. 3 A man who loveth wisdom delighteth his father;
And he who keepeth company with harlots spendeth his substance.

Line first is a variation of x. 1. אִישׁ־אֹהֵב has, according to rule, the *Metheg*, cf. 9*a*. אִישׁ is man, without distinction of age, from childhood (Gen. iv. 1) up to ripe old age (Isa. lxvi. 13); love and dutiful relation towards father and mother never cease. Line second reminds of xxviii. 7 (cf. xiii. 20).

A series of six proverbs follows, beginning with a proverb of the king:

Ver. 4 A king by righteousness bringeth the land to a good condition;
But a man of taxes bringeth it down.

The *Hiph.* הֶעֱמִיד signifies to make it so that a person or matter comes to stand erect and stand fast (*e.g.* 1 Kings xv. 4); הָרַס, to tear down, is the contrary of building up and extending (Ps. xxviii. 5), cf. נֶהֱרָס, *opp.* רוּם, of the state, xi. 11. By אִישׁ תְּרוּמוֹת is meant the king, or a man of this kind; but it is questionable whether as a man of gifts, *i.e.* one who lets gifts be made to him (Grotius, Fleischer, Ewald, Bertheau, Zöckler), or as a man of taxes, *i.e.* who imposes them (Midrash, Aben Ezra, Ralbag, Rosenmüller, Hitzig). Both interpretations are possible, for תרומות means tax (lifting, raising = dedicating), free-will offerings, as well as gifts that are obligatory and required by the laws of nature. Since the word, in the only other place

where it occurs, Ezek. xlv. 13–16, is used of the relation of the people to the prince, and denotes a legally-imposed tax, so it appears also here, in passing over from the religious sphere to the secular, to be meant of taxes, and that according to its fundamental conception of gifts, *i.e.* such taxes as are given on account of anything, such as the produce of the soil, manufactures, heritages. Thus also is to be understood Aquila's and Theodotion's *ἀνὴρ ἀφαιρεμάτων*, and the rendering also of the *Venet.* *ἐράνων*. A man on the throne, covetous of such gifts, brings the land to ruin by exacting contributions; on the contrary, a king helps the land to a good position, and an enduring prosperity, by the exercise of right, and that in appointing a well-proportioned and fit measure of taxation.

Ver. 5 A man who flattereth his neighbour
Spreadeth a net for his steps.

Fleischer, as Bertheau: *vir qui alterum blanditiis circumvenit;* but in the עַל there does not lie in itself a hostile tendency, an intention to do injury; it interchanges with אֶל, Ps. xxxvi. 3, and what is expressed in line second happens also, without any intention on the part of the flatterer: the web of the flatterer before the eyes of a neighbour becomes, if he is caught thereby, a net for him in which he is entangled to his own destruction (Hitzig). הֶחֱלִיק signifies also, without any external object, xxviii. 23, ii. 16, as internally transitive: to utter that which is smooth, *i.e.* flattering. פְּעָמָיו is, as Ps. lvii. 7 = רַגְלָיו, for which it is the usual Phœnician word.

Ver. 6 In the transgression of the wicked man lies a snare;
But the righteous rejoiceth [*jubelt*] and is glad.

Thus the first line is to be translated according to the sequence of the accents, *Mahpach*, *Munach*, *Munach*, *Athnach*, for the second *Munach* is the transformation of *Dechi;* אִישׁ רָע thus, like אַנְשֵׁי־רָע, xxviii. 5, go together, although the connection is not, like this, genitival, but adjectival. But there is also this sequence of the accents, *Munach*, *Dechi*, *Munach*, *Athnach*, which separates רָע and אִישׁ. According to this, Ewald translates: "in the transgression of one lies an evil snare;" but in that case the word ought to have been מוֹקֵשׁ רע, as at xii. 13; for although the numeral רבים sometimes precedes its substantive, yet no other adjective ever does; passages such as Isa.

xxviii. 21 and x. 30 do not show the possibility of this position of the words. In this sequence of accents the explanation must be: in the wickedness of a man is the evil of a snare, *i.e.* evil is the snare laid therein (Böttcher); but a reason why the author did not write מוקֵשׁ רַע would also not be seen there, and thus we must abide by the accentuation אִישׁ רַע. The righteous also may fall, yet he is again raised by means of repentance and pardon; but in the wickedness of a bad man lies a snare into which having once fallen, he cannot again release himself from it, xxiv. 16. In the second line, the form יָרֹן, for יָרֹן, is defended by the same metaplastic forms as יָשׁוֹד, Ps. xci. 6; יָרִין, Isa. xlii. 4; and also that the order of the words is not יִשְׂמַח וְרִנֵּן (LXX. ἐν χαρᾷ καὶ ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ; Luther: *frewet sich vnd hat wonne* [rejoices and has pleasure]), is supported by the same sequence of ideas, Zech. ii. 14, cf. Jer. xxxi. 7: the *Jubeln* is the momentary outburst of gladness; the *Freude* [gladness], however, is a continuous feeling of happiness. To the question as to what the righteous rejoiceth over [*jubelt*] and is glad [*freuet*] because of, the answer is not: because of his happy release from danger (Zöckler), but: because of the prosperity which his virtue procures for him (Fleischer). But the contrast between the first and second lines is not clear and strong. One misses the expression of the object or ground of the joy. Cocceius introduces into the second line a *si lapsus fuerit*. Schultens translates, *justus vel succumbens triumphabit*, after the Arab. *rân f. o.*, which, however, does not mean *succumbere*, but *subigere* (*vid.* under Ps. lxxviii. 65). Hitzig compares Arab. *raym f. i.*, *discedere*, *relinquere*, and translates: "but the righteous passeth through and rejoiceth." Böttcher is inclined to read יִרְאֶה וְשָׂמַח, he sees it (what?) and rejoiceth. All these devices, however, stand in the background compared with Pinsker's proposal (*Babylon.-Heb. Punktationssystem*, p. 156):

> "On the footsteps of the wicked man lie snares,
> But the righteous runneth and is glad,"

i.e. he runneth joyfully (like the sun, Ps. xix. 6) on the divinely-appointed way (Ps. cxix. 132), on which he knows himself threatened by no danger. The change of בִּפְשַׁע into בִּפְשֹׁעַ has xii. 13 against it; but יִרוֹן may be regarded, after iv. 12, cf. xviii. 10, as the original from which יִרֹן is corrupted.

Ver. 7 The righteous knoweth the cause of the poor,
But the godless understandeth nó knowledge.

The righteous knoweth and recogniseth the righteous claims of people of low estate, *i.e.* what is due to them as men, and in particular cases; but the godless has no knowledge from which such recognition may go forth (cf. as to the expression, xix. 25). The proverb begins like xii. 10, which commends the just man's compassion to his cattle; this commends his sympathy with those who are often treated as cattle, and worse even than cattle. The LXX. translates 7*b* twice: the second time reading רֹשׁ instead of רֶשַׁע, it makes nonsense of it.

Ver. 8 Men of derision set the city in an uproar,
But wise men allay anger.

Isa. xxviii. shows what we are to understand by אַנְשֵׁי לָצוֹן: men to whom nothing is holy, and who despise all authority. The *Hiphil* יָפִיחוּ does not signify *irretiunt*, from פָּחַח (*Venet.* παγιδιοῦσι, after Kimchi, Aben Ezra, and others), but *sufflant*, from פוּח (Rashi: ילהיבו): they stir up or excite the city, *i.e.* its inhabitants, so that they begin to burn as with flames, *i.e.* by the dissolution of the bonds of mutual respect and of piety, by the letting loose of passion, they disturb the peace and excite the classes of the community and individuals against each other; but the wise bring it about that the breathings of anger that has broken forth, or is in the act of breaking forth, are allayed. The anger is not that of God, as it is rendered by Jerome and Luther, and as יפיחו freely translated might mean. The Aram. err in regard to יפיחו in passages such as vi. 19.

Ver. 9 If a wise man has to contend with a fool,
He [the fool] rageth and laugheth, and hath no rest.

Among the old translators, Jerome and Luther take the "wise man" as subject even of the second line, and that in all its three members: *vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur sive rideat, non inveniet requiem.* Thus Schultens, C. B. Michaelis, Umbreit, Ewald, Elster, and also Fleischer: "The doubled *Vav* is correlative, as at Ex. xxi. 16, Lev. v. 3, and expresses the perfect sameness in respect of the effect, here of the want of effect. If the wise man, when he disputes with a fool, becomes angry, or jests, he will have no rest, *i.e.* he will never bring it to pass that the fool shall cease to reply; he yields

the right to him, and thus makes it possible for him to end the strife." But the angry passion, and the bursts of laughter alternating therewith, are not appropriate to the wise man affirming his right; and since, after Eccles. ix. 17, the words of the wise are heard בְּנַחַת, the וְאֵין נָחַת [and there is no rest] will cause us to think of the fool as the logical subject. So far correctly, but in other respects inappropriately, the LXX. *ἀνὴρ σοφὸς κρινεῖ ἔθνη* (after the expression עַם, *i.e.* עָם, instead of את), *ἀνὴρ δὲ φαῦλος* (which איש אויל does not mean) *ὀργιζόμενος καταγελᾶται καὶ οὐ καταπτήσσει* (as if the words were ולא יֵחַת).[1] The syntactical relation would be simpler if נִשְׁפַּט in 9*a* were vocalized as a hypothetical perfect. But we read for it the past נִשְׁפָּט. Ewald designates 9*a* as a conditional clause, and Hitzig remarks that the Lat. *viro sapiente disceptante cum stulto* corresponds therewith. It marks, like 1 Sam. ii. 13, Job i. 16, the situation from which there is a departure then with *perf. consec.*: if a wise man in the right is in contact with a fool, he starts up, and laughs, and keeps not quiet (supply לוֹ as at xxviii. 27), or (without לוֹ): there is no keeping quiet, there is no rest. The figure is in accordance with experience. If a wise man has any controversy with a fool, which is to be decided by reasonable and moral arguments, then he becomes boisterous and laughs, and shows himself incapable of quietly listening to his opponent, and of appreciating his arguments.

We now group together vers. 10–14. Of these, vers. 10 and 11 are alike in respect of the tense used; vers. 12–14 have in common the pronoun pointing back to the first member.

Ver. 10 Men of blood hate the guiltless
And the upright; they attempt the life of such

The nearest lying translation of the second line would certainly be: the upright seek his soul (that of the guiltless). In accordance with the contrasted יְשֻׁנָּאוּ, the Aram. understand the seeking of earnest benevolent seeking, but disregarding the נפ׳ש

[1] According to this the Targum וְלָא מִתְחַבַּר (he remains obstinate), according to which the ולא מתחפיר (he does not lose his wits) of the Peshito is perhaps to be corrected. The distribution of the subjects is obscure.

in לְנַפְשׁוֹ;[1] Symmachus (ἐπιζητήσουσι), Jerome (*quærunt*), and Luther thus also understand the sentence; and Rashi remarks that the phrase is here לְשׁוֹן חִבָּה, for he rests; but mistrusting himself, refers to 1 Sam. xxi. 23. Ahron b. Josef glosses: to enter into friendship with him. Thus, on account of the contrast, most moderns, interpreting the phrase *sensu bono*, also Fleischer: *probi autem vitam ejus conservare student.* The thought is, as xii. 6 shows, correct; but the *usus loq.* protests against this rendering, which can rest only on Ps. cxlii. 5, where, however, the poet does not say אֵין דּוֹרֵשׁ נַפְשִׁי, but, as here also the *usus loq.* requires, לְנַפְשִׁי. There are only three possible explanations which Aben Ezra enumerates: (1) they seek his, the bloody man's, soul, *i.e.* they attempt his life, to take vengeance against him, according to the meaning of the expressions as generally elsewhere used, *e.g.* at Ps. lxiii. 10; (2) they revenge his, the guiltless man's, life (LXX. ἐκζητήσουσιν), which has fallen a victim, after the meaning in which elsewhere only בִּקֵּשׁ דָּם and דָּרַשׁ נֶפֶשׁ, Gen. ix. 5, occur. This second meaning also is thus not in accordance with the usage of the words, and against both meanings it is to be said that it is not in the spirit of the Book of Proverbs to think of the יְשָׁרִים [the upright, righteous] as executors of the sentences of the penal judicature. There thus remains[2] the interpretation (3): the upright—they (the bloody men) seek the soul of such an one. The transition from the plur. to the sing. is individualizing, and thus the arrangement of the words is like Gen. xlvii. 21: "And the people (as regards them), he removed them to the cities," Gesen. § 145. 2. This last explanation recommends itself by the consideration that תם and יְשָׁרִים are cognate as to the ideas they represent,—let one call to mind the common expression תָּם וְיָשָׁר [perfect and upright, *e.g.* Job i. 1, 8, ii. 3],—that the same persons are meant thereby, and it is rendered necessary by this, that the thought, "bloody men hate the guiltless," is incomplete; for the same thing may also be said of the godless in general. One expects to hear that just against the guiltless, *i.e.* men walking in their inno-

[1] The Targum translates תם, guiltlessness, and the *Venet.* (μισοῦσι) γνῶσιν, turning to i. 22.

[2] For εὐθεῖς δὲ συνάξουσιν (will bring away?) τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν, understood after Jer. xlv. 5, lies linguistically yet further off.

cence, the bloody-mindedness of such men is specially directed, and 10*b* says the same thing; this second clause first brings the contrast to the point aimed at. Lutz is right in seeking to confute Hitzig, but he does so on striking grounds.

Ver. 11 All his wrath the fool poureth out;
But the wise man husheth it up in the background.

That רוּחוֹ is not meant here of his spirit (Luther) in the sense of *quæcunque in mente habet* (thus *e.g.* Fleischer) the contrast shows, for יְשַׁבְּחֶנָּה does not signify *cohibet*, for which יְחַשְׁכֶנָּה (LXX. *ταμιεύεται*) would be the proper word: רוּחַ thus is not here used of passionate emotion, such as at xvi. 31; Isa. xxv. 4, xxxiii. 11. שָׁבַח is not here equivalent to Arab. *sabbah, αἰνεῖν* (Imman., *Venet.*, and Heidenheim), which does not supply an admissible sense, but is equivalent to Arab. *sabbakh*, to quiet (Ahron b. Josef: קטפיאן = *καταπαύειν*), the former going back to the root-idea of extending (*amplificare*), the latter to that of going to a distance, putting away: *sabbakh, procul recessit, distitit*, hence שְׁבַח, Ps. lxxxix. 10, and here properly to drive off into the background, synon. הָשִׁיב (Fleischer). But בְּאָחוֹר (only here with ב) is ambiguous. One might with Rashi explain: but the wise man finally, or afterwards (Symmachus, *ἐπ' ἐσχάτων*; *Venet.* *κατόπιν* = *κατόπισθε*), appeaseth the anger which the fool lets loose; *i.e.*, if the latter gives vent to his anger, the former appeases, subdues, mitigates it (cf. בַּאֲחֹרֶנָּה, לְאָחוֹר, Isa. xlii. 23). But it lies still nearer to refer the antithesis to the anger of the wise man himself; he does not give to it unbridled course, but husheth it in the background, viz. in his heart. Thus Syr. and Targ. reading בְּרַעְיָנָא, the former, besides יְחַשְׁבֶנָּה (*reputat eam*), so also Aben Ezra: in the heart as the background of the organ of speech. Others explain: in the background, afterward, *retrorsum*, *e.g.* Nolde, but to which *compescit* would be more appropriate than *sedat.* Hitzig's objection, that in other cases the expression would be בְּקִרְבּוֹ, is answered by this, that with באחור the idea of pressing back (of אָחוֹר) is connected. The order of the words also is in favour of the meaning *in recessu* (*cordis*). *Iræ dilatio mentis pacatio* (according to an old proverb).

Ver. 12 A ruler who listens to deceitful words,
All his servants are godless.

They are so because they deceive him, and they become so; for instead of saying the truth which the ruler does not wish to hear, they seek to gain his favour by deceitful flatteries, misrepresentations, exaggerations, falsehoods. *Audiat rex quæ præcipit lex.* He does not do this, as the saying is, *sicut rex ita grex* (Sir. x. 2), in the sense of this proverb of Solomon.

Ver. 13 The poor man and the usurer meet together—
Jahve lighteneth the eyes of both.

A variation of xxii. 2, according to which the proverb is to be understood in both of its parts. That אִישׁ תְּכָכִים is the contrast of רָשׁ, is rightly supposed in *Temura* 16*b*; but Rashi, who brings out here a man of moderate learning, and Saadia, a man of a moderate condition (thus also the Targ. גַּבְרָא מְצַעְיָא, after Buxtorf, *homo mediocris fortunæ*), err by connecting the word with תָּוֶךְ. The LXX. *δανειστοῦ καὶ χρεωφειλέτου* (*ἀλλήλοις συνελθόντων*), which would be more correct inverted, for איש תככים is a man who makes oppressive taxes, high previous payments of interest; the verbal stem תָּכַךְ, Arab. *tak*, is a secondary to R. *wak*, which has the meanings of pressing together, and pressing firm (whence also the middle is named; cf. Arab. *samym âlaḳlab*, the solid = the middle point of the heart). תֹּךְ, with the plur. תככים, scarcely in itself denotes interest, *τόκος*; the designation איש תככים includes in it a sensible reproach (Syr. *afflictor*), and a *rentier* cannot be so called (Hitzig). Luther: *Reiche* [rich men], with the marginal note: "who can practise usury as they then generally all do?" Therefore Löwenstein understands the second line after 1 Sam. ii. 7: God enlighteneth their eyes by raising the lowly and humbling the proud. But this line, after xxii. 2*b*, only means that the poor as well as the rich owe the light of life (Ps. xiii. 4) to God, the creator and ruler of all things,—a fact which has also its moral side: both are conditioned by Him, stand under His control, and have to give to Him an account; or otherwise rendered: God maketh His sun to rise on the low and the high, the evil and the good (cf. Matt. v. 45)—an all-embracing love full of typical moral motive.[1]

[1] מאיר has, by Löwenstein, *Mehuppach Legarmeh*, but incorrectly, since after *Legarmeh* two conjunctives cannot occur. Also Norzi with *Mehuppach Mercha* is irregular, since Ben-Asher recognises only two examples of

Ver. 14 A king who judgeth the poor with truth,
His throne shall stand for ever.

בֶּאֱמֶת, as at Isa. xvi. 5 (synon. באמונה, במישרים, במישור), is equivalent to fidelity to duty, or a complete, full accomplishment of his duty as a ruler with reference to the dispensing of justice; in other words: after the norm of actual fact, and of the law, and of his duty proceeding from both together. כִּסְאוֹ has in Codd., *e.g. Jaman.*, and in the Venetian 1517, 21, rightly *Rebia.* In that which follows, שׁוֹפֵט בֶּאֱמֶת are more closely related than בֶּאֱמֶת דַּלִּים, for of two conjunctives standing together the first always connects more than the second. מֶלֶךְ שׁוֹפֵט בֶּאֱמֶת דַּלִּים is the truest representation of the logical grammatical relation. To 14*b* compare the proverb of the king, xvi. 12, xxv. 5.

A proverb with שֵׁבֶט, ver. 15, is placed next one with שׁוֹפֵט, but it begins a group of proverbs regarding discipline in the house and among the people:

Ver. 15 The rod and reproof give wisdom;
But an undisciplined son is a shame to his mother.

With שֵׁבֶט [a rod], which xxii. 15 also commends as salutary, תּוֹכַחַת refers to discipline by means of words, which must accompany bodily discipline, and without them is also necessary; the construction of the first line follows in number and gender the scheme xxvii. 9, Zech. vii. 7; Ewald, § 339*c*. In the second line the mother is named, whose tender love often degenerates into a fond indulgence; such a darling, such a mother's son, becomes a disgrace to his mother. Our "*ausgelassen*," by which Hitzig translates מְשֻׁלָּח, is used of joyfulness unbridled and without self-restraint, and is in the passage before us too feeble a word; שָׁלַח is used of animals pasturing at liberty, wandering in freedom (Job xxxix. 5; Isa. xvi. 2); נַעַר מְשֻׁלָּח is accordingly a child who is kept in by no restraint and no punishment, one left to himself, and thus undisciplined (Luther, Gesenius, Fleischer, and others).

Ver. 16 When the godless increase, wickedness increaseth;
But the righteous shall see their fall.

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this double accentuation to which this מאיר does not belong; *vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 12. That the *penultima* toning מֵאִיר in several editions is false scarcely needs to be remarked. Jablonski rightly points with *Mehuppach* on the *ult.*, and *Zinnorith* on the preceding open syllable.

The LXX. translation is not bad: *πολλῶν ὄντων ἀσεβῶν πολλαὶ γίνονται ἁμαρτίαι* (*vid.* regarding רַבָּה, ver. 2, xxviii. 28); but in the main it is only a *Binsenwahrheit*, as they say in Swabia, *i.e.* a trivial saying. The proverb means, that if among a people the party of the godless increases in number, and at the same time in power, wickedness, *i.e.* a falling away into sins of thought and conduct, and therewith wickedness, prevails. When irreligion and the destruction of morals thus increase, the righteous are troubled; but the conduct of the godless carries the judgment in itself, and the righteous shall with joy perceive, in the righteous retribution of God, that the godless man will be cast down from his power and influence. This proverb is like a motto to Ps. xii.

Ver. 17 Correct thy son, and he will give thee delight,
And afford pleasure to thy soul.

The LXX. well translates ויניחך by *καὶ ἀναπαύσει σε*;[1] הניח denotes rest properly, a breathing again, *ἀνάψυξις*; and then, with an obliteration of the idea of restraint so far, generally (like the Arab. *arah*, compared by Fleischer) to afford pleasure or delight. The post.-bibl. language uses for this the words נָחַת רוּחַ, and says of the pious that he makes נחת רוח to his Creator, *Berachoth* 17*a*; and of God, that He grants the same to them that fear Him, *Berach.* 29*b*; in the morning prayer of the heavenly spirits, that they hallow their Creator בנחת רוח (with inward delight). Write with Codd. (also *Jaman.*) and older editions וְיִנִיחֲךָ, not וְיִנִיחֶךָּ; for, except in verbs ל״ה, the suffix of this *Hiphil* form is not dageshed, *e.g.* אכוֹיתֶךָ, 1 Kings ii. 26; cf. also 1 Kings xxii. 16 and Ps. l. 8. מַעֲדַנֵּי the LXX. understands, after 2 Sam. i. 24 (עם־ערנים, *μετὰ κόσμου*), also here, of ornament; but the word signifies dainty dishes—here, high spiritual enjoyment. As in vers. 15 and 16 a transition was made from the house to the people, so there now follows the proverb of the discipline of children, a proverb of the education of the people:

Ver. 18 Without a revelation a people becomes ungovernable;
But he that keepeth the law, happy is he.

[1] Their translation of vers. 17 and 18 here is found, in a marred and mutilated form, after xxviii. 17. At that place the words are *καὶ ἀγαπήσει σε*.

Regarding the importance of this proverb for estimating the relation of the *Chokma* to prophecy, *vid.* vol. i. p. 41. חָזוֹן is, according to the sense, equivalent to נְבוּאָה, the prophetic revelation in itself, and as the contents of that which is proclaimed. Without spiritual preaching, proceeding from spiritual experience, a people is unrestrained (יִפָּרַע, *vid.* regarding the punctuation at xxviii. 25, and regarding the fundamental meaning, at i. 25); it becomes פָּרוּעַ, disorderly, Ex. xxxii. 25; *wild vnd wüst*, as Luther translates. But in the second line, according to the unity of the antithesis, the words are spoken of the people, not of individuals. It is therefore not to be explained, with Hitzig: but whoever, in such a time, nevertheless holds to the law, it is well with him! Without doubt this proverb was coined at a time when the preaching of the prophets was in vogue; and therefore this, "but whoever, notwithstanding," is untenable; such a thought at that time could not at all arise; and besides this, תורה is in the Book of Proverbs a moveable conception, which is covered at least by the law in contradistinction to prophecy. *Tôra* denotes divine teaching, the word of God; whether that of the Sinaitic or that of the prophetic law (2 Chron. xv. 3, cf. *e.g.* Isa. i. 10). While, on the one hand, a people is in a dissolute condition when the voice of the preacher, speaking from divine revelation, and enlightening their actions and sufferings by God's word, is silent amongst them (Ps. lxxiv. 9, cf. Amos viii. 12); on the other hand, that same people are to be praised as happy when they show due reverence and fidelity to the word of God, both as written and as preached. That the word of God is preached among a people belongs to their condition of life; and they are only truly happy when they earnestly and willingly subordinate themselves to the word of God which they possess and have the opportunity of hearing. אַשְׁרֵיהוּ (defective for אַשְׁרֵיהוּ) is the older, and here the poetic kindred form to אַשְׁרֵי, xiv. 21, xvi. 20. From the discipline of the people this series of proverbs again returns to the discipline of home:

Ver. 19 With words a servant will not let himself be bettered;
For he understandeth them, but conformeth not thereto.

The *Niph.* נוֹסַר becomes a so-called tolerative, for it connects with the idea of happening that of reaching its object: to

become truly bettered (taught in wisdom, corrected), and thus to let himself be bettered. With mere words this is not reached; the unreasonable servant needs, in order to be set right, a more radical means of deliverance. This assertion demands confirmation; therefore is the view of von Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 404) improbable, that 19*b* has in view a better-disposed servant: supposing that he is intelligent, in which case he is admonished without cause, then the words are also lost: he will let them pass over him in silence without any reply. This attempted explanation is occasioned by this, that מַעֲנֶה can signify nothing else than a response in words. If this were correct, then without doubt its fundamental meaning would correspond with כִּי; for one explains, with Löwenstein, "for he perceives it, and may not answer," *i.e.* this, that a reply cut off frustrates the moral impression. Or also: for he understands it, but is silent,—*in præfractum se silentium configit* (Schultens); and thus it is with the ancients (Rashi). But why should not וְאֵין מַעֲנֶה itself be the expression of this want of any consequences? מענה cannot certainly mean humiliation[1] (Meîri, after Ex. x. 3, הכנעה), but why as an answer in words and not also a response by act (Stuart: a practical answer)? Thus the LXX. *ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ νοήσῃ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπακούσεται*, according to which Luther: for although he at once understands it, he does not yet take it to himself. That מענה may mean obedience, the Aram. so understood, also at xvi. 4. It denoted a reply in the most comprehensive meaning of the word, *vid.* at xvi. 1. The thought, besides, is the same as if one were to explain: for he understands it, and is silent, *i.e.* lets thee speak; or: he understands it, but that which he perceives finds no practical echo.

Ver. 20 Seest thou a man hasty in his words?
The fool hath more hope than he.

Cf. xxvi. 12. Such an one has blocked up against himself the path to wisdom, which to the fool, *i.e.* to the ingenuous, stands open; the former is perfect, of the latter something may yet be made. In this passage the contrast is yet more precise, for the fool is thought of as the dull, which is the proper meaning

[1] The Syr. and Targ. also think on ענה, for they translate: "for he knows that he receives no strokes."

of כְּסִיל, *vid.* under xvii. 24. There is more hope for the fool than for him, although he may be no fool in himself, who overthrows himself by his words. "The προπετὴς ἐν λόγῳ αὐτοῦ (Sir. ix. 18) has, in the existing case, already overleaped the thought; the כסיל has it still before him, and comes at length, perhaps with his slow conception, to it" (Hitzig); for the ass, according to the fable, comes at last farther than the greyhound. Hence, in words as well as in acts, the proverb holds good, "*Eile mit Weile*" [= *festina lente*]. Every word, as well as act, can only be matured by being thought out, and thought over. From this proverb, which finds its practical application to the affairs of a house, and particularly also to the relation to domestics, the group returns to the subject of instruction, which is its ground-tone.

Ver. 21 If one pampers his servant from youth up,
He will finally reach the place of a child.

The LXX. had no answer to the question as to the meaning of מנן. On the other hand, for פִּנֵּק, the meaning to fondle, *delicatius enutrire*, is perfectly warranted by the Aram. and Arab. The Talmud, *Succa* 52*b*, resorts to the alphabet אט"בח in order to reach a meaning for מנן. How the Targ. comes to translate the word by מְנַפַּח (outrooted) is not clear; the rendering of Jerome: *postea sentiet eum contumacem*, is perhaps mediated by the ἔσται γογγυσμός of Symmachus, who combines נן with לון, *Niph.* γογγύζειν. The ὀθυνηθήσεται of the LXX., with the Syr., von Hofmann has sought to justify (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 404), for he derives מְנוֹן = מְנֻהוֹן from נָהָה. We must then punctuate מַנּוֹן; but perhaps the LXX. derived the word from אָנַן = מַאֲנוֹן, whether they pronounced it מָנוֹן (cf. מְסֹרֶת = מַאֲסֹרֶת) or מַנּוֹן. To follow them is not wise, for the formation of the word is precarious; one does not see what the speaker of this proverb, to whom the language presented a fulness of synonyms for the idea of complaint, meant by using this peculiar word. Linguistically these meanings are impossible: of Jerome, *dominus* = מְמֻנֶּה (Ahron b. Josef, Meîri, and others); or: the oppressed = מוּנֶּה, from יָנָה (Johlson); or: one who is sick = מוֹנֶה (Euchel). And Ewald's "*undankbar*" [unthankful], derived from the Arabic, is a mere fancy, since (Arab.) *manuwan* does not mean one who is unthankful, but,

on the contrary, one who upbraids good deeds shown.[1] The ancients are in the right track, who explain מנון after the verb נון, Ps. lxxii. 17 = נִין = בֵּן; the *Venet.*, herein following Kimchi, also adopts the nominal form, for it translates (but without perceptible meaning) γόνωσις. Luther's translation is fortunate:

> "If a servant is tenderly treated from youth up,
> He will accordingly become a *Junker* [squire]."

The ideas represented in modern Jewish translations: that of a son (*e.g.* Solomon: he will at last be the son) and that of a master (Zunz), are here united. But how the idea of a son (from the verb נון), at the same time that of a master, may arise, is not to be perceived in the same way as with *Junker* and the Spanish *infante* and *hidalgo;* rather with מנון, as the ironical naming of the son (little son), the idea of a weakling (de Wette) may be connected. The state of the matter appears as follows:— The verb נון has the meanings of luxuriant growth, numerous propagation; the fish has from this the Aram. name of נון, like the Heb. דָּג, from דָּגָה, which also means luxuriant, exuberant increase (*vid.* at Ps. lxxii. 17). From this is derived נִין, which designates the offspring as a component part of a kindred, as well as מָנוֹן, which, according as the מ is interpreted infin. or local, means either this, that it sprouts up luxuriantly, the abundant growth, or also the place of luxuriant sprouting, wanton growing, abundant and quick multiplication: thus the place of hatching, spawning. The subject in יִהְיֶה might be the fondled one; but it lies nearer, however, to take him who fondles as the subject, as in 21*a*. אַחֲרִיתוֹ is either adv. accus. for בְּאַחֲרִיתוֹ, or, as we preferred at xxiii. 32, it is the subj. in-

[1] In *Jahrb.* xi. p. 10 f. Ewald compares, in an expressive way, the Ethiopic *mannâna* (*Piel*) to scorn; *menân*, a reprobate; and *mannânî*, one who is despised; according to which מנון could certainly designate "a man despising scornfully his own benefactors, or an unthankful man." But this verbal stem is peculiarly Ethiop., and is certainly not once found in Arab. For *minnat* (which Ewald compares) denotes benefaction, and the duty laid on one thereby, the dependence thereby produced. The verb (Arab.) *minn* (= מָנַן) signifies to divide; and particularly, partly to confer benefaction, partly to attribute benefaction, reckon to, enumerate, and thereby to bring out the sense of obligation. Thus nothing is to be derived from this verbal stem for מנון.

troducing, after the manner of a substantival clause, the following sentence as its virtual predicate: "one has fondled his servant from his youth up, and his (that of the one who fondles) end is: he will become a place of increase." The master of the house is thought of along with his house; and the servant as one who, having become a man, presents his master with יְלִידֵי בַיִת, who are spoilt scapegraces, as he himself has become by the pampering of his master. There was used in the language of the people, נִין for בֵּן, in the sense in which we name a degenerate son a "*Schönes Früchtchen*" [pretty little fruit]; and מָנוֹן is a place (house) where many נינים are; and a man (master of a house) who has many of them is one whose family has increased over his head. One reaches the same meaning if מָנוֹן is rendered more immediately as the place or state of growing, increasing, luxuriating. The sense is in any case: he will not be able, in the end, any more to defend himself against the crowd which grows up to him from this his darling, but will be merely a passive part of it.

The following group begins with a proverb which rhymes by מרון, with מנון of the foregoing, and extends on to the end of this Hezekiah collection:

Ver. 22 A man of anger stirreth up strife;
And a passionate man aboundeth in trangression.

Line first is a variation of xv. 18*a* and xxviii. 25*a*. אִישׁ and בַּעַל as here, but in the reverse order at xxii. 24.[1] אַף here means anger, not the nose, viz. the expanded nostrils (Schultens). In רַב־פֶּשַׁע the פֶּשַׁע is, after xiv. 29, xxviii. 16, xx. 27, the governed genitive; Hitzig construes it in the sense of רב פֶּשַׁע, Ps. xix. 2, with יגרה, but one does not say גָּרָה פֶּשַׁע; and that which is true of רַבִּים, that, after the manner of a numeral, it can precede its substantive (*vid.* under Ps. vii. 26, lxxxix. 51), cannot be said of רַב. Much (great) in wickedness denotes one who heaps up many wicked actions, and burdens himself with greater guilt (cf. פֶּשַׁע, ver. 16). The wrathful man stirreth up (*vid.* under xv. 18) strife, for he breaks through the mutual relations of men, which rest on mutual esteem and

[1] For אִישׁ־אַף (Löwenstein after Norzi) is to be written, with Baer (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 19), אִישׁ אַף. Thus also in *Cod. Jaman.*

love, and by means of his passionate conduct he makes enemies of those against whom he thinks that he has reason for being angry; that on account of which he is angry can be settled without producing such hostility, but passion impels him on, and misrepresents the matter; it embitters hearts, and tears them asunder. The LXX. has, instead of רב, ἐξώρυξεν, of dreaming, כרה (xvi. 27).

Ver. 23 passes from anger to haughtiness:

A man's pride will bring him low;
But the lowly attaineth to honour.

Thus we translate תְּתִמְכֹ֣ךְ כָּב֣וֹד (Lat. *honorem obtinet*) in accord with xi. 16, and שְׁפַל־רוּחַ with xvi. 19, where, however, שְׁפַל is not adj. as here, but inf. The haughty man obscures the honour which he has by this, that he boasts immeasurably of it, and aspires yet more after it; the lowly man, on the other hand, obtains honour without his seeking it, honour before God and before men, which would be of no worth were it not connected with the honour before God. The LXX.: τοὺς δὲ ταπεινόφρονας ἐρείδει δόξῃ κύριος. This κύριος is indeed not contrary to the sense, but it is opposed to the style. Why the 24th verse should now follow is, as regards the contents and the expression, hard to say; but one observes that vers. 22–27 follow each other, beginning with the successive letters of the alphabet א (ב), ג, ח, ח, ר, ת (ת).

Ver. 24 He that taketh part with a thief hateth himself;
He heareth the oath and confesseth not.

Hitzig renders the first member as the pred. of the second: "he who does not bring to light such sins as require an atonement (Lev. v. 1 ff.), but shares the secret of them with the sinner, is not better than one who is a partner with a thief, who hateth himself." The construction of the verse, he remarks, is not understood by any interpreter. It is not, however, so cross,—for, understood as Hitzig thinks it ought to be, the author should have expressed the subject by שׁמֵע אלה ולא יגיד,—but is simple as the order of the words and the verbal form require it. The oath is, after Lev. v. 1, that of the judge who adjures the partner of the thief by God to tell the truth; but he conceals it, and burdens his soul with a crime worthy of

death, for from a concealer he becomes in addition a perjured man.

Ver. 25 Fear of man bringeth a snare with it;
But he that trusteth in Jahve is advanced.

It sounds strange, Hitzig remarks, that here in the Book of an Oriental author one should be warned against the fear of man. It is enough, in reply to this, to point to Isa. li. 12f. One of the two translations in the LXX. (cf. Jerome and Luther) has found this "strange" thought not so strange as not to render it, and that in the gnomic aorist: *φοβηθέντες καὶ αἰσχυνθέντες ἀνθρώπους ὑπεσκελίσθησαν.* And why should not חֶרְדַּת אָדָם be able to mean the fear of man (cowardice)? Perhaps not so that אדם is the *gen. objecti*, but so that חרדת אדם means to frighten men, as in 1 Sam. xiv. 15. חרדת אלהים, a trembling of God; cf. Ps. lxiv. 2; פחד איב, the fear occasioned by the enemy, although this connection, after Deut. ii. 25, can also mean fear of the enemy (*gen. objecti*). To יִתֵּן, occasioned = brings as a consequence with it, cf. x. 10, xiii. 15; the *synallage generis* is as at xii. 25*a*: it is at least strange with fem. infinit. and infinitival nouns, xvi. 16, xxv. 14; Ps. lxxiii. 28; but חֶרְדָּה (trembling) is such a *nom. actionis*, Ewald, § 238*a*. Regarding יְשֻׂגָּב (for which the LXX.[1] *σωθήσεται*, and LXX.[2] *εὐφρανθήσεται* = ישׂמח), *vid.* at xviii. 10. He who is put into a terror by a danger with which men threaten him, so as to do from the fear of man what is wrong, and to conceal the truth, falls thereby into a snare laid by himself—it does not help him that by this means he has delivered himself from the danger, for he brands himself as a coward, and sins against God, and falls into an agony of conscience (reproach and anguish of heart) which is yet worse to bear than the evil wherewith he was threatened. It is only confidence in God that truly saves. The fear of man plunges him into yet greater suffering than that from which he would escape; confidence in God, on the other hand, lifts a man internally, and at last externally, above all his troubles.

Ver. 26. A similar gen. connection to that between חרדת אדם exists between מִשְׁפַּט־אִישׁ:

Many seek the countenance of the ruler;
Yet from Jahve cometh the judgment of men.

Line first is a variation of xix. 6*a*, cf. 1 Kings x. 24. It lies near to interpret אִישׁ as *gen. obj.*: the judgment regarding any one, *i.e.* the estimating of the man, the decision regarding him; and it is also possible, for מִשְׁפָּטִי, Ps. xvii. 2, may be understood of the judgment which I have, as well as of the judgment pronounced regarding me (cf. Lam. iii. 59). But the usage appears to think of the genit. after מִשְׁפָּט always as subjective, *e.g.* xvi. 33, of the decision which the lot brings, Job xxxvi. 6, the right to which the poor have a claim; so that thus in the passage before us מִשְׁפַּט־אִישׁ means the right of a man, as that which is proper or fitting to him, the judgment of a man, as that to which as appropriate he has a claim (LXX. τὸ δίκαιον ἀνδρί). Whether the genit. be rendered in the one way or the other, the meaning remains the same: it is not the ruler who finally decides the fate and determines the worth of a man, as they appear to think who with eye-service court his favour and fawn upon him.

Ver. 27 An abomination to a righteous man is a villanous man;
And an abomination to the godless is he who walketh uprightly.

In all the other proverbs which begin with תּוֹעֲבַת, *e.g.* xi. 20, יהוה follows as genit., here צַדִּיקִים, whose judgment is like that of God. אִישׁ עָוֶל is an abhorrence to them, not as a man, but just as of such a character; עָוֶל is the direct contrast to יֹשֶׁר. The righteous sees in the villanous man, who boldly does that which is opposed to morality and to honour, an adversary of his God; on the other hand, the godless sees in the man that walketh uprightly (יְשַׁר־דָּרֶךְ, as at Ps. xxxvii. 14) his adversary, and the condemnation of himself.

With this doubled ת the Book of Proverbs, prepared by the men of Hezekiah, comes to an end. It closes, in accordance with its intention announced at the beginning, with a proverb concerning the king, and a proverb of the great moral contrasts which are found in all circles of society up to the very throne itself.

FIRST APPENDIX TO THE SECOND SOLOMONIC COLLECTION OF PROVERBS.—CHAP. XXX.

The title of this first appendix, according to the text lying before us, is:

"The words of Agur the son of Jakeh, the utterance."

This title of the following collection of proverbs is limited by *Olewejored;* and הַמַּשָּׂא, separated from the author's name by *Rebia*, is interpreted as a second inscription, standing on one line with דִּבְרֵי, as particularizing that first. The old synagogue tradition which, on the ground of the general title i. 1, regarded the whole Book of Proverbs as the work of Solomon, interpreted the words, "Agur the son of Jakeh," as an allegorical designation of Solomon, who appropriated the words of the *Tôra* to the king, Deut. xvii. 17, and again rejected them, for he said: God is with me, and I shall not do it (viz. take many wives, without thereby suffering injury), *Schemôth rabba*, c. 6. The translation of Jerome: *Verba congregantis filii Vomentis*, is the echo of this Jewish interpretation. One would suppose that if "Agur" were Solomon's name, "Jakeh" must be that of David; but another interpretation in *Midrash Mishle* renders בן ("son") as the designation of the bearer of a quality, and sees in "Agur" one who girded (חגר = אגר) his loins for wisdom; and in "son of Jakeh" one free from sin (נקי מכל חטא ועוֹ). In the Middle Ages this mode of interpretation, which is historically and linguistically absurd, first began to prevail; for then the view was expressed by several (Aben Ezra, and Meîri the Spaniard) that Agur ben Jakeh was a wise man of the time of Solomon. That of Solomon's time, they thence conclude (blind to xxv. 1) that Solomon collected together these proverbs of the otherwise unknown wise man. In truth, the age of the man must remain undecided; and at all events, the time of Hezekiah is the fixed period from which, where possible, it is to be sought. The name "Agur" means the gathered (vi. 8, x. 5), or, after the predominant meaning of the Arab. *âjar*, the bribed, *mercede conductum;* also the collector (cf. יָקוּשׁ, fowler); or the word might mean, perhaps, industrious in collecting (cf. *'alwak*, attached to, and other examples in Mühlau, p. 36).

Regarding בִּן = *binj* (usual in בִּן־נוּן), and its relation to the Arab. *ibn*, *vid. Genesis*, p. 555. The name *Jakeh* is more transparent. The noun יָקֶה, xxx. 17, Gen. xlix. 10, means the obedient, from the verb יָקַה; but, formed from this verbal stem, the form of the word would be יָקֵהַּ (not יָקֶה). The form יָקֶה is the participial adj. from יָקֵהּ, like יָפֶה from יָפֵהּ; and the Arab. *waḳay*, corresponding to this יָקֵהּ, viii. *ittaḳay*, to be on one's guard, particularly before God; the usual word for piety regarded as *εὐλάβεια*. Mühlau (p. 37) rightly sees in the proper names *Eltekeh* [Josh. xix. 44] and *Eltekon* [Josh. xv. 59] the secondary verbal stem תָּקַה, which, like *e.g.* תָּוָה (תָּאָה), תָּאַב, עָתַר, has originated from the reflexive, which in these proper names, supposing that אל is subj., means to take under protection; not: to give heed = *cavere*. All these meanings are closely connected. In all these three forms—תָּקַה, יָקַה, יָקֵהּ—the verb is a synonym of שׁמר; so that יָקֵהּ denotes[1] the pious, either as taking care, *εὐλαβής*, or as keeping, *i.e.* observing, viz. that which is commanded by God.

In consequence of the accentuation, הַמַּשָּׂא is the second designation of this string of proverbs, and is parallel with דברי. But that is absolutely impossible. מַשָּׂא (from נָשָׂא, to raise, viz. the voice, to begin to express) denotes the utterance, and according to the usage of the words before us, the divine utterance, the message of God revealed to the prophet and announced by him, for the most part, if not always (*vid.* at Isa. xiii. 1), the message of God as the avenger. Accordingly Jewish interpreters (*e.g.* Meîri and Arama) remark that משׂא designates what follows, as דבר נְבוּאִי, *i.e.* an utterance of the prophetic spirit. But, on the other hand, what follows begins with the confession of human weakness and short-sightedness; and, moreover, we read proverbs not of a divine but altogether

[1] According to the *Lex. 'Gezerî* (from the Mesopotamian town of *'Gezirt ibn 'Amr*), the word *wakihon* is, in the Mesopotamian language, "the overseer of the house in which is the cross of the Christians;" and accordingly, in Muhammed's letter to the Christians of Negran, after they became subject to him, "a monk shall not be removed from his monastery, nor a presbyter from his presbyterate, (*waḳâhtah*) *wala watah wakahyttah*" (this will be the correct phrase), "nor an overseer from his office." The verbal stem *waḳ-ah* (יָקַה) is, as it appears, Northern Semitic; the South Arabian lexicographer Neshwan ignores it (Wetzstein in Mühlau).

of a human and even of a decaying spiritual stamp, besides distinguished from the Solomonic proverbs by this, that the *I* of the poet, which remains in the background, here comes to the front. This משׂא of prophetic utterances does not at all harmonize with the following string of proverbs. It does not so harmonize on this account, because one theme does not run through these proverbs which the sing. משׂא requires. It comes to this, that משׂא never occurs by itself in the sense of a divine, a solemn utterance, without having some more clearly defining addition, though it should be only a demonstrative הַזֶּה (Isa. xiv. 28). But what author, whether poet or prophet, would give to his work the title of משׂא, which in itself means everything, and thus nothing! And now: the utterance—what can the article at all mean here? This question has remained unanswered by every interpreter. Ewald also sees himself constrained to clothe the naked word; he does it by reading together הַמַּשָּׂא נְאֻם, and translating the "sublime saying which he spoke." But apart from the consideration that Jer. xxiii. 31 proves nothing for the use of this use of נְאֻם, the form (הגבר) נְאֻם is supported by 2 Sam. xxiii. 1 (cf. ver. 5 with 2 Sam. xxii. 31); and besides, the omission of the אֲשֶׁר, and in addition of the relative pronoun (נְאֻמוֹ), would be an inaccuracy not at all to be expected on the brow of this gnomology (*vid.* Hitzig). If we leave the altogether unsuspected נְאֻם undisturbed, המשׂא will be a nearer definition of the name of the author. The Midrash has a right suspicion, for it takes together *Hamassa* and *Agur ben Jakeh*, and explains: of Agur the son of Jakeh, who took upon himself the yoke of the most blessed. The *Græcus Venetus* comes nearer what is correct, for it translates: Λόγοι *'Αγούρου υἱέως 'Ιακέως τοῦ Μασάου.* We connect xxxi. 1, where לְמוּאֵל מֶלֶךְ, "Lemuel (the) king," is a linguistic impossibility, and thus, according to the accentuation lying before us, מֶלֶךְ מַשָּׂא also are to be connected together; thus it appears that משׂא must be the name of a country and a people. It was Hitzig who first made this Columbus-egg to stand. But this is the case only so far as he recognised in למואל מלך משׂא a Lemuel, the king of Massa, and recognised this Massa also in xxx. 1 (*vid.* his dissertation: *Das Königreich Massa* [the kingdom of Massa], in Zeller's *Theolog. Jahrbb.* 1844, and his *Comm.*), viz. the Israel-

itish *Massa* named in Gen. xxv. 14 (=1 Chron. i. 30) along with *Dumah* and *Tema*. But he proceeds in a hair-splitting way, and with ingenious hypothesis, without any valid foundation. That this *Dumah* is the *Dumat el-jendel* (cf. under Isa. xxi. 11) lying in the north of Nejed, near the southern frontiers of Syria, the name and the founding of which is referred by the Arabians to *Dûm* the son of Ishmael, must be regarded as possible, and consequently *Massa* is certainly to be sought in Northern Arabia. But if, on the ground of 1 Chron. iv. 42 f., he finds there a Simeonitic kingdom, and finds its origin in this, that the tribe of Simeon originally belonging to the ten tribes, and thus coming from the north settled in the south of Judah, and from thence in the days of Hezekiah, fleeing before the Assyrians, were driven farther and farther in a south-east direction towards Northern Arabia; on the contrary, it has been shown by Graf (*The Tribe of Simeon*, a contribution to the history of Israel, 1866) that Simeon never settled in the north of the Holy Land, and according to existing evidences extended their settlement from Negeb partly into the Idumean highlands, but not into the highlands of North Arabia. Hitzig thinks that there are found traces of the *Massa* of Agur and Lemuel in the Jewish town[1] of טילמאם, of Benjamin of Tudela, lying three days' journey from Chebar, and in the proper name (Arab.) *Malsâ* (smooth), which is given to a rock between Tema and Wady el-Kora (*vid.* Kosegarten's *Chrestom.* p. 143); but how notched his ingenuity here is need scarcely be shown. By means of more cautious combinations Mühlau has placed the residence of Agur and Lemuel in the Hauran mountain range, near which there is a *Dumah*, likewise a *Têmâ;* and in the name of the town *Mismîje*, lying in the Lejâ, is probably found the *Mishma* which is named along with *Massa*, Gen. xxv. 14; and from this that is related in 1 Chron. v. 9 f., 18–22, of warlike expeditions on the part of the tribes lying on the east of the Jordan against the Hagarenes and their allies *Jetur*, *Nephish*, and *Nodab*,[2] it

[1] Cf. Blau's *Arab. im sechsten Jahrh.* in the *Deutsch. Morgl. Zeits.* xxxiii. 590, and also p. 573 of the same, regarding a family of proselytes among the Jews in Taima.

[2] Mühlau combines *Nodab* with *Nudêbe* to the south-east of Bosra; Blau (*Deut. Morg. Zeit.* xxv. 566), with the Ναβδαῖοι of Eupolemos named along with the Ναβαταῖοι. The Kamûs has Nadab as the name of a tribe.

is with certainty concluded that in the Hauran, and in the wilderness which stretches behind the Euphrates towards it, Israelitish tribes have had their abode, whose territory had been early seized by the trans-Jordanic tribes, and was held "until the captivity," 1 Chron. v. 22, *i.e.* till the Assyrian deportation. This designation of time is almost as unfavourable to Mühlau's theory of a *Massa* in the Hauran, inhabited by Israelitish tribes from the other side, as the expression "*to Mount Seir*" (1 Chron. iv. 42) is to Hitzig's North Arabian *Massa* inhabited by Simeonites. We must leave it undecided whether *Dumah* and *Têmâ*, which the Toledoth of Ismael name in the neighbourhood of *Massa*, are the east Hauran districts now existing; or as Blau (*Deut. Morgl. Zeit.* xxv. 539), with Hitzig, supposes, North Arabian districts (cf. *Genesis*, p. 377, 4th ed.).[1] "Be it as it may, the contents and the language of this difficult piece almost necessarily point to a region bordering on the Syro-Arabian waste. Ziegler's view (*Neue Uebers. der Denksprüche Salomo's*, 1791, p. 29), that Lemuel was probably an emir of an Arabian tribe in the east of Jordan, and that a wise Hebrew translated those proverbs of the emir into Hebrew, is certainly untenable, but does not depart so far from the end as may appear at the first glance" (Mühlau).[2] If the text-punctuation lying before us rests on the false supposition that *Massa*, xxx. 1, xxxi. 1, is a generic name, and not a proper name, then certainly the question arises whether מַשָּׂא should not be used instead of מַשָּׂא, much more מַיָּא, which is suggested as possible in the article "Sprüche," in Herzog's *Encycl.* xiv. 694. Were מַשָּׂא, Gen. x. 30, the region *Μεσήνη*, on the northern border of the Persian Gulf, in which Apamea lay, then it might be said in favour of this, that as the histories of Muhammed and of Benjamin of Tudela prove the existence of an old Jewish occupation of North Arabia, but without anything being heard of a מַיָּא, the Talmud bears testimony[3] to a Jewish occupation of Mesene, and particularly of Apamea; and by the mother of Lemuel, the king

[1] Dozy (*Israeliten in Mecca*, p. 89 f.) connects *Massa* with *Mansâh*, a pretended old name of Mecca.

[2] These German quotations with the name of Mühlau are taken from the additions to his book, which he placed at my disposal.

[3] *Vid.* Neubauer's *La Géographie du Talmud*, pp. 325, 329, 382.

of *Mesha*, one may think[1] of Helena, celebrated in Jewish writings, queen of Adiabene, the mother of Monabaz and Izates. But the identity of the *Mesha* of the catalogue of nations with *Μεσήνη* is uncertain, and the Jewish population of that place dates at least from the time of the Sassanides to the period of the Babylonian exile. We therefore hold by the Ishmaelite *Massa*, whether North Arabian or Hauranian; but we by no means subscribe Mühlau's *non possumus non negare, Agurum et Lemuëlem proselytos e paganis, non Israelitas fuisse.* The religion of the tribes descended from Abraham, so far as it had not degenerated, was not to be regarded as idolatrous. It was the religion which exists to the present day among the great Ishmaelite tribes of the Syrian desert as the true tradition of their fathers under the name of *Dîn Ibrâhîm* (Abraham's religion); which, as from Wetzstein, we have noted in the *Commentary on Job* (p. 387 and elsewhere), continues along with Mosaism among the nomadic tribes of the wilderness; which shortly before the appearance of Christianity in the country beyond the Jordan, produced doctrines coming into contact with the teachings of the gospel; which at that very time, according to historic evidences (*e.g.* Mêjâsinî's chronicles of the *Ka'be*), was dominant even in the towns of Higâz; and in the second century after Christ, was for the first time during the repeated migration of the South Arabians again oppressed by Greek idolatry, and was confined to the wilderness; which gave the mightiest impulse to the rise of Islam, and furnished its best component part; and which towards the end of the last century, in the country of Neged, pressed to a reform of Islam, and had as a result the Wahabite doctrine. If we except xxx. 5 f., the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel contain nothing which may not be conceived from a non-Israelitish standpoint on which the author of the Book of Job placed himself. Even xxx. 5 f. is not there (cf. Job vi. 10, xxiii. 12) without parallels. When one compares Deut. iv. 2, xiii. 1, and 2 Sam. xxii. 31 = Ps. xviii. 31 (from which ver. 5 of the proverbs of Agur is derived, with the change of יהוה into אֱלוֹהַּ), Agur certainly appears as one intimately acquainted with the revealed religion of Israel, and with their literature. But

[1] Derenbourg's *Essai sur l'Hist. et la Géog. de la Palestine*, i. p. 224.

must we take the two Massites therefore, with Hitzig, Mühlau, and Zöckler, as born Israelites? Since the Bible history knows no Israelitish king outside of the Holy Land, we regard it as more probable that King Lemuel and his countryman Agur were Ishmaelites who had raised themselves above the religion of Abraham, and recognised the religion of Israel as its completion.

If we now return to the words of xxx. 1*a*, Hitzig makes Agur Lemuel's brother, for he vocalizes אָגוּר בֶּן־יָקֶהָּ מַשָּׂא, *i.e.* Agur the son of her whom Massa obeys. Ripa and Björck of Sweden, and Stuart of America, adopt this view. But supposing that יָקֶה is connected with the accusative of him who is obeyed, בן, as the representative of such an attributive clause, as of its virtual genitive, is elsewhere without example; and besides, it is unadvisable to explain away the proper name יָקֶה, which speaks for itself. There are two other possibilities of comprehending הַמַּשָּׂא, without the change, or with the change of a single letter. Wetzstein, on xxxi. 1, has said regarding Mühlau's translation "King of Massa:" "I would more cautiously translate, 'King of the Massans,' since this interpretation is unobjectionable; while, on the contrary, this is not *terra Massa*, nor *urbs Massa*. It is true that the inhabitants of Massa were not pure nomads, after xxx. and xxxi., but probably, like the other tribes of Israel, they were half nomads, who possessed no great land as exclusive property, and whose chief place did not perhaps bear their name. The latter may then have been as rare in ancient times as it is in the present day. Neither the *Sammar*, the *Harb*, the *Muntefik*, nor other half nomads whom I know in the southern parts of the Syrian desert, have any place which bears their name. So also, it appears, the people of Uz (עוץ), which we were constrained to think of as a dominant, firmly-settled race, since it had so great a husbandman as Job, possessed no קִרְיַת עוּץ. Only in certain cases, where a tribe resided for many centuries in and around a place, does the name of this tribe appear to have remained attached to it. Thus from גּוֹף דּוּמָה, 'the low-country of the Dumahns,' or קִרְיַת דּוּמָה, 'the city of Dumahns,' as also from קִרְיַת תֵּימָא, 'the city of the Temans,' gradually there arose (probably not till the decline and fall of this tribe) a city of *Dumah*, a haven of *Midian*, and the like, so that the primary meaning of

the name came to be lost." It is clear that, from the existence of an Ishmaelite tribe מַשָּׂא, there does not necessarily follow a similar name given to a region. The conj. מִמַּשָּׂא, for הַמַּשָּׂא (*vid.* Herzog's *Encycl.* xiv. 702), has this against it, that although it is good Heb., it directly leads to this conclusion (*e.g.* 2 Sam. xxiii. 20, 29, cf. 1 Kings xvii. 1). Less objectionable is Bunsen's and Böttcher's הַמַּשָּׂאִי. But perhaps המשא may also have the same signification; far rather at least this than that which Malbim, after הַשַּׂר הַמַּשָּׂא, 1 Chron. xv. 27, introduced with the LXX. *ἄρχων τῶν ᾠδῶν*: "We ought then to compare 2 Sam. xxiii. 24, דודו בֵּית לָחֶם, a connection in which, after the analogy of such Arabic connections as *kaysu 'aylana*, Kais of the tribe of *'Ailân* (*Ibn Coteiba*, 13 and 83), or *Ma'nu Ṭayyin*, Ma'n of the tribe of Tay, *i.e.* Ma'n belonging to this tribe, as distinguished from other men and families of this name (*Schol. Hamasæ* 144. 3), בית לחם is thought of as genit."[1] (Mühlau). That בית לחם (instead of בֵּית הַלַּחְמִי) is easily changed, with Thenius and Wellhausen, after 1 Chron. xi. 26, into מִבֵּית לָחֶם, and in itself it is not altogether homogeneous, because without the article. Yet it may be supposed that instead of משא, on account of the appellat. of the proper name (the lifting up, *elatio*), the word המשא might be also employed. And since בן־יקה, along with אגור, forms, as it were, one *compositum*, and does not at all destroy[2] the regulating force of אגור, the expression is certainly, after the Arabic *usus loq.*, to be thus explained: The words of Agur the son of Jakeh, of the tribe (the country) of Massa.

The second line of this verse, as it is punctuated, is to be rendered:

The saying of the man to Ithîel, to Ithîel and Uchal,

not *Ukkal;* for, since Athias and van der Hooght, the incorrect form וְאֻכָל has become current. J. H. Michaelis has the right form of the word וְאֻכָל. Thus, with כ *raphatum*, it is to be read after the Masora, for it adds to this word the remark לית

[1] In העם וגו', Jer. viii. 5, ירושׁ is thought of as genit., although it may be also nom., after the scheme of apposition instead of annexion. That it is genit., cf. Philippi's *St. Const.* pp. 192–195.

[2] We say, in Arab., without any anomaly, *e.g. Alîju-bnu-Muḥammadin Tajjîun*, *i.e.* the Ali son of Muhammed, of the tribe (from the tribe) of Tay; cf. Josh. iii. 11; Isa. xxviii. 1, lxiii. 11; and Deut. iii. 13.

וחסר, and counts it among the forty-eight words sometimes written defectively without ו (*vid.* this list in the *Masora finalis*, 27*b*, Col. 4); and since it only remarks the absence of the letter lengthening the word where no *dagesh* follows the vocal, it thus supposes that the כ has no *dagesh*, as it is also found in Codd. (also *Jaman.*) written with the *Raphe.* לְאִיתִיאֵל is doubly accentuated; the *Tarcha* represents the *Metheg*, after the rule *Thorath Emeth*, p. 11. The ל after נְאֻם is, in the sense of the punctuation, the same dat. as in לַאדֹנִי, Ps. cx. 1, and has an apparent right in him who asks כִּי תֵדָע in the 4th verse. Ithîel and Uchal must be, after an old opinion, sons, or disciples, or contemporaries, of Agur. Thus, *e.g.*, Gesenius, in his *Lex.* under אִיתִיאֵל, where as yet his reference to Neh. xi. 7 is wanting. איתיאל is rendered by Jefet and other Karaites, "there is a God" = אִיתִי אֵל; but it is perhaps equivalent to אִתִּי אֵל, "God is with me;" as for אִתִּי, the form אִיתִּי is also found. אֻכָל (אֻכַל) nowhere occurs as a proper name; but in the region of proper names, everything, or almost everything, is possible.[1] Ewald sees in 1*b*–14 a dialogue: in vers. 2–4 the הַגֶּבֶר, *i.e.* as the word appears to him, the rich, haughty mocker, who has worn out his life, speaks; and in 5–14 the "*Mitmirgott*" [= God with me], or, more fully, "*Mitmirgott-sobinichstark*" [= God with me, so am I strong], *i.e.* the pious, humble man answers. "The whole," he remarks, "is nothing but poetical; and it is poetical also that this discourse of mockery is called an elevated strain." But (1) גֶּבֶר is a harmless word; and in נְאֻם הַגֶּבֶר, Num. xxiv. 3, 15, 2 Sam. xxiii. 1, it is a solemn, earnest one; (2) a proper name, consisting of two clauses connected by *Vav*, no matter whether it be an actual or a symbolical name, is not capable of being authenticated; Ewald, § 274*b*, recognises in נִדַּלְתִּי וגו', 1 Chron. xxv. 4, the naming, not of one son of Heman, but of two; and (3) it would be a very forced, inferior poetry if the poet placed one half of the name in one line, and then, as if constrained to take a new breath, gave the other half of it in a second line. But, on the other hand, that איתיאל and אכל are the names of two different persons, to whom the address of the man is directed, is attested by the, in this

[1] *Vid.* Wetzstein's *Inschriften aus den Trachonen und dem Haurangebirge* (1864), p. 336 f.

case aimless, *anadiplosis*, the here unpoetical parallelism with reservation. The repetition, as Fleischer remarks, of the name Ithîel, which may rank with Uchal, as the son or disciple of Agur, has probably its reason only in this, that one placed a second more extended phrase simply along with the shorter. The case is different; but Fleischer's supposition, that the poet himself cannot have thus written, is correct. We must not strike out either of the two לאיתיאל; but the supposed proper names must be changed as to their vocalization into a declaratory clause. A principal argument lies in ver. 2, beginning with כִּי: this כי supposes a clause which it established; for, with right, Mühlau maintains that כי, in the affirmative sense, which, by means of *aposiopesis*, proceeds from the confirmative, may open the conclusion and enter as confirmatory into the middle of the discourse (*e.g.* Isa. xxxii. 13), but cannot stand abruptly at the commencement of a discourse (cf. under Isa. xv. 1 and vii. 9). But if we now ask how it is to be vocalized, there comes at the same time into the sphere of investigation the striking phrase נאם הַגֶּבֶר. This phrase all the Greek interpreters attest by their rendering, *τάδε λέγει ὁ ἀνήρ* (*Venet.* *φησὶν ἀνήρ*); besides, this is to be brought forward from the wilderness of the old attempts at a translation, that the feeling of the translators strives against the recognition in ואכל of a second personal name: the Peshito omits it; the Targ. translates it, after the Midrash, by וְאוּכַל (I may do it); as Theodotion, *καὶ δυνήσομαι*, which is probably also meant by the *καὶ συνήσομαι* (from *συνιέναι*, to be acquainted with) of the *Venet.*; the LXX. with *καὶ παύομαι*; and Aquila, *καὶ τέλεσον* (both from the verb כלה). As an objection to נאם הגבר is this, that it is so bald without being followed, as at Num. xxiv. 3, 15, 2 Sam. xxiii. 1, with the attributive description of the man. Luther was determined thereby to translate: discourse of the man Leithiel . . . And why could not לְאִיתִיאֵל be a proper-name connection like שְׁאַלְתִּיאֵל (שַׁלְתִּיאֵל)? Interpreted in the sense of "I am troubled concerning God," it might be a symbolical name of the *φιλόσοφος*, as of one who strives after the knowledge of divine things with all his strength. But (1) לְאָה, with the accus. obj., is not established, and one is rather inclined to think of a name such as פְּלִיתִיאֵל, after Ps. lxxxiv. 3; (2) moreover, לאיתיאל cannot be at one

time a personal name, and at another time a declarative sentence —one must both times transform it into לְאִיתִי אֵל; but אֵל has to be taken as a vocative, not as accus., as is done by J. D. Michaelis, Hitzig, Bunsen, Zöckler, and others, thus: I have wearied myself, O God! . . . The nakedness of הגבר is accordingly not covered by the first *Leithiel.* Mühlau, in his work, seeks to introduce המשׂא changed into ממשׂא: "The man from Massa," and prefers to interpret הגבר generically:[1] "proverb (confession) of the man (*i.e.* the man must confess): I have wearied myself, O God! . . ." Nothing else in reality remains. The article may also be retrospective: the man just now named, whose "words" are announced, viz. Agur. But why was not the expression נאם אגור then used? Because it is not poetical to say: "the (previously named) man." On the other hand, what follows applies so that one may understand, under הגבר, any man you choose. There are certainly among men more than too many who inquire not after God (Ps. xiv. 2 f.). But there are also not wanting those who feel sorrowfully the distance between them and God. Agur introduces such a man as speaking, for he generalizes his own experience. Ps. xxxvi. 2 (*vid.* under this passsge) shows that a proper name does not necessarily follow נאם. With נאם הגבר Agur then introduces what the man has to confess—viz. a man earnestly devoted to God; for with נאם the ideas of that which comes from the heart and the solemnly earnest are connected. If Agur so far generalizes his own experience, the passionate *anadiplosis* does not disturb this. After long contemplation of the man, he must finally confess: I have troubled myself, O God! I have troubled myself, O God! . . . That the trouble was directed toward God is perhaps denoted by the alliteration of לאיתי with אל. But what now, further? ואכל is read as וְאֻכַּל, וְאֻכָּל, וְאֻכָּל, וְאֻכָּל, and it has also been read as וְאֻכַּל. The reading וְאֻכָּל no one advocates; this that follows says the direct contrary, *et potui* (*pollui*). Geiger (*Urschrift*, p. 61) supports the reading וְאֻכָּל, for he renders it interrogatively: "I wearied my-

[1] Thus, viz., that הגבר denotes, not the man as he ought to be, but the man as he usually is (the article, as the Arabic grammarians say, "not for the exhaustion of the characteristic marks of the genus," but for the expression of "the quality *mâhîje* of the genus").

self in vain about God, I wearied myself in vain about God; why should I be able to do it?" But since one may twist any affirmative clause in this way, and from a *yes* make a *no*, one should only, in cases of extreme necessity, consent to such a question in the absence of an interrogative word. Böttcher's לָאִיתִי אֵל, I have wearied myself out in vain, is not Hebrew. But at any rate the expression might be אֵל־אֻכָל, if only the *Vav* did not stand between the words! If one might transpose the letters, then we might gain וְלֹא אֻכָל, according to which the LXX. translates: *οὐ δυνήσομαι*. At all events, this despairing as to the consequence of further trouble, "I shall be able to do nothing (shall bring it to nothing)," would be better than וְאֻכַל (and I shall withdraw—become faint), for which, besides, וְאֻכְלָה should be used (cf. xxii. 8 with Job xxxiii. 21). One expects, after לאיתי, the expression of that which is the consequence of earnest and long-continued endeavour. Accordingly Hitzig reads וְאֻכַּל, and I have become dull—suitable to the sense, but unsatisfactory on this account, because כָּלַל, in the sense of the Arab. *kall, hebescere*, is foreign to the Heb. *usus loq.* Thus ואכל will be a *fut. consec.* of כלה. J. D. Michaelis, and finally Böttcher, read it as *fut. consec. Piel* וַאֲכַלֵּ or וַאֲכַל (*vid.* regarding this form in pause under xxv. 9), "and I have made an end;" but it is not appropriate to the inquirer here complaining, when dissatisfaction with his results had determined him to abandon his research, and let himself be no more troubled. We therefore prefer to read with Dahler, and, finally, with Mühlau and Zöckler, וָאֶכַל, and I have withdrawn. The form understood by Hitzig as a pausal form is, in the unchangeableness of its vocals, as accordant with rule as those of יָחַד, xxvii. 17, which lengthen the ַ of their first syllables in pause. And if Hitzig objects that too much is said, for one of such meditation does not depart, we answer, that if the inquiry of the man who speaks here has completed itself by the longing of his spirit and his soul (Ps. lxxxiv. 3, cxliii. 7), he might also say of himself, in person, כָּלִיתִי or וָאֶכַל. An inquiry proceeding not merely from intellectual, but, before all, from practical necessity, is meant—the doubled לאיתי means that he applied thereto the whole strength of his inner and his outer man; and ואכל, that he nevertheless did not reach his end, but wearied himself in

vain. By this explanation which we give to 1*a*, no change of its accents is required; but 1*b* has to be written:

נְאֻם הַגֶּבֶר לְאִיתִי אֵל
לְאִיתִי אֵל וְאֻכָל:[1]

Vers. 2, 3. The כִּי now following confirms the fruitlessness of the long zealous search:

For I am without reason for a man,
And a man's understanding I have not.
3 And I have not learned wisdom,
That I may possess the knowledge of the All-Holy.

He who cannot come to any fixed state of consecration, inasmuch as he is always driven more and more back from the goal he aims at, thereby brings guilt upon himself as a sinner so great, that every other man stands above him, and he is deep under them all. So here Agur finds the reason why in divine things he has failed to attain unto satisfying intelligence, not in the ignorance and inability common to all men—he appears to himself as not a man at all, but as an irrational beast, and he misses in himself the understanding which a man properly might have and ought to have. The מִן of מֵאִישׁ is not the partitive, like Isa. xliv. 11, not the usual comparative: than any one (Böttcher), which ought to be expressed by מִכָּל־אִישׁ, but it is the negative, as Isa. lii. 14; Fleischer: *rudior ego sum quam ut homo appeller*, or: *brutus ego, hominis non similis*. Regarding בַּעַר, *vid.* under xii. 1.[2] Ver. 3 now says that he went into no school of wisdom, and for that reason in his wrestling after knowledge could attain to nothing, because the necessary conditions to this were wanting to him. But then the question arises: Why this complaint? He must first go to school in order to obtain, according to the word "To him who hath is given," that for which he strove. Thus לָמַדְתִּי refers to learning in the midst of wrestling; but

[1] The *Munach* is the transformation of *Mugrash*, and this sequence of accents—*Tarcha*, *Munach*, *Sillûk*—remains the same, whether we regard אֵל as the accusative or as the vocative.

[2] According to the Arab. בעיר is not a beast as grazing, but as dropping *stercus* (*ba'r*, camel's or sheep's droppings); to the R. בר, Mühlau rightly gives the meanings of separating, whence are derived the meanings of grazing as well as of removing (cleansing) (cf. Pers. *thak karadn*, to make clean = to make clean house, *tabula rasa*).

למד, spiritually understood, signifies the acquiring of a *kenînens* [knowledge] or *könnens* [knowledge = ability]: he has not brought it out from the deep point of his condition of knowledge to make wisdom his own, so that he cannot adjudge to himself knowledge of the all-holy God (for this knowledge is the kernel and the star of true wisdom). If we read 3*b* לֹא אֵדָע, this would be synchronistic, *nesciebam*, with למדתי standing on the same line. On the contrary, the positive אדע subordinates itself to ולא־למדתי, as the Arab. *fâa' lama*, in the sense of (*ita*) *ut scirem scientiam Sanctissimi*, thus of a conclusion, like Lam. i. 19, a clause expressive of the intention, Ewald, § 347*a*. קְדֹשִׁים is, as at ix. 10, the name of God in a superlative sense, like the Arab. *el-kuddûs*.

Ver. 4 Who hath ascended to the heavens and descended?
Who hath grasped the wind in his fists?
Who hath bound up the waters in a garment?
Who hath set right all the ends of the earth?
What is his name, and what his son's name, if thou knowest?

The first question here, מִי וגו', is limited by *Pazer*; עלה־שמים has *Metheg* in the third syllable before the tone. The second question is at least shut off by *Pazer*, but, contrary to the rule, that *Pazer* does not repeat itself in a verse; Cod. Erfurt. 2, and several older editions, have for בחפניו more correctly בחפניו with *Rebia*. So much for the interpunction. חָפְנַיִם are properly not the two fists, for the fist—that is, the hand gathered into a ball, *pugnus*—is called אֶגְרֹף; while, on the contrary, חֹפֶן (in all the three dialects) denotes the palm of the hand, *vola* (*vid.* Lev. xvi. 12); yet here the hands are represented after they have seized the thing as shut, and thus certainly as fists. The dual points to the dualism of the streams of air produced by the disturbance of the equilibrium; he who rules this movement has, as it were, the north or east wind in one fist, and the south or west wind in the other, to let it forth according to his pleasure from this prison (Isa. xxiv. 22). The third question is explained by Job xxvi. 8; the שְׂמָלָה (from שׂמל, *comprehendere*) is a figure of the clouds which contain the upper waters, as Job xxxviii. 37, the bottles of heaven. "All the ends of the earth" are as at five other places, *e.g.* Ps. xxii. 28, the most distant, most remote parts of the earth; the setting up of all

these most remote boundaries (*margines*) of the earth is equivalent to the making fast and forming the limits to which the earth extends (Ps. lxxiv. 17), the determining of the compass of the earth and the form of its figures. כִּי תֵדָע is in symphony with Job xxxviii. 5, cf. 18. The question is here formed as it is there, when Jahve brings home to the consciousness of Job human weakness and ignorance. But there are here two possible significations of the fourfold question. Either it aims at the answer: No man, but a Being highly exalted above all creatures, so that the question מַה־שְּׁמוֹ [what his name?] refers to the name of this Being. Or the question is primarily meant of men: What man has the ability?—if there is one, then name him! In both cases מִי עָלָה is not meant, after xxiv. 28, in the modal sense, *quis ascenderit*, but as the following וַיֵּרֵד requires, in the nearest indicative sense, *quis ascendit*. But the choice between these two possible interpretations is very difficult. The first question is historical: Who has gone to heaven and (as a consequence, then) come down from it again? It lies nearest thus to interpret it according to the *consecutio temporum*. By this interpretation, and this representation of the going up before the descending again, the interrogator does not appear to think of God, but in contrast to himself, to whom the divine is transcendent, of some other man of whom the contrary is true. Is there at all, he asks, a man who can comprehend and penetrate by his power and his knowledge the heavens and the earth, the air and the water, *i.e.* the nature and the inner condition of the visible and invisible world, the quantity and extent of the elements, and the like? Name to me this man, if thou knowest one, by his name, and designate him to me exactly by his family—I would turn to him to learn from him what I have hitherto striven in vain to find. But there is no such an one. Thus: as I feel myself limited in my knowledge, so there is not at all any man who can claim limitless *können* and *kennen* [ability and knowledge]. Thus casually Aben Ezra explains, and also Rashi, Arama, and others, but without holding fast to this in its purity; for in the interpretation of the question, "Who hath ascended?" the reference to Moses is mixed up with it, after the Midrash and Sohar (Parasha, ויקהל, to Ex. xxxv. 1),

to pass by other obscurities and difficulties introduced. Among the moderns, this explanation, according to which all aims at the answer, "there is no man to whom this appertains," has no exponent worth naming. And, indeed, as favourable as is the *quis ascendit in cœlos ac rursus descendit*, so unfavourable is the *quis constituit omnes terminos terræ*, for this question appears not as implying that it asks after the man who has accomplished this; but the thought, according to all appearance, underlies it, that such an one must be a being without an equal, after whose name inquiry is made. One will then have to judge עלה and ירד after Gen. xxviii. 12; the ascending and descending are compared to our German "*auf und nieder*" [up and down], for which we do not use the phrase "*nieder und auf*," and is the expression of free, expanded, unrestrained presence in both regions; perhaps, since ירד is historical, as Ps. xviii. 10, the speaker has the traditional origin of the creation in mind, according to which the earth arose into being earlier than the starry heavens above.

Thus the four questions refer (as *e.g.* also Isa. xl. 12) to Him who has done and who does all that, to Him who is not Himself to be comprehended as His works are, and as He shows Himself in the greatness and wonderfulness of these, must be exalted above them all, and mysterious. If the inhabitant of the earth looks up to the blue heavens streaming in the golden sunlight, or sown with the stars of night; if he considers the interchange of the seasons, and feels the sudden rising of the wind; if he sees the upper waters clothed in fleecy clouds, and yet held fast within them floating over him; if he lets his eye sweep the horizon all around him to the ends of the earth, built up upon nothing in the open world-space (Job xxvi. 7): the conclusion comes to him that he has before him in the whole the work of an everywhere present Being, of an all-wise omnipotent Worker—it is the Being whom he has just named as אֵל, the absolute Power, and as the קְדֹשִׁים, exalted above all created beings, with their troubles and limitations; but this knowledge gained *viâ causalitatis*, *viâ eminentiæ*, and *viâ negationis*, does not satisfy yet his spirit, and does not bring him so near to this Being as is to him a personal necessity, so that if he can in some measure answer the fourfold מִי, yet there always

presses upon him the question מה־שׁמו, what is his name, *i.e.* the name which dissolves the secret of this Being above all beings, and unfolds the mystery of the wonder above all wonders. That this Being must be a person the fourfold מי presupposes; but the question, "What is his name?" expresses the longing to know the name of this supernatural personality, not any kind of name which is given to him by men, but the name which covers him, which is the appropriate personal immediate expression of his being. The further question, "And what the name of his son?" denotes, according to Hitzig, that the inquirer strives after an adequate knowledge, such as one may have of a human being. But he would not have ventured this question if he did not suppose that God was not a *monas* [unity] who was without manifoldness in Himself. The LXX. translates: ἢ τί ὄνομα τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτοῦ (בָּנָיו), perhaps not without the influence of the old synagogue reference testified to in the Midrash and Sohar of בנו to Israel, God's first-born; but this interpretation is opposed to the spirit of this חידה (intricate speech, enigma). Also in general the interrogator cannot seek to know what man stands in this relation of a son to the Creator of all things, for that would be an ethical question which does not accord with this metaphysical one. Geier has combined this ומה־שׁם־בנו with viii.; and that the interrogator, if he meant the חכמה, ought to have used the phrase ומה־שׁם־בִּתּוֹ, says nothing against this, for also in אָמוֹן, viii. 30, whether it means foster-child or *artifex*, work-master, the feminine determination disappears. Not Ewald alone finds here the idea of the Logos, as the first-born Son of God, revealing itself, on which at a later time the Palestinian doctrine of מֵימְרָא דַיְיָ imprinted itself in Alexandria;[1] but also J. D. Michaelis felt himself constrained to recognise here the N. T. doctrine of the Son of God announcing itself from afar. And why might not this be possible? The Rig-Veda contains two similar questions, x. 81, 4: "Which was the primeval forest, or what the tree from which one framed the heavens and the earth? Surely, ye wise men, ye ought in your souls to make inquiry whereon he stood when he raised the wind!" And i. 164, 4: "Who has seen the first-born? Where was the life, the blood, the soul of the world? Who came thither to ask

[1] *Vid. Apologetik* (1869), p. 432 ff.

this from any one who knew it?"[1] Jewish interpreters also interpret בנו of the *causa media* of the creation of the world. Arama, in his work עקדת יצחק, *sect.* xvi., suggests that by בנו we are to understand the primordial element, as the Sankhya-philosophy understands by the first-born there in the Rig, the *Prakriti*, *i.e.* the primeval material. R. Levi b. Gerson (Ralbag) comes nearer to the truth when he explains בנו as meaning the cause caused by the supreme cause, in other words: the *principium principiatum* of the creation of the world. We say: the inquirer meant the demiurgic might which went forth from God, and which waited on the Son of God as a servant in the creation of the world; the same might which in chap. viii. is called Wisdom, and is described as God's beloved Son. But with the name after which inquiry is made, the relation is as with the "more excellent name than the angels," Heb. i. 4.[2] It is manifestly not the name בן, since the inquiry is made after the name of the בן; but the same is the case also with the name חכמה, or, since this does not harmonize, according to its grammatical gender, with the form of the question, the name דבר (מימר); but it is the name which belongs to the first and only-begotten Son of God, not merely according to creative analogies, but according to His true being. The inquirer would know God, the creator of the world, and His Son, the mediator in the creation of the world, according to their natures. If thou knowest, says he, turning himself to man, his equal, what the essential names of both are, tell them to me! But who can name them! The nature of the Godhead is hidden, as from the inquirer, so from every one else. On this side of eternity it is beyond the reach of human knowledge.

The solemn confession introduced by נאם is now closed.

[1] Cited by Lyra in *Beweis des Glaubens Jahrg.* 1869, p. 230. The second of these passages is thus translated by Wilson (*Rig-Veda-Sanhitá*, London, 1854, vol. ii. p. 127): "Who has seen the primeval (being) at the time of his being born? What is that endowed with substance which the unsubstantial sustains? From earth are the breath and blood, but where is the soul? Who may repair to the sage to ask this?"

[2] The *Comm.* there remarks: It is the heavenly whole name of the highly exalted One, the שם המפורש, *nomen explicitum*, which here on this side has entered into no human heart, and can be uttered by no human tongue, the ὄνομα ὁ οὐδεὶς οἶδεν εἰ μὴ ὁ αὐτός, Rev. xix. 12.

Ewald sees herein the discourse of a sceptical mocker at religion; and Elster, the discourse of a meditating doubter; in ver. 5, and on, the answer ought then to follow, which is given to one thus speaking: his withdrawal from the standpoint of faith in the revelation of God, and the challenge to subordinate his own speculative thinking to the authority of the word of God. But this interpretation of the statement depends on the symbolical rendering of the supposed personal names איתיאל and אכל, and, besides, the dialogue is indicated by nothing; the beginning of the answer ought to have been marked, like the beginning of that to which it is a reply. The confession, 1*b*–4, is not that of a man who does not find himself in the right condition, but such as one who is thirsting after God must renounce: the thought of a man does not penetrate to the essence of God (Job xi. 7–9); even the ways of God remain inscrutable to man (Sir. xviii. 3; Rom. xi. 33); the Godhead remains, for our thought, in immeasurable height and depth; and though a relative knowledge of God is possible, yet the dogmatic thesis, *Deum quidem cognoscimus, sed non comprehendimus*, i.e. *non perfecte cognoscimus quia est infinitus*,[1] even over against the positive revelation, remains unchanged. Thus nothing is wanting to make 1–4 a complete whole; and what follows does not belong to that section as an organic part of it.

Ver. 5 Every word of *Eloah* is pure;
A shield is He for those who hide themselves in Him.
6 Add thou not to His words,
Lest He convict thee and thou becomest a liar.

Although the tetrastich is an independent proverb, yet it is connected to the foregoing *Neûm* [utterance, ver. 1]. The more limited a man is in his knowledge of God,—viz. in that which presents itself to him *lumine naturæ*,—so much the more thankful must he be that God has revealed Himself in history, and so much the more firmly has he to hold fast by the pure word of the divine revelation. In the dependent relation of ver. 5 to Ps. xviii. 31 (2 Sam. xxii. 31), and of ver. 6 to Deut. iv. 2, there is no doubt the self-testimony of God given to Israel, and recorded in the book of the Tôra, is here meant. כָּל־אִמְרַת

[1] *Vid.* Luthardt's *Kompendium der Dogmatik*, § 27.

is to be judged after *πᾶσα γραφή*, 2 Tim. iii. 16, not: every declaration of God, wherever promulgated, but: every declaration within the revelation lying before us. The primary passage [Ps. xviii. 31] has not כל here, but, instead of it, לְכֹל הַחֹסִים, and instead of אמרת אֱלוֹהַּ it has אמ' יהוה; his change of the name of Jahve is also not favourable to the opinion that ver. 5 f. is a part of the *Neûm*, viz. that it is the answer thereto. The proverb in this contains traces of the Book of Job, with which in many respects that *Neûm* harmonizes; in the Book of Job, אֱלוֹהַּ (with עַדַי) is the prevailing name of God; whereas in the Book of Proverbs it occurs only in the passage before us. Mühlau, p. 41, notes it as an Arabism. צָרַף (Arab. *ṣaraf*, to turn, to change) is the usual word for the changing process of smelting; צָרוּף signifies solid, pure, *i.e.* purified by separating: God's word is, without exception, like pure, massive gold. Regarding חָסָה, to hide oneself, *vid.* under Ps. ii. 12: God is a shield for those who make Him, as revealed in His word, their refuge. The part. חֹסֶה occurs, according to the Masora, three times written defectively,—xiv. 32; 2 Sam. xxii. 31; Neh. i. 7; in the passage before us it is to be written לַחוֹסִים; the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel have frequently the *plena scriptio* of the *part. act. Kal*, as well as of the *fut. Kal*, common to the Book of Job (*vid.* Mühlau, p. 65).

In 6*a*, after Aben Ezra's *Moznajim* 2*b* (11*b* of Heidenheim's edition), and *Zachoth* 53*a* (cf. Lipmann's ed.), and other witnesses (*vid.* Norzi), *t sp* (the ף with *dagesh*) is to be written,—the Cod. *Jaman.* and others *defect.* without ו,—not *tôsf*; for, since תּוֹסֶף (Ex. x. 28) is yet further abbreviated in this way, it necessarily loses[1] the aspiration of the *tenuis*, as in יֹלֶדֶת (= יֹלֶדֶת). The words of God are the announcements of His holy will, measured by His wisdom; they are then to be accepted as they are, and to be recognised and obeyed. He who adds anything to them, either by an overstraining of them or by repressing them, will not escape the righteous judgment of God: God will convict him of falsifying His word (תּוֹכִיחַ, Ps. l. 21; only

[1] That both *Shevas* in *tôsp* are quiesc., *vid.* Kimchi, *Michlol* 155 *a b*, who is finally decided as to this. That the word should be read *tôspʿal* is the opinion of Chajûg in הגות ס' (regarding the quiesc. letters), p. 6 of the Ed. by Dukes-Ewald.

here with ב of the obj.), and expose him as a liar—viz. by the dispensations which unmask the falsifier as such, and make manifest the falsehood of his doctrines as dangerous to souls and destructive to society. An example of this is found in the kingdom of Israel, in the destruction of which the curse of the human institution of its state religion, set up by Jeroboam, had no little share. Also the Jewish traditional law, although in itself necessary for the carrying over of the law into the *praxis* of private and public life, falls under the Deuteron. prohibition,—which the poet here repeats,—so far as it claimed for itself the same divine authority as that of the written law, and so far as it hindered obedience to the law—by the straining-at-a-gnat policy—and was hostile to piety. Or, to adduce an example of an addition more dogmatic than legal, what a fearful impulse was given to fleshly security by that overstraining of the promises in Gen. xvii., which were connected with circumcision by the tradition, "the circumcised come not into hell," or by the overstraining of the prerogative attributed by Paul, Rom. ix. 4 f., to his people according to the Scriptures, in the principle, "All Israelites have a part in the future world!" Regarding the accentuation of the *perf. consec.* after יַן, *vid.* at Ps. xxviii. 1. The penultima accent is always *in pausa* (cf. vers. 9 and 10).

In what now follows, the key-note struck in ver. 1 is continued. There follows a prayer to be kept in the truth, and to be preserved in the middle state, between poverty and riches. It is a Mashal-ode, *vid.* vol. i. p. 12. By the first prayer, "vanity and lies keep far from me," it is connected with the warning of ver. 6.

Ver. 7 Two things I entreat from Thee,
Refuse them not to me before I die.
8 Vanity and lies keep far away from me
Poverty and riches give me not:
Cause me to eat the bread which is allotted to me,
9 Lest in satiety I deny,
And say: Who is Jahve?
And lest, in becoming poor, I steal,
And profane the name of my God.

We begin with the settlement and explanation of the traditional punctuation. A monosyllable like שָׁוְא receives, if *Legarmeh*,

always *Mehuppach Legarmeh*, while, on the contrary, the polysyllable אֶשְׁבַּע has *Asla Legarmeh*. אַל־תִּתֶּן־לִי, with double *Makkeph* and with *Gaja* in the third syllable before the tone (after the *Metheg-Setzung*, § 28), is Ben-Asher's; whereas Ben-Naphtali prefers the punctuation אַל־תִּתֶּן לִי (*vid.* Baer's *Genesis*, p. 79, note 3). Also פֶּן־אֶשְׁבַּע has (cf. פֶּן־יִשְׂחָה, xxxi. 5) *Makkeph*, and on the antepenultima *Gaja* (*vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 32).

The *perf. consec.* וְכִחַשְׁתִּי has on the *ult.* the disjunctive *Zinnor* (*Sarka*), which always stands over the final letter; but that the *ult.* is also to be accented, is shown by the counter-tone *Metheg*, which is to be given to the first syllable. Also וְאָמַרְתִּי has in correct Codd., *e.g.* Cod. 1294, the correct ultima toning of a *perf. consec.*; Kimchi in the *Michlol* 6*b*, as well as Aben Ezra in both of his *Grammars*, quotes only וְנָנַבְתִּי וְתָפַשְׂתִּי as toned on the *penult.* That וְנָנַבְתִּי cannot be otherwise toned on account of the pausal accent, has been already remarked under 6*b*; the word, besides, belongs to the פחתין בא"ס, *i.e.* to those which preserve their *Pathach* unlengthened by one of the greater disjunctives; the *Athnach* has certainly in the three so-called metrical books only the disjunctive form of the *Zakeph* of the prose books. So much as to the form of the text.

As to its artistic form, this prayer presents itself to us as the first of the numerical proverbs, under the "Words" of Agur, who delighted in this form of proverb. The numerical proverb is a brief discourse, having a didactic end complete in itself, which by means of numerals gives prominence to that which it seeks to bring forward. There are two kinds of these. The more simple form places in the first place only one numeral, which is the sum of that which is to be brought forth separately: the numerical proverb of one cipher; to this class belong, keeping out of view the above prayer, which if it did not commence a series of numerical proverbs does not deserve this technical name on account of the low ciphers: vers. 24–28, with the cipher 4; Sir. xxv. 1 and 2, with the cipher 3. Similar to the above prayer are Job xiii. 20 f., Isa. li. 19; but these are not numerical proverbs, for they are not proverbs. The more artistic kind of numerical proverb has two ciphers: the two-ciphered numerical proverb we call the sharpened (pointed) proverb.

Of such two-ciphered numerical proverbs the "words" of Agur contain four, and the whole Book of Proverbs, reckoning vi. 16–19, five—this ascending numerical character belongs to the popular saying, 2 Kings ix. 32, Job xxxiii. 29, Isa. xvi. 6, and is found bearing the stamp of the artistic distich outside of the Book of Proverbs, Ps. lxii. 12, Job xxxiii. 14, xl. 5; Job v. 19, and particularly Amos i. 3–ii. 6. According to this scheme, the introduction of Agur's prayer should be:

אַחַת שָׁאַלְתִּי מֵאִתָּךְ

וּשְׁתַּיִם אַל־תִּמְנַע מִמֶּנִּי בְּטֶרֶם אָמוּת

and it could take this form, for the prayer expresses two requests, but dwells exclusively on the second. A twofold request he presents to God, these two things he wishes to be assured of on this side of death; for of these he stands in need, so as to be able when he dies to look back on the life he has spent, without the reproaches of an accusing conscience. The first thing he asks is that God would keep far from him vanity and lying words. שָׁוְא (= שָׁוֶא, from שׁוֹא = שָׁאָה, to be waste, after the form מָוֶת) is either that which is confused, worthless, untrue, which comes to us from without (*e.g.* Job xxxi. 5), or dissoluteness, hollowness, untruthfulness of disposition (*e.g.* Ps. xxvi. 4); it is not to be decided whether the suppliant is influenced by the conception thus from within or from without, since דְּבַר־כָּזָב [a word of falsehood] may be said by himself as well as to him, a falsehood can intrude itself upon him. It is almost more probable that by שׁוא he thought of the misleading power of God-estranged, idolatrous thought and action; and by דבר־כזב, of lying words, with which he might be brought into sympathy, and by which he might ruin himself and others. The second petition is that God would give him neither poverty (רֵאשׁ, *vid.* x. 4) nor riches, but grant him for his sustenance only the bread of the portion destined for him. The *Hiph.* הַטְרִיף (from טָרַף, to grind, viz. the bread with the teeth) means to give[1] anything, as טֶרֶף, with which, xxxi. 15, נָתַן חֹק is parallel: to present a fixed piece, a definite portion of sustenance. חֹק, Gen. xlvii. 22, the portion assigned as nourishment; cf. Job

[1] The *Venet.* translates, according to Villoison, θίρψον με; but the MS. has, according to Gebhardt, θρέψον.

xxiii. 14 חֻקִּי, the decree determined regarding me. Accordingly, לֶחֶם חֻקִּי does not mean the bread appropriately measured out for me (like ἄρτος ἐπιούσιος, that which is required for οὐσία, subsistence), but the bread appropriate for me, determined for me according to the divine plan. Fleischer compares (Arab.) *ratab* and *marsaum*, which both in a similar way designate a fixed sustentation portion. And why does he wish to be neither poor nor rich? Because in both extremes lie moral dangers: in riches, the temptation to deny God (which כִּחֵשׁ בַּה' signifies, in the later Heb. כָּפַר בְּעִקָּר, to deny the fundamental truth; cf. (Arab.) *kafar*, unbelieving), whom one flowing in superabundance forgets, and of whom one in his self-indulgence desires to know nothing (Job xxi. 14–16, xxii. 16 f.); in poverty, the temptation is to steal and to blaspheme the name of God, viz. by murmuring and disputing, or even by words of blasphemy; for one who is in despair directs the outbreaks of his anger against God (Isa. viii. 21), and curses Him as the cause of His misfortune (Rev. xvi. 11, 21). The question of godless haughtiness, מִי יהוה, the LXX. improperly change into מִי יראה, τίς με ὁρᾷ. Regarding נוֹרַשׁ, to grow poor, or rather, since only the *fut. Niph.* occurs in this sense, regarding יִוָּרֵשׁ, *vid.* at xx. 13.

That the author here, by blaspheming (grasping at) the name of God, especially thinks on that which the *Tôra* calls "cursing (קִלֵּל) God," and particularly "blaspheming the name of the Lord," Lev. xxiv. 15, 16, is to be concluded from the two following proverbs, which begin with the catchword קלל:

Ver. 10 Calumniate not a servant with his master,
Lest he curse thee, and thou must atone for it.

Incorrectly Ewald: entice not a servant to slander against his master; and Hitzig: "Make not a servant tattle regarding his master." It is true that the *Poel* לוֹשֵׁן (to pierce with the tongue, *linguâ petere*) occurs twice in the sense of to calumniate; but that הֶלְשִׁין means nothing else, is attested by the post.-bibl. Hebrew; the proverb regarding schismatics (בִּרְכַּת הַמִּינִים) in the Jewish *Schemone-Esre* (prayer of the eighteen benedictions) began with ולמולשינים, "and to the calumniators" (*delatoribus*). Also in the Arab. *âlsana* signifies *pertulit verba alicujus ad alterum*, to make a babbler, *rapporteur* (Fleischer). That the word also

here is not to be otherwise interpreted, is to be concluded from אַל with the causative rendering. Rightly Symmachus, *μὴ διαβάλῃς*; Theodotion, *μὴ καταλαλήσῃς*; and according to the sense also, Jerome, *ne accuses;* the *Venet. μὴ καταμηνύσῃς* (give not him); on the contrary, Luther, *verrate nicht* [betray not], renders הלשין with the LXX., Syr. in the sense of the Aram. אַשְׁלֵם and the Arab. *âslam* (*tradere, prodere*). One should not secretly accuse (Ps. ci. 5) a servant with his master, and in that lies the character of slander (לְשׁוֹן הָרָע) when one puts suspicion upon him, or exaggerates the actual facts, and generally makes the person suspected—one thereby makes a man, whose lot in itself is not a happy one, at length and perhaps for ever unhappy, and thereby he brings a curse on himself. But it is no matter of indifference to be the object of the curse of a man whom one has unrighteously and unjustly overwhelmed in misery: such a curse is not without its influence, for it does not fruitlessly invoke the righteous retribution of God, and thus one has sorrowfully to atone for the wanton sins of the tongue (*ve-aschāmta*, for *ve-aschamtá* as it is would be without pause).

There now follows a *Priamel*,[1] the first line of which is, by יקלל, connected with the יקללך of the preceding distich:

Ver. 11 A generation that curseth their father,
And doth not bless their mother;
12 A generation pure in their own eyes,
And yet not washed from their filthiness;
13 A generation—how haughty their eyes,
And their eyelids lift themselves up;
14 A generation whose teeth are swords and their jaw teeth knives
To devour the poor from the earth and the needy from the midst of men.

Ewald translates: O generation! but that would have required the word, 13*a*, הֲדוֹר (Jer. ii. 31), and one would have expected

[1] [Cf. vol. i. p. 13. The name (from *præambulum*) given to a peculiar form of popular gnomic poetry which prevailed in Germany from the 12th (*e.g.* the Meistersinger or Minstrel Sparvogel) to the 16th century, but was especially cultivated during the 14th and 15th centuries. Its peculiarity consisted in this, that after a series of antecedents or subjects, a briefly-expressed consequent or predicate was introduced as the epigrammatic point applicable to all these antecedents together. *Vid.* Erschenburg's *Denkmälern altdeutscher Dichtkunst*, Bremen 1799.]

to have found something mentioned which the generation addressed were to take heed to; but it is not so. But if "O generation!" should be equivalent to "O regarding the generation!" then הוי ought to have introduced the sentence. And if we translate, with Luther: There is a generation, etc., then יֵשׁ is supplied, which might drop out, but could not be omitted. The LXX. inserts after ἔκγονον the word κακόν, and then renders what follows as pred.—a simple expedient, but worthless. The *Venet.* does not need this expedient, for it renders γενεὰ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ βλασφημήσει; but then the order of the words in 11*a* would have been דור יקלל אביו; and in 12*a*, after the manner of a subst. clause, דור טהור בעיניו הוא, one sees distinctly, from 13 and 14, that what follows דור is to be understood, not as a pred., but as an attributive clause. As little can we interpret ver. 14, with Löwenstein, as pred. of the three subj., "it is a generation whose teeth are swords;" that would at least have required the words דור הוא; but ver. 14 is not at all a judgment valid for all the three subjects. The Targ. and Jerome translate correctly, as we above;[1] but by this rendering there are four subjects in the preamble, and the whole appears, since the common pred. is wanting, as a mutilated Priamel. Perhaps the author meant to say: it is such a generation that encompasses us; or: such is an abomination to Jahve; for דור is a *Gesamtheit* = totality, generation of men who are bound together by contemporary existence, or homogeneity, or by both, but always a totality; so that these verses, 11–14, might describe *quatuor detestabilia genera hominum* (C. B. Michaelis), and yet one *generatio*, which divide among themselves these four vices, of blackest ingratitude, loathsome self-righteousness, arrogant presumption, and unmerciful covetousness. Similar is the description given in the Mishna *Sota* ix. 14, of the character of the age in which the Messiah appeared. "The appearance of this age," thus it concludes, "is like the appearance of a dog; a son is not ashamed before his father; to whom will we then look for help? To our Father in heaven!"[2] The undutifulness of a child is here placed

[1] The Syr. begins 11*a* as if הוי were to be supplied.

[2] Cf. also Ali b. Abi Tâleb's dark description, beginning with *hadha alzman* (this age), *Zur allg. Char. der arab. Poesie* (1870), p. 54 f

first. To curse one's parents is, after Ex. xxi. 17, cf. Prov. xx. 10, a crime worthy of death; "not to bless," is here, *per litoten*, of the same force as קִלֵּל [to curse]. The second characteristic, ver. 12, is wicked blindness as to one's judgment of himself. The LXX. coarsely, but not bad: *τὴν δ' ἔξοδον αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀπένιψεν.* Of such darkness one says: *sordes suas putat olere cinnama.* רָחַץ is not the abbreviated part. (Stuart), as *e.g.* Ex. iii. 2, but the finite, as *e.g.* Hos. i. 6.

In 13*a* the attributive clause forms itself, so as to express the astonishing height of arrogance, into an exclamation: a generation, how lofty are their eyes (cf. *e.g.* vi. 17, עֵינַיִם רָמוֹת)! to which, as usual, it is simply added: and his eyelids (*palpebræ*) lift themselves up; in Lat., the lifting up of the eyebrow as an expression of haughtiness is described by *elatum* (*superbum*) *supercilium.*

The fourth characteristic is insatiable covetousness, which does not spare even the poor, and preys upon them, the helpless and the defenceless: they devour them as one eats bread, Ps. xiv. 4. The teeth, as the instruments of eating, are compared to swords and knives, as at Ps. lvii. 4 to spears and arrows. With שִׁנָּיו there is interchanged, as at Job xxix. 17, Jonah i. 6, מְתַלְּעֹתָיו (not מָוֶת, as Norzi writes, contrary to *Metheg-Setzung*, § 37, according to which *Gaja*, with the servant going before, is inadmissible), transposed from מַלְתְּעוֹתָיו, Ps. lviii. 7, from לָחַע, to strike, pierce, bite. The designation of place, מֵאָרֶץ, "from the earth" (which also, *in pausa*, is not modified into מֵאָרֶץ), and מֵאָדָם, "from the midst of men," do not belong to the obj.: those who belong to the earth, to mankind (*vid.* Ps. x. 18), for thus interpreted they would be useless; but to the word of action: from the earth, out from the midst of men away, so that they disappear from thence (Amos viii. 4). By means of fine but cobweb combinations, Hitzig finds Amalek in this fourfold proverb. But it is a portrait of the times, like Ps. xiv., and certainly without any national stamp.

With the characteristic of insatiableness it closes, and there follows an *apophthegma de quatuor insatiabilibus quæ ideo comparantur cum sanguisuga* (C. B. Michaelis). We translate the text here as it lies before us:

Ver. 15 The *'Alûka* hath two daughters: Give! Give!
Three of these are never satisfied;
Four say not: Enough!
16 The under-world and the closing of the womb;
The earth is not satisfied with water;
And the fire saith not: Enough!

We begin with Masoretic exteynalities. The first ב in הב is *Beth minusculum;* probably it had accidentally this diminutive form in the original MSS., to which the Midrash (cf. *Sepher Taghin ed. Bargès*, 1866, p. 47) has added absurd conceits. This first הַב has *Pasek* after it, which in this case is servant to the *Olewejored* going before, according to the rule *Thorath Emeth*, p. 24, here, as at Ps. lxxxv. 9, *Mehuppach.* The second הב, which of itself alone is the representative of *Olewejored*, has in Hutter, as in the Cod. Erfurt 2, and Cod. 2 of the Leipzig Public Library, the pausal punctuation הָב (cf. קָח, 1 Sam. xxi. 10), but which is not sufficiently attested. Instead of לֹא־אָמְרוּ, 15*b*, לֹא אָמְרוּ, and instead of לֹא־אָמְרָה, 16*b*, לֹא אָמְרָה are to be written; the *Zinnorith* removes the *Makkeph*, according to *Thorath Emeth*, p. 9, *Accentuationssystem*, iv. § 2. Instead of כָּמַיִם, 16*a*, only Jablonski, as Mühlau remarks, has כָּמַיִם; but incorrectly, since *Athnach*, after *Olewejored*, has no pausal force (*vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 37). All that is without any weight as to the import of the words. But the punctuation affords some little service for the setting aside of a view of Rabbenu Tam (*vid. Tosaphoth* to *Aboda zara* 17*a*, and *Erubin* 19*a*), which has been lately advocated by Löwenstein. That view is, that *'Alûka* is the name of a wise man, not Solomon's, because the Pesikta does not reckon this among the names of Solomon, nor yet a name of hell, because it is not, in the Gemara, numbered among the names of Gehinnom. Thus לְעֲלוּקָה would be a superscription, like לדוד and לשלמה, Ps. xxvi. 1, lxxii. 1, provided with *Asla Legarmeh.* But this is not possible, for the *Asla Legarmeh*, at Ps. xxvi. 1 and lxxii. 1, is the transformation of *Olewejored*, inadmissible on the first word of the verse (*Accentuationssystem*, xix. § 1); but no *Olewejored* can follow such an *Asla Legarmeh*, which has the force of an *Olewejored*, as after this לעלוקה, which the accentuation then does not regard as the author's name given as a superscription.

עֲלוּקָה is not the name of a person, and generally not a proper name, but a generic name of certain traditional signification. "One must drink no water"—says the Gemara *Aboda zara* 12*b*—"out of a river or pond, nor (immediately) with his mouth, nor by means of his hand; he who, nevertheless, does it, his blood comes on his own head, because of the danger. What danger? סַכָּנַת עֲלוּקָה," *i.e.* the danger of swallowing a leech. The Aram. also designates a leech by עֲלוּקָא (cf. *e.g.* Targ. Ps. xii. 9: hence the godless walk about like the leech, which sucks the blood of men), and the Arab. by *'alak* (*n. unit.* *'alaḳat*), as the word is also rendered here by the Aram. and Arab. translators. Accordingly, all the Greeks render it by *βδέλλη*; Jerome, by *sanguisuga* (Rashi, *sangsue*); also Luther's *Eigel* is not the *Igel erinaceus* [hedgehog], but the *Egel*, *i.e.*, as we now designate it, the *Blutegel* [leech], or (less correctly) *Blutigel*. עֲלוּקָה is the fem. of the adj. עָלוּק, attached to, which meaning, together with the whole verbal stem, the Arab. has preserved (*vid.* Mühlau's *Mittheilung des Art.* *'aluka aus dem Kamus*, p. 42).[1] But if, now, the *'Alûka* is the leech,[2] which are then its two daughters, to which is here given the name הַב הַב, and which at the same time have this cry of desire in their mouths? Grotius and others understand, by the two daughters of the leech, the two branches of its tongue; more correctly: the double-membered overlip of its sucker. C. B. Michaelis thinks that the greedy cry, "Give! Give!" is personified: *voces istæ concipiuntur ut hirudinis filiæ, quas ex se gignat et velut mater sobolem impense diligat.* But since this does not satisfy, symbolical interpretations of *'Aluka* have been resorted to. The Talmud, *Aboda zara* 17*a*, regards it as a name of hell. In this sense it is used in the language of the Pijut (synagogue

[1] Nöldeke has remarked, with reference to Mühlau's *Monographie*, that *'aluḳa*, in the sense of tenacious (*tenax*), is also found in Syr. (*Geopon.* xiii. 9, xli. 26), and that generally the stem עלק, to cleave, to adhere, is more common in Aram. than one would suppose. But this, however common in Arab., is by no means so in Syr.; and one may affirm that, among other Arabisms found in the Proverbs of Agur, the word *'Alûka* has decidedly an Arab. sound.

[2] In Sanscrit the leech is called *galaukas* (masc.) or *galaukâ* (fem.), *i.e.* the inhabitant of the water (from *gala*, water, and *ôkas*, dwelling). Ewald regards this as a transformation of the Semitic name.

poetry).[1] If *ʿAlûka* is hell, then fancy has the widest room for finding an answer to the question, What are the two daughters? The Talmud supposes that רשות (the worldly domination) and מינות (heresy) are meant. The Church-fathers also, understanding by *ʿAlûka* the power of the devil, expatiated in such interpretations. Of the same character are Calmet's interpretation, that *sanguisuga* is a figure of the *mala cupiditas*, and its twin-daughters are *avaritia* and *ambitio*. The truth lying in all these is this, that here there must be some kind of symbol. But if the poet meant, by the two daughters of the *ʿAlûka*, two beings or things which he does not name, then he kept the best of his symbol to himself. And could he use *ʿAlûka*, this common name for the leech, without further intimation, in any kind of symbolical sense? The most of modern interpreters do nothing to promote the understanding of the word, for they suppose that *ʿAlûka*, from its nearest signification, denotes a demoniacal spirit of the character of a vampire, like the *Ḍakinî* of the Indians, which nourish themselves on human flesh; the *ghouls* of the Arabs and Persians, which inhabit graveyards, and kill and eat men, particularly wanderers in the desert; in regard to which it is to be remarked, that (Arab.) *ʿawlaḳ* is indeed a name for a demon, and that *alʿaluwaḳ*, according to the Kamus, is used in the sense of *alghwal*. Thus Dathe, Döderlein, Ziegler, Umbreit; thus also Hitzig, Ewald, and others. Mühlau, while he concurs in this understanding of the word, and now throwing open the question, Which, then, are the two daughters of the demoness *ʿAlûka?* finds no answer to it in the proverb itself, and therefore accepts of the view of Ewald, since 15*b*–16, taken by themselves, form a fully completed whole, that the line לעלוקה וגו׳ is the beginning of a numerical proverb, the end of which is wanting. We acknowledge, because of the obscurity—not possibly aimed at by the author himself—in which the two daughters remain, the fragmentary characters of the proverb of the *ʿAlûka;* Stuart also does this, for he regards it as brought out of a connection in which it was intelligible,—but we believe that the line שלוש וגו׳

[1] So says *e.g.* Salomo ha-Babli, in a *Zulath* of the first *Chanukka-Sabbats* (beginning אֵין צוּר חֵלֶף): יֶקְדוּ כְּהַבְחֵבִי עֵלֶק, they burn like the flames of hell.

is an original formal part of this proverb. For the proverb forming, according to Mühlau's judgment, a whole rounded off:

שלוש הנה לא תשבענה
ארבע לא אמרו הון:
שאול ועצר רחם
ארץ לא שבעה מים
ואש לא אמרה הון:

contains a mark which makes the original combination of these five lines improbable. Always where the third is exceeded by the fourth, the step from the third to the fourth is taken by the connecting *Vav:* ver. 18, וארבע; 21, ותחת ארבע; 29, וארבעה. We therefore conclude that ארבע לא וגו׳ is the original commencement of independent proverb. This proverb is:

> Four things say not: Enough!
> The under-world and the closing of the womb [*i.e.* unfruitful womb]—
> The earth is not satisfied with water,
> And the fire says not: Enough!

a tetrastich more acceptable and appropriate than the Arab. proverb (Freytag, *Provv.* iii. p. 61, No. 347): "three things are not satisfied by three: the womb, and wood by fire, and the earth by rain;" and, on the other hand, it is remarkable to find it thus clothed in the Indian language,[1] as given in the Hitopadesa (p. 67 of Lassen's ed.), and in Pantschatantra, i. 153 (ed. of Kosegarten):

nâgnis trpjati kâshthânâṅ nâpagânâṅ mahôdadhiḥ
nântakaḥ sarvabhûtânâṅ na punsâṅ vâmalôcanâḥ.

> Fire is not sated with wood, nor the ocean with the streams,
> Nor death with all the living, nor the beautiful-eyed with men.

As in the proverb of Agur the 4 falls into 2 + 2, so also in this Indian *sloka*. In both, fire and the realm of death (*ântaka* is death as the personified "end-maker") correspond; and as there the

[1] That not only natural productions, but also ideas and literary productions (words, proverbs, knowledge), were conveyed from the Indians to the Semites, and from the Semites to the Indians, on the great highways by sea and land, is a fact abundantly verified. There is not in this, however, any means of determining the situation of Massa.

womb and the earth, so here *feminarium cupiditas* and the ocean. The parallelizing of ארץ and רחם is after passages such as Ps. cxxxix. 15, Job i. 21 (cf. also Prov. v. 16; Num. xxiv. 7; Isa. xlviii. 1); that of שאול and אש is to be judged of[1] after passages such as Deut. xxxii. 22, Isa. lvi. 24. That לא אמרו הון repeats itself in לא אמרה הון is now, as we render the proverb independently, much more satisfactory than if it began with שלוש וגו׳: it rounds itself off, for the end returns into the beginning. Regarding הון, *vid.* i. 13. From הון, to be light, it signifies living lightly; ease, superabundance, in that which renders life light or easy. "Used accusatively, and as an exclamation, it is equivalent to plenty! enough! It is used in the same sense in the North African Arab. *brrakat* (spreading out, fulness). Wetzstein remarks that in Damascus *lahôn*, *i.e.* hitherto, is used in the sense of *hajah*, enough; and that, accordingly, we may attempt to explain הון of our [Heb.] language in the sense of (Arab.) *hawn haddah*, *i.e.* here the end of it!" (Mühlau.)

But what do we now make of the two remaining lines of the proverb of the ʿ*Alûka*? The proverb also in this division of two lines is a fragment. Ewald completes it, for to the one line, of which, according to his view, the fragment consists, he adds two:

> The bloodsucker has two daughters, "Hither! hither!"
> Three saying, "Hither, hither, hither the blood,
> The blood of the wicked child."

A proverb of this kind may stand in the O. T. alone: it sounds as if quoted from Grimm's *Mährchen*, and is a side-piece to Zappert's *altdeutsch. Schlummerliede.* Cannot the mutilation of the proverb be rectified in a less violent way without any self-made addition? If this is the case, that in vers. 15 and 16, which now form one proverb, there are two melted together, only the first of which lies before us in a confused form, then this phenomenon is explained by supposing that the proverb of the ʿ*Alûka* originally stood in this form:

> The ʿ*Alûka* has two daughters: Give! give!—
> The under-world and the closing of the womb;
> There are three that are never satisfied.

Thus completed, this tristich presents itself as the original side-

[1] The parallelizing of רחם and שאול, *Berachoth* 15*b*, is not directly aimed at by the poet.

piece of the lost tetrastich, beginning with ארבע. One might suppose that if שׁאול and עצר רחם have to be regarded as the daughters of the *ʿAlûka*, which Hitzig and also Zöckler have recognised, then there exists no reason for dividing the one proverb into two. Yet the taking of them as separate is necessary, for this reason, because in the fourth, into which it expands, the *ʿAlûka* is altogether left out of account. But in the above tristich it is taken into account, as was to be expected, as the mother with her children. This, that sheol (שְׁאוֹל is for the most part fem.), and the womb (רֶחֶם = רַחַם, which is fem., Jer. xx. 17) to which conception is denied, are called, on account of their greediness, the daughters of the *ʿAlûka*, is to be understood in the same way as when a mountain height is called, Isa. v. 1, a horn of the son of oil. In the Arab., which is inexhaustibly rich in such figurative names, a man is called "a son of the clay (*limi*);" a thief, "a son of the night;" a nettle, "the daughter of fire." The under-world and a closed womb have the *ʿAlûka* nature; they are insatiable, like the leech. It is unnecessary to interpret, as Zöckler at last does, *ʿAlûka* as the name of a female demon, and the לילית, "daughters," as her companions. It may be adduced in favour of this view that לָעֲלוּקָה is without the article, after the manner of a proper name. But is it really without the article? Such a doubtful case we had before us at xxvii. 23. As yet only Böttcher, § 394, has entered on this difficulty of punctuation. We compare Gen. xxix. 27, בַּעֲבֹדָה; 1 Kings xii. 32, לַעֲנָלִים; 1 Chron. xiii. 7, בַּעֲגָלָה; and consequently also Ps. cxlvi. 7, לָעֲשׁוּקִים; thus the assimilating force of the *Chateph* appears here to have changed the syntactically required לָ and בָּ into לַ and בַּ. But also supposing that עֲלוּקָה in לָעֲלוּקָה is treated as a proper name, this is explained from the circumstance that the leech is not meant here in the natural history sense of the word, but as embodied greediness, and is made a person, one individual being. Also the symbol of the two daughters is opposed to the mythological character of the *ʿAlûka*. The imper. הַב, from יהב, occurs only here and at Dan. vii. 17 (= תֵּן), and in the bibl. Heb. only with the intentional ־ָה, and in inflection forms. The insatiableness of sheol (xxvii. 20*a*) is described by Isaiah, v. 14; and Rachel, Gen. xxx. 1, with her "Give me children,"

is an example of the greediness of the "closed-up womb" (Gen. xx. 18). The womb of a childless wife is meant, which, because she would have children, the *nuptiæ* never satisfy; or also of one who, because she does not fear to become pregnant, invites to her many men, and always burns anew with lust. "In Arab. *'aluwak* means not only one fast bound to her husband, but, according to Wetzstein, in the whole of Syria and Palestine, the prostitute, as well as the *κίναιδοι*, are called *'ulak* (plur. *'alwak*), because they obtrude themselves and hold fast to their victim" (Mühlau). In the third line, the three: the leech, hell, and the shut womb, are summarized: *tria sunt quæ non satiantur.* Thus it is to be translated with Fleischer, not with Mühlau and others, *tria hæc non satiantur.* "These three" is expressed in Heb. by שְׁלֹשׁ־אֵלֶּה, Ex. xxi. 11, or שְׁלֹשֶׁת אֵלֶּה(הָ), 2 Sam. xxi. 22; הֵנָּה (which, besides, does not signify *hæc*, but *illa*) is here, taken correctly, the pred., and represents in general the verb of being (Isa. li. 19), *vid.* at vi. 16. Zöckler finds the point of the proverb in the greediness of the unfruitful womb, and is of opinion that the poet purposely somewhat concealed this point, and gave to his proverb thereby the enhanced attraction of the ingenious. But the tetrastich ארבע וגו' shows that hell, which is compared to fire, and the unfruitful womb, to which the parched and thirsty earth is compared, were placed by the poet on one and the same line; it is otherwise with vers. 18–20, but where that point is nothing less than concealed.

The proverb of the *'Alûka* is the first of the proverbs founded on the figure of an animal among the "words" of Agur. It is now followed by another of a similar character:

Ver. 17 An eye that mocketh at his father,
And despiseth obedience to his mother:
The ravens of the brook shall pluck it out,
And the young eagles shall eat it.

If "an eye," and not "eyes," are spoken of here, this is accounted for by the consideration that the duality of the organ falls back against the unity of the mental activity and mental expression which it serves (cf. *Psychol.* p. 234). As haughtiness reveals itself (ver. 13) in the action of the eyes, so is the eye also the mirror of humble subordination, and also of

malicious scorn which refuses reverence and subjection to father and mother. As in German the verbs [*verspotten, spotten, höhnen, hohnsprechen*] signifying to mock at or scorn may be used with the accus., genit., or dat., so also לָעַג [to deride] and בּוּז [to despise] may be connected at pleasure with either an accusative object or a dative object. Ben-Chajim, Athias, van der Hooght, and others write תִּלְעַג; Jablonski, Michaelis, Löwenstein, תִּלְעַג; Mühlau, with Norzi, accurately, תִּלְעַג, with *Munach*, like תִּבְחַר, Ps. lxv. 5; the writing of Ben-Asher[1] is תִּלְעַג, with *Gaja*, *Chateph*, and *Munach*. The punctuation of ליקהת is more fluctuating. The word לְקֻהַת (*e.g.* Cod. *Jaman.*) may remain out of view, for the *Dag. dirimens* in ק stands here as firmly as at Gen. xlix. 10, cf. Ps. xlv. 10. But it is a question whether one has to write לִיקֻהַת with *Yod quies.* (regarding this form of writing, preferred by Ben-Naphtali, the *Psalmen-Comm.* under Ps. xlv. 10, in both Edd.; Luzzatto's *Gramm.* § 193; Baer's *Genesis*, p. 84, note 2; and Heidenheim's *Pentateuch*, with the text-crit. *Comm.* of Jekuthiël ha-Nakdans, under Gen. xlvii. 17, xlix. 10), as it is found in Kimchi, *Michlol* 45*a*, and under יקה, and as also Norzi requires, or לִיקְהַת (as *e.g.* Cod. Erfurt 1), which appears to be the form adopted by Ben-Asher, for it is attested[2] as such by Jekuthiël under Gen. xlix. 10, and also expressly as such by an old Masora-Cod. of the Erfurt Library. Löwenstein translates, "the weakness of the mother." Thus after Rashi, who refers the word to קָהָה, to draw together, and explains it, Gen. xlix. 10, "collection;" but in the passage before us, understands it of the wrinkles on the countenance of the aged mother. Nachmani (Ramban) goes still further, giving to the word, at Gen. xlix. 10, everywhere the meaning of weakness and frailty. Aben Ezra also, and Gersuni (Ralbag), do not go beyond the meaning of a drawing together; and the LXX., with the

[1] The *Gaja* has its reason in the *Zinnor* that follows, and the *Munach* in the syllable beginning with a moveable *Sheva;* תִּלְעַג with *Scheva quiesc.* must, according to rule, receive *Mercha*, vid. *Thorath Emeth*, p. 26.

[2] Kimchi is here no authority, for he contradicts himself regarding such word-forms. Thus, regarding וַיִּלֶּלֶת, Jer. xxv. 36, in *Michlol* 87*b*, and under ילל. The form also wavers between בִּיתְרוֹן and בִּיתָרוֹן, Eccles. ii. 13. The Cod. *Jaman.* has here the *Jod* always *quiesc.*

Aram., who all translate the word by *senectus*, have also קָהָה in the sense of to become dull, infirm (certainly not the Æthiopic *leh°ka*, to become old, weak through old age). But Kimchi, whom the *Venet.* and Luther[1] follow, is informed by Abulwalîd, skilled in the Arab., of a better: יְקֻהָה (or יְקֻהָה, cf. נְצֻרָה, Ps. cxli. 3) is the Arab. *waḳhat*, obedience (*vid.* above יָקֵהּ, under 1*a*). If now it is said of such a haughty, insolent eye, that the ravens of the brook (cf. 1 Kings xvii. 4) will pluck it out, and the בְּנֵי־נֶשֶׁר eat it, they, the eagle's children, the unchildlike human eye: it is only the description of the fate that is before such an one, to die a violent death, and to become a prey to the fowls of heaven (cf. *e.g.* Jer. xvi. 3 f., and Passow's *Lex.* under *κόραξ*); and if this threatening is not always thus literally fulfilled, yet one has not on that account to render the future optatively, with Hitzig; this is a false conclusion, from a too literal interpretation, for the threatening is only to be understood after its spirit, viz. that a fearful and a dishonourable end will come to such an one. Instead of יִקְרוּהָ, as Mühlau reads from the Leipzig Cod., יקרוה, with *Mercha* (Athias and Nissel have it with *Tarcha*), is to be read, for a word between *Olewejored* and *Athnach* must always contain a conjunctive accent (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 51; *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 9). עִרְבִי־נָחַל is also irregular, and instead of it עִרְבִי־נָחַל is to be written, for the reason given above under ver. 16 (פִּיהֶם).

The following proverb, again a numerical proverb, begins with the eagle, mentioned in the last line of the foregoing:

Ver. 18 Three things lie beyond me,
And four I understand not:
19 The way of the eagle in the heavens,
The way of a serpent over a rock,
The way of a ship on the high sea,
And the way of a man with a maid.
20 Thus is the way of the adulterous woman:
She eateth and wipeth her mouth, and saith:
I have done no iniquity.

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[1] Jerome translates, *et qui despicit partum matris suæ*. To *partus* there separates itself to him here the signification *expectatio*, Gen. xlix. 10, resting on a false combination with קוה. To think of *pareo*, *parui*, *paritum* (Muhlau), was not yet granted to him.

נִפְלְאוּ מִמֶּנִּי, as relative clause, like 15*b* (where Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion rightly: *τρία δέ ἐστιν ἃ οὐ πλησθήσεται*), is joined to שְׁלֹשָׁה הֵמָּה. On the other hand, ארבע (*τέσσαρα*, for which the *Kerî*, conforming to 18*a*, אַרְבָּעָה, *τέσσαρας*) has to be interpreted as object. accus. The introduction of four things that are not known is in expressions like Job xlii. 3; cf. Ps. cxxxix. 6. The turning-point lies in the fourth; to that point the other three expressions gravitate, which have not an object in themselves, but are only as *folie* to the fourth. The articles wanting after הַנָּשֶׁר: they would be only the marks of the gender, and are therefore unnecessary; cf. under xxix. 2. And while בַּשָּׁמַיִם, in the heavens, and בְּלֶב־יָם, in the sea, are the expressions used, עֲלֵי צוּר is used for on the rock, because here "on" is not at the same time "in," "within," as the eagle cleaves the air and the ship the waves. For this same reason the expression, "the way of a man בְּעַלְמָה," is not to be understood of love unsought, suddenly taking possession of and captivating a man toward this or that maid, so that the principal thought of the proverb may be compared to the saying, "marriages are made in heaven;" but, as in *Kidduschin* 2*b*, with reference to this passage, is said *coitus via appellatur*. The ב refers to *copula carnalis*. But in what respect did his understanding not reach to this? "Wonderful," thus Hitzig explains as the best interpreter of this opinion elsewhere (cf. *Psychol.* p. 115) propounded, "appeared to him the flying, and that how a large and thus heavy bird could raise itself so high in the air (Job xxxix. 27); then how, over the smooth rock, which offers no hold, the serpent pushes itself along; finally, how the ship on the trackless waves, which present nothing to the eye as a guide, nevertheless finds its way. These three things have at the same time this in common, that they leave no trace of their pathway behind them. But of the fourth way that cannot be said; for the trace is left on the *substrat*, which the man דֶּרֶךְ, and it becomes manifest, possibly as pregnancy, keeping out of view that the עלמה may yet be בתולה. That which is wonderful is consequently only the coition itself, its mystical act and its incomprehensible consequences." But does not this interpretation carry in itself its own refutation? To the three wonderful ways which leave no traces behind them, there

cannot be compared a fourth, the consequences of which are not only not trackless, but, on the contrary, become manifest as proceeding from the act in an incomprehensible way. The point of comparison is either the wonderfulness of the event or the tracklessness of its consequences. But now "the way of a man בתולה" is altogether inappropriate to designate the wonderful event of the origin of a human being. How altogether differently the *Chokma* expresses itself on this matter is seen from Job x. 8–12; Eccles. xi. 5 (cf. *Psychol.* p. 210). That "way of a man with a maid" denotes only the act of coition, which physiologically differs in nothing from that of the lower animals, and which in itself, in the externality of its accomplishment, the poet cannot possibly call something transcendent. And why did he use the word בעלמה, and not rather בְּנֶקֵבָה [with a female] or בְּאִשָּׁה [*id.*]? For this reason, because he meant the act of coition, not as a physiological event, but as a historical occurrence, as it takes place particularly in youth as the goal of love, not always reached in the divinely-appointed way. The point of comparison hence is not the secret of conception, but the tracelessness of the carnal intercourse. Now it is also clear why the way of the serpent על צור was in his eye: among grass, and still more in sand, the trace of the serpent's path would perhaps be visible, but not on a hard stone, over which it has glided. And it is clear why it is said of the ship בלב־ים [in the heart of the sea]: while the ship is still in sight from the land, one knows the track it follows; but who can in the heart of the sea, *i.e.* on the high sea, say that here or there a ship has ploughed the water, since the water-furrows have long ago disappeared? Looking to the heavens, one cannot say that an eagle has passed there; to the rock, that a serpent has wound its way over it; to the high sea, that a ship has been steered through it; to the maid, that a man has had carnal intercourse with her. That the fact might appear on nearer investigation, although this will not always guide to a certain conclusion, is not kept in view; only the outward appearance is spoken of, the intentional concealment (Rashi) being in this case added thereto. Sins against the sixth [=the seventh] commandment remain concealed from human knowledge, and are distinguished from others by this, that they shun human cognition (as the proverb

says: אין אפיטרופוס לעריות, there is for sins of the flesh no *ἐπίτροπος*)—unchastity can mask itself, the marks of chastity are deceitful, here only the All-seeing Eye (עַיִן רֹאָה כֹּל, *Aboth* ii. 1) perceives that which is done. Yet it is not maintained that "the way of a man with a maid" refers exclusively to external intercourse; but altogether or this side the proverb gains ethical significance. Regarding עַלְמָה (from עלם, *pubes esse et cœundi cupidus*, not from עלם, to conceal, and not, as Schultens derives it, from עלם, *signare*, to seal) as distinguished from בְּתוּלָה, *vid.* under Isa. vii. 14. The mark of maidenhood belongs to עלמה not in the same way as to בתולה (cf. Gen. xxiv. 43 with 16), but only the marks of puberty and youth; the wife אִשָּׁה (viz. אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ) cannot as such be called עלמה. Ralbag's gloss עלמה שהיא בעולה is incorrect, and in Arama's explanation (*Akeda*, Abschn. 9): the time is not to be determined when the sexual love of the husband to his wife flames out, ought to have been ודרך אִישׁ בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ. One has therefore to suppose that ver. 20 explains what is meant by "the way of a man with a maid" by a strong example (for "the adulterous woman" can mean only an old adulteress), there not inclusive, for the tracklessness of sins of the flesh in their consequences.

This 20th verse does not appear to have been an original part of the numerical proverb, but is an appendix thereto (Hitzig). If we assume that כֵּן points forwards: thus as follows is it with the . . . (Fleischer), then we should hold this verse as an independent cognate proverb; but where is there a proverb (except xi. 19) that begins with כֵּן? כן, which may mean *eodem modo* (for one does not say כֵּן גַּם) as well as *eo modo*, here points backwards in the former sense. Instead of וּמְחָתָה פִּיהָ (not פִּיהָ; for the attraction of that which follows, brought about by the retrogression of the tone of the first word, requires dageshing, *Thorath Emeth*, p. 30) the LXX. has merely *ἀπονιψαμένη*, *i.e.* as Immanuel explains: מְנַקָּה עצמה, *abstergens semet ipsam*, with Grotius, who to *tergens os suum* adds the remark: *σεμνολογία* (*honesta elocutio*). But eating is just a figure, like the "secret bread," ix. 17, and the wiping of the mouth belongs to this figure. This appendix, with its כן, confirms it, that the intention of the four ways refers to the tracklessness of the consequences.

It is now not at all necessary to rack one's brains over the grounds or the reasons of the arrangement of the following proverb (*vid.* Hitzig). There are, up to this point, two numerical proverbs which begin with שְׁתַּיִם, ver. 7, and שְׁתֵּי, ver. 15; after the cipher 2 there then, ver. 18, followed the cipher 3, which is now here continued,:

Ver. 21 Under three things doth the earth tremble,
And under four can it not stand:
22 Under a servant when he becomes king,
And a profligate when he has bread enough;
23 Under an unloved woman when she is married,
And a maid-servant when she becomes heiress to her mistress.

We cannot say here that the 4 falls into 3 + 1; but the four consists of four ones standing beside one another. אָרֶץ is here without pausal change, although the *Athnach* here, as at ver. 24, where the modification of sound occurs, divides the verse into two; מֵאָרֶץ, 14*b* (cf. Ps. xxxv. 2), remains, on the other hand, correctly unchanged. The "earth" stands here, as frequently, instead of the inhabitants of the earth. It trembles when one of the four persons named above comes and gains free space for acting; it feels itself oppressed as by an insufferable burden (an expression similar to Amos vii. 10);—the arrangement of society is shattered; an oppressive closeness of the air, as it were, settles over all minds. The first case is already designated, xix. 10, as improper: under a slave, when he comes to reign (*quum rex fit*); for suppose that such an one has reached the place of government, not by the murder of the king and by the robbery of the crown, but, as is possible in an elective monarchy, by means of the dominant party of the people, he will, as a rule, seek to indemnify himself in his present highness for his former lowliness, and in the measure of his rule show himself unable to rise above his servile habits, and to pass out of the limited circle of his earlier state. The second case is this: a נָבָל, one whose mind is perverted and whose conduct is profligate,—in short, a low man (*vid.* xvii. 17), —יִשְׂבַּע־לֶחֶם (cf. *Metheg-Setzung*, § 28), *i.e.* has enough to eat (cf. to the expression xxviii. 19, Jer. xliv. 17); for this undeserved living without care and without want makes him only so much

the more arrogant, and troublesome, and dangerous. The שְׂנוּאָה, in the second case, is not thought of as a spouse, and that, as in supposed polygamy, Gen. xxix. 31, Deut. xxi. 15–17, as fallen into disfavour, but who again comes to favour and honour (Dathe, Rosenmüller); for she can be שְׂנוּאָה without her own fault, and as such she is yet no גְּרוּשָׁה; and it is not to be perceived why the re-assumption of such an one should shatter social order. Rightly Hitzig, and, after his example, Zöckler: an unmarried lady, an old spinster, is meant, whom no one desired because she had nothing attractive, and was only repulsive (cf. Grimm, under Sir. vii. 26*b*). If such an one, as כִּי תִבָּעֵל says, at length, however, finds her husband and enters into the married relation, then she carries her head so much the higher; for she gives vent to ill-humour, strengthened by long restraint, against her subordinates; then she richly requites her earlier and happily married companions for their depreciation of her, among whom she had to suffer, as able to find no one who would love her. In the last case it is asked whether כִּי־תִירַשׁ is meant of inheriting as an heiress (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, the Targ., Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther), or supplanting (Euchel, Gesenius, Hitzig), *i.e.* an entering into the inheritance of the dead, or an entering into the place of a living mistress. Since ירשׁ, with the accus. of the person, Gen. xv. 3, 4, signifies to be the heir of one, and only with the accus. of peoples and lands signifies, "to take into possession (to seize) by supplanting," the former is to be preferred; the LXX. (Syr.), *ὅταν ἐκβάλῃ*, appear to have read כִּי־תְגָרֵשׁ. This גָּרַשׁ would certainly be, after Gen. xxi. 10, a piece of the world turned upside down; but also the entering, as heiress, into the inheritance, makes the maid-servant the reverse of that which she was before, and brings with it the danger that the heiress, notwithstanding her want of culture and dignity, demean herself also as heiress of the rank. Although the old Israelitish law knew only intestate succession to an inheritance, yet there also the case might arise, that where there were no natural or legal heirs, the bequest of a wife of rank passed over to her servants and nurses.

Vers. 24–28. Another proverb with the cipher 4, its first line terminating in ארץ:

Ver. 24 Four are the little things of the earth,
And yet they are quick of wit—wise:
25 The ants—a people not strong,
And yet they prepare in summer their food;
26 Conies—a people not mighty,
And yet set their dwelling on the rocks;
27 No king have the locusts,
And yet they go forth in rank and file, all of them together;
28 The lizard thou canst catch with the hands,
And yet it is in the king's palaces.

By the disjunctive accent, אַרְבָּעָה, in spite of the following word toned on the beginning, retains its *ultima*-toning, 18*a*; but here, by the conjunctive accent, the tone retrogrades to the *penult.*, which does not elsewhere occur with this word. The connection קְטַנֵּי־אֶרֶץ is not superlat. (for it is impossible that the author could reckon the שְׁפָנִים, conies, among the smallest of beasts), but, as in the expression נִכְבַּדֵי־אֶרֶץ, the honoured of the earth, Isa. xxiii. 8. In 24*b*, the LXX., Syr., Jerome, and Luther see in מ the comparative: *σοφώτερα τῶν σοφῶν* (מֵחֲכָמִים), but in this connection of words it could only be partitive (wise, reckoning among the wise); the *part. Pual* מְחֻכָּמִים (Theodotion, the *Venet. σεσοφισμένα*) was in use after Ps. lviii. 6, and signified, like בָּשֵׁל מְבֻשָּׁל, Ex. xii. 9, boiled well; thus חכמים מחכמים, taught wit, wise, cunning, prudent (cf. Ps. lxiv. 7, a planned plan = a cunningly wrought out plan; Isa. xxviii. 16, and Vitringa thereto: grounded = firm, grounding), Ewald, § 313*c*. The reckoning moves in the contrasts of littleness to power, and of greatness to prudence. The unfolding of the ארבעה [four] begins with the הַנְּמָלִים [the ants] and שְׁפָנִים [conies], subject conceptions with apposit. joined; 26*a*, at least in the indetermination of the subject, cannot be a declaration. Regarding the *fut. consec.* as the expression, not of a causal, but of a contrasted connection, *vid.* Ewald, § 342, 1*a*. The ants are called עַם, and they deserve this name, for they truly form communities with well-ordered economy; but, besides, the ancients took delight in speaking of the various classes of animals as peoples and states.[1] That which is said, 25*b*, as also vi. 8, is not to be understood of stores laid up for the winter. For the ants are torpid for the most part in winter; but certainly the summer is their time

[1] *Vid. Walter von der Vogelweide*, edited by Lachmann, p. 8 f.

for labour, when the labourers gather together food, and feed in a truly motherly way the helpless. עָכְבָּן, translated arbitrarily in the *Venet.* by ἐχῖνοι, in the LXX. by χοιρογρύλλιοι, by the Syr. and Targ. here and at Ps. civ. by חֲנָם, and by Jerome by *lepusculus* (cf. λαγίδιον), both of which names, here to be understood after a prevailing Jewish opinion, denote the *Caninichen*[1] (Luther), Latin *cuniculus* (κόνικλος), is not the *kaninchen* [rabbit], nor the marmot, χοιρογρύλλιος (C. B. Michaelis, Ziegler, and others); this is called in Arab. *yarbuw'*; but שָׁפָן is the *wabr*, which in South Arab. is called *thufun*, or rather *thafan*, viz. the *klippdachs* (*hyrax syriacus*), like the marmot, which lives in societies and dwells in the clefts of the mountains, *e.g.* at the Kedron, the Dead Sea, and at Sinai (*vid.* Knobel on Lev. xi. 5; cf. Brehm's *Thierleben*, ii. p. 721 ff., the *Illustrirte Zeitung*, 1868, Nr. 1290). The *klippdachs* are a weak little people, and yet with their weakness they unite the wisdom that they establish themselves among the rocks. The ants show their wisdom in the organization of labour, here in the arranging of inaccessible dwellings.

Ver. 27. Thirdly, the locusts belong to the class of the wise little folk: these have no king, but notwithstanding that, there is not wanting to them guidance; by the power and foresight of one sovereign will they march out as a body, חֹצְצִין, dividing, viz. themselves, not the booty (Schultens); thus: dividing themselves into companies, *ordine dispositæ*, from חָצַץ, to divide, to fall into two (cogn. חָצָה, *e.g.* Gen. xxxii. 7) or more parts; Mühlau, p. 59–64, has thoroughly investigated this whole wide range of roots. What this חָצַץ denotes is described in Joel ii. 7: "Like mighty men they hunt; like men of war they climb the walls; they march forward every one on his appointed way, and change not their paths." Jerome narrates from his own observation: *tanto ordine ex dispositione jubentis* (LXX. at this passage before us: ἀφ' ἑνὸς κελεύσματος εὐτάκτως) *volitant, ut instar tesserularum, quæ in pavimentis artificis figuntur manu,*

[1] The *kaninchen* as well as the *klippdachs* [cliff-badgers] may be meant, Lev. xi. 5 (Deut. xiv. 7); neither of these belong to the *bisulca*, nor yet, it is true, to the ruminants, though to the ancients (as was the case also with hares) they seemed to do. The *klippdach* is still, in Egypt and Syria, regarded as unclean.

suum locum teneant et ne puncto quidem et ut ita dicam ungue transverso declinent ad alterum. Aben Ezra and others find in חצן the idea of gathering together in a body, and in troops, according to which also the Syr., Targ., Jerome, and Luther translate; Kimchi and Meîri gloss חצן by חותך and כורת, and understand it of the cutting off, *i.e.* the eating up, of plants and trees, which the *Venet.* renders by *ἐκτέμνουσα.*

Ver. 28. In this verse the expression wavers in a way that is with difficulty determinable between שְׂמָמִית and שְׁמָמִית. The Edd. of Opitz Jablonski and Van der Hooght have שׂמ, but the most, from the Venetian 1521 to Nissel, have שׁמ (*vid* Mühlau, p. 69). The Codd. also differ as to the reading of the word; thus the Codd. Erfurt 2 and 3 have שׁמ; but Cod. 1294 has שׂמ. Isaak Tschelebi and Moses Algazi, in their writings regarding words with שׂ and שׁ (Constant. 1723 and 1799), prefer שׂמ, and so also do Mordecai Nathan in his *Concordance* (1563–4), David de Pomis (1587), and Norzi. An important evidence is the writing סממית, *Schabbath* 77*b*, but it is as little decisive as סִרְיוֹן [coat of mail], used by Jeremiah [xlvi. 4], is decisive against the older expression שִׁרְיוֹן. But what kind of a beast is meant here is a question. The swallow is at once to be set aside, as the *Venet.* translates (*χελιδών*) after Kimchi, who explains after Abulwalîd, but not without including himself, that the Heb. word for (Arab.) *khuttaf* (which is still the name given to the swallow from its quickness of motion), according to Haja's testimony, is much rather סְנוֹנִית, a name for the swallow; which also the Arab. (Freytag, ii. p. 368) and the modern Syriac confirm; besides, in old Heb. it has the name of סוּם or סִיס (from Arab. *shash*, to fly confusedly hither and thither). In like manner the ape (Aben Ezra, Meîri, Immanuel) is to be set aside, for this is called קוֹף (Indian *kapi*, *kap*, *kamp*, to move inconstantly and quickly up and down),[1] and appears here admissible only on the ground that from בירים תחפיט they read that the beast had a resemblance to man. There remains now only the lizard (LXX. Jerome) and the spider (Luther) to be considered. The Talmud, *Schabbath* 77*b*, reckons five instances in which fear of the weaker pursues the stronger: one of these instances is איומת סנונית על הנשר, another

[1] *Vid.* A. Weber's *Indische Studien*, i. pp. 217, 343.

אימת כמטית על העקרב. The swallow, thus Rashi explains, creeps under the wings of the eagle and hinders it from spreading them out in its flight; and the spider (*araigne*) creeps into the ear of the scorpion; or also: a bruised spider applied heals the scorpion's sting. A second time the word occurs, *Sanhedrin* 103*b*, where it is said of King Amon that he burnt the Tôra, and that over the altar came a שממית (here with שׂ), which Rashi explains of the spider (a spider's web). But Aruch testifies that in these two places of the Talmud the explanation is divided between *ragnatelo* (spider) and (Ital.) *lucêrta* (lizard). For the latter, he refers to Lev. xi. 30, where לטאה (also explained by Rashi by *lézard*) in the Jerus. Targ. is rendered[1] by שממיתא (the writing here also varies between שׂ and שׁ or ס). Accordingly, and after the LXX. and Jerome, it may be regarded as a confirmed tradition that שממית means not the spider, for which the name עַכָּבִישׁ is coined, but the lizard, and particularly the stellion (spotted lizard). Thus the later language used it as a word still living (plur. סְמָמִיּוֹת, *Sifre*, under Deut. xxxiii. 19). The Arab. also confirms this name as applicable to the lizard.[2] "To this day in Syria and in the Desert it is called *samawiyyat*, probably not from poison, but from *samawah* = שְׁמָמָה, the wilderness, because the beast is found only in the stony heaps of the *Kharab*" (Mühlau after Wetzstein). If this derivation is correct, then שממית is to be regarded as an original Heb. expression; but the lizard's name, *samm*, which, without doubt, designates the animal as poisonous (cf. סַם, *samam*, *samm*, vapour, poisonous breath, poison), favours Schultens' view: שממית = (Arab.) *samamyyat*, *afflatu interficiens*, or generally *venenosa*. In the expression בְּיָדַיִם תִּתְפֹּשׂ, Schultens, Gesenius, Ewald, Hitzig, Geier, and others, understand ידים of the two fore-feet of the lizard: "the lizard feels (or: seizes) with its two hands;" but granting that ידים is used of the fifteen feet of the *stellio*, or of the climbing feet of any other animal (LXX. *καλα-*

[1] The Samaritan has, Lev. xi. 30, שממית for אנקה, and the Syr. translates the latter word by אמקתא, which is used in the passage before us (cf. Geiger's *Urschrift*, p. 68 f.) for שממית; *omaḳto* (Targ. *aḳmetha*) appears there to mean, not a spider, but a lizard.

[2] Perhaps also the modern Greek, *σαμιάμιυθος* (*σαμιάμιδος*, *σαμιαμίδιον*), which Grotius compares.

βώτης = ἀσκαλαβώτης), yet it is opposed by this explanation, that in line first of this fourth distich an expression regarding the smallness or the weakness of the beast is to be expected, as at 25*a*, 26*a*, and 27*a*. And since, besides, תפשׂ with ביד or בכף always means "to catch" or "seize" (Ezek. xxi. 16, xxix. 7; Jer. xxxviii. 23), so the sense according to that explanation is: the lizard thou canst catch with the hand, and yet it is in kings' palaces, *i.e.* it is a little beast, which one can grasp with his hand, and yet it knows how to gain an entrance into palaces, by which in its nimbleness and cunning this is to be thought of, that it can scale the walls even to the summit (Aristoph. *Nubes* 170). To read תִּתָּפֵשׂ with Mühlau, after Böttcher, recommends itself by this, that in תֹּתַפֵּשׂ one misses the suff. pointing back (תִּתְפְּשֶׂנָּה); also why the intensive of תפשׂ is used, is not rightly comprehended. Besides, the address makes the expression more animated; cf. Isa. vii. 25, תָּבוֹא. In the LXX. as it lies before us, the two explanations spoken of are mingled together: καὶ καλαβώτης (= ἀσκαλαβώτης) χερσὶν ἐρειδόμενος καὶ εὐάλωτος ὢν . . . This εὐάλωτος ὢν (Symmachus, χερσὶν ἑλλαμβανόμενος) hits the sense of 28*a*. In הֵיכְלֵי מֶלֶךְ, מלך is not the genit. of possession, as at Ps. xlv. 9, but of description (Hitzig), as at Amos vii. 13.

Vers. 29–31. Another numerical proverb with the cipher 4 = 3 + 1:

Three things are of stately walk,
And four of stately going:
30 The lion, the hero among beasts,
And that turneth back before nothing;
31 The swift-loined, also the goat;
And a king with whom is the calling out of the host.

Regarding הֵיטִיב with inf. following (the segolated *n. actionis* צַעַר is of equal force with an inf.), *vid.* under xv. 2.[1] The relation of the members of the sentence in 30*a* is like that in 25*a* and 26*a*: subj. and apposit., which there, as here, is continued in a verbal clause which appears to us as relative. It deserves to be here remarked that לַיִשׁ, as the name for a

[1] In 29*a*, after Norzi, מֵיטִיבֵי, and in 29*b*, מֵיטְבֵי, is to be written, and this is required by the little Masora to 1 Sam. xxv. 31, the great, to Ezek. xxxiii. 33, and also the Erfurt little Masora to the passage before us.

lion, occurs only here and at Job iv. 11, and in the description of the Sinai wilderness, Isa. xxx. 6; in Arab. it is *layth*, Aram. לֵית, and belongs to the Arameo-Arab. dialect of this language; the LXX. and Syr. translate it "the young lion;" the *Venet.* excellently, by the epic λῖς. בְּבְהֵמָה has the article only to denote the genus, viz. of the beasts, and particularly the four-footed beasts. What is said in 30*b* (cf. with the expression, Job xxxix. 22) is described in Isa. xxx. 4. The two other beasts which distinguish themselves by their stately going are in 31*a* only briefly named. But we are not in the condition of the readers of this Book of Proverbs, who needed only to hear the designation זַרְזִיר מָתְנַיִם at once to know what beast was meant. Certainly זַרְזִיר, as the name for a beast, is not altogether unknown in the post-bibl. Heb. "In the days of Rabbi Chija (the great teacher who came from Babylon to the Academy of Sepphoris), as is narrated in *Bereschith rabba, sect.* 65, a *zarzir* flew to the land of Israel, and it was brought to him with the question whether it were eatable. Go, said he, place it on the roof! Then came an Egyptian raven and lighted down beside it. See, said Chija, it is unclean, for it belongs to the genus of the ravens, which is unclean (Lev. xi. 15). From this circumstance there arose the proverb: The raven goes to the *zarzir* because it belongs to his own tribe."[1] Also the *Jer. Rosch haschane*, Halacha 3: "It is the manner of the world that one seeks to assist his *zarzir*, and another his *zarzir*, to obtain the victory;" and *Midrash Echa* v. 1, according to which it is the custom of the world, that one who has a large and a little *zarzir* in his house, is wont to treat the little one sparingly, so that in the case of the large one being killed, he might not need to buy another. According to this, the *zarzir* is a pugnacious animal, which also the proverb *Bereschith rabba*, c. 75, confirms: two *zarzir* do not sleep on one board; and one makes use of his for contests like cock-fights. According to this, the זרזיר is a bird, and that of the species of the raven; after Rashi, the *étourneau*, the starling, which is confirmed by the Arab. *zurzur* (vulgar Arab.

[1] This "like draws to like" in the form: "not in vain goes the raven to the *zarzir*, it belongs just to its own tribe," came to be often employed, *Chullin* 65*a*, *Baba Kamma* 92*b*. Plantavitius has it, Tendlau more at large, *Sprichwörter*, *u.s.w.*, Nr. 577.

zarzur), the common name of starlings (cf. Syr. *zarzizo*, under *zrz* of Castelli). But for the passage before us, we cannot regard this as important, for why is the starling fully named זרזיר מָתְנַיִם? To this question Kimchi has already remarked that he knows no answer for it. Only, perhaps, the grave magpie (*corvus pica*), strutting with upraised tail, might be called *succinctus lumbos*, if מתנים can at all be used here of a bird. At the earliest, this might possibly be used of a cock, which the later Heb. named directly גֶּבֶר, because of its manly demeanour; most old translators so understand it. The LXX. translates, omitting the loins, by *ἀλέκτωρ ἐμπεριπατῶν θηλείαις εὔψυχος*, according to which the Syr. and Targ.: like the cock which struts about proudly among the hens;[1] Aquila and Theodotion: *ἀλέκτωρ* (*ἀλεκτρυὼν*) *νώτου*; the Quinta: *ἀλέκτωρ ὀσφύος*; Jerome: *gallus succinctus lumbos*. *Sarsar* (not *sirsir*, as Hitzig vocalizes) is in Arab. a name for a cock, from *sarsara*, to crow, an *onomatopœia*. But the Heb. זרזיר, as the name of a bird, signifies, as the Talmud proves on the ground of that history, not a cock, but a bird of the raven order, whether a starling, a crow, or a magpie. And if this name of a *corvinus* is formed from the *onomatopœia* זרזר, the weaker form of that (Arab.) *sarsar*, then מתנים, which, for זרזיר, requires the verbal root זרז, to girdle, is not wholly appropriate; and how strangely would the three animals be mingled together, if between לָבִישׁ and תַּיִשׁ, the two four-footed animals, a bird were placed! If, as is to be expected, the "*Lendenumgürtete*" [the one girded about the loins = זרזיר מָתְנַיִם] be a four-footed animal, then it lies near, with C. B. Michaelis and Ziegler, after Ludolf's[2] example, to

[1] Regarding the Targum Text, *vid.* Levy under אַבָּא and זְרִיבָל. The expression דְּמִזְדָּרֵן (who is girded, and shows himself as such) is not unsuitable.

[2] Ludolf gave, in his *Hist. Æthiop.* i. 10, and *Commentarius*, p. 150, only a description of the *Zecora*, without combining therewith זרזיר; but *vid.* Joh. Dietr. Winckler's *Theol. u. Philol. Abhand.* i. (1755) p. 33 ff.: "A nearer explanation of what is to be understood by זרזיר מתנים, Prov. xxx. 31, along with a statement from a hitherto unpublished correspondence between the learned philologists Hiob Ludolf and Matthai Leydecker, a Reformed preacher in Batavia." With Ludolf, Joh. Simonis also, in the *Arcanum Formarum* (1735), p. 687 sq., decides in favour of the zebra.

think of the zebra, the South African wild ass. But this animal lay beyond the sphere of the author's observation, and perhaps also of his knowledge, and at the same time of that of the Israelitish readers of this Book of Proverbs; and the dark-brown cross stripes on a white ground, by which the zebra is distinguished, extend not merely to its limbs, but over the whole body, and particularly over the front of the body. It would be more tenable to think of the leopard, with its black round spots, or the tiger, with dark stripes; but the name זרזיר מתנים scarcely refers to the colour of the hair, since one has to understand it after the Aram. זֶרֶז חַרְצִיהּ = שִׁנֵּם מָתְנָיו, 1 Kings xviii. 46, or אָזַר חֲלָצָיו, Job xxxviii. 3, and thus of an activity, *i.e.* strength and swiftness, depending on the condition of the loins. Those who, with Kimchi, think that the נָמֵר [leopard] is thus named, ground their view, not on this, that it has rings or stripes round its legs, but on this, that it דק מתנים וחזק במתניו. But this beast has certainly its definite name; but a fundamental supposition entering into every attempt at an explanation is this, that זרזיר מתנים, as well as לַיִשׁ and תַּיִשׁ, is the proper name of a beast, not a descriptive attribute. Therefore the opinion of Rosse, which Bochart has skilfully established in the *Hierozoicon*, does not recommend itself, for he only suggests, for choice, to understand the name, "the girded about the loins," in the proper sense of straps and clasps around and on the loins (thus *e.g.* Gesenius, Fleischer, Hitzig), or of strength, in the sense of the Arab. *habuwk*, the firmly-bound = compact, or *samm alsłab*, the girded loin (thus *e.g.* Muntinghe). Schultens connects together both references: *Utrumque jungas licet.* That the by-name fits the horse, particularly the war-horse, is undeniable; one would have to refer it, with Mühlau, to the slender structure, the thin flanks, which are reckoned among the requisites of a beautiful horse.[1] But if *succinctus lumbos* were a by-name of a horse, why did not the author at once say סוס זרזיר מתנים? We shall give the preference to the opinion, according to which the expression, "girt about the loins" = "with strong loins," or "with slender limbs," is not the by-name, but the proper name of the animal.

[1] *Vid.* Ahlwardt, *Chalef elahmar's Qasside* (1859), and the interpretation of the description of the horse contained therein, p. 201 ff.

This may be said of the hunting-hound, *lévrier* (according to which the *Venet.*, incorrectly translating מתנים: *λαγῳοκύων ψοιῶν*),[1] which Kimchi ranks in the first place. Luther, by his translation, *Ein Wind* = *Windhund* [greyhound], of good limbs, has given the right direction to this opinion. Melanchthon, Lavater, Mercier, Geier, and others, follow him; and, among the moderns, so also do Ewald and Böttcher (also Bertheau and Stuart), which latter supposes that before זרזיר מתנים there originally stood כלב, which afterwards disappeared. But why should the greyhound not at once be called זרזיר מתנים? We call the smaller variety of this dog the *Windspiel* [greyhound]; and by this name we think on a hound, without saying *Windspielhund.* The name זרזיר מתנים (Symmachus excellently: *περιεσφιγμένος*, not *περιεσφραγισμένος*, *τὴν ὀσφύν*, *i.e.* strongly bound in the limbs) is fitted at once to suggest to us this almost restless, slender animal, with its high, thin, nimble limbs. The verbal stem זָרַר, (Arâb.) *zarr*, signifies to press together, to knit together; the reduplicative form זָרְזֵר, to bind firmly together, whence זַרְזִיר, firmly bound together, referred to the limbs as designating a natural property (Ewald, § 158*a*): of straight and easily-moveable legs.[2] The hunting-hound (*salâḳi* or *salûḳi*, *i.e.* coming from Seleucia) is celebrated by the Arab. poets as much as the hunting-horse.[3] The name גָּבֶר, though not superfluous, the author ought certainly to have avoided, because it does not sound well in the Heb. collocation of words.

There now follows תַּיִשׁ, a goat, and that not the ram (Jerome, Luther), which is called אַיִל, but the he-goat, which bears this name, as Schultens has already recognised, from its pushing, as it is also called עַתּוּד, as *paratus ad pugnam*; the two names appear to be only provincially different; שָׂעִיר, on the contrary, is the old he-goat, as shaggy; and צְפִיר also perhaps denotes it, as Schultens supposes, with twisted, *i.e.* curled hair (*tortipilus*).

[1] Thus reads Schleusner, *Opusc. Crit.* p. 318, and refers it to the horse: *nam solebant equos figuris quibusdam notare et quasi sigillare.*

[2] The Aram. זְרַז is shortened from זַרְזֵר, as כְּרַךְ from כַּרְכֵּר; the particip. adj. זָרִיז signifies nimble, swift, eager, *e.g. Pesachim* 4*a*: "the zealous obey the commandment—as soon as possible hasten to fulfil it."

[3] *Vid.* Ahlwardt, *Chalef elahmar's Qasside*, p. 205 f.

In Arab. *tays* denotes the he-goat as well as the roebuck and the gazelle, and that at full growth. The LXX. (the Syr. and Targ., which is to be emended after the Syr.) is certainly right, for it understands the leading goat: *καὶ τράγος ἡγούμενος αἰπολίου.* The text, however, has not וְתַיִּשׁ, but אוֹ תַיִּשׁ, *ἢ τράγος* (Aquila, Theodotion, Quinta, and the *Venet.*). Böttcher is astonished that Hitzig did not take hold of this אוֹ, and conjectures תְּאוֹ־תַיִּשׁ, which should mean a "gazelle-goat" (Mühlau: *dorcas mas*). But it is too bold to introduce here תְּאוֹ (תּוֹא), which is only twice named in the O. T., and תאו־תיש for תְּאוֹ זָכָר is not the Heb. style; and besides, the setting aside of אוֹ has a harsh *asyndeton* for its consequence, which bears evidence to the appearance that תאו and תיש are two different animals. And is the אוֹ then so objectionable? More wonderful still must Song ii. 9 appear to us. If the author enumerated the four of stately going on his fingers, he would certainly have said וְתַיִּשׁ. By אוֹ he communicates to the hearer, setting before him another figure, how there in the Song Sulamith's fancy passed from one object to another.

To the lion, the king of the animal world, the king אֶלְקוֹם עַמּוֹ corresponds. This אלקום Hitzig regards as mutilated from אלהים (which was both written and pronounced as אלקים by the Jews, so as to conceal the true sound of the name of God),—which is untenable, for this reason, that this religious conclusion ["A king with whom God is"] accords badly with the secular character of this proverb. Geiger (*Urschrift*, p. 62 ff.) translates: "and King Alkimos corresponding to it (the lustful and daring goat)"—he makes the harmless proverb into a *ludibrium* from the time of the Maccabeo-Syrian war. The LXX., which the Syr. and Targ. follow, translates *καὶ βασιλεὺς δημηγορῶν ἐν ἔθνει*; it appears to have changed אלקום עמו into קם אל עמו (standing with his people and haranguing them), like the Quinta: *καὶ βασ. ἀναστὰς* (*ὃς ἀνέστη*) *ἐν τῷ λαῷ αὐτοῦ.* Ziegler and Böttcher also, reading עַמּוֹ and אֶל without any transposition, get וּמֶלֶךְ אֶל־קוּם עַמּוֹ, which the former translates: "a king with the presence of his people;" the latter, "a king with the setting up of his people,"—not accordant with the thought, for the king should be brought forward as מיטיב לָבֶת. For the same reason, Kimchi's explanation is not suitable: a

king with whom is no resistance, *i.e.* against whom no one can rank himself (thus *e.g.* also Immanuel); or more specially, but not better: who has no successor of his race (according to which the *Venet.* *ἀδιάδεκτος ξὺν ἑαυτῷ*). Rather this explanation commends itself: a king with whom (*i.e.* in war with whom) is no resistance. Thus Jerome and Luther: against whom no one dare place himself; thus Rashi, Aben Ezra, Ralbag (שׁאין תקומה עמו), Ahron b. Josef (קום = *ἀντίστασις*), Arama, and others; thus also Schultens, Fleischer (*adversus quem nemo consistere audet*), Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, Stuart, and others. But this connection of אֵל with the infin. is not Heb.; and if the *Chokma*, xii. 28, has coined the expression אֵל־מָוֶת for the idea of "immortality," then certainly it does not express the idea of resistlessness by so bold a *quasi compositum*. But this boldness is also there mitigated, for יְהִי is supplied after אֵל, which is not here practicable with קוּם, which is not a subst. like מָוֶת. Pocock in the *Spec. historiæ Arabum*, and Castellus in the *Lex. Heptaglotton* (not Castellio, as the word is printed by Zöckler), have recognised in אלקום the Arab. *âlkawm;* Schultens gives the LXX. the honour of this recognition, for he regards their translation as a paraphrase of *ὁ δῆμος μετ' αὐτοῦ*. Bertheau thinks that it ought to be in Arab. *kawmuhu*, but אלקום עמו = *âlkawhu ma'ahu* is perfectly correct, *âlkawhu* is the summons or the *Heerbann* = *arriere-ban;*[1] in North Africa they speak in their language in the same sense of the *Gums*. This explanation of אלקום, from the Arab. Dachselt (*rex cum satellitio suo*), Diedrichs in his Arab.-Syr. *Spicilegium* (1777), Umbreit, Gesenius, and Vaihinger, have recognised, and Mühlau has anew confirmed it at length. Hitzig, on the contrary, remarks that if Agur wrote on Arab. territory, we could be contented with the Arab. appellative, but not with the article, which in words like אַלְגַּבִּישׁ and אַלְכִּימִים is no longer of force as an art., but is an integ. component part of the word. We think that it is with אלקום exactly as with other words descriptive of lordship, and the many similar that have passed over into the Spanish

[1] Wetzstein's *Ausgewählte Inschriften*, p. 355: "The word *kawm* signifies people, not in the sense of *populus*, but in the sense of the Heb. קוּם (Job xxiv. 17) = *mukawim abrajul*, he who breaks with or against any one." Incorrect in Gesenius-Dietrich's *Heb. Wörterbuch*.

language; the word is taken over along with the article, without requiring the Heb. listener to take the art. as such, although he certainly felt it better than we do, when we say "*das Alkoran*" [the Alcoran], "*das Alcohol*," and the like. Blau also, in his *Gesch. der Arab. Substantiv-Determ.*,[1] regards it as certain that Agur borrowed this אלקום from the idiom of the Arabians, among whom he lived, and heard it constantly spoken. By this explanation we first reach a correspondence between what is announced in lines first and second and line sixth. A king as such is certainly not "comely in going;" he can sit upon his throne, and especially as δημηγορῶν will he sit (Acts xii. 21) and not stand. But the majesty of his going shows itself when he marches at the head of those who have risen up at his summons to war. Then he is for the army what the תיש [he-goat] is for the flock. The או, preferred to ו, draws close together the תיש and the king (cf. *e.g.* Isa. xiv. 9).

Vers. 32, 33. Another proverb, the last of Agur's "Words" which exhorts to thoughtful, discreet demeanour, here follows the proverb of self-conscious, grave deportment:

If thou art foolish in that thou exaltest thyself,
Or in devising,—put thy hand to thy mouth!
33 For the pressure on milk bringeth forth butter,
And pressure on the nose bringeth forth blood,
And pressure on sensibility bringeth forth altercation.

Löwenstein translates ver. 32:

Art thou despicable, it is by boasting;
Art thou prudent, then hold thy hand on thy mouth.

But if זמם denotes reflection and deliberation, then נָבָל, as its opposite, denotes unreflecting, foolish conduct. Then בְּהִתְנַשֵּׂא [by boasting] is not to be regarded as a consequent (thus it happens by lifting thyself up; or: it is connected with boasting); by this construction also, אִם־נָבַלְתָּ must be accented with *Dechi*, not with *Tarcha*. Otherwise Euchel:

Hast thou become offensive through pride,
Or seems it so to thee,—lay thy hand to thy mouth.

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[1] In the "*Alt-arab. Sprachstudien*," *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxv. 539 f.

The thought is appropriate,[1] but נָבַלְתָּ for נִבַּלְתָּ is more than improbable; נָבָל, thus absolutely taken in an ethical connection, is certainly related to נָבָל, as כָּסַל, Jer. x. 8, to כְּסִיל. The prevailing mode of explanation is adopted by Fleischer: *si stulta arrogantia elatus fueris et si quid durius (in alios) mente conceperis, manum ori impone; i.e.*, if thou arrogantly, and with offensive words, wilt strive with others, then keep thyself back, and say not what thou hast in thy mind. But while מְזִמָּה and מְזִמּוֹת denote intrigues, xiv. 17, as well as plans and considerations, זָמַם has never by itself alone the sense of *meditari mala;* at Ps. xxxvii. 12, also with ל of the object at which the evil devices aim. Then for וְאִם . . . אִם (Arab. *ân . . . wân*) there is the supposition of a correlative relation, as *e.g.* 1 Kings xx. 18, Eccles. xi. 3, by which at the same time זְמוֹתָ is obviously thought of as a contrast to נָבַלְתָּ. This contrast excludes[2] for זמות not only the sense of *mala moliri* (thus *e.g.* also Mühlau), but also the sense of the Arab. *zamm, superbire* (Schultens). Hitzig has the right determination of the relation of the members of the sentence and the ideas: if thou art irrational in ebullition of temper and in thought—thy hand to thy mouth! But הִתְנַשֵּׂא has neither here nor elsewhere the meaning of הִתְעַבֵּר (to be out of oneself with anger); it signifies everywhere to elevate or exalt oneself, *i.e.* rightly or wrongly to make much of oneself. There are cases where a man, who raises himself above others, appears as a fool, and indeed acts foolishly; but there are also other cases, when the despised has a reason and an object for vindicating his superiority, his repute, his just claim: when, as we say, he places himself in his right position, and assumes importance; the poet here recommends, to the one as well as to the other, silence. The rule that silence is gold has its exceptions, but here also it is held valid as a rule. Luther and others interpret the *perfecta* as looking back: "hast thou be-

[1] Yet the Talmud, *Nidda* 27*a*, derives another moral rule from this proverb, for it interprets זָמַם in the sense of חָסַם, to tie up, to bridle, to shut up, but אם נבלת in the sense of "if thou hast made thyself despicable," as Löwenstein has done.

[2] The Arab. signification, to become proud, is a *nüance* of the primary signification, to hold erect—viz. the head,—as when the rider draws up the head of a camel by means of the halter (Arab. *zamam*).

come a fool and ascended too high and intended evil, then lay thy hand on thy mouth." But the reason in ver. 33 does not accord with this rendering, for when that has been done, the occasion for hatred is already given; but the proverb designs to warn against the stirring up of hatred by the reclaiming of personal pretensions. The *perfecta*, therefore, are to be interpreted as at Deut. xxxii. 29, Job ix. 15, as the expression of the abstract present; or better, as at Job ix. 16, as the expression of the fut. *exactum:* if thou wouldest have acted foolishly, since thou walkest proudly, or if thou hadst (before) thought of it (Aquila, Theodotion: *καὶ ἐὰν ἐννοηθῇς*)—the hand on thy mouth, *i.e.* let it alone, be silent rather (expression as xi. 24; Judg. xviii. 19; Job xl. 4). The *Venet.* best: *εἴπερ ἐμώρανας ἐν τῷ ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ εἴπερ ἐλογίσω, χεὶρ τῷ στόματι.* When we have now interpreted הִתְנַשֵּׂא, not of the rising up of anger, we do not also, with Hitzig, interpret the dual of the two snorting noses—viz. of the double anger, that of him who provokes to anger, and that of him who is made angry,—but אַפַּיִם denotes the two nostrils of one and the same person, and, figuratively, snorting or anger. Pressure against the nose is designated מְיִן־אַף, *ἐκμύζησις* (*ἐκπίεσις*) *μυκτῆρος* (write וּמְיִן־אַף, with *Metheg*, with the long tone, after *Metheg-Setzung*, § 11, 9, 12), and מְיִן אַפַּיִם, *ἐκμύζησις θυμοῦ* (Theodotion), with reference to the proper meaning of אפים, pressure to anger, *i.e.* to the stirring up and strengthening of anger. The nose of him who raises himself up comes into view, in so far as, with such self-estimation, sneering, snuffling scorn (*μυκτηρίζειν*) easily connects itself; but this view of מתנשׂא is not here spoken of.

SECOND APPENDIX TO THE SECOND SOLOMONIC COLLECTION OF PROVERBS.—XXXI. 1–9.

Superscription:

Ver. 1 Words of Lemuel the king,
The utterance wherewith his mother warned him.

Such would be the superscription if the interpunction of the text as it lies before us were correct. But it is not possibly

right. For, notwithstanding the assurance of Ewald, § 277*b*, למואל מלך, nevertheless, as it would be here used, remains an impossibility. Certainly under circumstances an indeterminate apposition can follow a proper name. That on coins we read מתתיה כהן גדול or נרון קיסר is nothing strange; in this case we also use the words "Nero, emperor," and that we altogether omit the article shows that the case is singular: the apposition wavers between the force of a generic and of a proper name. A similar case is the naming of the proper name with the general specification of the class to which this or that one bearing the name belongs in lists of persons, as *e.g.* 1 Kings iv. 2–6, or in such expressions as, *e.g.*, "Damascus, a town," or "*Tel Hum*, a castle," and the like; here we have the indefinite article, because the apposition is a simple declaration of the class.[1] But would the expression, "The poem of Oscar, a king," be proper as the title of a book? Proportionally more so than "Oscar, king;" but also that form of indeterminate apposition is contrary to the *usus loq.*, especially with a king with whom the apposition is not a generic name, but a name of honour. We assume that "Lemuel" is a symbolical name, like "Jareb" in "King Jareb," Hos. v. 13, x. 6; so we would expect the phrase to be למואל (ה)מלך rather than למואל כולך. The phrase "Lemuel, king," here in the title of this section of the book, sounds like a double name, after the manner of עֶבֶר מֶלֶךְ in the book of Jeremiah. In the Greek version also the phrase *Λεμουέλου βασιλέως* (*Venet.*) is not used as syntactically correct without having joined to the *βασιλέως* a dependent genitive such as *τῶν Αράβων*, while none of the old translators, except Jerome, take the words למואל מלך together in the sense of *Lamuelis regis*. Thus מֶלֶךְ מַשָּׂא are to be taken together, with Hitzig, Bertheau, Zöckler, Mühlau, and Dächsel, against Ewald and Kamphausen; משא, whether it be a name of a tribe or a country, or of both

[1] Thus it is also with the examples of indeterminate *gentilicia*, which Riehm makes valid for למואל מלך (for he translates למואל symbolically, which, however, syntactically makes no difference): "As analogous to 'Lemuel, a king,' one may adduce 'Jeroboam, son of Nebat, an Ephrathite,' 1 Kings xi. 26, instead of the usual form 'the Ephrathite;'" and בן־ימיני, Ps. vii. 1, for בן הימיני; on the contrary, כהן, 1 Kings iv. 5, does not belong to the subject, but is the pred.

at the same time, is the region ruled over by Lemuel, and since this proper name throws back the determination which it has in itself on מלך, the phrase is to be translated: "Words of Lemuel the king of Massa" (*vid.* under xxx. 1). If Aquila renders this proper name by *Λεμμοῦν*, Symmachus by *'Ιαμουήλ*, Theodotion by *Ρεβουήλ*, the same arbitrariness prevails with reference to the initial and terminal sound of the word, as in the case of the words *'Αμβακούμ*, *Βεελζεβούλ*, *Βελίαρ*. The name לְמוּאֵל sounds like the name of Simeon's first-born, יְמוּאֵל, Gen. xlvi. 10, written in Num. xxvi. 12 and 1 Chron. iv. 24 as נְמוּאֵל; יוּאֵל also appears, 1 Chron. iv. 35, as a Simeonite name, which Hitzig adduces in favour of his view that משׂא was a North Arab. Simeonite colony. The interchange of the names ימואל and נמואל is intelligible if it is supposed that ימואל (from יָמָה = יָמָא) designates the sworn (sworn to) of God, and נמואל (from נָם Mishnic = נָאַם)[1] the expressed (addressed) of God; here the reference of ימו and נמו to verbal stems is at least possible, but a verb לָמָה is found only in the Arab., and with significations *inus*. But there are two other derivations of the name: (1) The verb (Arab.) *waâla* signifies to hasten (with the infin. of the *onomatop.* verbs *waniyal*, like *rahyal*, walking, because motion, especially that which is tumultuous, proceeds with a noise), whence *mawnil*, the place to which one flees, retreat. Hence לְמוּאֵל or לְמוֹאֵל, which is in this case to be assumed as the ground-form, might be formed from אֵל מוֹאֵל, God is a refuge, with the rejection of the א. This is the opinion of Fleischer, which Mühlau adopts and has established, p. 38–41; for he shows that the initial א is not only often rejected where it is without the support of a full vocal, *e.g.* נַחְנוּ = אֲנַחְנוּ, *lalah* = *ilalah* (*Deus*), but that this aphaeresis not seldom also occurs where the initial has a full vocal, *e.g.* לְעָזֵר = אֶלְעָזֵר, *lahmaru* = *âllahmaru* (*ruber*), *lahsâ* = *âl-lahsâ* (the name of a town); cf. also Blau in *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxv. 580. But this view is thus acceptable and tenable; a derivation which spares us by a like certainty the supposition of such an abbreviation established only by the late Palestinian לעזר, *Ἀάζαρος*, might well desire the preference. (2) Fleischer himself suggests another derivation: "The signi-

[1] In the *Midrash Koheleth* to i. 1, the name Lemuel (as a name of Solomon) is explained: he who has spoken to God in his heart.

fication of the name is *Deo consecratus*, לְמוֹ, poetic for לְ, as also in ver. 4 it is to be vocalized לְמוֹאֵל after the Masora." The form לְמוֹאֵל is certainly not less favourable to that first derivation than to this second; the *û* is in both cases an obscuration of the original . But that "Lemuel" may be explained in this second way is shown by "Lael," Num. iii. 24 (Olshausen, § 277*d*).[1] It is a beautiful sign for King Lemuel, and a verification of his name, that it is he himself by whom we receive the admonition with which his mother in her care counselled him when he attained to independent government. אֲשֶׁר connects itself with דברי, after we have connected משׂא with מלך; it is accus. of the manner to יִסְּרַתְהוּ = יִסְּרַתְהוּ; cf. חַטָּתוּ, vii. 21, with נְחָלָתְהוּ, xxxi. 12: wherewith (with which words) she earnestly and impressively admonished him. The Syr. translates: words of Muel, as if לְ were that of the author. "Others as inconsistently: words to Lemuel—they are words which he himself ought to carry in his mouth as received from his mother" (Fleischer).

The name "Massa," if it here means *effatum*, would be proportionally more appropriate for these "Words" of Lemuel than for the "Words" of Agur, for the maternal counsels form an inwardly connected compact whole. They begin with a question which maternal love puts to itself with regard to the beloved son whom she would advise:

Ver. 2 What, my son? and what the son of my womb?
And what, O son of my vows?!

The thrice repeated מה is completed by תֵּעָשֶׂה (cf. Köhler under Mal. ii. 15), and that so that the question is put for the purpose of exciting attention: Consider well, my son, what thou wilt do as ruler, and listen attentively to my counsel (Fleischer). But the passionate repetition of מה would be only affectation if thus interpreted; the underlying thought must be of a subjective nature: what shall I say, אֲדַבֵּר (*vid.* under Isa. xxxviii. 15), what advise thee to do? The question, which is at the same time a call, is like a deep sigh from the heart of the mother concerned for the welfare of her son, who would say to him what is beneficial, and say it in words which strike and remain fixed. He

[1] Simonis has also compared Æthiopic proper names, such as *Zakrestos*, *Zaiasus*, *Zamikaël*, *Zamariam*.

is indeed her dear son, the son whom she carries in her heart, the son for whom with vows of thanksgiving she prayed to God; and as he was given her by God, so to His care she commits him. The name "Lemuel" is, as we interpret it, like the anagram of the fulfilment of the vows of his mother. בְּרִי bears the Aramaic shade in the Arameo-Arab. colouring of these proverbs from Massa; בְּרֵיהּ is common in the Aram., and particularly in the Talmudic, but it can scarcely be adduced in support of ברי. וּמָה belongs to the 24, מָה, with ח or ע not following; *vid.* the Masora to Ex. xxxii. 1, and its correction by Norzi at Deut. xxix. 23. We do not write וּמַה־בַּר; מה, with *Makkeph* and with *Metheg*, exclude one another.

Ver. 3. The first admonition is a warning against effeminating sensuality:

> Give not thy strength to women,
> Nor thy ways to them that destroy kings.

The punctuation לְמָחוֹת sees in this form a syncopated *inf. Hiph.* = לְהַמְחוֹת (*vid.* at xxiv. 17), according to which we are to translate: *viasque tuas ad perdendos reges* (*ne dirige*), by which, as Fleischer formulates the twofold possibility, it may either be said: direct not thy effort to this result, to destroy neighbouring kings,—viz. by wars of invasion (properly, to wipe them away from the table of existence, as the Arabs say), —or: do not that by which kings are overthrown; *i.e.*, with special reference to Lemuel, act not so that thou thyself must thereby be brought to ruin. But the warning against vengeful, rapacious, and covetous propensity to war (thus Jerome, so the *Venet.* after Kimchi: *ἀπομάττειν βασιλέας*, C. B. Michaelis, and earlier, Gesenius) does not stand well as parallel with the warning against giving his bodily and mental strength to women, *i.e.* expending it on them. But another explanation: direct not thy ways to the destruction of kings, *i.e.* toward that which destroys kings (Elster); or, as Luther translates: go not in the way wherein kings destroy themselves,—puts into the words a sense which the author cannot have had in view; for the individualizing expression would then be generalized in the most ambiguous way. Thus למחות מלכין will be a name for women, parallel to לַנָּשִׁים. So far the translation of the Targum: לִבְנָת מַלְכִין, *filiabus* (לְאַמְהוֹת?) *regum*,

lies under a right supposition. But the designation is not thus general. Schultens explains *catapultis regum* after Ezek. xxvi. 9; but, inasmuch as he takes this as a figure of those who lay siege to the hearts of men, he translates: *expugnatricibus regum*, for he regards מחות as the plur. of מָחָה, a particip. noun, which he translates by *deletor*. The connecting form of the fem. plur. of this מָחָה might certainly be מְחוֹת (cf. מְזֵי, from מָזֶה), but לְמַחוֹת מלכין ought to be changed into לְמֵי וגו׳; for one will not appeal to anomalies, such as לַמּ׳, xvi. 4; בַּנּ׳, Isa. xxiv. 2; לַמּ׳, Lam. i. 19; or תַּח׳ וגו׳, 1 Kings xiv. 24, to save the *Pathach* of לַמְחוֹת, which, as we saw, proceeds from an altogether different understanding of the word. But if לַמּ׳ is to be changed into לְמֵי, then one must go further, since for מָחָה not an active but a conditional meaning is to be assumed, and we must write לְמוּחוֹת, in favour of which Fleischer as well as Gesenius decides: *et ne committe consilia factaque tua iis quæ reges perdunt, regum pestibus.* Ewald also favours the change לְמוּחוֹת, for he renders מָחָה as a denom. of מֹחַ, marrow: those who enfeeble kings, in which Kamphausen follows him. Mühlau goes further; he gives the privative signification, to enfeeble, to the *Piel* מִחָה = *makhakha* (cf. Herzog's *Real-Wörterb.* xiv. 712), which is much more probable, and proposes לַמְמַחוֹת: *iis quæ vires enervant regum.* But we can appropriately, with Nöldeke, adhere to לְמוֹחוֹת, *deletricibus* (*perditrici bus*), for by this change the parallelism is satisfied; and that מָחָה may be used, with immediate reference to men, of entire and total destruction, is sufficiently established by such passages as Gen. vi. 7, Judg. xxi. 17, if any proof is at all needed for it. Regarding the LXX. and those misled by it, who, by מלכין and מלכים, 4*a*, think on the Aram. מְלָכִין, *βουλαί*, *vid.* Mühlau, p. 53.[1] But the Syr. has an idea worthy of the discourse, who translates *epulis regum* without our needing, with Mühlau, to charge him with dreaming of לֶחֶם in למחות. Perhaps that is true; but perhaps by למחות he thought of לְמֻחוֹת (from מֻחַ, the particip. adj. of מָחַח): do not direct thy ways to rich food (morsels), such as kings love and can have. By this reading,

[1] Also Hitzig's *Blinzlerinnen* [women who ogle or leer = seductive courtesans] and Böttcher's *Streichlerinnen* [caressers, viz. of kings] are there rejected, as they deserve to be.

3*b* would mediate the transition to ver. 4; and that the mother refers to the immorality, the unseemliness, and the dangers of a large harem, only in one brief word (3*a*), cannot seem strange, much rather it may be regarded as a sign of delicacy. But so much the more badly does וְדַרְכֵיךְ accord with לְמֹחוֹת. Certainly one goes to a banquet, for one finds leisure for it; but of one who himself is a king, it is not said that he should not direct his ways to a king's dainties. But if לְמֹחוֹת refers to the whole conduct of the king, the warning is, that he should not regulate his conduct in dependence on the love and the government of women. But whoever will place himself amid the revelry of lust, is wont to intoxicate himself with ardent spirits; and he who is thus intoxicated, is in danger of giving reins to the beast within him. Hence there now follows a warning against drunkenness, not unmediated by the reading לְמֹחוֹת:

Ver. 4 It is not for kings, O Lemuel,
Not for kings to drink wine,
Not for rulers to ask for intoxicating drink;
5 Lest he drink, and forget what is prescribed,
And pervert the right of all the children of want.

The usual translation of 4*a* is: *non decet reges* . . . (as *e.g.* also Mühlau); but in this אַל is not rightly rendered, which indeed is at times only an *οὐ*, spoken with close interest, but yet first of all, especially in such parænetic connection as here, it is a dissuasive *μή*. But now לֹא לַמְּלָכִים שְׁתוֹת or לֹא לַמְּלָכִים לִשְׁתוֹת, after 2 Chron. xxvi. 18, Mic. iii. 1, signifies: it is not the part of kings, it does not become them to drink, which may also be turned into a dissuasive form: let it not be the part of kings to drink, let them not have any business therewith, as if it belonged to their calling; according to which Fleischer renders: *Absit a regibus, Lemuel, absit a regibus potare vinum.* The clearer expression לְמוֹאֵל, instead of לְמוֹאֵל, is, after Böttcher, occasioned by this, that the name is here in the vocative; perhaps rather by this, that the meaning of the name: consecrated to God, belonging to God, must be placed in contrast to the descending to low, sensual lust. Both times we write אַל לַמְּלָכִים with the orthophonic *Dagesh*[1] in the ל following ל, and with-

[1] *Vid. Luth. Zeitschrift*, 1863, p. 413. It is the rule, according to which, with Ben-Asher, it is to be written בֶּן־נוּן

out the recompensative *Dagesh*, the want of which is in a certain measure covered by the *Metheg* (*vid.* Norzi). Regarding the *inf. constr.* שְׁתוֹ (cf. קָנֹה, xvi. 16), *vid.* Gesen. § 75, Anm. 2; and regarding the sequence of accents here necessary, אֲלֶ֣ לְמֻלְכִ֔ים שְׁתוֹ־יָ֑ין (not *Mercha*, *Dechi*, *Athnach*, for *Dechi* would be here contrary to rule), *vid. Thoraath Emeth*, p. 22 § 6, p. 43 § 7. In 4*b* nothing is to be gained from the *Chethîb* אוֹ. There is not a substantive אָו, desire, the *constr.* of which would here have to be read, not אוֹ (Umbreit, Gesenius), but אַו, after the form קַו (Maurer); and why did the author not write תַּאֲוַת שֵׁכָר? But the particle אוֹ does not here also fall in with the connection; for if שֵׁכָר אוֹ connect itself with יַיִן (Hitzig, Ewald, and others), then it would drag disagreeably, and we would have here a spiritless classification of things unadvisable for kings. Böttcher therefore sees in this אוֹ the remains of the obliterated סְבוֹא; a corrector must then have transformed the וא which remained into אוֹ. But before one ventures on such conjectures, the *Kerî* אַי [where?] must be tried. Is it the abbreviated אַיִן (Herzog's *Real-Wörterbuch*, xiv. 712)? Certainly not, because וְלָרוֹזְנִים אַיִן שֵׁכָר would mean: and the princes, or rulers (*vid.* regarding רוזנים at viii. 15), have no mead, which is inconsistent. But אַיִן does not abbreviate itself into אַי, but into אִי. Not אַי, but אִי, is in Heb., as well as in Ethiop., the word with which negative adjectives such as אִי נָקִי, not innocent, Job xxii. 30, and in later Heb. also, negative sentences, such as אִי אֶפְשָׁר: it is not possible, are formed.[1] Therefore Mühlau vocalizes אִי, and thinks that the author used this word for אַל, so as not to repeat this word for the third time. But how is that possible? אִי שֵׁכָר signifies either: not mead, or: there is not mead; and both afford, for the passage before us, no meaning. Is, then, the *Kerî* אַי truly so unsuitable? Indeed, to explain: how came intoxicating drink to rulers! is inadmissible, since אַי always means only *ubi* (*e.g.* Gen. iv. 9); not, like the Ethiop. *aitê*, also *quomodo*. But the

[1] The author of the Comm. עטרת זקנים to the ארח חיים, c. 6, Geiger and others would read אִי, because אִי is abbreviated from אֵין. But why not from אַיִן, 1 Sam. xxi. 9? The traditional expression is אַי; and Elias Levita in the *Tishbi*, as also Baer in the Siddur *Abodath Jisrael*, are right in defending it against that innovation.

question *ubi temetum*, as a question of desire, fits the connection, whether the sentence means: *non decet principibus dicere* (Ahron b. Josef supplies שיאמרו) *ubi temetum*, or: *absit a principibus quærere ubi temetum* (Fleischer), which, from our view of 4*a*, we prefer. There is in reality nothing to be supplied; but as 4*a* says that the drinking of wine ought not to characterize kings, so 4*b*, that "Where is mead?" (*i.e.* this eager inquiry after mead) ought not to characterize rulers.[1] Why not? ver. 5 says. That the prince, being a slave to drink, may not forget the מְחֻקָּק, *i.e.* that which has been made and has become חֹק, thus that which is lawfully right, and may not alter the righteous cause of the miserable, who cry against their oppressors, *i.e.* may not handle falsely the facts of the case, and give judgment contrary to them. שְׁנָּה דִין (Aquila, Theodotion, Quinta, *ἀλλοιοῦν κρίσιν*) is elsewhere equivalent to הִטָּה מִשְׁפָּט (עִוֵּת). בְּנֵי־עֹנִי are those who are, as it were, born to oppression and suffering. This mode of expression is a Semitism (Fleischer), but it here heightens the impression of the Arab. colouring. In כל (*Venet.* *ὠντινοῦν*) it is indicated that, not merely with reference to individual poor men, but in general to the whole class of the poorer people, suffering humanity, sympathy and a regard for truth on the part of a prince given to sensuality are easily thrown aside. Wine is better suited for those who are in a condition to be timeously helped over which, is a refreshment to them.

Ver. 6 Give strong drink to him that is perishing,
And wine to those whose soul is in bitter woe;
7 Let him drink and forget his poverty,
And let him think of his misery no more.

The preparation of a potion for malefactors who were condemned to death was, on the ground of these words of the proverb, cared for by noble women in Jerusalem (נשים יקרות שבירושלים), *Sanhedrin* 43*a*; Jesus rejected it, because He wished, without becoming insensible to His sorrow, to pass away from the earthly life freely and in full consciousness, Mark xv. 23.

[1] The translation of Jerome, *quia nullum secretum est ubi regnat ebrietas* (as if the words were לֵית רָזָא אֵי שֵׁכָר), corresponds to the proverb: נכנס יין יצא סוד, when the wine goes in the secret comes out; or, which is the same thing: if one adds יין (= 70), סוד (= 70) comes out.

The transition from the plur. to the sing. of the subject is in ver. 7 less violent than in ver. 5, since in ver. 6 singular and plur. already interchange. We write תְּנוּ־שֵׁכָר with the counter-tone *Metheg* and *Mercha*. אוֹבֵד designates, as at Job xxix. 13, xxxi. 19, one who goes to meet destruction: it combines the present signification *interiens*, the fut. signif. *interiturus*, and the perf. *perditus* (hopelessly lost). מָרֵי נֶפֶשׁ (those whose minds are filled with sorrow) is also supported from the Book of Job, iii. 20, cf. xxi. 25, the language and thought and mode of writing of which notably rests on the Proverbs of Agur and Lemuel (*vid.* Mühlau, pp. 64–66). The *Venet.* τοῖς πικροῖς (not ψυχροῖς) τὴν ψυχήν. רֵישׁ (poverty) is not, however, found there, but only in the Book of Proverbs, in which this word-stem is more at home than elsewhere. Wine rejoices the heart of man, Ps. civ. 15, and at the same time raises it for the time above oppression and want, and out of anxious sorrow, wherefore it is soonest granted to them, and in sympathizing love ought to be presented to them by whom this its beneficent influence is to be wished for. The ruined man forgets his poverty, the deeply perplexed his burden of sorrow; the king, on the contrary, is in danger from this cause of forgetting what the law required at his hands, viz. in relation to those who need help, to whom especially his duty as a ruler refers.

Ver. 8 Open thy mouth for the dumb,
For the right of all the children of leaving;
9 Open thy mouth, judge righteously,
And do right to the poor and needy.

He is called dumb who suffers the infirmity of dumbness, as עִוֵּר and פִּסֵּחַ, Job xxix. 15, is he who suffers the infirmity of blindness or lameness, not here figuratively; at the same time, he who, on account of his youth, or on account of his ignorance, or from fear, cannot speak before the tribunal for himself (Fleischer). With לְ the *dat. commodi* (LXX. after Lagarde, μογιλάλῳ; Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, ἀλάλῳ; the *Venet.* after Gebhardt, βωβῷ) אֶל, of the object aimed at, interchanges, as *e.g.* 1 Kings xix. 3, 2 Kings vii. 7, אֶל־נַפְשָׁם, for the preservation of their life, or for the sake of their life, for it is seldom that it introduces the object so purely as here. And that an infin. such as חֲלוֹף should stand as a subst. occurs proportionally

seldomer in Heb. (Isa. iv. 4; Ps. xxii. 7; cf. with ה of the artic., Num. iv. 12; Ps. lxvi. 9) than it does in Arab. בְּנֵי חֲלוֹף in the same way as בְּנֵי־עָנִי, 5*b*, belongs to the Arab. complexion of this proverb, but without its being necessary to refer to the Arab. in order to fix the meaning of these two words. Hitzig explains after *khalf*, to come after, which further means "to have the disadvantage," in which Zöckler follows him; but this verb in Arab. does not mean *ὑστερεῖν* (*ὑστερεῖσθαι*), we must explain "sons of him that remains behind," *i.e.* such as come not forward, but remain behind (*'an*) others. Mühlau goes further, and explains, with Schultens and Vaihinger: those destitute of defence, after (Arab.) *khalafahu* he is ranked next to him, and has become his representative—a use of the word foreign to the Heb. Still less is the rendering of Gesenius justified, "children of inheritance" = children left behind, after *khallafa*, to leave behind; and Luther, "for the cause of all who are left behind," by the phrase (Arab.) *khallfany 'an 'awnih*, he has placed me behind his help, denied it to me, for the *Kal* of the verb cannot mean to abandon, to leave. And that בני חלוף means the opposers of the truth, or of the poor, or the litigious person, the quarrelsome, is perfectly inadmissible, since the *Kal* חלוף cannot be equivalent to (Arab.) *khilaf*, the inf. of the 3d conj., and besides, the gen. after דִּין always denotes those in whose favour, not those against whom it is passed; the latter is also valid against Ralbag's "sons of change," *i.e.* who say things different from what they think; and Ahron b. Josef's "sons of changing," viz. the truth into lies. We must abide by the meaning of the Heb. חָלַף, "to follow after, to change places, pass away." Accordingly, Fleischer understands by חֲלוֹף, the going away, the dying, viz. of parents, and translates: *eorum qui parentibus orbati sunt.* In another way Rashi reaches the same sense: orphans deprived of their helper. But the connection בני חלף requires that we make those who are intended themselves the subject of חלוף. Rightly Ewald, Bertheau, Kamphausen, compare Isa. ii. 18 (and Ps. xc. 5 f., this with questionable right), and understand by the sons of disappearance those whose inherited lot, whose proper fate, is to disappear, to die, to perish (Symmachus: *πάντων υἱῶν ἀποιχομένων*; Jerome: *omnium filiorum qui per-*

transeunt). It is not men in general as children of frailty that are meant (Kimchi, Meîri, Immanuel, Euchel, and others), after which the *Venet.* τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν (*i.e.* those who must exchange this life for another), but such as are on the brink of the abyss. שְׁפָט־צֶדֶק in בְּצֶדֶק is not equivalent to בְּצֶדֶק, but is the accus. of the object, as at Zech. viii. 16, decide justice, *i.e.* so that justice is the result of thy judicial act; cf. Knobel on Deut. i. 16. דִּין is imper., do right to the miserable and the poor; cf. Ps. liv. 3 with Jer. xxii. 16, v. 28. That is a king of a right sort, who directs his high function as a judge, so as to be an advocate [*procurator*] for the helpless of his people.

THIRD APPENDIX TO THE SECOND COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS.—XXXI. 10 ff.

The admonitions of a faithful mother are followed by words in praise of a virtuous wife; the poet praises them through all the *prædicamenta*, *i.e.* all the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet. The artificialness of the order, says Hitzig, proves that the section belongs to a proportionally late age. But if, as he himself allows, even a Davidic psalm, viz. Ps. ix.–x., is constructed acrostically, then from this, that there the acrostic design is not so purely carried out as it is here in this ode, no substantial proof can be drawn for the more recent origin of the latter. Yet we do not deny that it belongs to an earlier time than the earliest of the era of Hezekiah. If Hitzig carries it back to the times subsequent to Alexander on account of the *scriptio plena*, without distinctive accents, vers. 17, 25, it is, on the other hand, to be remarked that it has the *scriptio plena* in common with the "utterance from Massa," which he places forward in the times of Hezekiah, without being influenced to such clear vision by writings such as ימלוך, xxx. 22, אובד, xxxi. 6, רוזנים, xxxi. 4. Besides, the *plene* written עוֹז, ver. 25, is incorrect, and בְּעֹז, ver. 17, which has its parallel in עֹז־, Ps. lxxxiv. 6, is in its form altogether dependent on the *Munach*, which was added some thousand years after.

In the LXX. this section forms the concluding section of the Book of Proverbs. But it varies from the Heb. text in that the ם (*στόμα*) goes before the ע (*ἰσχύν*). The very same sequence of letters is found in the Heb. text of Ps. xxxiv. and Lam. ii. iii. and iv.

Stier has interpreted allegorically the matron here commended. He understands thereby the Holy Ghost in His regenerating and sanctifying influence, as the *Midrash* does the *Tôra;* Ambrosius, Augustine, and others, the Church; Immanuel, the soul in covenant with God, thirsting after the truth. As if it were not an invaluable part of Biblical moral instruction which is here presented to us! Such a woman's mirror is nowhere else found. The housewife is depicted here as she ought to be; the poet shows how she governs and increases the wealth of the house, and thereby also advances the position of her husband in the common estimation, and he refers all these, her virtues and her prudence, to the fear of God as their root (Von Hofmann's *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 2. 404 f.). One of the most beautiful expositions of this section is that of Luis de Leon, *La perfecta casada* (Salamanca, 1582), which has been revived in a very attractive way by Wilkens.[1]

A wife, such as she ought to be, is a rare treasure, a good excelling all earthly possession:

Ver. 10 א A virtuous woman, who findeth her!
She stands far above pearls in worth.

In the connection אֵשֶׁת חַיִל and the like, the idea of bodily vigour is spiritualized to that of capacity, ability, and is generalized; in *virtus* the corresponding transition from manliness, and in the originally Romanic "*Bravheit*," valour to ability, is completed; we have translated as at xii. 4, but also Luther, "a virtuous woman," is suitable, since *Tugend* (virtue) has with *Tüchtigkeit* [ability] the same root-word, and according to our linguistic [German] usage designates the property of moral goodness and propriety, while for those of former times, when they spoke of the *tugend* (*tugent*) of a woman, the word combined with it the idea of fine manners (cf. חֵן, xi. 16) and culture (cf. שֵׂכֶל טוֹב, xiii. 15). The question מִי יִמְצָא, *quis inveniat*, which,

[1] C. A. Wilkens' *Fray Luis de Leon.* A biography from the History of the Spanish Inquisition and Church of the 16th cent. (1866), pp. 322–327.

Eccles. vii. 24, proceeds from the supposition of the impossibility of finding, conveys here only the idea of the difficulty of finding. In ancient Jerusalem, when one was married, they were wont to ask: מוצא או מוצא, *i.e.* has he found? thus as is said at Prov. xviii. 22, or at Eccles. vii. 26. A virtuous woman [*braves Weib*] is not found by every one, she is found by comparatively few. In 10*b* there is given to the thought which underlies the question a synonymous expression. Ewald, Elster, and Zöckler incorrectly render the ו by "although" or "and yet." Fleischer rightly: the second clause, if not in form yet in sense, runs parallel to the first. מִכֹּר designates the price for which such a woman is sold, and thus is purchasable, not without reference to this, that in the Orient a wife is obtained by means of מֹהַר. מֶכֶר, synon. מְחִיר, for which a wife of the right kind is gained, is רָחוֹק, placed further, *i.e.* is more difficult to be obtained, than pearls (*vid.* regarding "pearls" at iii. 15), *i.e.* than the price for such precious things. The poet thereby means to say that such a wife is a more precious possession than all earthly things which are precious, and that he who finds such an one has to speak of his rare fortune. The reason for this is now given:

Ver. 11 ב The heart of her husband doth trust her,
And he shall not fail of gain.

If we interpret שָׁלָל, after Eccles. ix. 8, as subject, then we miss לוֹ; it will thus be object., and the husband subj. to לֹא יֶחְסַר: *nec lucro carebit*, as *e.g.* Fleischer translates it, with the remark that שָׁלָל denotes properly the spoil which one takes from an enemy, but then also, like the Arab. *ġanymat*, can mean profit and gain of all kinds (cf. Rödiger in Gesenius' *Thes.*). Thus also in our "*kriegen*" = to come into possession, the reference to war disappears. Hitzig understands by שלל, the continual prosperity of the man on account of his fortunate possession of such a wife; but in that case the poet should have said שִׂמְחַת שלל; for שלל is gain, not the feeling that is therewith connected. There is here meant the gain, profit, which the housewife is the means of bringing in (cf. Ps. lxviii. 13). The heart of her husband (בַּעֲלָהּ) can be at rest, it can rest on her whom it loves —he goes after his calling, perhaps a calling which, though weighty and honourable, brings in little or nothing; but the wife keeps the family possessions scrupulously together, and

increases them by her laborious and prudent management, so that there is not wanting to him gain, which he properly did not acquire, but which the confidence he is justified in reposing in his wife alone brings to him. She is to him a perpetual spring of nothing but good.

Ver. 12 ג She doeth good to him, and not evil,
All the days of her life;

or, as Luther translates:

"*Sie thut jm liebs vnd kein leids.*"
[She does him good, and no harm.]

She is far from ever doing him evil, she does him only good all her life long; her love is not dependent on freaks, it rests on deep moral grounds, and hence derives its power and purity, which remain ever the same. גָּמַל signifies to accomplish, to perform. To the not assimilated form גְּמָלַתְהוּ, cf. יְפָרַתְהוּ, 1*b*. The poet now describes how she disposes of things:

Ver. 13 ד She careth for wool and flax,
And worketh these with her hands' pleasure.

The verb דָּרַשׁ proceeds, as the Arab. shows,[1] from the primary meaning *terere;* but to translate with reference thereto: *tractat lanam et linum* (LXX., Schultens, Dathe, Rosenmüller, Fleischer), is inadmissible. The Heb. דרשׁ does not mean the external working at or manufacturing of a thing; but it means, even when it refers to this, the intention of the mind purposely directed thereto. Thus wool and flax come into view as the material of work which she cares to bring in; and וַתַּעַשׂ signifies the work itself, following the creation of the need of work. Hitzig translates the second line: she works at the business of her hands. Certainly בְּ after עָשָׂה may denote the sphere of activity, Ex. xxxi. 4; 1 Kings v. 30, etc.; but if חֵפֶץ had here the weakened signification business, πρᾶγμα,—which it gains in the same way as we say business, affair, of any object of care,—the scarcely established meaning presents itself, that she shows herself active in that which she has made the business of her hands. How much more beautiful, on the contrary, is the thought: she is active with her hands' pleasure! חֵפֶץ is, as Schultens rightly explains, *inclinatio flexa et propensa in aliquid*, and *pulchre manibus diligentissimis attribuitur lubentia cum ob-*

[1] The inquirer is there called (Arab.) *daras*, as *libros terens.*

lectatione et per oblectationem sese animans. עָשָׂה, without obj. accus., signifies often: to accomplish, *e.g.* Ps. xxii. 32; here it stands, in a sense, complete in itself, and without object. accus., as when it means "*handeln*" [*agere*], xiii. 16, and particularly to act in the service of God = to offer sacrifice, Ex. x. 25; it means here, and at Ruth ii. 19, Hag. ii. 4, to be active, as at Isa. xix. 15, to be effective; וַתַּעַשׂ is equivalent to ותעשׂ בַּמְּלַאכְתָּהּ or ותעשׂ מְלַאכְתָּהּ (cf. under x. 4). And pleasure and love for the work, חֵפֶץ, can be attributed to the hands with the same right as at Ps. lxxviii. 72, discretion. The disposition which animates a man, especially his inner relation to the work devolving upon him, communicates itself to his hands, which, according as he has joy or aversion in regard to his work, will be nimble or clumsy. The Syr. translates: "and her hands are active after the pleasure of her heart;" but בחפץ is not equivalent to בְּחֶפְצָהּ; also בְּחֶפֶץ, in the sense of *con amore* (Böttcher), is not used. The following proverb praises the extent of her housewifely transactions:

Ver. 14 ה She is like the ships of the merchant—
Bringeth her food from afar.

She is (LXX. ἐγένετο) like merchant ships (בָּאֳנִיּוֹת, indeterminate, and thus to be read *kŏŏnîjoth*), *i.e.* she has the art of such ships as sail away and bring wares from a distance, are equipped, sent out, and managed by an enterprising spirit; so the prudent, calculating look of the brave wife, directed towards the care and the advancement of her house, goes out beyond the nearest circle; she descries also distant opportunities of advantageous purchase and profitable exchange, and brings in from a distance what is necessary for the supply of her house, or, mediately, what yields this supply (מִמֶּרְחָק, Cod. *Jaman.* ממרחק, cf. under Isa. x. 6), for she finds that source of gain she has espied. With this diligence in her duties she is not a long sleeper, who is not awakened till the sun is up; but

Ver. 15 ו She riseth up while it is yet night,
And giveth food to her house,
And the fixed portion to her maidens.

The *fut. consec.* express, if not a logical sequence of connection, yet a close inner binding together of the separate features of the character here described. Early, ere the morning dawns,

such a housewife rises up, because she places care for her house above her own comfort; or rather, because this care is to her a satisfaction and a joy. Since now the poet means without doubt to say that she is up before the other inmates of the house, especially before the children, though not before the maids: we have not, in וַתִּתֵּן, to think that the inmates of the house, all in the morning night-watch, stand round about her, and that each receives from her a portion for the approaching day; but that she herself, early, whilst yet the most are asleep, gives out or prepares the necessary portions of food for the day (cf. וַיִּתֵּן, Isa. liii. 9). Regarding טֶרֶף, food, from טָרַף (to tear in pieces, viz. with the teeth), and regarding חֹק, a portion decreed, *vid.* at xxx. 8. It is true that חֹק also means the appointed labour (*pensum*), and thus the day's work (דְּבַר יוֹם); but the parallelism brings it nearer to explain after xxx. 8, as is done by Gesenius and Hitzig after Ex. v. 14. This industry,—a pattern for the whole house,—this punctuality in the management of household matters, secures to her success in the extension of her household wealth:

Ver. 16 † She seeketh a field and getteth possession of it;
Of the fruit of her hands she planteth a vineyard.

The field which she considereth, towards which her wish and her effort are directed, is perhaps not one beyond those which she already possesses, but one which has hitherto been wanting to her family; for the poet has, after ver. 23, an inhabitant of a town in his eye,—a woman whose husband is not a landlord, but has a business in the city. The perf. זָמְמָה precedes and gives circumstantiality to the chief *factum* expressed by וַתִּקָּחֵהוּ. Regarding זָמַם, *vid.* xxi. 27. "לָקַח is the general expression for purchasing, as נָתַן, 24*b*, for selling. Thus the Aram. and Arab. אַחַר, while, (Arab.) *akhadh w'ta*, Turk. *alisch werisch* (from *elmek*, to take, and *wirmek*, to give—viz. *sâtün*, in the way of selling; Lat. *venum*), post.-bibl. מְקַח וּמִמְכָּר or מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן, denotes giving and taking = business in general" (Fleischer). In 16*b* the *Chethîb* is, with Ewald and Bertheau, to be read נָטַע, and, with Hitzig, to be made dependent on ותקחה, as parallel obj.: "of her hands' fruit (she gaineth) a planting of vines." But a planting of vines would be expressed by מַטַּע כרם (Mic. i. 6); and the *Kerî* נְטָעָה is more acceptable. The perf., as a

fundamental verbal form, is here the expression of the abstract present: she plants a vineyard, for she purchases vines from the profit of her industry (Isa. vii. 23, cf. v. 2). The poet has this augmented household wealth in his eye, for he continues:

Ver. 17 ח She girdeth her loins with strength,
And moveth vigorously her arms.

Strength is as the girdle which she wraps around her body (Ps. xciii. 1). We write חָגְרָה בְעֹז; both words have *Munach*, and the ב of בעז is aspirated. Thus girded with strength, out of this fulness of strength she makes firm or steels her arms (cf. Ps. lxxxix. 22). The produce of the field and vineyard extend far beyond the necessity of her house; thus a great portion is brought to sale, and the gain thence arising stimulates the industry and the diligence of the unwearied woman.

Ver. 18 ט She perceiveth that her gain is good;
And her light goeth not out at night.

The perf. and fut. are related to each other as antecedent and consequent, so that 18*a* can also be rendered as an hypothetical antecedent. She comes to find (taste) how profitable her industry is by the experience resulting from the sale of its product: the corn, the grapes, and the wine are found to be good, and thus her gain (cf. iii. 14) is better, this opened new source of nourishment productive.

This spurs on her active industry to redoubled effort, and at times, when she is not fully occupied by the oversight of her fields and vineyard, she has another employment over which her light goes not out till far in the night. בַּלָּיְלָה is, as at Lam. ii. 19, a needless *Kerî* for the poetic בַּלַּיְל (Isa. xvi. 3). What other business it is to which she gives attention till in the night, is mentioned in the next verse.

Ver. 19 י She putteth her hand to the rock [*Spinnrocken*];
And her fingers lay hold on the spindle.

She applies herself to the work of spinning, and performs it with skill. The phrase שָׁלְחָה יָד בְּ (שָׁלַח, Job xxviii. 9) signifies to take up an object of work, and תָּמְכָה, with obj. accus. (cf. Amos i. 5), the handling of the instrument of work necessary thereto. כַּפַּיִם denotes the hands when the subject is skilful, successful work; we accordingly say יָגִיעַ כפים, not יגיע ידים; cf. vers. 13 and 16,

Ps. lxxviii. 72. What פֶּלֶךְ means is shown by the Arab. *falakat*, which, as distinguished from *mighzal*, *i.e.* *fuseau* (Lat. *fusus*), is explained by *bout arrondi et conique au bas du fuseau*, thus: the whorl, *i.e.* the ring or knob fastened on the spindle below, which gives it its necessary weight and regulates its movement, Lat. *verticellus*, post-bibl. פִּיקָה (which Bartenora glosses by the Ital. *fusajuolo*) or צְנוֹרָה, *e.g.* *Kelim* ix. 6, כוּשׁ שׁבלע את הצנורה, a spindle which holds the whorl hidden (*vid.* Aruch under כשׁ, iii.). But the word then also signifies *per synecdochen partis pro toto*, the spindle, *i.e.* the cylindrical wood on which the thread winds itself when spinning (cf. 2 Sam. iii. 29, where it means the staff on which the infirm leans); Homer gives to Helen and the goddesses golden spindles (*χρυσηλάκατοι*). Accordingly it is not probable that כִּישׁוֹר also denotes the whorl, as Kimchi explains the word: "כישור is that which one calls by the name *verteil*, viz. that which one fixes on the spindle (פלך) above to regulate the spinning (מטוה)," according to which the *Venet.* renders כישור by *σφόνδυλος*, whorl, and פלך by *ἄτρακτος*, spindle. The old interpreters have not recognised that כישור denotes a thing belonging to the spinning apparatus; the LXX., Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Syr., and Jerome see therein an ethical idea (from כָּשֵׁר, to be capable, able); but Luther, not misled thereby, translates with unusual excellence:

> She stretches her hand to the rock,
> And her fingers grasp the spindle.

He has in this no predecessors, except only the Targumists, whose כּוּנְשְׁרָא (*vid.* Levy) appears also to denote the spinning-rock. The Syriac and Talmudic כּוּשׁ, which is compared by Gesenius-Dietrich, is another word, and denotes, not the rock, but the spindle. Immanuel also, who explains פלך as the מעוּל, *i.e.* the spindle, understands (as perhaps also Parchon) by כישור the rock. And why should not the rock (*wocken* = distaff), *i.e.* the stock to which the tuft of flax, hemp, or wool is fixed for the purpose of being spun, Lat. *colus*, not be named כִּישׁוֹר, from כשׁר, to be upright as a stick, upright in height, or perhaps more correctly as מכשׁיר, *i.e.* as that which prepares or makes fit the flax for spinning? Also in צִינֹק, Jer. xxix. 26, there are united the meanings of the close and the confining dungeon, and שְׁלֹה = שִׁילֹן

signifies[1] the place which yields rest. The spinning-wheel is a German invention of the 16th century, but the rock standing on the ground, or held also in the hands, the spindle and the whorl, are more ancient.[2] With the spindle תמך stands in fit relation, for it is twirled between the fingers, as Catullus says of Fate:

Libratum tereti versabat pollice fusum.[3]

That which impels the housewife to this labour is not selfishness, not a narrow-hearted limitation of her care to the circle of what is her own, but love, which reaches out far beyond this circle:

Ver. 20 כ She holdeth out her hand to the unfortunate,
And stretcheth forth her hands to the needy.

With כִּפֶּיהָ, 19*b*, is connected the idea of artistic skilfulness; with כַּפָּהּ, here that of offering for counsel (*vid.* at Isa. ii. 6); with sympathy and readiness to help, she presents herself to those who are oppressed by the misfortunes of life as if for an alliance, as if saying: place confidence in me, I shall do whatever I can—there thou hast my hand! Hitzig erroneously thinks of the open hand with a gift lying in it: this ought to be named, for כף in itself is nothing else than the half-opened

[1] Otherwise, but improbably, Schultens: *colus a* כשׁר = *katr kathr*, *necti in orbem*, *circumnecti in globum*. In פֶּלֶךְ, whence פַּלָּךְ, he rightly finds the primary meaning of *circumvolutio sive gyratio*.

[2] A view of the ancient art of spinning is afforded by the figures of the 12th Dynasty (according to Lepsius, 2380–2167 B.C.) in the burial chamber of *Beni Hassan* (270 kilometres above Bulak, on the right bank of the Nile). M. J. Henry, in his work *L'Egypte Pharaonique* (Paris 1846), Bd. 2, p. 431, mentions that there are figures there which represent "*toutes les opérations de la fabrication des tissus depuis le filage jusqu au tissage.*" Then he continues: *Lex fuseaux dont se servent les fileuses sont exactement semblables aux nôtres, et on voit même ces fileuses imprimer le mouvement de rotation à ces fuseaux, en en froissant le bout inferieur entre leur main et leur cuisse.*

[3] In the "marriage of Peleus and Thetis," Catullus describes the work of the Fates: "Their hands are ceaselessly active at their never-ending work; while the left holds the rock, surrounded with a soft fleece, the right assiduously draws the thread and forms it with raised fingers; then it swiftly turns the spindle, with the thumb stretched down, and swings it away in whirling circles." Then follows the refrain of the song of the Fates:

Currite ducentes subtegmina, currite, fusi.

(After HERTZBERG'S *Translation*.)

hand. Also in 20*b* we are not to think of alms. Here Hitzig rightly: she stretches out to him both of her hands, that he might grasp them, both of them, or whichever he may. She does not throw to him merely a gift from a distance, but above all she gives to him to experience her warm sympathy (cf. Ezek. xvi. 49). Here, as at 19*a*, שִׁלְּחָה is punctuated (with *Dagesh*) as *Piel*. The punctuation supposes that the author both times not unintentionally made use of the intensive form. This one verse (20) is complete in itself as a description of character; and the author has done well in choosing such strong expressions, for, without this sympathy with misery and poverty, she, so good and trustworthy and industrious, might indeed be pleasing to her husband, but not to God. One could almost wish that greater expansion had been given to this one feature in the picture. But the poet goes on to describe her fruitful activity in the nearest sphere of her calling:

Ver. 21 ל She is not afraid of the snow for her house;
For her whole house is clothed in scarlet.

A fall of snow in the rainy season of winter is not rare in Palestine, the Hauran, and neighbouring countries, and is sometimes accompanied with freezing cold.[1] She sees approaching the cold time of the year without any fear for her house, even though the season bring intense cold; for her whole house, *i.e.* the whole of the members of her family, are לָבֻשׁ שָׁנִים. The connection is accusatival (*Venet.* *ἐνδεδυμένος ἐρυθρά*), as at 2 Sam. xv. 32; Ezek. ix. 2, 3. שָׁנִי, from שָׁנָה, to shine, glance clear, or high red, and is with or without תּוֹלַעַת the name of the colour of the *Kermes* worm, crimson or scarlet, perhaps to be distinguished from אַרְגָּמָן, the red-purple shell colour, and תְּכֵלֶת, the blue. שָׁנִים are clothing or material coloured with such שָׁנִי (bright red) (*vid.* at Isa. i. 18). The explanation of the word by *dibapha* is inadmissible, because the doubled colouring, wherever it is mentioned, always refers to the purple, particularly that of Tyre (*dibapha Tyria*), not to the scarlet.[2] But why does the poet name scarlet-coloured clothing? On

[1] *Vid.* regarding a fall of snow in Jerusalem, the journal *Saat auf Hoffnung Jahrg.* 3, Heft 3; and in the Hauran Comm. to Job xxxviii. 22.

[2] *Vid.* Blümner's *Die gewerbliche Thätigkeit der Völker des klassischen Alterthums* (1869), p. 21 f.

account of the contrast to the white snow, says Hitzig, he clothes the family in crimson. But this contrast would be a meaningless freak. Rather it is to be supposed that there is ascribed to the red material a power of retaining the heat, as there is to the white that of keeping off the heat; but evidences for this are wanting. Therefore Rosenmüller, Vaihinger, and Böttcher approve of the translation *duplicibus* (Jerome, Luther) [= with double clothing], because they read, with the LXX., שְׁנַיִם.[1] But, with right, the Syr., Targ. abide by זְהוֹרִיתָא, scarlet. The scarlet clothing is of wool, which as such preserves warmth, and, as high-coloured, appears at the same time dignified (2 Sam. i. 24). From the protecting, and at the same time ornamental clothing of the family, the poet proceeds to speak of the bed-places, and of the attire of the housewife:

Ver. 22 מ She prepareth for herself pillows;
Linen and purple is her raiment.

Regarding מַרְבַדִּים (with ב *raphatum*), *vid.* at vii. 16. Thus, pillows or mattresses (Aquila, Theodotion, περιστρώματα; Jerome, *stragulatam vestem;* Luther, *Decke* = coverlets) to make the bed soft and to adorn it (Kimchi: לְפוּת עַל הַמִּטּוֹת, according to which *Venet.* κόσμια); Symmachus designates it as ἀμφιτάπους, *i.e.* τάπητες (*tapetæ, tapetia*, carpets), which are hairy (shaggy) on both sides.[2] Only the LXX. makes out of it δισσὰς χλαίνας, lined overcoats, for it brings over שנים. By עָשְׂתָה־לָּהּ it is not meant that she prepares such pillows for her own bed, but that she herself (*i.e.* for the wants of her house) prepares them. But she also clothes herself in costly attire. שֵׁשׁ (an Egyptian word, not, as Heb., derived from שׁוּשׁ, cogn. יָשַׁשׁ, to be white) is the old name for linen, according to which the Aram. translates it by בוּץ, the Greek by βύσσος, *vid. Genesis*, pp. 470, 557, to which the remark is to be added, that

[1] The LXX. reads together שנים מרבדים, δισσὰς χλαίνας, and brings into vers. 21 (her husband remains without care for the members of the family if it does not snow χιονίζῃ, as it is to be read for χρονίζῃ) and 22 the husband, who appears to the translator too much kept in the background.

[2] *Vid.* Lumbroso, *Recherches sur l'Economie politique de l'Egypte sous les Lagides* (Turin, 1870), p. 111; *des tapis de laine de première qualité, pourpres, laineux des deux côtés* (ἀμφίταποι).

the linen [Byssus], according to a prevailing probability, was not a fine cotton cloth, but linen cloth. Luther translates שֵׁשׁ, here and elsewhere, by *weisse Seide* [white silk] (*σηρικόν*, *i.e.* from the land of the Σῆρες, Rev. xviii. 12); but the silk is first mentioned by Ezekiel under the name of מֶשִׁי; and the ancients call the country where silk-stuff (*bombycina*) was woven, uniformly Assyria. אַרְגָּמָן (Aram. אַרְגְּוָן, derived by Benfey, with great improbability, from the rare Sanscrit word *râga-vant*, red-coloured; much rather from רָגַם = רָקַם, as stuff of variegated colour) is red purple; the most valuable purple garments were brought from Tyre and Sidon.

Now, first, the description turns back to the husband, of the woman who is commended, mentioned in the introduction:

Ver. 23 נ Well known in the gates is her husband,
Where he sitteth among the elders of the land.

Such a wife is, according to xii. 4, עֲטֶרֶת בַּעְלָהּ,—she advances the estimation and the respect in which her husband is held. He has, in the gates where the affairs of the city are deliberated upon, a well-known, reputable name; for there he sits, along with the elders of the land, who are chosen into the council of the city as the chief place of the land, and has a weighty voice among them. The phrase wavers between נוֹדָע (LXX. *περίβλεπτος γίνεται*; *Venet.* *ἔλνωσται*) and נוֹדָע. The old Venetian edd. have in this place (like the Cod. *Jaman.*), and at Ps. ix. 17, נוֹדָע; on the contrary, Ps. lxxvi. 2, Eccles. vi. 10, נוֹדָע, and that is correct; for the Masora, at this place and at Ps. lxxvi. 2 (in the *Biblia rabb.*), is disfigured. The description, following the order of the letters, now directs attention to the profitable labour of the housewife:

Ver. 24 ס She prepareth body-linen and selleth it,
And girdles doth she give to the Phœnicians.

It is a question whether סָדִין signifies *σινδών*, cloth from *Sindhu*, the land of India (*vid.* at Isa. iii. 23); the Arab. *sadn* (*sadl*), to cause to hang down, to descend (for the purpose of covering or veiling), offers an appropriate verbal root. In the Talmud, סדין is the sleeping linen, the curtain, the embroidered cloth, but particularly a light smock-frock, as summer costume, which was worn on the bare body (cf. Mark xiv. 51 f.). Kimchi explains the word by night-shirt; the *Edictum Diocle-*

tiani, xviii. 16, names *σινδόνες κοιταρίαι*, as the *Papyrus Louvre*, *ὀθόνια ἐγκοιμήτρια*; and the connection in the Edict shows that linen attire (*ἐκ λίνου*) is meant, although—as with שֵׁשׁ, so also with סדין—with the ancients and the moderns, sometimes linen and sometimes cotton is spoken of without any distinction. Æthicus speaks of costly girdles, *Cosmogr.* 84, as fabricated at Jerusalem: *baltea regalia . . . ex Hierosolyma allata;* Jerusalem and Scythopolis were in later times the chief places in Palestine for the art of weaving. In Galilee also, where excellent flax grew, the art of weaving was carried on; and the *ὀθόναι*, which, according to Clemens Alex. *Pædag.* ii. 10, p. 239, were exported *ἐκ γῆς Ἑβραίων*, are at least in their material certainly synon. with *σινδόνες*. Regarding נָתַן, syn. מָכַר, opp. לָקַח, syn. נָשָׂא = קָנָה, *vid.* at 16*a*. There is no reason to interpret כְּנַעֲנִי here, with the obliteration of the ethnographical meaning, in the general sense of סֹחֵר, trader, merchant; for purple, 22*b*, is a Phœnician manufacture, and thus, as an article of exchange, can be transferred to the possession of the industrious wife. The description is now more inward:

Ver. 25 ע Strength and honour is her clothing;
Thus she laugheth at the future day.

She is clothed with עֹז, strength, *i.e.* power over the changes of temporal circumstances, which easily shatter and bring to ruin a household resting on less solid foundations; clothed with הָדָר, glory, *i.e.* elevation above that which is low, little, common, a state in which they remain who propose to themselves no high aim after which they strive with all their might: in other words, her raiment is just pride, true dignity, with which she looks confidently into the future, and is armed against all sorrow and care. The connection of ideas, עֹז והדר (defectively written, on the contrary, at Ps. lxxxiv. 6, Masora, and only there written *plene*, and with *Munach*), instead of the frequent הוד והדר, occurs only here. The expression 25*b* is like Job xxxix. 7, wherefore Hitzig rightly compares Job xxiv. 14 to 25*a*. יוֹם אַחֲרוֹן, distinguished from אַחֲרִית, and incorrectly interpreted (Rashi) of the day of death, is, as at Isa. xxx. 8, the future, here that which one at a later period may enter upon.

The next verse presents one of the most beautiful features in the portrait:

Ver. 26 פ She openeth her mouth with wisdom,
And amiable instruction is on her tongue.

The ב of בְּחָכְמָה is, as also at Ps. xlix. 5, lxxviii. 2, that of means: when she speaks, then it is wisdom pressing itself from her heart outward, by means of which she breaks the silence of her mouth. With עַל, in the expression 26*b*, elsewhere תַּחַת interchanges: under the tongue, Ps. x. 7, one has that which is ready to be spoken out, and on the tongue, Ps. xv. 3, that which is in the act of being spoken out. תּוֹרַת־חֶסֶד is a genitive connection after the manner of *tôrath* אֱמֶת, Mal. ii. 6. The gen. is not, as at Lev. vi. 2, in *tôrath* הָעֹלָה, the gen. of the object (thus *e.g.* Fleischer's *institutio ad humanitatem*), but the gen. of property, but not so that חסד denotes grace (Symmachus, *νόμος ἐπίχαρις*; Theodotion, *νόμος χάριτος*), because for this meaning there is no example except Isa. xl. 6; and since חֶסֶד in the O. T. is the very same as in the N. T., love, which is the fulfilling of the law, Hos. vi. 6, cf. 1 Kings xx. 31,[1] it is supposed that the poet, since he writes תורת חֶסֶד, and not תורת חֵן, means to designate by חֶסֶד this property without which her love for her husband, her industry, her high sentiment, would be no virtues, viz. unselfish, sympathizing, gentle love. Instruction which bears on itself the stamp of such amiability, and is also gracious, *i.e.* awakening love, because going forth from love (according to which Luther, translating *holdselige Lere* = pleasing instructions, thus understands it)—such instruction she carries, as house-mother (i. 8), in her mouth. Accordingly the LXX. translate (*vid.* Lagarde regarding the mistakes of this text before us) *θεσμοὶ ἐλεημοσύνης*, and Jerome *lex clementiæ*. חֶסֶד is related to אַהֲבָה as grace to love; it denotes love showing itself in kindness and gracefulness, particularly condescending love, proceeding from a compassionate sympathy with the sufferings and wants of men. Such graceful instruction she communicates

[1] Immanuel remarks that *Tôrath* חסד probably refers to the *Tôra*, and שכולה חסד, *i.e.* which is wholly love, which goes forth in love, to the *Gesetz* = statute.

now to this and now to that member of her household, for nothing that goes on in her house escapes her observation.

Ver. 27 צ She looketh well to the ways of her house,
And eateth not the bread of idleness.

Although there exists an inner relation between 27*a* and ver. 26, yet 27*a* is scarcely to be thought of (Hitzig) as appos. to the suffix in לְשׁוֹנָהּ. Participles with or without determination occur in descriptions frequently as predicates of the subject standing in the discourse of the same force as abstr. present declarations, *e.g.* Isa. xl. 22 f., Ps. civ. 13 f. צוֹפִיָּה is connected with the accus. of the object of the intended warning, like xv. 3, and is compared according to the form with הֹמִיָּה, vii. 11. הֲלִיכָה signifies elsewhere things necessary for a journey, Job vi. 19, and in the *plur. magnificus* it denotes show (*pompa*), Hab. iii. 6: but originally the walk, conduct, Nah. ii. 6; and here in the plur. walks = comings and goings, but not these separately, but in general, the *modi procedendi* (LXX. *διατριβαι*). The *Chethîb* has הילכות, probably an error in writing, but possibly also the plur. of הֲלָכָה, thus found in the post.-bibl. Heb. (after the form צְדָקוֹת), custom, viz. appointed traditional law, but also like the Aram. הֲלָכָא (*emph.* הֲלָכְתָא), usage, manner, common practice. Hitzig estimates this *Chethîb*, understood Talmudically, as removing the section into a late period; but this Talmudical signification is not at all appropriate (Hitzig translates, with an incorrect rendering of צופיה, "for she sees after the ordering of the house"), and besides the Aram. הֲלָכָא, *e.g.* Targ. Prov. xvi. 9, in the first line, signifies only the walk or the manner and way of going, and this gives with the *Kerî* essentially the same signification. Luther well: *Sie schawet wie es in jrem Hause zugeht* [= she looks how it goes in her house]. Her eyes are turned everywhere; she is at one time here, at another there, to look after all with her own eyes; she does not suffer the day's work, according to the instructions given, to be left undone, while she folds her own hands on her bosom; but she works, keeping an oversight on all sides, and does not eat the bread of idleness (עַצְלָה = עַצְלוּת, xix. 15), but bread well deserved, for *εἴ τις οὐ θέλει ἐργάζεσθαι, μηδὲ ἐσθιέτω*, 2 Thess. iii. 10.

Now begins the finale of this song in praise of the virtuous woman:

Ver. 28 ק Her sons rise up and bless her,
Her husband (riseth up) and praiseth her.

The *Piel* אִשֵּׁר in such a connection is denom. of אֹשֶׁר (אַשְׁרֵי). Her children rise up (קוּם, like *e.g.* Jer. xxvi. 17, but here, perhaps, with the associated idea of reverential honour) and bless her, that she has on her part brought the house and them to such prosperity, such a position of respect, and to a state where love (חסד) reigns, and her husband rises up and sings her praise.

Ver. 29 ר "Many are the daughters who have done bravely,
But thou hast surpassed them all together."

We have already often remarked, last time under xxix. 6, that רַב, not indeed in its sing., but in its plur. רַבִּים and רַבּוֹת, can precede, after the manner of a numeral, as attribute; but this syntactical licence, xxviii. 12, by no means appears, and needs to be assumed as little here as at viii. 26, although there is no reason that can be adduced against it. עָשָׂה חַיִל signifies here not the gaining of riches (the LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther, Gesenius, Böttcher, and others), which here, where the encomium comes to its height, would give to it a mercenary mammon-worship note—it indeed has this signification only when connected with ל of the person: *Sibi opes acquirere*, Deut. vi. 17; Ezek. xxviii. 4—but: bravery, energy, and, as the reference to אֵשֶׁת חַיִל demands, moral activity, capacity for activity, in accordance with one's calling, *ποιεῖν ἀρετήν*, by which the *Venet.* translates it. בָּנוֹת is, as in the primary passages, Gen. xxx. 13, Song vi. 9, a more delicate, finer name of women than נָשִׁים: many daughters there have always been who have unfolded ability, but thou my spouse hast raised thyself above them all, *i.e.* thou art excellent and incomparable. Instead of עָלִית, there is to be written, after Chajug, Aben Ezra (*Zachoth* 7*a*), and Jekuthiel under Gen. xvi. 11, עָלִיתְ; the Spanish *Nakdanim* thus distinguish the forms מָצָאתְ, thou hast found, and מָצְאַת, she has found. כָּלָּה, for כָּלֶן, Gen. xlii. 36. What now follows is not a continuation of the husband's words of praise (Ewald, Elster, Löwenstein), but an *epiphonema auctoris*

(Schultens); the poet confirms the praise of the husband by referring it to the general ground of its reason:

Ver. 30 שׁ Grace is deceit; and beauty, vanity—
A wife that feareth Jahve, she shall be praised.

Grace is deceit, because he who estimates the works of a wife merely by the loveliness of her external appearance, is deceived by it; and beauty is vanity, *vanitas*, because it is nothing that remains, nothing that is real, but is subject to the law of all material things—transitoriness. The true value of a wife is measured only by that which is enduring, according to the moral background of its external appearance; according to the piety which makes itself manifest when the beauty of bodily form has faded away, in a beauty which is attractive.[1] יִרְאַת (with *Makkeph* following)[2] is here the connective form of יִרְאָה (fem. of יְרֵא). The *Hithpa.* תִּתְהַלָּל is here manifestly (xxvii. 2) not reflexive, but representative of the passive (cf. xii. 8, and the frequently occurring מְהֻלָּל, *laudatus* = *laudandus*), nowhere occurring except in the passage before us. In itself the fut. may also mean: she will be praised = is worthy of praise, but the jussive rendering (Luther: Let her be praised) is recommended by the verse which follows:

Ver. 31 ת Give to her of the fruit of her hands;
And let her works praise her in the gates!

The fruit of her hands is the good which, by her conduct, she has brought to maturity,—the blessing which she has secured for others, but, according to the promise (Isa. iii. 10), has also secured for her own enjoyment. The first line proceeds on the idea that, on account of this blessing, she herself shall rejoice. תְּנוּ־לָהּ (with *Gaja*, after *Metheg-Setzung*, § 37) is not equivalent to give to her honour because of . . .; for in that case, instead of the ambiguous מִן, another preposition—such *e.g.* as עַל—would have been used; and so תְּנוּ, of itself, cannot be equi-

[1] *Vid.* the application of ver. 30 in *Taanith* 26*b*: "Young man," say the maidens, "lift up thine eyes and behold that which thou choosest for thyself! Direct thine eyes not to beauty (נוי), direct thine eyes to the family (מִשְׁפָּחָה); pleasantness is a deception, etc."

[2] The writing יִרְאַת־ is that of Ben Asher, יִרְאַת that of Ben Naphtali; Norzi, from a misunderstanding, claims יִרְאַת־ (with *Gaja*) as Ben Asher's manner of writing.

valent to תְּנוּ (sing the praise of), as Ziegler would read, after Judg. xi. 40. It must stand with כבוד, or instead of מִפְּרִי an accus. obj. is to be thought of, as at Ps. lxviii. 35, Deut. xxxii. 3, which the necessity of the case brings with it,—the giving, as a return in the echo of the song of praise. Immanuel is right in explaining תנו־לה by תגמלו לה חסד or עשו עתה חסד וכבוד, cf. Ps. xxviii. 4. The מִן, as is not otherwise to be expected, after תנו is partitive: give to her something of the fruit of her hands, *i.e.* recompense it to her, render it thankfully, by which not exclusively a requital in the form of honourable recognition, but yet this specially, is to be thought of. Her best praise is her works themselves. In the gates, *i.e.* in the place where the representatives of the people come together, and where the people are assembled, her works praise her; and the poet desires that this may be right worthily done, full of certainty that she merits it, and that they honour themselves who seek to praise the works of such a woman, which carry in themselves their own commendation.

NOTE.

The Proverbs peculiar to the Alexandrine Translation.

In the LXX. there are not a few proverbs which are not found in the Heb. text, or, as we may express it, are peculiar to the Egyptian Text Recension, as distinguished from the Palestinean. The number is not so great as they appear to be on a superficial examination; for many of these apparently independent proverbs are duplicate translations. In many places there follows the Greek translation of the Heb. proverbs another translation, *e.g.* at i. 14, 27, ii. 2, iii. 15, iv. 10, vi. 25*b*, x. 5, xi. 16, xiv. 22, xv. 6, xvi. 26, xxiii. 31, xxix. 7*b*, 25, xxxi. 29*a*. These duplicate translations are found sometimes at different places, *e.g.* xvii. 20*b* is duplicate to xvii. 16*d*; xix. 15 is duplicate to xviii. 8; xxii. 9*cd* = xix. 6*b*, i. 19*b*; xxix. 17 is duplicate to xxviii. 17*cd*; or, according to the enumeration of the verses as it lies before us, not within the compass of one verse to which they belong: xxii. 8, 9 is a duplicate transla-

tion of ver. 8*b* and 9*a* of the Heb. text; xxiv. 23, xxx. 1, a duplicate translation of xxx. 1; and xxxi. 26, 27*b*, of xxxi. 26 of the Heb. text.[1] Everywhere, here, along with the translated proverb of our Heb. text, there is not an independent one. Also one has to be on his guard against seeing independent proverbs where the translator, only, at his own will, modified one of the Heb. proverbs lying before us, as *e.g.* at x. 10, xiii. 23, xix. 7, as he here and there lets his Alexandrine exegesis influence him, ii. 16 f., v. 5, ix. 6, and adds explanatory clauses, ii. 19, iii. 18, v. 3, ix. 12; seldom fortunate in this, oftener, as at i. 18, 22, 28, ix. 12, xxviii. 10, showing by these interpolations his want of knowledge. There are also, in the translation, here and there passages introduced from some other part of Scripture, *e.g.*: i. 7*ab* = Ps. cxi. 10, LXX.; iii. 22*cd* = iii. 8; iii. 28*c* = xxvii. 1*b*, xiii. 5*c*, from Ps. cxii. 5, cf. xxxvii. 21; xvi. 1 (ὅσῳ μέγας κ.τ.λ.) = Sir. iii. 18; xxvi. 11*cd* = Sir. iv. 21. A free reminiscence, such as xvi. 17, may speak a certain independence, but not those borrowed passages.

Keeping out of view all this only apparent independence, we place together the independent proverbs contained in the LXX., and, along with them, we present a translation of them into Heb. Such a translation has already been partly attempted by Ewald, Hitzig, and Lagarde; perhaps we have been here and there more fortunate in our rendering. It is certainly doubtful whether the translator found all these proverbs existing in Heb. Many of them appear to be originally Greek. But the rendering of them into Hebrew is by no means useless. It is of essential importance in forming a judgment regarding the original language.[2]

[1] One must suppose that here translations of other Greeks, which were placed alongside of the LXX. in Origen's *Hexapla*, were taken up into the LXX. But this is not confirmed: these duplicates were component parts of the LXX., which Origen and the Syriac translators found already existing.

[2] These the translator has not printed, because, however interesting it may be to the student of the Hebrew language as such, to compare Delitzsch's renderings into Hebrew with the Greek original, as placed before him, they may be here omitted, inasmuch as all that is of importance on the subject, in an exegetical point of view, has been already embodied in the Commentary.]

There are a few grains of wheat, and, on the other hand, much chaff, in these proverbs that are peculiar to the LXX. They are not, in the most remote way, fit to supply the place of the many proverbs of our Heb. text which are wanting in the LXX. One must also here be cautious in examining them. Thus, *e.g.*, xvii. 19 stands as a proverb of only one line; the second forms a part of ver. 16. As true defects, we have noticed the following proverbs and parts of proverbs: i. 16, vii. 25*b*, viii. 32*b*, 33, xi. 3*b*, 4, 10*b*, xviii. 8, 23, 24, xix. 1, 2, 15, xxi. 5, xxii. 6, xxiii. 23, xxv. 20*a*. All these proverbs and parts of proverbs of the Heb. text are wanting in the LXX.

It is difficult to solve the mystery of this Alexandrine translation, and to keep separate from each other the Text Recension which the translator had before him, the transformations and corrections which, of his own authority, he made on the corruptions which the text of the translation, as it came from the first translator and the later revisers of it, has suffered in the course of time. They appear in Egypt to have been as arbitrary as incompetent in handling the sacred Scriptures. The separating from each other of the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel, xxx.–xxxi. 9, has its side-piece in the separation of Jeremiah's proœmiums of the prophecies concerning the people, Jer. xxv.

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THE END.

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